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Campos-Chaves v. Garland

Issues

When providing notice to an immigrant in deportation proceedings, does the government comply with its obligations under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) by providing a Notice to Appear with no date and location and a subsequent, updated Notice of Hearing including that information?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government complies with the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)) (“INA”) when it provides notice of deportation proceedings in a separate document from their date and time. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), the government must provide “written notice” to undocumented immigrants who are subject to deportation. This “written notice” is provided in a document called a “notice to appear” (“NTA”) and must include the “time and place” of the proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). However, the government routinely sends two documents: one NTA to alert the immigrant about the removal proceedings, and another Notice of Hearing (“NOH”) to communicate the time and place of the hearing. Campos-Chaves argues that this scheme violates the INA because the statute requires this information to be provided in one document. The United States argues that it complies with the INA because its disjunctive language permits dual-document notice and because a curative NOH overcomes a defective NTA. This case touches on important questions regarding fair notice to immigrants in deportation proceedings and judicial economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the government provides notice “required under” and “in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information, such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order.

Moris Campos-Chaves (“Campos-Chaves”) is a citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization on January 24, 2005. Campos-Chaves v. Garland at 1-2. On February 10, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS” or “government”) served Campos-Chaves with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), initiating deportation proceedings against him. Id. at 2. This NTA did not contain the time and place of his deportation hearing.

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Irizarry v. United States

Issues

Is a district court required to provide a defendant with notice of its intent to depart from the sentence range established by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, if the grounds for departure are not identified in either the presentence investigation report or the Government's presentencing hearing submissions?

 

In 2001 Leah Smith obtained a divorce from and restraining against her former husband, Richard Irizarry, for spousal abuse. Between the divorce in 2001 and 2003, Irizarry sent Ms. Smith 255 e-mails, several threatening to kill Ms. Smith and her family. In 2003, Irizarry was arrested. Irizarry pleaded guilty to making threatening interstate communications to his ex-wife. As a result, he was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, a sentence nine months longer than the maximum sentence recommended by Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced Irizarry to the maximum amount of time allow under the statute, because of the likelihood Irizarry would continue threatening his ex-wife. Irizarry objected to the sentence because the court failed to give advance notice of its intent to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h) ("Rule 32(h)"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, determining that Rule 32(h) does not apply to such sentence variances. In the Supreme Court, Irizarry argues that his sentence should be overturned because Rule 32(h) requires a district court to give the parties notice any time it intends to depart from the sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on a ground not previously identified in the presentence report or a government submission.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h), and the holding in Burns v.United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) requiring a court to provide reasonable notice to the parties that it is contemplating a departure from the applicable sentencing guideline range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing submission, has any continuing application in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Richard Irizarry married Leah Smith in 1995. Irizarry was physically and mentally abusive to Smith and their son. In 2000, Smith left Irizarry and moved across the country and, in 2001, divorced Irizarry and obtained a restraining order against him. See United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). That year, Irizarry was arrested and sent to jail for violating the restraining order after he arrived at Smith's new apartment. See Brief of United States in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 3.
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Jones v. Flowers

Issues

When mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, is the government required to take additional steps to locate the owner before taking the property?

 

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to give “reasonably calculated” notice to inform an affected party of an upcoming governmental proceeding. The issue before the Court is whether, when mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, due process requires the government to take additional steps to locate the owner before taking the property. A holding that the government is required to take additional steps may subject the government to significant administrative burdens and undermine the process of transferring property rights. A holding that due process does not require the government to take additional steps may make property from tax sales more transferable, but may also deprive property owners of their constitutional right to due process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, does due process require the government to make any additional effort to locate the owner before taking the property?

 

In 1967 Gary Jones purchased a house in Little Rock, Arkansas. When he and his wife separated in 1993, his wife stayed in the house and he moved to a new address. Jones did not notify the tax authority of his new address. After both Joneses failed to pay taxes on the house, the Commissioner of State Lands sent a notice to Gary Jones’ last known address via certified mail. The notice stated that the property would be subject to a public sale if Jones did not pay the delinquent taxes and penalties.

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Peake v. Sanders

Issues

Is a failure to give required notice to a veteran claiming disability benefits presumptively prejudicial?

