New Jersey Revised Statutes § 52:18A-49.1 directs the Department of the Treasury to create and administer a certification process for LGBTQ+ owned businesses in accordance with Executive Order No. 295 (2022).
New Jersey Revised Statutes § 52:4B-51 requires the Attorney General, through the Department of Law and Public Safety, to establish and oversee a statewide Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) program. The statute defines a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner as a registered nurse with specialized forensic and medical training to provide trauma-informed care to sexual assault victims and to collect and preserve evidence for criminal investigation and prosecution.
New Jersey Revised Statutes §§ 37:1-1.1 and 37:1-6 define the state’s legal parameters for marriage, reflecting both equality in access and the protection of minors. Section 37:1-1.1 affirms that marriage in New Jersey is a civil contract between two consenting adults, regardless of their gender identity, and it codifies the constitutional recognition of marriage equality established through
Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution states:
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows.”
Can a government contractor immediately appeal a denied claim for “derivative sovereign immunity” under the collateral-order doctrine?
Menocal and other detainees (“Menocal”) filed a class action against GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”), alleging forced labor and unjust enrichment. GEO argues it is shielded from suit because, under the Yearsley doctrine, a contractor has immunity for actions performed at the government’s direction. GEO further contends that the lower courts’ denials of these claims are immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. Menocal asserts that the Yearsley doctrine does not provide immunity from suit, only a defense, and that the lower court’s denial is not immediately appealable. The outcome of this case implicates the right to bring a suit against government contractors and will impact public welfare.
Whether an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”) operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (“AIPC”) under a contract with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal, et. al. at 3. Alejandro Menocal was a detainee at AIPC in Aurora, Colorado, from June 2014 to September 2014.
Can a district court consider sentencing disparities created by the First Step Act when deciding whether compassionate release is warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons?”
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the compassionate release provision of the Sentencing Reform Act allows courts to consider disparities created by the First Step Act’s prospective reduction in mandatory minimum sentences. Petitioner Daniel Rutherford argues that the phrase “extraordinary and compelling” invites a totality of the circumstances analysis utilizing any relevant facts, including sentencing length and changes in law. Respondent United States counters that change in law disparities are not “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under the plain meaning of the statute. The outcome of this case will impact the separation of powers between branches of government as well as the mechanisms for remedying sentence disparities.
Whether a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act’s prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
As part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), Congress enacted a “compassionate release” provision that allows district courts to reduce prison sentences.
Are monetary damages permissible against a government official for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) by a government official allows for an individual to seek monetary damages against that official in their individual capacity. Landor contends that RLUIPA should be interpreted identically to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which allows for individual-capacity monetary damages against a government official. Landor also argues that the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution permits RLUIPA to allow for these damages. The Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety argues that RLUIPA is distinct from RFRA precisely because the Spending Clause of the Constitution precludes individual liability of state officials, so RFRA and RLUIPA should not be interpreted identically. This case directly impacts freedom of religion rights in prisons, specifically for religious minorities, and the deterrence of future violations of those rights.
Are monetary damages permissible against a government official for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000?
Incarcerated in 2020 for approximately six months, Damon Landor was held in three different correctional facilities in Louisiana. Landor v.
Can federal judges consider reasons that support vacating a conviction when deciding whether to reduce a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons?”
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether federal judges may reduce a prisoner’s sentence under the compassionate release statute for reasons that may also fall under a post-conviction motion challenging the legality of a sentence. Joe Fernandez, convicted and sentenced to life on October 7, 2014, for participating in a double murder-for-hire conspiracy, sought a sentence reduction after the trial judge expressed doubts regarding the credibility of the government’s witness and the fairness of the verdict based on extraordinary and compelling reasons. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that prisoners must bring arguments regarding innocence or sentencing errors through the habeas process, not via compassionate release. Fernandez argues that Congress designed the compassionate release statute to afford courts broad discretion to reduce sentences in exceptional circumstances. The United States government, meanwhile, argues that the compassionate release statute is limited to four specific categories of circumstances: age, illness, family hardship, or other circumstances the Bureau of Prisons finds compelling. The outcome of this case will have a major impact on how much discretion federal judges have in revisiting sentences they believe are unjust, thereby clarifying the balance between mercy and finality for criminal defendants.
Whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Prisoners seeking release on the grounds that their sentence was in violation of the law can move to make such a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
The Hatch Act, enacted in 1939 and most recently amended in 2012, is a federal statute that restricts the political activities of federal civilian executive b
New Jersey Revised Statutes § 18A:36-41 requires the New Jersey Commissioner of Education to issue statewide guidance to local school districts to ensure a safe and nondiscriminatory educational environment for transgender and gender-nonconforming students. The law directs schools to adopt policies that respect student privacy, maintain confidentiality of records, and use student-asserted names and pronouns.
