sentencing guidelines

Dorsey v. United States (11-5683); Hill v. United States

Issues

Does the FSA apply to all sentencings occurring after its effective date or only to crimes committed after the statute became effective?

 

On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which reduced the disparity between the amounts of crack and powder cocaine required to trigger certain minimum mandatory sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioners Edward Dorsey and Corey Hill were both arrested for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute prior to the FSA’s passage, but were both sentenced after the FSA was enacted. Under the pre-FSA guidelines, they received ten-year prison sentences, but under the new FSA guidelines, both would have received substantially shorter prison sentences. Dorsey, Hill, and the United States government all argue that Congress intended for the FSA to apply immediately, and therefore, all prisoners sentenced after August 3, 2010, including Dorsey and Hill, should have been sentenced according to the FSA. Miguel Estrada, a court-appointed amicus curiae writing in support of the judgments below, argues that nothing indicates that Congress intended for immediate effectiveness and that the federal Saving Statute prevents retroactive application of new statutes that would eliminate previously incurred penalties. The decision in these cases will have implications for the consistent application of the FSA to prisoners falling within this particular sentencing window, as well as potential social costs and burdens on the justice system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Hill v. United States:

Whether the District Court erred in not sentencing Hill pursuant to the FSA where he was sentenced on December 2, 2010 after the Act’s effective date and the Sentencing Guideline amendments it mandated?

In Dorsey v. United States:

Did the Seventh Circuit err when, in conflict with the First and Eleventh Circuits, it held that the FSA does not apply to all defendants sentenced after its enactment?

In 1986, Congress established a tiered system of mandatory five- and ten-year prison sentences for drug-trafficking offenses. See Brief of the United States in support of Petitioners at 4. Congress was concerned about the proliferation of crack cocaine. See 

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Hughes v. United States

Issues

Is a defendant who pleads guilty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) eligible for sentence reduction when the pertinent Sentencing Guideline range is later modified by an amendment?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Erik Hughes is eligible for a sentence reduction even though he pled guilty with a binding sentence agreement. Hughes pled guilty to drug and firearm charges and received a 180-month sentence, which, at the time, was just below the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines of between 188 and 235 months. Since his sentencing, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, reducing the sentencing range for Hughes’s crime to between 151 and 188 months. Hughes sought to modify his sentence under 15 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which requires a sentence to be based on the Guidelines. The Eleventh Circuit denied modification based on Freeman v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that sentences from plea deals are not based on the Guidelines, but Hughes contends that the circuit court incorrectly applied the 4-1-4 decision. Hughes also argues that he is eligible for a modification because his sentence is based on the Guidelines under a tort theory of proximate cause. The United States responds that the connection between the Guidelines, the plea agreement, and the sentencing is too tenuous. At stake are an important question of what portions of a plurality decision should bind lower courts, potential inequities regarding parties who may and may not have their sentences reduced, and a shift in power in plea negotiations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, as a four-justice plurality in Freeman v. United States concluded, a defendant who enters into a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if there is a later, retroactive amendment to the relevant Sentencing Guidelines range.

In 2013, the federal government charged Erik Hughes with four counts of drug and firearm offenses. United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1010 (2017). Subsequently, Hughes and the government reached a plea agreement whereby Hughes plead guilty to two counts, conspiracy with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm as a felon, in exchange for a sentence of 180 months in prison. Id.

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Irizarry v. United States

Issues

Is a district court required to provide a defendant with notice of its intent to depart from the sentence range established by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, if the grounds for departure are not identified in either the presentence investigation report or the Government's presentencing hearing submissions?

 

In 2001 Leah Smith obtained a divorce from and restraining against her former husband, Richard Irizarry, for spousal abuse. Between the divorce in 2001 and 2003, Irizarry sent Ms. Smith 255 e-mails, several threatening to kill Ms. Smith and her family. In 2003, Irizarry was arrested. Irizarry pleaded guilty to making threatening interstate communications to his ex-wife. As a result, he was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, a sentence nine months longer than the maximum sentence recommended by Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced Irizarry to the maximum amount of time allow under the statute, because of the likelihood Irizarry would continue threatening his ex-wife. Irizarry objected to the sentence because the court failed to give advance notice of its intent to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h) ("Rule 32(h)"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, determining that Rule 32(h) does not apply to such sentence variances. In the Supreme Court, Irizarry argues that his sentence should be overturned because Rule 32(h) requires a district court to give the parties notice any time it intends to depart from the sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on a ground not previously identified in the presentence report or a government submission.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h), and the holding in Burns v.United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) requiring a court to provide reasonable notice to the parties that it is contemplating a departure from the applicable sentencing guideline range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing submission, has any continuing application in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Richard Irizarry married Leah Smith in 1995. Irizarry was physically and mentally abusive to Smith and their son. In 2000, Smith left Irizarry and moved across the country and, in 2001, divorced Irizarry and obtained a restraining order against him. See United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). That year, Irizarry was arrested and sent to jail for violating the restraining order after he arrived at Smith's new apartment. See Brief of United States in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 3.
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Rosales-Mireles V. United States

Issues

Should the Supreme Court correct a sentencing error where a prisoner’s criminal history is miscalculated, but the imposed sentence falls within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ range?

To aid the courts in sentencing defendants, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommend prison sentences based on defendants’ criminal histories. When a probation officer miscalculated convicted defendant Rosales-Mireles’s criminal history, the error bumped Rosales-Mireles into a sentencing category with a longer recommended imprisonment range. However, he ultimately received a sentence that overlapped with the range of the appropriate sentencing category. Rosales-Mireles contends that allowing such plain errors in criminal history calculations damages the fairness of the judicial process, and undermines the Guidelines’ purpose of uniform sentencing. The Government counters that requiring remand would erode courts’ discretion and impose a heavy financial burden on the Government. The Court must decide if integrity of the judiciary is better preserved by correcting a sentencing error or adhering to standard criminal procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in order to meet the standard for plain error review set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano that "[t]he Court of Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’” it is necessary, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit required, that the error be one that “would shock the conscience of the common man, serve as a powerful indictment against our system of justice, or seriously call into question the competence or integrity of the district judge.”

In January 2010, Florencio Rosales-Mireles, a Mexican citizen, was convicted of aggravated assault in Texas state court, and was subsequently sent back to Mexico. Brief for Respondent, United States of America at 4. In 2015, after illegally reentering the United States, Rosales-Mireles was again arrested in Texas.

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