The petitioner, along with three other transgender individuals, were charged for violating section 153(1) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act: “cross-dressing in public for an ‘improper purpose.’” The petitioner brought action, alleging that section 153(1)(xlvii) was too vague to be enforceable. The petitioners argued that a prohibition on cross-dressing criminalizes gender expression and identity, in violation of Article 149D of the Constitution.

In the case People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875 (1992), two women were arrested under NYS Penal Law § 245.01 for publicly exposing the portion of their breasts “below the top of the areola” in a Rochester, New York public park.

In Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases North General Hospital, 81 N.Y.2d 211 (1993), pregnant women who were denied admission to an inpatient detoxification program challenged the hospital’s categorical exclusion as sex discrimination under New York State's  Human Rights Law. The hospital defended its policy on safety grounds, asserting that it lacked obstetrical services and could not treat any pregnant patient.

In Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510 (2006), a group of religiously affiliated organizations challenged a New York statute that required health insurance plans covering prescription drugs to include contraceptive coverage under the Women’s Health and Wellness Act (NY Insurance Law § 3221(16) and § 4303(cc)).

In United States v. One Package of Japanese Pessaries, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936), the United States government seized a shipment of contraceptive devices mailed from Japan to a licensed New York physician, arguing that their import violated section 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, which at the time prohibited the import of contraceptives. The doctor maintained that the contraceptive devices were intended for patients whose health could be endangered by pregnancy.

In S.B. v. A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1 (2016), a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship sought custody and visitation after their relationship had ended. Under previous precedent (Alison D. v. Virginia M. (77 NY2d 651 [1991])) only biological or adoptive parents were recognized.

In the case Hernandez v. Robles (2006), 44 same-sex couples challenged New York State’s Domestic Relations Law after being denied marriage licenses. Lower courts upheld the statute, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the legislature could restrict civil marriage to opposite-sex couples. The Court concluded that the statute did not violate state or federal equal protection under the standards applied.

The Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVJSA) allows New York courts to impose reduced or alternative sentences and to resentence incarcerated individuals, when documented domestic abuse significantly contributed to the offense and a standard sentence would be unduly harsh. Penal Law § 70.45 provides the determinate-sentencing framework that courts may depart from under the Act. Penal Law § 60.1

In the case People v. Alonzo, the defendant was charged with several counts of sexual abuse based on multiple groping acts committed against two women during a single, brief encounter. The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether each individual touch could be prosecuted as a separate offense or whether the conduct amounted to one continuous act per victim.

In Breest v. Haggis (1st Dep’t 2019), the plaintiff brought civil claims under the New York City Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act (VGMVPA), asserting that a well-known filmmaker sexually assaulted her and that the assault constituted “a crime of violence motivated by gender.” The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint did not adequately allege that gender bias was a motivating factor.