Barrett v. United States

    Issues

    Can a court punish a criminal defendant with two sentences for a single act in violation of both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j), according to the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment?

    Oral argument:
    October 07, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

     

    This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) allow for cumulative punishments for a singular criminal act that violates both provisions of this statute. Sections 924(c) and (j) punish the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug trafficking. Dwayne Barrett contends that § 924(c) and (j) are not separate crimes because they punish the same underlying singular act, and Congress has authorized cumulative sentences for the same act. Charles L. McCloud, as court-appointed amicus curiae, argues that § 924(c) and (j) are two separate crimes, and Congress intended to allow for cumulative punishments for a single act that violates both statutes. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case raises concerns regarding the justice of sentencing to punish multiple violations involving a singular act and the duties of the legislative and judicial branches in determining the scope of criminal punishment. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j).

    Facts

    From August 2011 to January 2012, Petitioner Dwayne Barrett belonged to a group that committed several robberies.  Barrett primarily acted as the group’s driver.  On December 12, 2011, Barrett drove Jermaine Dore and Taijay Todd, and followed another group of men in a van. Barrett, Dore, and Todd intended to rob this other group of $10,000 they had received from selling untaxed cigarettes.

    Once the other group of men parked their van, Barrett followed suit.  Barrett remained in his car as Dore and Todd pursued the men in the van. Pointing guns at the two men in the front of the van, Dore and Todd removed the men from their van, stealing the van and cigarette proceeds. One man, Gamar Dafalla, remained in the backseat of the van when Dore and Todd stole it.  Shortly thereafter, Dafalla attempted to stop the robbery by throwing the money out of the van to one of the men who had been kicked out.  After realizing that Dafalla threw the money they had attempted to steal out of the van, Dore and Todd shot and killed him.

    Barrett was convicted of seven charges in a jury trial. Although the district court judge acknowledged that Barrett was not present when Dafalla was killed and Barrett did not plan for Dafalla’s murder, the judge sentenced Barrett to consecutive sentences for the seven charges, totaling a ninety-year prison term. 

    After a failed appeal attempt to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Barrett’s counsel petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari to review Barrett’s charges involving 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In 2019, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration due to its recent decision on § 924(c)(3)(B) in United States v. Davis.

    In 2021, a district court judge re-sentenced Barrett to a fifty-year prison term: twenty years for concurrent robbery-related counts, five years for brandishing a gun in the October 2011 robbery, and twenty-five years for Barrett’s crimes related to the Dafalla murder.

    In 2023, as Barrett’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Lora v. United States.Lora directly dealt with the interaction between two of Barrett’s charges, Count Six (§ 924(c), gun discharge) and Count Seven (§ 924(j), gun used in murder). Specifically, the court in Lora held that § 924(j) “neither incorporates subsection (c)’s penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate.” Barrett filed a supplemental brief, where he explained that the district court judge incorrectly believed that § 924(j) mandated a consecutive sentence. 

    The district court had held that Counts Six and Seven “merged into one sentence.” However, the Second Circuit disagreed, finding that having Counts Six and Seven sentences run back-to-back still respected the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, the Second Circuit required resentencing of Counts Six and Seven as separate sentences.  

    Barrett petitioned the Supreme Court again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this case on March 3, 2025. 

    Analysis

    THE CLEAR-STATEMENT RULE

    Barrett asserts that giving two separate sentences for charges that constitute the same offense infringes the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Double Jeopardy Clause is specifically intended to protect defendants against “multiple punishments for the same offense.” Barrett argues that when one act violates two provisions of the same statute, Congress is presumed to have intended only one punishment under the law in question. Thus, the key question Barrett highlights is whether § 924(c) and § 924(j) constitute two separate crimes for one act or if the statutory provisions cover a single crime that carries with it two different ways to punish the same act. Barrett argues that when the same offense appears twice in a statutory scheme, there is a presumption against cumulative sentences. For statutes to overcome that presumption, Barrett contends, Congress must include a clear statement in the statute that specifically indicates its wish to punish the same offense more than once under both § 924(c) and (j). Barrett asserts that this clear-statement rule comes from Blockburger v. United States, and that § 924(c) and (j) have no language suggesting cumulative sentences are permissible. Barrett further argues that because the statutes lack express language allowing for separate punishments under both provisions, the statutes fail the clear-statement rule. Thus, cumulative sentences for an act that violates both § 924(c) and (j) cannot be imposed by courts.

