punitive damages

Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend

Issues

Can a seaman recover punitive damages if he is injured on the job and his employer refuses to pay for his medical treatment and lost wages?

 

Edgar L. Townsend, a seaman, was injured while working aboard his ship. His employers refused to supply him with maintenance and cure, which covers medical care and wages for injured seamen, in violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general maritime law.  Townsend sought punitive damages for this refusal. Townsend's employers sought declaratory relief on the punitive damages claim, arguing that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), prohibited all claims of punitive damages under general maritime law, because they are not specified in the Jones Act, and because punitive damages are non-pecuniary. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that while Miles's reasoning is meant to provide uniformity in the application of the Jones Act and general maritime law, the holding of Miles addressed only loss of society damages in a wrongful death suit; it did not address punitive damages in a maintenance and cure claim. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that they were still bound by their prior ruling in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987), which specifically allows for the recovery of punitive damages. There is currently a circuit split on the issue, as the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts have awarded punitive damages as a remedy for failure to provide maintenance and cure, while the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts have applied the Miles uniformity principle and awarded only pecuniary damages. The Supreme Court's holding in this case will settle the circuit split and decide whether courts may award punitive damages in maintenance and cure claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a seaman recover punitive damages for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure? The Eleventh Circuit's decision below holds in the affirmative, but conflicts with the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well as two state courts of last resort, the reasoning of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), and Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).

Edgar L. Townsend was a seaman and crew member on a ship called the Motor Tug Thomas. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282, 1283 (11th Cir.

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Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker

Issues

Is a ship's owner subject to punitive damages for the acts of the ship's master if the court hasn't found that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in those acts and the acts went against the owner's established policies?

If Congress has enacted a controlling statute that provides civil and criminal penalties for certain maritime conduct but does not provide for punitive damages, can a court impose punitive damages for the conduct under federal maritime common law?

Does federal maritime law allow punitive damages as high as those in this case?

 

In 1989 the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, off the Alaska coast, spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. In the years following the spill, Exxon would pay millions of dollars in private claims and over a billion dollars to settle government suits under environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). An additional class action suit by private parties sought compensatory damages for economic harm, as well as punitive damages (a civil penalty for particularly egregious conduct). In the final suit, an Alaska district court awarded roughly $20 million in compensatory damages against Exxon-and $5 billion in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit eventually reduced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion but upheld the decision to award such damages. Exxon now asks the United States Supreme Court to strike down the award of punitive damages or reduce its amount. In addressing Exxon's petition, the Court must set maritime law standards for punitive damage awards against a ship's owner for acts of the ship's master. The Court will also consider whether Congress meant penalties under the CWA to be the full punishment for a spill, excluding punitive damages under maritime law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. May punitive damages be imposed under maritime law against a shipowner (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits) for the conduct of a ship's master at sea, absent a finding that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in that conduct, and even when the conduct was contrary to policies established and enforced by the owner?

2. When Congress has specified the criminal and civil penalties for maritime conduct in a controlling statute, here the Clean Water Act, but has not provided for punitive damages, may judge-made federal maritime law (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits) expand the penalties Congress provided by adding a punitive damages remedy?

3. Is this $2.5 billion punitive damages award, which is larger than the total of all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal appellate courts in our history, within the limits allowed by federal maritime law?

The following facts are taken from Exxon v. Baker, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007); Baker v. Exxon, 270 F.3d.1215 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F.Supp.2d 1043 (D.Alaska 2002); and the Encyclopedia of the Earth:

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Trevor W. Morrison, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and W. Bradley Wendel for their insights into the Exxon v. Baker case.

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Opati v. Republic of Sudan

Issues

Can the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply retroactively so that plaintiffs can seek punitive damages against a foreign state for terrorist activities that were carried out prior to the enactment of the current version of the statute?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether it can retroactively apply portions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to impose punitive damages on a foreign nation. Monicah Opati seeks to recover punitive damages from the Republic of Sudan for its role in al Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings. Opati contends that under Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Act’s immunity exception for foreign states applies retroactively, thereby reaching the al Qaeda bombings even though they occurred prior to the current statute’s enactment. The Republic of Sudan counters that Altmann does not apply here; and, the FSIA’s plaint text does not allow plaintiffs such as Opati to recover punitive damages retroactively under the Act’s immunity exception for foreign states. This case’s outcome implicates the amount of deference given to political branches and could change the balance between plaintiffs suing under FSIA and defendant foreign states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies retroactively, thereby permitting recovery of punitive damages under 28 U.S. § 1605A(c) against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the statute.

In August 1998, al Qaeda, a terrorist organization, launched bomb attacks outside the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Owens v. Republic of Sudan at 762. These attacks killed many U.S. citizens who were government employees and contractors. Id.

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Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams

Issues

1. Whether, when the Supreme Court remands a case and instructs a state court to apply a constitutional standard, the state court can then decide the case using a procedural rule not previously mentioned in litigation.

2. Whether punitive damages 97 times greater than compensatory damages can be awarded based on the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct rather than the harm actually suffered by the plaintiff.

