Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.

Issues

Does section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act provide a private right of action for Medicaid providers against states under the Supremacy Clause, even when Congress has not explicitly created the right? 

The Supreme Court will consider whether individual Medicaid providers have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act (“§ (30)(A)”), which requires state Medicaid agencies to take provider costs into account when setting reimbursement rates, when Congress has not explicitly granted a private right of action. Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare, argues that individuals do not have a private right of action under § (30)(A) or the Supremacy Clause because a private remedy cannot exist without congressional intent and private litigants should not play a role in determining whether a state gets federal funding. According to Exceptional Child Center, however, when a state law conflicts with federal law, individuals have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause to bring an injunction and prevent harm that would result from the conflicting state statute. The Court’s ruling will impact the right of individuals to recover under the Supremacy Clause as well as the administration of Medicaid and other statutory schemes that provide funding to states as long as they comply with federal law. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Supremacy Clause give Medicaid providers a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) against a state where Congress did not expressly create enforceable rights under that statute?

Exceptional Child Center, Inc., and four other companies (collectively, “ECC”) offer in-home healthcare and other services for those who are Medicaid-eligible in Idaho. See Inclusion, Inc. v. Armstrong, 835 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (D.

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Additional Resources

•    Robert Pear: As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, The New York Times (Dec. 27, 2014). 

•    Peyton M. Sturges: High Court to Review Medicaid Dispute, Providers' Rights to Force Higher Payments, Bloomberg BNA's Health Law Reporter (Oct. 9, 2014). 

•    Steve Vladeck: Enforcing Medicaid Against Recalcitrant States: The Former HHS Officials' Amicus Brief in Armstrong, PrawfsBlawg (Dec. 23, 2014). ​

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Mach Mining v. EEOC

The Supreme Court will determine the extent to which courts can review efforts by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to informally mediate discrimination claims before filing a lawsuit. Mach Mining, LLC argues that judicial review of the EEOC’s pre-suit conciliation efforts is permissible pursuant to the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Contrarily, the EEOC asserts that Congress did not intend for judicial review of the EEOC’s pre-suit conciliation efforts. The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve a circuit split regarding judicial review of the EEOC’s pre-conciliation efforts. Further, the Supreme Court will clarify the boundaries of the EEOC’s responsibilities in the conciliation process. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court can impose the mandatory requirement of conciliation on the EEOC before the organization to file a civil discrimination suit?

In 2008, a woman filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See EEOC v. Mach Mining Inc., 738 F.3d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 2013). The woman alleged that Mach Mining, LLC (“MM”) denied her a job because of her sex.

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Wellness International Network v. Sharif

Issues

1.    Do bankruptcy courts have constitutional authority to make a final judgment on state law claims?

2.    May a bankruptcy court resolve claims otherwise outside its jurisdiction so long as the litigants consent expressly or impliedly?

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the constitutionality of the allocation of power between federal district courts and bankruptcy courts, as well as an opportunity to clarify the role of the Stern v. Sullivan decision in this power struggle. The parties first dispute the extent of a bankruptcy court’s authority to decide a state law issue, namely one based on an alter ego theory. On the one hand, Wellness contends that an alter ego claim should not be distinguished from the necessary process in any bankruptcy filing of determining which of the debtor’s assets are available to the creditor. Sharif disagrees and believes that adjudicating an alter ego claim is a common law claim, i.e., not a core bankruptcy proceeding, and therefore is exclusively within the jurisdiction of an Article III court. The parties also dispute whether, notwithstanding the outcome of the preceding issue, a party can consent to the bankruptcy court adjudicating an alter ego claim. Wellness believes the right to Article III adjudication here protects personal interests and is therefore subject to waiver by litigants. By contrast, Sharif characterizes this as a separation of powers (i.e., structural) issue that may not be waived. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the presence of a subsidiary state property law issue in a 11 U.S.C. § 541 action brought against a debtor to determine whether property in the debtor's possession is property of the bankruptcy estate means that such action does not “stem[] from the bankruptcy itself” and therefore, that a bankruptcy court does not have the constitutional authority to enter a final order deciding that action.

2. Whether Article III permits the bankruptcy courts to exercise the judicial power of the United States over claims against a debtor where the debtor has consented to the exercise of such judicial power by voluntarily filing for bankruptcy relief.

