The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), codified in 42 U.S.C. Chapter 103, is a large piece of legislation passed in 1980 that gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the ability to intervene in managing land contaminated with high levels of hazardous materials.
Does the Whistleblower Protection Act bar an agency from taking enforcement action against an employee who violated one of the agency’s regulations?
The Supreme Court will address whether employees may violate government agency regulations without losing their rights under the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”). The Court’s decision will clarify whether certain regulations have the force and effect of law under the WPA, which will, in turn, influence the extent to which employees will be willing to disclose information involving perceived government missteps. The Department of Homeland Security argues that violations of legislatively mandated regulations are unprotected under the WPA. MacLean contends, however, that an agency regulation is not an exception to the WPA, and thus disclosures that violate an agency regulation are still protected under the WPA.
Congress has directed that the Transportation Security Administration “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting” the “disclosure of information obtained or developed” in carrying out certain transportation security functions, if the agency “decides” that “disclosing the information would * * * be detrimental” to transportation security. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(e), 115 Stat. 603; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-296, Tit. XVI, § 1601(b), 116 Stat. 2312. Such information is referred to in the regulations as “Sensitive Security Information.” See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Feb. 22, 2002).
The question presented is whether certain statutory protections codified at 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A), which are inapplicable when an employee makes a disclosure “specifically prohibited by law,” can bar an agency from taking an enforcement action against an employee who intentionally discloses Sensitive Security Information.
In 2001, Respondent Robert J. MacLean became a Federal Air Marshal (“Air Marshal”). See MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
The authors would like to thank Professors Cynthia Farina and Aziz Rana of Cornell Law School for their insights into this case.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces federal laws prohibiting workplace discrimination.
Intermediate scrutiny is a test courts often use in the field of Constitutional Law to determine a statute's constitutionality.
Minimum wage laws establish a base level of pay that employers are required to pay certain covered employees. The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. In addition to a federal minimum wage, some states also have their own minimum wages, codified either in a state statute or in the state's constitution. States are broken up into 4 classifications for minimum wage:
Can annuity benefits claimants under the Railroad Retirement Act seek judicial review when the Railroad Retirement Board denies a claim to reopen a decision under Section 5(f) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, or does such a determination fail to represent a final decision?
This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the judicial review provision of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and to determine whether the statute provides for broad review of agency decisions, such as decisions to reopen or deny a reopening of past outcomes through the “any final decision” language of Section 355(f). Manfredo Salinas argues that the Supreme Court should construe the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act’s provision broadly to permit judicial review of a United States Railroad Retirement Board decision not to backdate disability benefits. The United States Railroad Retirement Board counters that the statute grants the United States Railroad Retirement Board broad internal review and limits judicial review only to those decisions encompassed by the express language of the surrounding statutory framework. This case has important implications on the finality and reviewability of decisions that impact the duration and dollar amount of federally funded annuities.
Whether, under Section 5(f) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act and Section 8 of the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad Retirement Board’s denial of a request to reopen a prior benefits determination is a “final decision” subject to judicial review.
On February 28, 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas (“Salinas”), a railroad worker, applied to Respondent United States Railroad Retirement Board (the “Board”) for a disability annuity under 45 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1). See Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. at 1–2. The Board denied Salinas’s application on August 28, 2006.
Statutory construction, also known as statutory interpretation, is the process by which courts interpret and apply legislation.
Does the term “tangible objects” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 encompass all physical objects, including fish, or only those objects that are meant to preserve information?
In this case the Supreme Court will address whether the term “tangible objects” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 encompasses more than objects that preserve information—specifically whether it includes fish. Section 1519 criminalizes destroying or concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a government investigation. While Yates encourages the Court to look at the statutory language surrounding “tangible objects” and argues that fish are not “tangible objects” within the meaning of the statute, the government contends that “tangible objects” is an unambiguous term that applies to all objects, including fish. The Court’s ruling will implicate the reach of federal law, statutory interpretation, and the notice requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the wake of the criminal charges filed against Enron's corporate officers, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Known as the “anti-shredding provision” of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object’ with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis supplied). John L. Yates, a commercial fisherman, was charged and convicted under this anti-shredding criminal statute for destroying purportedly undersized, harvested fish from the Gulf of Mexico after a federally-deputized officer had issued him a civil citation and instructed him to bring them back to port.
This petition presents the important question of whether the reach of section 1519 extends to the construction of anything meeting the dictionary definition of “tangible objects,” or instead is limited to the destruction of tangible objects related to record-keeping as follows:
Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose?
On August 23, 2007, Petitioner John Yates and his crew were actively engaged in fishing aboard their vessel when Officer John Jones (“Officer Jones”) of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission approached for an inspection. See United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2013).