    The United States declined to defend the Second Circuit’s decision below, instead supporting Barrett’s contention that cumulative sentences of the kind at issue in this case are impermissible.  Accordingly, the Court appointed Charles L. McCloud to brief the arguments in opposition to Barrett. McCloud counters that the clear-statement rule Petitioner references from Blockburger does not exist. McCloud argues that the test in Blockburger is “not a magic-words requirement” but instead a “rule of thumb” for courts to apply to aid in their determining whether a statute enables cumulative sentences. Accordingly, while McCloud agrees with Barrett that Blockburger outlines a presumption against cumulative sentences that must be rebutted, McCloud notes that the absence of a clear statement within § 924(c) and (j) authorizing cumulative sentences is not determinative. McCloud asserts that Congress must simply demonstrate its intent to impose cumulative sentences under both § 924(c) and (j), and this intent can be shown in any manner Congress choosesso long as its intent to impose cumulative sentences is clear. McCloud notes that anything from statutory structure, legislative history, context, and broader public goals can demonstrate whether Congress intended any given statutory provisions to include cumulative sentences. Thus, McCloud argues that Petitioner’s clear statement rule does not control, and cumulative sentences are permissible under § 924(c) and (j).

    STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND APPLYING PRECEDENT

    In reviewing the language of § 924(c) and (j), Barrett argues that nothing in either section indicates congressional intent to impose cumulative sentences under both provisions. Specifically, Barrett points to the Court’s interpretation of a statute in Whalen v. United States. Barrett highlights that cumulative sentences in that statute were expressly authorized, yet the Court was unwilling to impose cumulative sentences in that case. Barrett then notes that if the Court was unwilling to impose cumulative sentences with explicit statutory language, the silence on cumulative sentences in § 924(c)(1)(A) is even stronger evidence to preclude cumulative sentences in this case. Barrett also asserts that § 924(j) is entirely silent about cumulative sentences and whether it applies to § 924(c). Barrett draws a contrast between the text of § 924(j) and § 924(c)(1)(A) by noting that §924(j) lacks language of the sort that appears in § 924(c)(1)(A) requiring a punishment “in addition to” “the underlying crime.” Barrett claims that this language cannot be added in by courts to § 924(j) because Congress is aware that it can add that missing language, and that while this language might authorize cumulative sentences, the lack of this language in both subsections favors the argument against cumulative sentences under these two provisions. In other words, Barrett contends that this language should be mirrored in both subsections to enable cumulative punishments. Barrett further argues that even though structurally § 924(c) and (j) are separate statutory provisions, precedent supports the interpretation that separate statutory subsections alone are not enough to show a clear statement authorizing cumulative sentences. Barrett points to Ball v. United States where the Court did not subject the defendant in that case to cumulative sentences for crimes in different statutes that punish the same underlying act. Since the Court did not apply cumulative sentences in that case, and in other similar cases, Barrett argues that the Court’s precedent favors one sentence for an act that violates both §924(c) and (j).