In addition, this case also presents the two questions currently before the Court in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013) (No. 12-1200). Because of the procedural posture of Executive Benefits-there the district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's summary judgment order de novo-it is possible that the Court may conclude that no constitutional violation occurred and thus, not reach the issues on which certiorari was granted. In such event, this case presents the opportunity to address those questions, about which there is also a split among the circuits:

3. Whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by the bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and if so, whether implied consent based on a litigant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy Article III.

4. Whether bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court in a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).

The facts of this case stem from a “decade-long saga” involving Richard Sharif, the debtor, and Wellness International Network, Ltd., (“Wellness”), the creditor. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013).

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Additional Resources

•    Supreme Court to Reconsider Authority of Bankruptcy Judges, The Knowledge Effect (July 22, 2014).

•    Jeff Elkin: Wellness International Network v. Sharif: A Return to a Formalist Reading of Article III?, The Legislation & Policy Blog (Oct. 29, 2014).

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Reed v. Town of Gilbert

Issues

Does a town’s sign ordinance that assigns different size and posting requirements based on the type of noncommercial speech displayed violate the First Amendment?  

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit split regarding the constitutionality of sign ordinances that treat signs differently depending on the type of noncommercial speech displayed. The Town of Gilbert’s Sign Code stipulated size requirements and posting times that differed depending on if the signs were classified as political, ideological, or “temporary directional signs” for religious or non-profit events. The latter category’s size and timing requirements were more restrictive than those for political or ideological signs. Good News Community Church and its pastor, Clyde Reed, argue that Gilbert’s sign code violates the First Amendment. Conversely, Gilbert contends that the Sign Code does not violate the Constitution since it does not favor certain viewpoints or ideas over others and serves an important government interest in regulating safety and aesthetics. The Court’s ruling could have important consequences for free speech as well as for local governments’ ability to manage community safety and aesthetics.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Gilbert’s mere assertion of a lack of discriminatory motive render its facially content-based sign code content-neutral and justify the code’s differential treatment of Petitioners’ religious signs?

Respondent Town of Gilbert’s (“Gilbert”) sign ordinance (“Sign Code”) requires that individuals obtain a permit to post signs within the city limits. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir.

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Oneok v. Learjet

Issues

Does the Natural Gas Act, which regulates wholesale prices of natural gas, preempt state antitrust liability when accusations concern not wholesale, but retail prices?

The Supreme Court will decide whether the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) preempts state laws that regulate the retail of natural gas. Oneok and other sellers of natural gas argue that the NGA preempts the claims that these sellers of natural gas violated antitrust laws by illegally manipulating the retail price of natural gas and engaging in wash sales. Learjet, however, contends that while wholesale rates are regulated by the NGA, the NGA does not preempt state law that regulates retail rates. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case could impact federalism concerns as well as the future of the natural gas market. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Natural Gas Act preempt state-law claims challenging industry practices that directly affect the wholesale natural gas market when those claims are asserted by litigants who purchased gas in retail transactions?

Starting in 2005, Respondents Learjet, Inc. and other retail gas purchasers (collectively, “Learjet”), filed claims in both federal and state court alleging that Petitioners Oneok, Inc. and other natural gas traders (collectively, “Oneok”), skewed the market for natural gas and inflated gas prices by “engaging in wash

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Mellouli v. Holder

Issues

The Supreme Court will determine when a state drug-paraphernalia conviction sufficiently “relates to” a substance listed under the Controlled Substances Act to justify removing a permanent U.S. resident under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Moones Mellouli argues that, even though Adderall is a federally-controlled substance, his deportation was impermissible because his state conviction record did not identify the substance found in his drug paraphernalia and thus did not relate to a federally-controlled substance. United States Attorney General Holder contrastingly argues that deportation is permissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act because a state drug-paraphernalia conviction itself sufficiently relates to a federally controlled substance. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact immigration and safety in the United States. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

To trigger deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), must the government prove the connection between a drug paraphernalia conviction and a substance listed in section 802 of the Controlled Substances Act?

The United States Attorney General, Eric Holder, is responsible for adding substances to and maintaining the Federal Controlled Substance Schedule. See Brief for Respondent, Eric Holder, at 2–3. Holder and the Department of Justice are also responsible for federal regulation of controlled substances in the United States. See id.

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Kellogg Brown & Root v. United States ex rel. Carter

Issues

1) Does the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act—which tolls the statute of limitations for an offense that involves fraud against the United States during wartime—apply to civil fraud claims and require a formal declaration of war?

