maritime law

Air and Liquid System Corp. v. Devries

Issues

Does a bare-metal manufacturer have a duty to warn users of asbestos-related hazards where a third party added asbestos-containing components to the manufacturer’s product?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a manufacturer may be held liable under maritime law for injuries caused by third-party products that were added to the manufacturer’s product. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. argues that a manufacturer has no duty to warn against the asbestos-related dangers of third-party products. Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee, whose husbands died of asbestos-related illnesses, counter that imposing a duty to warn is reasonable because bare-metal manufacturers should reasonably foresee that their products will be used with asbestos-containing products. Because the injured parties were U.S. Navy sailors, this case also asks the Supreme Court to consider principles of maritime law. The outcome will determine the contours of recovery in the admiralty context.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether products-liability defendants can be held liable under maritime law for injuries caused by products that they did not make, sell, or distribute.

Respondents Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee (“Devries and McAfee”) separately filed suit in Pennsylvania state court, alleging that their deceased husbands, John B. Devries and Kenneth McAfee, had contracted cancer after being exposed to asbestos in the United States Navy. In re: Asbestos Product Liability Litigation (No. VI) at 5.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend

Issues

Can a seaman recover punitive damages if he is injured on the job and his employer refuses to pay for his medical treatment and lost wages?

 

Edgar L. Townsend, a seaman, was injured while working aboard his ship. His employers refused to supply him with maintenance and cure, which covers medical care and wages for injured seamen, in violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general maritime law.  Townsend sought punitive damages for this refusal. Townsend's employers sought declaratory relief on the punitive damages claim, arguing that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), prohibited all claims of punitive damages under general maritime law, because they are not specified in the Jones Act, and because punitive damages are non-pecuniary. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that while Miles's reasoning is meant to provide uniformity in the application of the Jones Act and general maritime law, the holding of Miles addressed only loss of society damages in a wrongful death suit; it did not address punitive damages in a maintenance and cure claim. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that they were still bound by their prior ruling in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987), which specifically allows for the recovery of punitive damages. There is currently a circuit split on the issue, as the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts have awarded punitive damages as a remedy for failure to provide maintenance and cure, while the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts have applied the Miles uniformity principle and awarded only pecuniary damages. The Supreme Court's holding in this case will settle the circuit split and decide whether courts may award punitive damages in maintenance and cure claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a seaman recover punitive damages for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure? The Eleventh Circuit's decision below holds in the affirmative, but conflicts with the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well as two state courts of last resort, the reasoning of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), and Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).

Edgar L. Townsend was a seaman and crew member on a ship called the Motor Tug Thomas. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282, 1283 (11th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker

Issues

Is a ship's owner subject to punitive damages for the acts of the ship's master if the court hasn't found that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in those acts and the acts went against the owner's established policies?

If Congress has enacted a controlling statute that provides civil and criminal penalties for certain maritime conduct but does not provide for punitive damages, can a court impose punitive damages for the conduct under federal maritime common law?

Does federal maritime law allow punitive damages as high as those in this case?

 

In 1989 the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, off the Alaska coast, spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. In the years following the spill, Exxon would pay millions of dollars in private claims and over a billion dollars to settle government suits under environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). An additional class action suit by private parties sought compensatory damages for economic harm, as well as punitive damages (a civil penalty for particularly egregious conduct). In the final suit, an Alaska district court awarded roughly $20 million in compensatory damages against Exxon-and $5 billion in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit eventually reduced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion but upheld the decision to award such damages. Exxon now asks the United States Supreme Court to strike down the award of punitive damages or reduce its amount. In addressing Exxon's petition, the Court must set maritime law standards for punitive damage awards against a ship's owner for acts of the ship's master. The Court will also consider whether Congress meant penalties under the CWA to be the full punishment for a spill, excluding punitive damages under maritime law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. May punitive damages be imposed under maritime law against a shipowner (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits) for the conduct of a ship's master at sea, absent a finding that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in that conduct, and even when the conduct was contrary to policies established and enforced by the owner?

2. When Congress has specified the criminal and civil penalties for maritime conduct in a controlling statute, here the Clean Water Act, but has not provided for punitive damages, may judge-made federal maritime law (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits) expand the penalties Congress provided by adding a punitive damages remedy?

3. Is this $2.5 billion punitive damages award, which is larger than the total of all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal appellate courts in our history, within the limits allowed by federal maritime law?

The following facts are taken from Exxon v. Baker, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007); Baker v. Exxon, 270 F.3d.1215 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F.Supp.2d 1043 (D.Alaska 2002); and the Encyclopedia of the Earth:

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Trevor W. Morrison, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and W. Bradley Wendel for their insights into the Exxon v. Baker case.

Submit for publication
0

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International

Issues

Is reading a contract to allow class arbitration, when the contract does not expressly allow it, consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.?

 

AnimalFeeds filed a class action lawsuit against the four major parcel tanker transportation companies, including Stolt-Nielsen, alleging antitrust violations. As per a written contact between the parties, the case was referred to an arbitration panel. The contract, however, is silent as to whether class arbitrations are permissible. Stolt-Nielsen argues that the silence in the agreement should mean that class arbitration is not permitted, while AnimalFeeds claims the decision should be left to the arbitrators. The arbitrators decided to allow class arbitration, but the district court (S.D.N.Y.) refused. The Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court's decision will place an economic burden on the losing side and may affect international businesses decisions on whether to select a forum in the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), this Court granted certiorari to decide a question that had divided the lower courts: whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits the imposition of class arbitration when the parties' agreement is silent regarding class arbitration. The Court was unable to reach that question, however, because a plurality concluded that the arbitrator first needed to address whether the agreement there was in fact “silent.” That threshold obstacle is not present in this case, and the question presented here - which continues to divide the lower courts - is the same one presented in Bazzle:

Whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are silent on that issue is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.

The Respondent in this case, AnimalFeeds International Corp., (“AnimalFeeds”) entered into international maritime agreements with the Petitioners parcel tanker transportation companies, Stolt-Nielsen SA, Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd., Odjfell ASA, Odjfell Seachem AS, Odjfell USA, Inc., Jo Tankers B.V., Jo Tankers, Inc., and Tokyo Marine Ltd.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

· Wex: Law about Admiralty

· Wex: Law about Arbitration

· American Arbitration Association's Policy on Class Arbitration

Submit for publication
0

The Dutra Group v. Batterton

Issues

Are punitive damages available in personal­‑injury suits involving a breach of a general maritime duty?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the Jones Act allows punitive damages to be awarded in a personal‑injury suit involving a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. The Dutra Group contends that Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that the Jones Act bars punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases because it does so in negligence cases, and they are simply alternative causes of actions for the same injury. The Dutra Group also argues that punitive damages were not historically awarded in pre-Jones Act unseaworthiness cases. Christopher Batterton counters that punitive damages have traditionally been available in general maritime claims at common law and that the Jones Act did alter the remedies available in general maritime suits prior to its enactment. Additionally, Batterton asserts that the Jones Act allows for recovery of punitive damages under certain circumstances. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it has implications on the American maritime industry’s ability to compete with the foreign maritime industry, as allowing recovery for punitive damages could increase the business costs and sales prices.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether punitive damages may be awarded to a Jones Act seaman in a personal‑injury suit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.

Respondent, Christopher Batterton, worked as a deckhand on a ship owned and managed by the Dutra Group, Petitioner. Batterton v. Dutra Group at 4. In a work accident, pressurized air blew a hatch cover open, crushing Batterton’s left hand and leaving him permanently disabled.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to maritime law