section 1983

Connick v. Thompson

Issues

Is a single failure by prosecutors to provide exculpatory evidence to a defendant sufficient to establish failure-to-train liability against a District Attorney’s office?

 

John Thompson was wrongfully imprisoned for 18 years following a trial during which the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Thompson brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the district attorney's office is liable for failing to properly train its employees on the requirements of Brady. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of assigning liability to the district attorney's office. Petitioners, including District Attorney Harry Connick, appealed to the Supreme Court. Connick claims that there was no obvious need to train prosecutors regarding Brady standards and that liability should not attach to the office when there was no notice that the training program needed reform. Respondent Thompson contends that the prosecutors’ lack of training amounted to a deliberate indifference to preserving constitutional rights and that liability may properly attach to the district attorney's office without a past history of violations. This decision will determine the extent to which a municipality may be liable for a single action by one of its employees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district attorney's office for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous culpability and causation standards of Canton and Bryan County?

In April 1985, shortly before his murder trial, a Louisiana state court convicted Respondent John Thompson of attempted armed robbery. See Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2009). Several weeks later in May 1985, the same court convicted Thompson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. See Thompson v. Connick, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29717 at *2 (E.D. La.

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Additional Resources

· Wex: Brady Rule

· Law.com, Tony Mauro: Clement Lines Up Ex-Prosecutors, Seeks Argument Time in Misconduct Case (Aug. 25, 2010)

· New Orleans Times-Picayune, Katy Reckdahl: Appeals Court Upholds $14 Million Judgment Against Orleans DA Office (Dec. 20, 2008)

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Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee

Issues

Does Title IX’s implied right of action provide an exclusive remedy for claims of gender discrimination in federally-funded academic institutions, therefore limiting the right to bring a separate claim for a violation of constitutional right to Equal Protection?

 

Lisa and Robert Fitzgerald brought suit against the Barnstable School Committee (“Barnstable”) under both § 1983 and Title IX, claiming the district was deliberately indifferent to their daughter’s claims of sexual harassment by an older student on her school bus. Neither the police nor the school’s own investigation found enough evidence to charge or punish the alleged perpetrator. The federal district court dismissed the Fitzgeralds’ Title IX sexual discrimination claim on summary judgment. The court indicated that because Title IX prescribed the remedy for allegations of sexual discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, it foreclosed a separate § 1983 claim alleging a violation of a constitutional right to Equal Protection. The Fitzgeralds claim there are fundamental differences between the rights of action in § 1983 and Title IX, and that a statute intended to expand rights would never limit a constitutional right of action. Barnstable, however, maintains that Congress’s efforts to pass Title IX represented an entirely separate standard to govern sex discrimination in schools. Women’s rights groups claim that a decision to foreclose liability under § 1983 will make it more difficult to bring claims of sexual discrimination in educational institutions, while Barnstable claims that maintaining both causes of action would overexpose educational institutions to suits for violations committed by individuals, rather than just the institution itself.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), has been interpreted to provide an implied private right of action for sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates an express remedy for violations of the U.S. Constitution. Three courts of appeals have held that Title IX’s implied remedy does not foreclose Section 1983 claims to enforce the Constitution’s prohibition against invidious sex discrimination. In contrast, four circuits, including the First Circuit in this case, have held that Title IX’s implied right of action is the exclusive remedy for sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions.

The question presented is:

Whether Title IX’s implied right of action precludes Section 1983 constitutional claims to remedy sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions.

After several months of displaying atypical behavior, kindergartner Jacqueline Fitzgerald reported to her parents (the “Fitzgeralds”) in February 2001 that an older student on her school bus was harassing her by forcing her to lift her skirt when she wore dresses. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 504 F.3d 165, 169 (1st Cir.

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Additional Resources

· U.S. Department of Education—Title IX and Sexual Discrimination http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html

· Workplace Prof Blog: Another Right Without a Remedy on the Way: Court Grants Cert in the Title IX Preclusion/Peer Sex Harassment Case (June 9, 2008)

· Comment from Lisa and Robert Fitzgerald in The Flat Hat, student newspaper at The College of William & Mary http://flathatnews.com/content/68983/supreme-court-will-hear-title-ix-case

· Criticism of U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee: http://www.openmarket.org/2008/07/22/fitzgerald-v-barnstable-school-committee-a-stealth-assault-on-the-state-action-doctrine/

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Los Angeles County v. Humphries

Issues

Whether all claims for relief against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including claims for declaratory or prospective relief, are subject to the Monell requirement that the plaintiff prove that the constitutional injury was inflicted as a result of a policy, custom, or practice of the municipality.

