energy

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut

Issues

Whether a party can assert a federal common claim challenging a company’s carbon dioxide emissions as a public nuisance, or whether such efforts to curb emissions should be brought solely through the legislative process.

 

Several states brought suit against various power companies, arguing that the companies’ carbon emissions create a public nuisance – i.e. harm the public welfare – by contributing to global warming and damaging the environment. The district court dismissed the claim before trial, holding that disputes concerning global warming are “political questions” that should be resolved by the legislature, not the courts. However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that courts are allowed to hear such cases, and that such disputes are not restricted to resolution in the political arena. Furthermore, the Second Circuit held that allowing such cases does not alleviate a plaintiff’s heavy burden of proving its side of the dispute in court. The decision will depend on whether the Supreme Court feels that the judiciary can properly handle such claims, or whether the complexity, controversy, and volume of such cases counsel in favor of dismissing this initial suit.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether States and private parties have standing to seek judicially-fashioned emissions caps on five utilities for their alleged contribution to harms claimed to arise from global climate change caused by more than a century of emissions by billions of independent sources.

2. Whether a cause of action to cap carbon dioxide emissions can be implied under federal common law where no statute creates such a cause of action, and the Clean Air Act speaks directly to the same subject matter and assigns federal responsibility for regulating such emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency.

3. Whether claims seeking to cap defendants' carbon dioxide emissions at "reasonable" levels, based on a court's weighing of the potential risks of climate change against the socioeconomic utility of defendants' conduct, would be governed by "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" or could be resolved without "initial policy determination[s] of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

In July 2004, the States of Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the City of New York (collectively “Connecticut”) filed a complaint against American Electric Power Company, Southern Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy, and Cinergy (c

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Diamond Alternative Energy LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency

Issues

If a regulation doesn’t affect a party directly but only predictably, can that party still satisfy the redressability requirement for standing and bring a lawsuit?

This case asks the Court to determine whether fuel producers, like Diamond Alternative Energy, have standing to sue the EPA for its decision to allow California to impose stricter emissions standards than those in the federal Clean Air Act. Diamond argues that, while the decision affects only car manufacturers directly, and fuel producers only indirectly, the decision’s negative consequences for conventional fuel producers are so predictable that they should be able to sue to block the decision. Petitioners further argue that not allowing those who are indirectly regulated to sue would leave them dependent on third parties who may not share their interests and give the government an incentive to impose burdensome regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency, on the other hand, contends that allowing this type of standing would undermine the purpose of the Court’s standing requirements, which is to ensure that the Court resolves real, not hypothetical disputes and that a favorable court decision for a plaintiff remedies the harm they allege. This case touches on important questions about how regulations affect a variety of parties and who can bring suit when they believe the government has harmed them.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.

The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) gives the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) the authority to promulgate federal emissions standards for new automobiles which preempt any conflicting state regulations because of 

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas

Issues

Under the Hobbs Act, can someone who wasn’t directly involved in a case challenge a government agency’s decision in court if they believe the agency went beyond its legal power? Second, do the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to temporarily store nuclear fuel away from nuclear-reactor sites? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether parties like Texas can challenge an agency’s decision in court, despite not participating in the agency’s earlier hearing concerning the decision. Texas claims it has standing as an aggrieved party because it only needs to participate even slightly in the original decision-making process, while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) argues Texas misinterprets the law because Texas was required to be a party in the decision-making process, not just a general participant, to be an aggrieved party. The case also asks the Supreme Court to decide if federal laws regulating nuclear energy production allow the NRC to license private companies to store nuclear waste away from the nuclear energy facilities, specifically in the Permian Basin in Texas. Texas argues that federal statutes only empower the NRC to license on-site or federal controlled off-site storage, while the NRC asserts that they have that power because the statutes do not explicitly limit its authority to license temporary, private off-site storage. The outcome of this case has future implications for both nuclear energy expansion, and oil and gas production in the Permian Basin region.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Hobbs Act, which authorizes a “party aggrieved” by an agency’s “final order” to petition for review in a court of appeals, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency’s statutory authority.

Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.

In 1942, the first nuclear reactor was created in the United States. Texas v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 3. In 1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, which allowed civilian use of atomic power.

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Oneok v. Learjet

Issues

Does the Natural Gas Act, which regulates wholesale prices of natural gas, preempt state antitrust liability when accusations concern not wholesale, but retail prices?

The Supreme Court will decide whether the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) preempts state laws that regulate the retail of natural gas. Oneok and other sellers of natural gas argue that the NGA preempts the claims that these sellers of natural gas violated antitrust laws by illegally manipulating the retail price of natural gas and engaging in wash sales. Learjet, however, contends that while wholesale rates are regulated by the NGA, the NGA does not preempt state law that regulates retail rates. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case could impact federalism concerns as well as the future of the natural gas market. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Natural Gas Act preempt state-law claims challenging industry practices that directly affect the wholesale natural gas market when those claims are asserted by litigants who purchased gas in retail transactions?

Starting in 2005, Respondents Learjet, Inc. and other retail gas purchasers (collectively, “Learjet”), filed claims in both federal and state court alleging that Petitioners Oneok, Inc. and other natural gas traders (collectively, “Oneok”), skewed the market for natural gas and inflated gas prices by “engaging in wash

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