takings

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

Issues

Does an access regulation promulgated by the California Agricultural Relations Board constitute an unconstitutional governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment because it allows union organizers to speak to agricultural workers on their employer’s land at specified times during certain periods of the year?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a state access regulation that requires agricultural employers to allow union organizers to enter their property to speak with their employees during certain parts of the workday constitutes a governmental taking of the employer’s private property without just compensation. Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing Company contend that allowing union organizers on their land is a per se regulatory taking because it is essentially the same as a permanent physical occupation of the employer’s land for a public purpose, and without compensation, this taking is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Victoria Hassid, the Chair of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board that promulgated the regulation at issue, argues that only narrow categories of regulations have been recognized as per se regulatory takings and that if the Court expanded the categories to include this access regulation, it would imperil many existing state and federal regulations. The outcome of this case has serious implications for agricultural workers’ access to information about labor unions, existing state and federal regulations that allow access to private property, and the rights enjoyed by private property owners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.

In 1975, California passed the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA” or “Act”), which established the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“ALRB” or “Board”). Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma at 526. The ALRB found that there were few opportunities for unions to communicate with agricultural workers, which interfered with the workers’ right to organize.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Devillier v. Texas

Issues

Under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, may a person whose property is taken without compensation file a court claim even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Takings Clause allows a person whose property is taken without compensation to seek redress in court even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action. The Petitioners Devillier, et al. argue that the Takings Clause permits individuals to seek redress in court, as the Constitution implicitly bestows the procedural right when granting the substantive right to just compensation. The Petitioners further argue that both the constitutional text and the historical context of the just-compensation right support the recognition of such a right. On the other hand, Respondent State of Texas contends that the Takings Clause on its own does not establish a cause of action, asserting that Congress must provide such authorization before individuals can seek relief in court. The Respondent also argues that neither the text nor the historical background of the just-compensation right indicates an implied cause of action, pointing out that properties have historically been compensated through direct intervention by Congress for over a century. The outcome of this case has significant ramifications for the balance between state and federal court power, judicial and legislative power, and the substantive rights of property owners against the states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a person whose property is taken without compensation may seek redress under the self-executing takings clause of the Fifth Amendment even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action.

In 1956, the Federal Aid Highway Act allocated billions of dollars to the states to construct an interstate highway system. Devillier v. Texas at 2. One of these highways is Interstate Highway 10 (“IH-10”) which passes through Texas into California.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Horne v. U.S. Department of Agriculture

Issues

Do the Department of Agriculture’s regulations—requiring that a percentage of raisin crops be “reserved” for the government to use to control supply—constitute a taking necessitating just compensation?

This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify what constitutes a taking. The Hornes argue that the Marketing Order, requiring raisin handlers to deliver a reserve portion of a growers’ crop to the government, constitutes a categorical taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Department of Agriculture, on the other hand, argues that the reserve requirement is simply a time-use limitation that is lawful and does not require just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. This case will have important implications for property owners generally, and will affect the government’s options regarding how to regulate agriculture in ways to protect producers and consumers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the government's “categorical duty” under the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation when it “physically takes possession of an interest in property,” Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012), applies only to real property and not to personal property.
  2. Whether the government may avoid the categorical duty to pay just compensation for a physical taking of property by reserving to the property owner a contingent interest in a portion of the value of the property, set at the government’s discretion.
  3. Whether a governmental mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as a “condition” on permission to engage in commerce effects a per se taking.

In 1949, Respondent Department of Agriculture promulgated the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (“Marketing Order”) under authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (“AMAA”). See Horne v. U.S. Dept.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States

Issues

Whether the statute of limitations in the Tucker Act limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims?

 

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. (“JRS”) brought a takings claim against the United States government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. The United States filed a motion to dismiss the action, claiming that JRS filed the suit after the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations expired. The United States Court of Federal Claims denied the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the decision of the lower court because it found that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim, even though neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction; it was raised by a group of interested third parties in an amicus brief.  The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the amicus brief, dismissed the case, finding that the statute of limitations was a jurisdictional issue that the court could raise sua sponte, or on its own, and that JRS brought the claim too late. JRS argues that the plain language of the statute shows that the statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional issue and the court could not raise the issue sua sponte.  JRS relies on the legislative history of the Tucker Act to support its point. Conversely, the United States government argues that because the statute of limitations is part of Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity, it does limit the jurisdiction of the court. While the issue in this case is narrow, the Court’s decision may help in delineating where the Court draws the line between which issues are jurisdictional and which are not.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The statute of limitations in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, provides: “Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”  The question presented is:  Whether the statute of limitations in Tucker Act limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

In 1969, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. (“JRS”) signed a 50 year lease for a 158-acre tract of land in Michigan. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, (Fed. Cir.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for his insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Knick v. Township of Scott

Issues

Should the Court reconsider the part of the Supreme Court’s Williamson County decision that requires property owners to exhaust state‑court remedies before litigating takings claims in federal courts?