 

In 2001, Craig and Wendy Humphries were arrested on child abuse charges and listed in California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI"), which is organized under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act ("CANRA"). All charges against the Humphrieses were dismissed, and the Humphrieses obtained an order declaring them factually innocent. However, the Humphrieses were unable to contest their listing in the CACI. The Humphrieses sued Los Angeles County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief establishing that CANRA and policies related to the CACI are unconstitutional because of the lack of procedures to challenge an individual's inclusion based on a substantiated claim. Los Angeles County argued that as a local government it had no control over CACI procedures because the state government created these policies. The Ninth Circuit sided with the Humphrieses and held that Los Angeles County's liability should be determined according the requirements established in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The Supreme Court must now decide whether claims for declaratory relief against a public entity are subject to the requirements of Monell.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Are claims for declaratory relief against a local public entity subject to the requirement of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) that the plaintiff demonstrate that the constitutional violation was the result of a policy, custom or practice attributable to the local public entity as determined by the First, Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, or are such claims exempt from Monell's requirement as determined by the Ninth Circuit?

2. May a plaintiff be a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for purposes of a fee award against a local public entity based upon a claim for declaratory relief where the plaintiff has not demonstrated that any constitutional violation was the result of a policy, custom or practice attributable to the public entity under Monell?

3. May a plaintiff be a prevailing party on a claim for declaratory relief for purposes of a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 where there is neither a formal order nor judgment granting declaratory relief, nor any other order altering the legal relationship between the parties in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff?

In March 2001, Craig Humphries' fifteen-year-old daughter S.H. stole his car and drove from California to her mother's home in Utah. See Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2009). S.H.

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Additional Resources

· Los Angeles Times, Carol J. Williams: Abuser List Tags Innocents, Too (Dec. 7, 2008)

· Education Week, Mark Walsh: Civil Rights Case Has Implications for Schools (Feb. 23, 2010)

· Examiner. com, Daniel Weaver: NC Court of Appeals Rules Procedure for Putting People on Child Abuse Register is Unconstitutional (Mar. 4, 2010)

· Cbsnews.com: Child Abuse Registry Hits Stumbling Blocks (Apr. 26, 2010)

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Messerschmidt v. Millender

Issues

Under what circumstances are police officers granted qualified immunity from civil lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an illegal search if they relied on a facially valid warrant later determined to be invalid and overbroad?

Should the Court reconsider the standard that the presumption that an officer acted reasonably by obtaining a warrant can be rebutted by showing that the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable”?

 

Petitioner, detective Curt Messerschmidt, obtained and executed a warrant to search Respondent Augusta Millender’s residence. Millender sued Messerschmidt and other law enforcement officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Messerschmidt and other officers violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by executing an invalid search warrant and unreasonably searching her home. The court determined that the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad. Messerschmidt contends that he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability because he relied on a warrant and acted in good faith. Millender, on the other hand, maintains that the officers’ reliance on the warrant was unreasonable, and therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. The decision will determine the scope of qualified immunity for officers who have, in good faith, relied on warrants later determined to be invalid.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Court has held that police officers who procure and execute warrants later determined invalid are entitled to qualified immunity, and evidence obtained should not be suppressed, so long as the warrant is not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 920, 923 (1984); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 344-45 (1986).

1. Under these standards, are officers entitled to qualified immunity where they obtained a facially valid warrant to search for firearms, firearm-related materials, and gang-related items in the residence of a gang member and felon who had threatened to kill his girlfriend and fired a sawed-off shotgun at her, and a district attorney approved the application, no factually on point case law prohibited the search, and the alleged over breadth in the warrant did not expand the scope of the search?

2. Should the Malley/Leon standards be reconsidered or clarified in light of lower courts' inability to apply them in accordance with their purpose of deterring police misconduct, resulting in imposition of liability on officers for good faith conduct and improper exclusion of evidence in criminal cases?

Shelly Kelly decided to end her romantic relationship with Jerry Ray Bowen, but she feared that Bowen might become physically violent. See Millender v. Messerschmidt, 620 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.

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Rehberg v. Paulk

Issues

Whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” in grand jury proceedings is entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim after presenting false testimony.

 

Relying on false testimony, three grand juries indicted Petitioner Charles Rehberg for varying charges. After the indictments were dismissed, Rehberg brought a private suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several parties, including Respondent James Paulk, who had testified before all three grand juries. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Paulk, an investigator in the district attorney’s office, was entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” is entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983. Rehberg argues that complaining witnesses were never given absolute immunity under common law, and that a lesser grant of qualified immunity is more appropriate under the circumstances. Paulk, on the other hand, contends that a decision to withhold absolute immunity will discourage public officials from giving complete and objective testimony before grand juries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), this Court held that law enforcement officials enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjured testimony that they provide at trial. But in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), this Court held that law enforcement officials are not entitled to absolute immunity when they act as “complaining witnesses” to initiate a criminal prosecution by submitting a legally invalid arrest warrant. The federal courts of appeals have since divided about how Briscoe and Malley apply when government officials act as “complaining witnesses” by testifying before a grand jury or at another judicial proceeding. The question presented in this case is: 

Whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” by presenting perjured testimony against an innocent citizen is entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim for civil damages.

