The “Daubert Standard” provides a systematic framework for a trial court judge to assess the reliability and relevance of expert witness testimony before it is presented to a jury. Established in the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S.
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) allow an expert witness to testify that most drug couriers carry drugs knowingly, and that drug-trafficking organizations do not trust unknowing couriers with large quantities of drugs, when knowledge is an element of the offense?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits expert testimony about the mental states of a group that the defendant is a member of. Diaz was convicted of knowingly importing drugs into the United States after a government expert testified that “in most circumstances, the driver knows they are hired . . . to take the drugs from point A to point B.” Diaz argues that such testimony is impermissible under Rule 704(b) because it is functionally equivalent to stating an opinion that she had a certain mental state. The United States counters that the rule only restricts an expert from explicitly concluding or directly opining on whether a defendant had a certain mental state. The outcome of this case will affect how the government goes about proving its criminal cases, how effectively parties can rebut expert testimony, and how juries make decisions about mental states.
Whether in a prosecution for drug trafficking — where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs — Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) permits a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters.
Delilah Guadalupe Diaz lives in Moreno Valley, California. Brief for Respondent, the United States at 5. One night in August 2020, she drove across the border from Mexico into the United States. Id. She told a border patrol officer who inspected the car that it was her boyfriend’s.
Marital privilege, also known as spousal privilege, is recognized by the law of evidence and the Supreme Court to protect private spousal communications and prevent any testimony against a spouse from being used in judicial proceedings.
In her Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) suit against Sprint, Ellen Mendelsohn sought to use the testimony of other Sprint employees who claimed to have experienced age discrimination at Sprint. This evidence falls into the category sometimes called "me too" testimony, because the employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn and were not parties in Mendelsohn's litigation. The district court rejected the "me too" testimony, interpreting a past Tenth Circuit ruling to mean that testimony of other employees was admissible only if the other employees worked under the same supervisor and were fired around the time Sprint fired Mendelsohn. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the same-supervisor requirement only applied in discriminatory discipline actions, not in cases like Mendelsohn involving allegations of company-wide discrimination.� Currently, four circuits hold that "me too" evidence is irrelevant and thus inadmissible, while another five circuits hold that such evidence is excludable at the discretion of the court. The Tenth Circuit's holding departs from both of these views. By deciding Sprint v. Mendelsohn, the Supreme Court will resolve this circuit split regarding "me too" evidence. The Court's decision will affect the ability of employees to prove company-wide discrimination. Its ruling will be particularly important because it will apply not only to ADEA, but also to suits brought under a range of federal anti-discrimination statutes.�
