compensation

Baker Botts v. ASARCO

Issues

Can bankruptcy lawyers recover compensation for fees incurred through defending a fee application against a bankruptcy client’s objections?

This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to decide whether courts have the authority to grant defense-fee awards when a law firm defends itself against its bankruptcy client’s objections to legal fees. Brief for Petitioner Baker Botts at (i). ASARCO argues that § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) does not permit awards for compensation to bankruptcy practitioners for successfully defending fee applications. Brief for Respondent at 16. In opposition, Baker Botts contends that § 330 gives courts broad discretion to award compensation for services that are necessary to the administration of bankruptcy cases, including successfully defending fee applications. Brief for Petitioners at 23. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the compensation of bankruptcy lawyers and the rights of bankruptcy clients. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Committee On Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Business Law Section of the Florida Bar, et al. (“New York City and Florida Bar Associations”), in Support of Petitioners at 9; Brief of Amicus Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars, in Support of Petitioners at 25; Brief for Petitioners at 23 (quoting § 330(a)(C)).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants discretion to bankruptcy judges to award "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by" an attorney or other professional employed by the estate. 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(1). Before any compensation may be awarded, the Code requires professionals to complete a detailed fee application, to which any party in interest may object. It is undisputed that the preparation of such a fee application is compensable. But the circuits have now divided over whether defending it is likewise compensable. The Ninth Circuit, like the vast majority of lower courts, has held that bankruptcy judges may award compensation for the defense of a fee application, at least when the defense is meritorious and successful. It so held in part because categorically denying compensation would undermine the statutory requirement that bankruptcy professionals' compensation not be diluted compared to that of non-bankruptcy practitioners. But the Fifth Circuit, in the judgment below, held that such compensation is never authorized by §330(a). 

The question presented is whether Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants bankruptcy judges discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application.

In 2005, Respondent ASARCO, a copper mining company, filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) due to mounting cash-flow and litigation problems. In re ASARCO, 751 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2014).

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Devillier v. Texas

Issues

Under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, may a person whose property is taken without compensation file a court claim even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Takings Clause allows a person whose property is taken without compensation to seek redress in court even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action. The Petitioners Devillier, et al. argue that the Takings Clause permits individuals to seek redress in court, as the Constitution implicitly bestows the procedural right when granting the substantive right to just compensation. The Petitioners further argue that both the constitutional text and the historical context of the just-compensation right support the recognition of such a right. On the other hand, Respondent State of Texas contends that the Takings Clause on its own does not establish a cause of action, asserting that Congress must provide such authorization before individuals can seek relief in court. The Respondent also argues that neither the text nor the historical background of the just-compensation right indicates an implied cause of action, pointing out that properties have historically been compensated through direct intervention by Congress for over a century. The outcome of this case has significant ramifications for the balance between state and federal court power, judicial and legislative power, and the substantive rights of property owners against the states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a person whose property is taken without compensation may seek redress under the self-executing takings clause of the Fifth Amendment even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action.

In 1956, the Federal Aid Highway Act allocated billions of dollars to the states to construct an interstate highway system. Devillier v. Texas at 2. One of these highways is Interstate Highway 10 (“IH-10”) which passes through Texas into California.

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Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt

Issues

Must an employee making over $200,000 each year satisfy the “extras regulation” requirements in 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 to be a “highly compensated employee” exempt from overtime pay under the FLSA?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether highly compensated white-collar employees must meet the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 to be exempt from overtime pay. To be exempt from overtime pay, 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 requires that employees receive certain minimum weekly guarantees and that a reasonable relationship exist between the guaranteed amount and amount actually earned. Helix argues that incorporating 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 into the Fair Labor Standards Act’s highly compensated employee exception goes against the text and regulatory history of the highly compensated employee exemption regulation and unnecessarily complicates the exemption process. Hewitt counters that 29 C.F.R § 541.604 has been embraced in the text and practice of highly compensated employee exemption regulation and that it encourages employers to improve welfare and increase job slots. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the oil, gas, and nursing industries, as well as their employees’ job markets.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a supervisor making over $200,000 each year is entitled to overtime pay because the standalone regulatory exemption set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.601 remains subject to the detailed requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 when determining whether highly compensated supervisors are exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime-pay requirements.

Petitioners Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. and Helix Well Ops, Inc. (collectively “Helix”) provide offshore oil and gas well intervention services. Hewitt v. Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc. at 1. Helix employed Respondent Michael Hewitt for two years as a Toolpusher. Id. at 2. Hewitt, like most Toolpushers, typically worked and lived on an offshore oil rig for twenty-eight-day periods during offshore trips for Helix.

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workers compensation

Workers' compensation laws protect people who become injured or disabled while working at their jobs. The laws provide the injured workers with fixed monetary awards in an attempt to eliminate the need for litigation. These laws also provide benefits for dependents of those workers who are killed because of work-related accidents or illnesses.

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