Petitioner Charles Rehberg sent anonymous faxes parodying and criticizing the Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia, seeking to raise public awareness about the hospital’s unethical billing and accounting practices. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 835 (11th Cir. 2010).

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Safford Unified School District # 1 v. Redding

Issues

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires a stricter standard than reasonableness for student strip-searches, and if so, whether school officials conducting a strip-search have qualified immunity from suit for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

Safford middle school officials strip-searched thirteen-year-old Savana Redding, seeking prescription-strength ibuprofen pills based on uncorroborated information from another student that Savana possessed ibuprofen in an unspecified time and location. This case concerns whether the school violated Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and, if so, whether qualified immunity shields the school officials from liability. After a District Court and a Ninth Circuit panel found the search to be lawful, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc; it reversed and held that qualified immunity did not protect the school official who ordered the search. Petitioners Safford Unified School District #1, et al. argue that the search was reasonable given the fellow student's tip and the threat of prescription drug abuse, but that even if it was not, school officials must have qualified immunity so they are free to exercise their judgment regarding drug abuse in schools. They argue that a decision in Respondent's favor would hamper school officials' ability to respond in the face of threats to student safety in school. Respondent April Redding argues that a strip search was unreasonable because the school lacked any indication that Savana had pills hidden in her undergarments, and that the school officials should be held responsible. She argues that a decision for Petitioner would enable school officials to conduct highly invasive searches based on only minimal, vague suspicion. This case promises guidance both to school officials seeking to carry out their duties effectively without violating students' rights and to lower courts responsible for assessing school officials' conduct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public school officials from conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school policy.

(2) Whether the Ninth Circuit departed from established principles of qualified immunity in holding that a public school administrator may be liable in a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus.

In the fall of 2003, Safford Middle School officials were concerned about the distribution of prescription and over-the-counter-drugs among students. See Redding v. Safford Unified School District 531 F.3d 1071, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008). Bringing medicine on campus without permission violated school rules, and a student had recently become ill after ingesting a pill he allegedly received from a classmate.

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Thompson v. Clark

Issues

Does the favorable termination element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure require a plaintiff to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that affirmatively indicates the plaintiff’s innocence?  

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the “favorable termination” element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure requires a petitioner to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that is consistent with his innocence. Petitioner Larry Thompson brought a Section 1983 claim against his arresting officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights after his criminal charges were dismissed “in the interest of justice,” with no further explanation regarding Thompson’s innocence or guilt. Thompson claims that his criminal proceedings terminated favorably, but Respondent Paigel Clark—an arresting police officer— argues that Thompson failed to meet this requirement, asserting that charges must be dismissed in a way that affirmatively indicates innocence. This case has important implications for the future of Section 1983 claims, prosecutorial discretion, and police officer accountability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls.

In January 2014, Petitioner Larry Thompson lived with his fiancé, their newborn child, and his fiancé’s sister, Camille Watson, in Brooklyn, New York. Thompson v. Clark at 182. One night, Watson noticed a rash on the newborn child and called 911 to report that Thompson was abusing his child. Id. When Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMT”) arrived, Thompson confronted them, telling them that no one in the apartment had called 911. Id.

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Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson

Issues

Can states avoid federal court review of a law that prohibits the right to abortion by delegating the enforcement of that law to the public through conferral of a civil cause of action?

This case asks the Court to determine whether the enforcement scheme of S.B. 8, Texas’s law prohibiting abortion providers from performing abortions once a fetal heartbeat has been detected, shields the law from review in federal court. S.B. 8 delegates the enforcement of the law to private citizens, allowing them to file civil claims against abortion providers. Petitioner Whole Woman’s Health challenges the law in federal court, seeking to enjoin Texas state officials—including judges and judicial clerks —from enforcing the law, because as members of the judiciary they would be required to adjudicate S.B. 8 claims. Respondents Judge Austin Jackson, and other state officials, reply that, because the law explicitly delegates enforcement to private citizens, they cannot be enjoined from performing judicial functions under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. The case has significant implications for accessing abortions and for protecting constitutional rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state can insulate from federal-court review a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional right by delegating to the general public the authority to enforce that prohibition through civil actions.

In 2021, Texas enacted a law which, in part, prohibits physicians from performing abortions on pregnant women once the fetus has a discernable heartbeat. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson I, at 4–5. The law, referred to as Senate Bill 8 (“S.B.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Deborah Dinner, Riley Keenan, and Michael Dorf for their insight and guidance in this case.

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