INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY

City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas, LLC.

Issues

Is the City of Austin’s sign code, which distinguishes between on- and off-premises signs, an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a city sign code’s differential treatment of on-premises and off-premises signs constitutes a content-based regulation of speech. The City of Austin’s sign code permits on-premises, but not off-premises, signs to be digitized, and bans the construction of new off-premises signs. Austin argues that this distinction is a lawful, content-neutral regulation. Reagan National Advertising of Texas counters that Austin’s on- versus off-premises distinction constitutes an unlawful, content-based restriction under Reed v. Town of Gilbert and the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The outcome of this case has important implications for governments considering roadway safety measures and for entities who advertise through off-premises signs like billboards.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Austin city code’s distinction between on-premises signs, which may be digitized, and off-premises signs, which may not, is a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed v. Town of Gilbert.

Respondents Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC. (“Reagan”) and Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company, L.P. (“Lamar”), are involved in the outdoor advertising business. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin, at 699. In April and June 2017, Reagan applied for permits to convert their existing off-premises signs into digital signs.

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equal protection

intermediate scrutiny

Reed v. Town of Gilbert

Issues

Does a town’s sign ordinance that assigns different size and posting requirements based on the type of noncommercial speech displayed violate the First Amendment?  

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit split regarding the constitutionality of sign ordinances that treat signs differently depending on the type of noncommercial speech displayed. The Town of Gilbert’s Sign Code stipulated size requirements and posting times that differed depending on if the signs were classified as political, ideological, or “temporary directional signs” for religious or non-profit events. The latter category’s size and timing requirements were more restrictive than those for political or ideological signs. Good News Community Church and its pastor, Clyde Reed, argue that Gilbert’s sign code violates the First Amendment. Conversely, Gilbert contends that the Sign Code does not violate the Constitution since it does not favor certain viewpoints or ideas over others and serves an important government interest in regulating safety and aesthetics. The Court’s ruling could have important consequences for free speech as well as for local governments’ ability to manage community safety and aesthetics.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Gilbert’s mere assertion of a lack of discriminatory motive render its facially content-based sign code content-neutral and justify the code’s differential treatment of Petitioners’ religious signs?

Respondent Town of Gilbert’s (“Gilbert”) sign ordinance (“Sign Code”) requires that individuals obtain a permit to post signs within the city limits. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir.

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strict scrutiny

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