Court below

 

In 1997, Mayola Williams’s husband Jesse Williams died from lung cancer as a result of smoking cigarettes manufactured and marketed by Philip Morris USA Inc. Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris alleging negligence, strict product liability, and fraud. At trial, the court rejected Philip Morris’s request for a jury instruction on punitive damages which stated that Philip Morris could not be punished for harms suffered by nonparties. The jury awarded Williams $79.5 million dollars in punitive damages. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams (“Williams II”), the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court upholding this award and instructed the lower court to apply its standard of prohibiting punishment of a defendant for damage to nonparties. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld its decision, finding that a state procedural law not previously addressed justified the trial judge’s denial of the requested instruction. In this case, the Court will decide whether a lower court can decline to apply a standard that the Court has articulated and instead uphold its ruling on state procedural law grounds. This decision will affect the Supreme Court’s institutional supremacy and state courts’ treatment of punitive damages awards.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When this case was last before it, this Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and held that due process precludes a jury from imposing punitive damages to punish for alleged injuries to persons other than the plaintiff. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). This Court then remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court with directions to “apply the [constitutional] standard we have set forth.” Ibid. On remand, however, the Oregon Supreme Court refused to follow this Court’s directive. Instead, the Oregon court “adhered to” the judgment that this Court had vacated because it found that Philip Morris had procedurally defaulted under state law and thereby forfeited its claim of federal constitutional error. App., infra, 22a.

The questions presented—the second of which was accepted for review but not reached when this case was last before the Court—are:

1. Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose—for the first time in the litigation—a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

2. Whether a punitive damages award that is 97 times the compensatory damages may be upheld on the ground that the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct can “override” the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plaintiffs harm.

In 1950, Jesse Williams began smoking cigarettes and eventually smoked three packs a day of Marlboros, which are manufactured and marketed by Philip Morris USA Inc. (“Philip Morris”). See Brief for Petitioner, Philip Morris USA Inc.

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Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams

Issues

  1. Among the three guideposts that courts should consider when reviewing punitive damages, can the high degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and the similarity between the punitive damages award and authorized civil penalties in comparable cases supersede the consideration that punitive damages should be proportionate to the harm suffered by the plaintiff?
  2. Can a jury punish a defendant for harms suffered by non-parties without violating due process?
Court below

 

Mayola Williams brought suit against Philip Morris U.S.A. alleging that Philip Morris fraudulently and negligently caused the death of her husband, who smoked Philip Morris cigarettes for over forty years. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a trial jury’s punitive damages award of $79.5 million. Philip Morris contends that the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive because it was not reasonably related to Mr. Williams’ injuries. Williams argues that the Oregon Supreme Court was within its discretion to affirm the trial jury’s punitive damages award because the award conformed with many of the guidelines for determining reasonable damages, and those guidelines are the most important factor. This decision will impact punitive damages calculation in product liability and other tort cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether, in reviewing a jury’s award of punitive damages, an appellate court’s conclusion that a defendant’s conduct was highly reprehensible and analogous to a crime can “override” the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the Plaintiff’s harm.
  2. Whether due process permits a jury to punish a defendant for the effects of its conduct on non-parties.

Jesse Williams died from cancer as a result of smoking Philip Morris brand cigarettes for over forty years. Williams v. Philip Morris, 340 Or. 35, 38 (2006).

Additional Resources

  • Charles Lane, Justices To Rule on Punitive Damages, Wash. Post, May. 31, 2006, at D01
  • Brief of the American Tort Reform Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 126 S.Ct. 2329 (2006) (No. 05-1256).
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punitive damages

Overview

Punitive damages are awarded in addition to actual damages in certain circumstances. Punitive damages are considered punishment and are typically awarded at the court's discretion when the defendant's behavior is found to be especially harmful. Punitive damages are normally not awarded in the context of a breach of contract claim. See e.g. O'Gilvie Minors v.

The Dutra Group v. Batterton

Issues

Are punitive damages available in personal­‑injury suits involving a breach of a general maritime duty?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the Jones Act allows punitive damages to be awarded in a personal‑injury suit involving a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. The Dutra Group contends that Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that the Jones Act bars punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases because it does so in negligence cases, and they are simply alternative causes of actions for the same injury. The Dutra Group also argues that punitive damages were not historically awarded in pre-Jones Act unseaworthiness cases. Christopher Batterton counters that punitive damages have traditionally been available in general maritime claims at common law and that the Jones Act did alter the remedies available in general maritime suits prior to its enactment. Additionally, Batterton asserts that the Jones Act allows for recovery of punitive damages under certain circumstances. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it has implications on the American maritime industry’s ability to compete with the foreign maritime industry, as allowing recovery for punitive damages could increase the business costs and sales prices.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether punitive damages may be awarded to a Jones Act seaman in a personal‑injury suit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.

Respondent, Christopher Batterton, worked as a deckhand on a ship owned and managed by the Dutra Group, Petitioner. Batterton v. Dutra Group at 4. In a work accident, pressurized air blew a hatch cover open, crushing Batterton’s left hand and leaving him permanently disabled.

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