COMMERCE POWER

Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause refers to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among states, and with the Indian tribes.”

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon

Issues

Are airline cargo loaders and their supervisors, who load and unload goods from planes that cross international or interstate borders but do not physically transport such goods themselves, “transportation workers” who are exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether an airline ramp supervisor is exempt from arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Federal Arbitration Act codifies the federal policy for disputes to go through arbitration, exempting workers that engage in interstate commerce. Southwest Airlines argues that Saxon must resolve her dispute through arbitration because Saxon is not an exempt employee under the Act. Saxon argues that her work as a ramp supervisor includes loading and unloading cargo that travels interstate, so she is exempt from mandatory arbitration. The outcome of this case has implications for defining the limits of the Federal Arbitration Act and how courts define a worker operating in interstate commerce.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether workers who load or unload goods from vehicles that travel in interstate commerce, but do not physically transport such goods themselves, are interstate “transportation workers” exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act.

Latrice Saxon is a Southwest Airlines (“Southwest”) ramp supervisor that manages the loading and unloading of passenger luggage. Saxon v. Sw. Airlines Co. at 494. As a ramp supervisor, Saxon trains, supervises, and occasionally assists ramp agents with loading and unloading cargo. Id.

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Taylor v. United States

Issues

In a criminal case brought under the Hobbes Act, must the United States prove beyond a reasonable doubt that drugs targeted for robbery traveled through interstate commerce or otherwise affected interstate commerce?

 

The Supreme Court will clarify the interaction between the Hobbs Act of 1948 (“the Hobbs Act”) and Congress’ commerce power over intra-state activity. The Hobbs Act prohibits obstruction or delay of “the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts . . . to do [so].” Petitioner David Anthony Taylor was convicted in federal court for affecting interstate commerce by attempting to rob a marijuana dealer of his “drugs and drug proceeds.” Taylor argues that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his activity had any effect on interstate commerce, and thus he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process rights. However, the United States contends that the aggregation principle of the Commerce Clause grants federal jurisdiction over the activity as part of a “national market,” even if the stolen drugs remained entirely within one state. Consequently, the United States asserts that the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act is satisfied as a matter-of-law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In a federal criminal prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951: Is the government relieved of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the interstate commerce element by relying exclusively on evidence that the robbery or attempted robbery of a drug dealer is an inherent economic enterprise that satisfies as a matter of law, the interstate commerce element of the offense?

Roanoke, Virginia experienced a heightened level of crime between 2007 and 2010. See Brief for Petitioner, David Anthony Taylor at 4. Cocaine and marijuana trades enjoyed substantial profitability, leading to an associated increase in drug-related violence and robbery. See 

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