This case asks the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, which established a requirement that property owners must first exhaust state‑court remedies before their federal takings claims are ripe for litigation in federal court. The Township of Scott’s zoning ordinance requires that property owners whose property contains a cemetery must leave that property open to the public during daylight hours and allow state agents access to determine the existence and location of any property or to ensure compliance with the ordinance. Rose Mary Knick, a resident of the Township, sued the Township after receiving violation notices, arguing that the ordinance is a taking without just compensation. Knick further argues that Williamson County’s ripeness requirement is an unworkable standard that prevents plaintiffs from reasonably accessing such courts. The Township of Scott counters that Knick does not have a valid federal statutory claim because none of Knick’s federal rights were violated. That is, the Township argues, a state‑court remedy for just compensation existed, which Knick did not avail herself of. Further, it contends that Williamson County does not prevent litigants from accessing federal court because courts have flexibility in deciding if it is fair to hear a plaintiff’s claim. Homeowners, takings litigation, and access to federal forums are some of the considerations implicated in this case. This is because overruling Williamson County may allow future plaintiffs to bring their claims in the court of their choosing without insurmountable procedural obstacles barring their path.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–96 (1985), requiring property owners to exhaust state court remedies to ripen federal takings claims, as suggested by Justices of this Court?

On December 20, 2012, Respondent Township of Scott, Pennsylvania (“Township”) enacted an ordinance relating to the “Operation and Maintenance of Cemeteries and Burial Places.” Knick v. Township of Scott at 3. The ordinance requires property owners whose property contains cemeteries to allow the public free, reasonable access to the cemeteries during the day. Id.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District

Court below

In 1972, Coy A. Koontz, the petitioner, purchased a vacant lot consisting of 14.9 acres. Due to Florida regulations, all but 1.4 acres of Koontz’s property became a Riparian Habitat Zone, which could not be developed without permission from St. Johns River Water Management District, the respondent. In 1994, Koontz applied for a permit to develop 3.7 acres of this property. After investigating the property, St. Johns River Water Management District agreed to approve the permit if Koontz would agree to one of two conditions: 1) deed the remainder of his property into a conservation area and perform offsite mitigation by either replacing culverts located four and a half miles from his property or plugging drainage canals on a property located seven miles away from his property; or, 2) reduce development to one acre and turn the remaining 13.9 acres into a deed-restricted conservation area. Koontz refused to accept either of these conditions and St. Johns River Water Management District denied the permit. Koontz brought a lawsuit claiming an improper exaction of his property and the case has been through several appeals before the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Koontz argues that the constitutional standards set out in Nollan and Dolan should apply to this case and similar cases so that the government can be held liable for improper taking when the government refuses to issue a land-use permit on the sole basis that the permit applicant did not accede to a financial or public service condition. St. Johns River Water Management District argues that the constitutional standards set out in Nollan and Dolan should not apply to this case and similar cases where the government did not actually take any property from the landowner. This decision has the potential to drastically modify takings jurisprudence with regard to exactions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the government can be held liable for taking when it refuses to issue a land-use permit on the sole basis that the permit applicant did not accede a permit condition that, if applied, would violate the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests set out in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1997), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and
  2. Whether the nexus and proportionality tests set out in Nollan and Dolan apply to a land-use exaction that takes the form of a government demand that a permit applicant dedicate money, services, labor, or any other type of personal property to a public use?

top

Issue(s)

Whether the constitutional standards set out in

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources
Submit for publication
Submit for publication

Murr v. Wisconsin

Issues

Should two legally-distinct, but adjacent, commonly-owned parcels be treated as a single parcel when determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether two commonly-owned, contiguous parcels should be considered as a single parcel when determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred. The case arises after four residents of Wisconsin, the Murrs, decided to sell one of two contiguous parcels they had received from their parents. Wisconsin forbid the sale, citing a regulation under which two contiguous parcels of less with a combined area of less than one acre are considered a single parcel. The Murrs argue that the parcels are separate and distinct, as evident by the separate deed to each property. The State of Wisconsin argues that the parcels should be aggregated under the “parcel as a whole” analysis the Supreme Court devised. At stake is just compensation to landowners harmed by overreaching regulation, and the ability of the states and localities to regulate their domain and protect the environment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In a regulatory taking case, does the “parcel as a whole” concept as described in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), establish a rule that two legally distinct, but commonly owned contiguous parcels, must be combined for takings analysis purposes?

Between 1994 and 1995, Joseph, Michael, Donna, and Peggy Murr (collectively, “the Murrs”), received from their parents two neighboring lots along the St. Croix River—Lots E and F. See Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 2013AP2828, at *2, 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota

Issues

Does the government violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment when it requires a homeowner who owed property tax to the government to forfeit their property worth more than such debt and then keeps the surplus proceeds?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment when the government forfeits a homeowner’s property due to a property tax delinquency and keeps the surplus proceeds of that property’s sale.  Petitioner Geraldine Tyler argues that her equity interest in her condominium is private property protected by the Takings Clause, and that the government violated the Takings Clause by selling her home and retaining proceeds in excess of her debt to the government.  She further contends that the forfeiture serves punitive rather than remedial purposes and thus is an excessive fine under the Excessive Fines Clause.  Respondent Hennepin County asserts that the government has the sovereign power to foreclose on properties to hold tax delinquents accountable.  Hennepin County also argues that tax forfeitures do not violate the Excessive Fines Clause because they are remedial and not punitive.  This case’s holding will impact the constitutional limit on the government’s power over individual property rights and the government’s ability to promote Minnesota productive land use.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause; and (2) whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt, plus interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.

Petitioner Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Minneapolis and stopped paying property taxes on it when she moved into a new apartment in 2010. See Tyler v.

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to takings