2) Once a party files a suit, does the False Claim Act bar all subsequent suits based on similar facts indefinitely or only while the initial suit is pending before a court?

Benjamin Carter brought an action under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), alleging that Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) had misrepresented water purification work and falsified time sheets in order to overbill the United States government. In this case, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (“WSLA”) applies to civil suits brought under the FCA and whether the FCA bars all subsequent suits after a party files a suit based on the same underlying facts. KBR contends that the WSLA tolls the statute of limitations only for criminal suits and that the FCA bars every suit subsequent to the first suit filed on similar facts. Carter counters that the WSLA tolls both criminal and civil suits and that the FCA bars subsequent suits only when a similar suit is pending before a court. The Court’s ruling will affect whistleblowers as well as businesses and health care providers that supply services to the United States government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1) Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act—a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for “any offense” involving fraud against the government “[w]hen the United States is at war,” 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be “narrowly construed” in favor of repose—applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.

2) Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act’s so called “first-to-file” bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)—which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims—functions as a “one-case-at-a-time” rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.

Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) had a government contract to supply logistical services to the United States military in Iraq. See U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 174 (4th Cir. 2013). For about three months in 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for KBR as an operator of a water purification unit.

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United States v. Wong

Issues

Is the Federal Tort Claims Act’s six-month time limit for filing suit in federal court subject to equitable tolling?

Kwai Fun Wong, a Hong Kong citizen, filed an administrative claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that federal employees injured Wong during immigration detention. After an administrative denial, Wong sought to file her claim in federal court; however, the United States asserted that Wong filed the claim after the FTCA’s filing deadline and that Wong’s claim was therefore time-barred. The Ninth Circuit held that the claim was not time-barred because the FTCA’s filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling that excuses Wong’s late filing. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will affect the procedure litigants must follow before suing the United States government, which will also impact the flow of litigation against the United States in federal court. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the six-month time bar for filing suit in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), is subject to equitable tolling. 

In 1985, Respondent Kwai Fun Wong, a Hong Kong citizen, lawfully entered the United States and, as a Tao minister, soon became a leader within the Wu-Wei Tien Tao Association (“Tien Tao”), a religious organization. See Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957–958 (9th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his insights and assistance.

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United States v. June

Issues

Can a two-year time limit for bringing a tort claim against the federal government be extended in situations where a claimant, despite exercising due diligence, could not have discovered the injury within that time window?

In 2010, Marlene June brought an administrative claim against the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), which the FHWA eventually denied. June then filed a wrongful-death suit against the government, which the district court dismissed as untimely because it was filed after the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations period had already expired. This case turns on whether the two-year statute of limitations is subject to “equitable tolling,” wherein the statute of limitations does not begin to run for a plaintiff who, exercising due diligence, could not have discovered the injury in time to file. This case thus presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity address the ability of agencies to administer claims. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), is subject to equitable tolling.

The Respondent in this case is Marlene June. See Brief for Petitioner, the United States of America, at II. She brought suit on behalf of her grandchild, the surviving child of her deceased son Andrew Edward Booth.

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Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp.

Issues

In what circumstances may a party, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, immediately appeal an order dismissing a claim arising from a case that has been consolidated with other suits for pretrial purposes?

Under 28 U.S.C § 1291, a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction over a district court’s final decision. This case will determine when a party, involved in a pretrial consolidation, can appeal its individual dismissal. In this case, the district court consolidated Gelboim’s claim with other claims for pretrial purposes, but subsequently dismissed Gelboim’s individual claim. Gelboim argues that because the district court dismissed her individual claim, the district court’s decision on her claim is a final decision that is immediately appealable regardless of whether there are still claims from the consolidated action pending district court review. Gelboim also argues that if dismissed claims are not immediately appealable, claims will be in stasis for an indefinite period of time, which will lead to the waste of judicial time and resources. Bank of America counters by claiming that consolidated claims should be reviewed as a unit regardless of whether consolidation occurs only for pretrial purposes or for all purposes. Bank of America believes that this practice is consistent with Congress’s intent to reduce “needless duplication of effort.” The outcome of this case will affect which court decides when a case is ready for appeal, and how much discretion district courts will have in dealing with multidistrict litigation. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether and in what circumstances is the dismissal of an action that has been consolidated with other suits immediately appealable?

The London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) is an international method of calculating interest rates. See In re LIBOR-based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). LIBOR is important because it is the rate that banks charge to other banks for short-term loans.

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