Age Discrimination in Employment Act

Issues

Steven Pyett, Thomas O’Connell, and Michael Phillips (the "employees") claim that their employer, Temco Service Industries, Inc., and the company, 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, that owns the building in which they worked, discriminated against them on the basis of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). The employees are members of Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB"), of which Temco and 14 Penn Plaza are members. The CBA stated that the sole and exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims, including those brought under the ADEA, is the union’s grievance and arbitration procedure. The issue in this case is whether a union has the power to bargain away its members’ rights to litigate employment discrimination claims. The employees argue that the answer should be no, while the employers argue the opposite. The outcome of this case will clarify whether a union has the power to waive its members' statutory right to sue their employers in federal court for certain types of discrimination in favor of a mandatory arbitration procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

Myrna Gomez-Perez worked full-time for the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) in Dorado, Puerto Rico. She transferred to another office to be closer to her ill mother, but after one month, she requested to return to her past position in Dorado. After her request was denied, Gomez-Perez, then forty-five years old, filed an equal employment opportunity ("EEO") complaint with the USPS alleging age discrimination. Gomez-Perez claims that after she filed the complaint, her supervisors retaliated by reducing her work hours and lodging false complaints against her. She filed suit against John E. Potter as Postmaster and the USPS in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico alleging that her supervisors' retaliation was in violation of ? 633a of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The USPS filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted. Gomez-Perez appealed. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment and agreed with the district court that ? 633a of the ADEA prohibited age discrimination against federal employees, but did not create a cause of action for victims of retaliation. Gomez-Perez argues that an implicit right of action for retaliation should be read into the ADEA in order to avoid giving the government a blank check to discriminate after an initial complaint has been filed with the EEOC. The USPS argues for a strict reading of ? 633a, which does not explicitly include a right of action for retaliation. The outcome of this case will affect the right of federal government employees to be free of workplace age discrimination, and will affect the government's costs in investigating workplace discrimination claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

Jack Gross sued his employer FBL Financial Group, Inc. ("FBL") in 2004, claiming that FBL had demoted him due to his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Under the trial judge's instructions to the jury, Gross had to prove by circumstantial or direct evidence that his age was a motivating factor in FBL's decision to demote him. The burden then shifted to FBL to prove that Gross's age was not the determining factor, and that it would have demoted Gross regardless of his age. The jury ultimately found for Gross. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins ("Price Waterhouse") requires plaintiffs to present direct evidence to shift the burden to the defendant, and that Gross had presented only circumstantial evidence. Though Price Waterhouse dealt with Title VII claims, the Eighth Circuit held that ADEA claims should be treated similarly and rejected Gross's claim that Price Waterhouse no longer applied. In this case, the Supreme Court may determine the applicability of Price Waterhouse and the burden of proof in ADEA cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Issues

After finding that older individuals faced discrimination in the workplace, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ?621 et seq. The ADEA prohibits employers from arbitrarily discriminating against older employees. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought suit against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Kentucky Retirement Services ("KRS"), who administers the state retirement program, because the retirement program distinguishes among recipients, at least in part, on the basis of age. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the retirement scheme in question violated the ADEA. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether an employer may deny an employee disability benefits because of his or her eligibility to receive normal retirement benefits under the ADEA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

In this case, a hair's breadth of analytical difference is worth almost $6 million dollars, as the plaintiffs, former employees at Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory ("KAPL") ask the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the Second Circuit's finding for the defendants. The plaintiffs had prevailed at trial and on appeal on a disparate impact theory of illegal age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., when the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Smith v. City of Jackson. While upholding the disparate impact theory, City of Jackson also requires the touchstone of the analysis to be whether employers considered "reasonable factors other than age," which the Second Circuit determined was a burden of persuasion to be borne by the plaintiffs. The employee-plaintiffs disagree, maintaining that the "reasonable factors other than age" harbor in the ADEA statute is a traditional affirmative defense on which the employer-defendants bear the burden of proof. In determining where the burden rests, the Supreme Court's decision will impact the nature of future employee litigation under the ADEA, shape the strategies for a successful reduction in force, and determine what deference is due the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations interpreting the ADEA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources