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14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett

Issues

Is an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement which precludes an employee from bringing a lawsuit in court for an alleged violation of statutory anti-discrimination law enforceable?

 

Steven Pyett, Thomas O’Connell, and Michael Phillips (the "employees") claim that their employer, Temco Service Industries, Inc., and the company, 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, that owns the building in which they worked, discriminated against them on the basis of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). The employees are members of Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB"), of which Temco and 14 Penn Plaza are members. The CBA stated that the sole and exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims, including those brought under the ADEA, is the union’s grievance and arbitration procedure. The issue in this case is whether a union has the power to bargain away its members’ rights to litigate employment discrimination claims. The employees argue that the answer should be no, while the employers argue the opposite. The outcome of this case will clarify whether a union has the power to waive its members' statutory right to sue their employers in federal court for certain types of discrimination in favor of a mandatory arbitration procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is an arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement, freely negotiated by a union and an employer, which clearly and unmistakably waives the union members’ right to a judicial forum for their statutory discrimination claims, enforceable?

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New Process Steel v. NLRB

Issues

Whether the National Labor Relations Board may decide cases with only two sitting members.

 

Under 29 U.S.C. §153(b), the “[National Labor Relations] Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . . A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to [delegation].” New Process Steel argues that the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) is prohibited by statute from deciding issues when it acts with only two sitting members on a five-member Board. The NLRB contends that it has the authority to issue decisions, even with only two current members on a five-member Board. The NLRB claims that its previous delegation of authority to a three-member Board allows the Board to continue operating with a two-member quorum. This case will decide how to interpret the 29 U.S.C. §153(b), and whether the current two-member quorum meets the minimum statutory requirement. This case will also affect how the Board handles pending or future cases when there are vacancies on the Board.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the National Labor Relations Board have authority to decide cases with only two sitting members, where 29 U.S.C. §153(b) provides that “three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board”?

New Process Steel operates steel processing facilities in the United States and Mexico. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. N.L.R.B., 564 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.

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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.

Issues

Should workers be compensated for time spent putting on and taking off safety gear, when the applicable collective bargaining agreement excludes time spent “changing clothes” from the compensable workday and that exclusion is permitted by section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act?

Petitioner Clifton Sandifer and a group of former and current steelworkers sued Respondent U.S. Steel for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The steelworkers are represented by United Steelworkers, a labor union which has had a collective bargaining agreement in place with U.S. Steel since 1947. These collective bargaining agreements have stipulated that workers will not be paid for the time it takes to put on their safety gear before they start working or for the time it takes to remove their safety gear after they stop working. FLSA requires employers to pay workers for these activities, but section 203(o) allows exceptions to payment for time spent “changing clothes” when labor unions and management specify otherwise in collective bargaining agreements. The steelworkers in this case argue that putting on safety gear is not encompassed by the phrase “changing clothes,” which they contend only refers to changing from street clothes into work clothes. U.S. Steel argues that safety gear is included within that language and has been appropriately bargained over with the labor union. The decision in this case will clarify what activities are covered by section 203(o) and in doing so will provide clarity to management and labor unions when they collectively bargain over these issues. Specifically, the outcome of the case will determine whether unions may bargain away a statutory right of employees to be paid for time spent putting on and removing required safety gear for work.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the period of time during which a covered employee must be paid begins when the worker engages in a principal activity. Donning and doffing safety gear (including protective clothing) required by the employer is a principal activity when it is an integral and indispensable part of the activities for which the worker is employed. Such requirements are common in manufacturing firms. However, under section 203(o) of the Act an employer need not compensate a worker for time spent in "changing clothes" (even if it is a principal activity) if that time is expressly excluded from compensable time under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement applicable to that worker. 

The interrelated questions presented are: 

  1. What constitutes "changing clothes" within the meaning of section 203(o)? 
  2. If a worker's actions are a principal activity but fall within the scope of the section 203(o) exemption, do those actions nonetheless commence the period of time during which (aside from the clothes-changing time) the worker must be compensated? 
  3. If a worker engages in a principal activity which is not exempted by section 203(o), but which involves only a de minimis amount of time, does the activity nonetheless commence the period of time during which the worker must be compensated?

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Facts

The steelworkers involved in this collective action lawsuit are approximately 800 current or former employees of United States Steel Corporation (“U.S.

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