 

Woodrow Sanders and Patricia Simmons are U.S. military veterans who did not receive notice regarding who was responsible for obtaining evidence for their disability claims as is required by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000. At issue in this consolidated case is whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) presumptively bears the burden of proving that a notice error in such benefits claims was harmless. The veterans argue that the language of 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) and the pro-claimant structure of the veterans benefits system create a presumptive burden on the VA. The VA argues that the Supreme Court should interpret the statute according to the prejudicial error rule of the Administrative Procedure Act5 U.S.C. § 706; this interpretation would require a claimant to prove that a VA notice error actually harmed the outcome of his or her claim. A Supreme Court ruling in favor of the veterans would bolster the pro-claimant system, making it easier for veterans to successfully bring claims. A decision for the veterans, however, could slow down the processing of deserving claims because the VA would have to defend its denial of claims where there was a notice error, but where the claimant did not suffer any harm from the error.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096, requires the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to provide a notice to benefits claimants. Under 38 U.S.C. 7261(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005), review of administrative decisions resolving claims for veterans benefits must “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.” The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a failure of the VA to give the notice required by the VCAA must be presumed to be prejudicial.

This case involves two consolidated decisions issued by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans ClaimsSee 38 U.S.C.

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Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service

Issues

Do the notice requirements related to an Internal Revenue Service summons on third parties apply only when the delinquent taxpayer has an interest in the records, or to all third-party summons for records?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the notice requirements of I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) apply only when a delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the summonsed records, or if they apply broadly to summons issued for anyone’s records whenever they could be helpful in collecting a delinquent taxpayer’s liability. Hanna Karcho Polselli argues that the textual interpretation of the provision supports a legal interest requirement because such a reading gives meaning to other provisions in the statute. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) counters that such a requirement is contrary to both the text of the statute and Congressional intentions when enacting the statute. The outcome of this case will determine the extent to which the privacy of the general public is protected from the government’s ability to summons information in its investigation and collection of tax liability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the exception in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the notice requirements for an Internal Revenue Service summons on third-party recordkeepers applies only when the delinquent taxpayer owns or has a legal interest in the summonsed records, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has held, or whether the exception applies to a summons for anyone’s records whenever the IRS thinks that person’s records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer’s liability, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th and 7th Circuits have held.

The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) determined that Remo Polselli had underpaid his federal taxes by over $2 million throughout the course of a decade. Polselli v. United States Dep’t of Treasury-Internal Revenue Serv., at 620. After beginning an investigation to locate Polselli’s assets, the IRS determined that Polselli had used other legal entities in an attempt to prevent asset collection. Id.

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Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.

Issues

Does the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act require that an applicant must provide the sponsor with 180 days’ notice before the applicant starts to market its biosimilar product? In addition, if 180 days’ notice is required, may the sponsor seek an injunctive remedy precluding marketing of the biosimilar until the 180 days’ notice period runs?   

This case presents the Supreme Court the opportunity to determine how to construe the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”). Specifically, this case focuses on the notice requirements of the BPCIA and asks whether notice of marketing a biosimilar must be provided 180 days after the approval of the biosimilar but before the marketing of the product. In addition, if the Court determines that notice is required after approval, but before marketing, the Court must decide what remedies are proper to correct the improper notice. Pointing to the BPCIA’s purpose, Sandoz Inc. argues that notice is only required 180 days before marketing; and, that injunctions are improper remedies to correct any potential notice-fault. In contrast, Amgen Inc. also points to the BPCIA’s purpose to argue that notice can only be effective if made after FDA approval; and, that the only way to provide a meaningful remedy would be to allow an injunction. Depending on the Court’s holding, this case could impact the balance between innovation and affordability in the biologics market.        

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act created a streamlined pathway for the licensure of biological products that are “biosimilar” to or “interchangeable” with a previously approved biological product, known as a reference product. 42 U.S.C. §262(k). Congress enacted a detailed procedure for the resolution of patent disputes between §262(k) applicants and reference product manufacturers, known as sponsors. Id. §262(l). The petitions present two questions concerning whether the §262(l) framework is mandatory or optional for applicants:

1. Is an applicant required to provide the sponsor with 180 days’ notice after licensure and before it be- gins marketing its biosimilar product, and may a court enforce that duty by ordering the applicant not to market its product until 180 days after a post-licensure no- tice? 

2. Is an applicant required to provide the sponsor with a copy of its biologics license application and related manufacturing information, and may a court issue an order enforcing that duty? 

In 2010 Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act which enacted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”). Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir.

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