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CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE

Barrett v. United States

Issues

Can a court punish a criminal defendant with two sentences for a single act in violation of both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j), according to the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) allow for cumulative punishments for a singular criminal act that violates both provisions of this statute. Sections 924(c) and (j) punish the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug trafficking. Dwayne Barrett contends that § 924(c) and (j) are not separate crimes because they punish the same underlying singular act, and Congress has authorized cumulative sentences for the same act. Charles L. McCloud, as court-appointed amicus curiae, argues that § 924(c) and (j) are two separate crimes, and Congress intended to allow for cumulative punishments for a single act that violates both statutes. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case raises concerns regarding the justice of sentencing to punish multiple violations involving a singular act and the duties of the legislative and judicial branches in determining the scope of criminal punishment. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j).

From August 2011 to January 2012, Petitioner Dwayne Barrett belonged to a group that committed several robberies. United States v.

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Dean v. United States

Issues

In determining a sentence for the predicate felony underlying § 924(c), what is the scope of a trial court’s discretion in considering the statute’s mandatory consecutive sentence? 

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the scope of a trial court’s discretion in considering the mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (mandating a minimum sentence if a firearm is used in furtherance of a violent crime) when determining a sentence for the predicate offense. In deciding whether the lower courts erred by not further reducing the petitioner’s sentence for his predicate offense, the Court will look at whether United States v. Pepper (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 implied that a sentencing court should consider all relevant information about a defendant when determining an appropriate sentence) overruled United States v. Hatcher (holding that a trial court could not impose a mere one-day sentence for crimes that were not subject to a mandatory minimum just because the § 924(c)-mandated sentence had been 300 months). Petitioner Levon Dean, Jr. argues that trial courts should be given full discretion to consider all possible information and that Congressional support of a shorter sentence is evinced by the text of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1986. The United States, as respondent, counters that the Sentencing Reform Act cannot be used simply to lower the aggregate sentence and that Congress specifically intended to prohibit lighter sentences because of the unique dangers of a § 924(c) violation. If the Court rules that Pepper overruled Hatcher, this will give trial courts more discretion in fashioning shorter aggregate sentences for defendants who used a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper v. United States―holding that a judge can adjust sentencing guidelines downward if the defendant is rehabilitated after his initial sentencing―overrule United States v. Hatcher and other Eighth Circuit opinions that limit the district court’s discretion in determining the appropriate sentence for the felony serving as the basis for a conviction for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)?

On April 15, 2013, brothers Levon Dean, Jr. (“Dean”) and Jamal Dean (“Jamal”), as well as some friends, were involved in an armed robbery of a drug dealer. On that day, Jessica Cabbell, a prostitute, had a “date” planned with J.R., a methamphetamine and marijuana dealer, at a motel in Sioux City, Iowa. See United States v. Dean, 810 F.3d 521, 525 (2015). According to Cabbell’s friend Sarah Berg, J.R.

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Setser v. United States

Issues

1. Whether a district court can impose a federal sentence that runs consecutively to a state sentence even before that sentence is imposed.

2. Whether it is reasonable for a federal sentence to run consecutively to one state sentence but concurrently to another when those two state sentences run concurrently to each other.

 

Petitioner Monroe Setser’s arrest in Lubbock, Texas for drug- and firearms-related crimes resulted in both state and federal criminal charges as well as the revocation of his probation for an unrelated state offense. Setser pleaded guilty in federal court and received a 151-month prison sentence that would run concurrently to the state sentence to be imposed for the same incident but consecutively to the sentence imposed pursuant to his probation revocation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal. Setser now argues that federal district courts lack the authority to impose federal sentences that run consecutively to anticipated state sentences. He notes that Congress has not demonstrated any intention to the contrary. By invitation of the Supreme Court, attorney Evan Young responds that district courts have broad discretion in determining how federal sentences will be served. Young argues that this determination must remain an exclusively judicial function.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Does a district court have authority to order a federal sentence to run consecutively to an anticipated, but not-yet-imposed, state sentence?

    2. Is it reasonable for a district court to provide inconsistent instructions about how a federal sentence should interact with state sentences?

    Setser pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to possession with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting. See United States v. Setser , 607 F.3d 128, 129 (5th Cir.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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