    McCloud counters Barrett’s analogy to Whalen by arguing that while the Court in Whalen noted that there was no express language in the statute that allowed cumulative sentences, legislative history for the statute in Whalen did not aid in determining whether Congress wanted to impose cumulative sentences. McCloud argues that legislative history favors cumulative sentences here and fills in the gap that the Court said was missing in Whalen. McCloud notes that in the legislative history, Congress considered nesting § 924(j) within § 924(c). However, since Congress ultimately separated the two provisions, Congress manifested its intent to create two separate offenses, entailing cumulative sentences. McCloud further argues that since Congress considered amending only § 924(c) to impose a mandatory life sentence in the event death stemmed from violating the provision, this demonstrates that Congress wanted separate sentences under both § 924(c) and (j). McCloud retorts Barrett’s mirrored-language claim by noting that Barrett’s claim runs counter to the Court’s holding in Missouri v. Hunter. McCloud asserts that in Hunter, the Court held that this exact kind of mirrored language was not necessary to impose cumulative sentences under two statutory provisions. McCloud further points to legislative history to note that § 924(j) was added long after § 924(c) was enacted, and Hunter had been decided prior to § 924(j). McCloud asserts that because the requisite cumulative sentencing language was already present in § 924(c) when § 924(j) was written, and because the Court’s ruling in Hunter did not require the cumulative-sentence language to be present in all statutory provisions to enable them, that Congress knew there was no need to duplicate the language from § 924(c) in § 924(j) to ensure cumulative sentences were authorized. McCloud also distinguishes the present case from the cases Barrett cites including Ball. Specifically, McCloud states that Ball interpreted the statute in that case to preclude cumulative sentences because the act that violated one statute must also violate the other, so one act would always open the defendant to cumulative sentences under the statute in that case.  Here, McCloud argues that § 924(c) and (j) punish entirely separate criminal acts, so one criminal act will accordingly not always violate both provisions. Thus,McCloud argues that precedent does not favor Barrett.

    Discussion

    CONCERN FOR JUSTICE OF RESULTS

    Barrett argues that his interpretation of § 924(c) and (j) will still result in the appropriate punishment for the crime committed.  Barrett maintains that if he is convicted under § 924(j) rather than § 924(c), § 924(j)(1) allows the judge to sentence Barrett to a sentence that matches § 924(c)’s thirty-year minimum requirement.In this way, Barrett explains, he is not escaping justice if one of his convictions is vacated. See id. Barrett counters McCloud’s argument that Barrett’s interpretation would lead to absurd results with examples of safeguards which prevent these results.  Barrett suggests that courts can choose to convict defendants under whichever statute allows for a greater sentence when both § 924(c) and (j) apply. Further, Barrett points out that appellate courts can review punishments considered too light for the act committed.

    McCloud argues that Barrett’s interpretation of § 924(c) and (j) would lead to absurd results.  Under Barrett’s interpretation, McCloud argues, defendants who committed a worse crime would receive a lower sentence. For example, McCloud asserts that a defendant whose act resulted in death would receive a lower sentence than a defendant who committed the same act, but their act did not result in death. McCloud explains that § 924(c) could require a minimum sentence of thirty years for firearm usage while § 924(j) could limit the maximum sentence for an act resulting in death to fifteen years. McCloud illustrates that under Barrett’s interpretation, if a defendant was convicted for firearm usage not resulting in death, they would face a minimum of thirty years. However, McCloud points out, that if the same defendant was convicted for firearm usage which resulted in death, a more serious crime, they could only be sentenced to fifteen years because the defendant cannot be charged under both § 924(c) and (j).

    SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS

    Barrett asserts that the lower court’s interpretation upsets the separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch. Barrett argues that the legislature has the sole power to determine the scope of punishments for crimes committed. Barrett maintains that a court violates the separation of powers when it imposes multiple punishments on a defendant for the same crime where the legislature has not given the courts the authority to do so. The U.S. government, supporting Barrett as Petitioner, agrees that only the legislature can determine when courts can impose multiple punishments for the same act.  

    McCloud agrees that the legislative branch has the authority to determine the scope of criminal punishments. However, McCloud disagrees that the lower court’s interpretation violates this authority. McCloud suggests that the lower court’s interpretation does not upset the separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch. Instead, McCloud argues, the legislature does allow courts to sentence criminal defendants to cumulative punishments under § 924(c) and (j).

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Andrew R. Davis and Cameron T. Hines

    Edited by:      Zaria Alyssa Goicochea

     

    Additional Resources