ENVIRONMENT

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether there is a trust relationship between the Navajo Nation (“the Nation) and the U.S. government regarding the Nation’s water rights. Arizona contends that the Nation’s claim infringes upon the Supreme Court’s retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the Colorado River mainstream in Arizona v. California. Furthermore, Arizona argues that the Nation has failed to state a cognizable breach-of-trust claim because the Nation did not specify a source of law establishing the government’s fiduciary duty. The Nation counters that the claim does not fall under the Supreme Court’s reserved jurisdiction because the Nation did not seek a quantification of its rights to the Colorado River mainstream. The Nation further contends that it has identified provisions in treaties, statutes, and the Winters doctrine to establish the trust duty on the federal government to ensure an adequate water supply for the Navajo Reservation. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for the Navajo Nation’s water resources, the stability of water rights, and the water allocation system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether private citizens can fashion their own cleanup remedies at federal “Superfund” sites. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, commonly known as “Superfund,” allows the Environmental Protection Agency to create cleanup plans for polluted sites across the nation. Gregory Christian and other resident landowners (“Landowners”) near the Superfund site of Anaconda, Montana, sued the owner of the site, Atlantic Richfield, alleging that the company owed them damages to restore their properties to pre-pollution status. Atlantic Richfield argues that the Superfund Act preempts any party from seeking state-law restoration damages. The Landowners counter that the Superfund Act leaves room for additional damages beyond what the Environmental Protection Agency has already deemed appropriate. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the certainty and finality of Superfund cleanups, private-property rights, and the balance of state and federal power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether pollution added to navigable waters through a nonpoint source is regulated by the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). A point source is a discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance that includes pipes, ditches, and other clearly discernable means from which pollutants are or can be discharged into navigable waters. County of Maui (“Maui”) contends that pollutants that enter navigable waters through nonpoint sources, like groundwater, are too attenuated to attach liability under the CWA. Maui argues that pollutants that enter navigable waters through nonpoint sources are not added “directly to” navigable water and thus fall outside the scope of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), the statute that codifies which pollutant discharges are subject to the CWA’s permit requirements. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund (“HWF”) counters that Maui’s reading is underinclusive and that the CWA’s intended purpose is to regulate pollutants not just added directly to navigable waters, but also those that were simply added to navigable waters. HWF argues that discharges of pollutants to nonpoint sources which then enter navigable waters fall within the meaning of “discharge of a pollutant” under the CWA. The outcome of this case has important implications for the continued viability of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System’s permit program, the divide between federal and state control of groundwater regulations, and the fiscal impact that the CWA has on individual landowners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether it should equitably apportion the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin between Georgia and Florida. There is a long history of conflict between the states over Georgia’s use of water from the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers. Florida argues that the Supreme Court should impose a water consumption cap on Georgia because Georgia’s unreasonable water consumption inflicts real harm on Florida and its ecosystems. Georgia counters that Florida is not entitled to relief in this original jurisdiction action because Florida has not proven that the consumption cap will provide effective redress and Florida has failed to include a necessary party in the litigation. Florida contends that Georgia’s water usage has caused a reduction in the flow of the Apalachicola River that has harmed the region’s oyster population damaging the regional economy. Moreover, Florida suggests that it is the Court’s duty to intervene and apportion the water rights equally between the two states. Georgia disputes that it harmed the oyster population and organizations supporting it argue that upstream states have no duty to maintain or protect water flows to benefit downstream states. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to review whether the Clean Water Act grants broad original and exclusive jurisdiction to the United States Courts of Appeals. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agency actions are judicially reviewable by the federal district courts unless otherwise provided by congressional statute. One such provision—Section 1369(b) of the Clean Water Act—enumerates classes of agency actions that are originally and exclusively reviewable by the Courts of Appeals. In June 2015, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency jointly adopted a new rule redefining the phrase “waters of the United States.” The National Association of Manufacturers argues that challenges to this rule fall outside of the classes enumerated in Section 1369(b) and thus are not directly reviewable by the Courts of Appeals. The Department of Defense and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, on the other hand, argue that Section 1369(b) should be read broadly and functionally as to include the rule. The outcome of this case will implicate judicial efficiency and thoroughness concerns.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This challenge to administrative action by numerous states, including Ohio (“Ohio et al.”) asks the Court to determine whether a stay of enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) default emissions regulations, named the “Good Neighbor Provision,” is appropriate, pending review of the legality of the EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Ohio et al. maintain that they are requesting a stay, which should be approved when considering the irreparable harm to state parties as a result of the implementation of the federal-default rule. Meanwhile, the EPA claims Ohio et al. are actually requesting an injunction, which should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Ohio et al. further argue that the agency’s disapproval of their state-level implementation plans was an “arbitrary and capricious” action because the EPA failed to consider that state courts would limit the applicability of the federal-implementation plan, leading to a less effective rule. The EPA counters that its consideration of the “reasonableness” of the plan was adequate at the time of its initial promulgation and that it was not required to consider subsequent legal action. The outcome of this case has significant implications regarding the transition to greener energy, specifically related to economic costs, and the success of environmental goals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Court to determine if the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority. Seven County Infrastructure Coalition contends that NEPA only requires an agency to consider effects with a “reasonably close causal relationship” to the agency’s proposed action. Eagle County, Colorado counters that NEPA requires an agency to consider reasonably foreseeable effects of an agency’s proposed action that include effects a “prudent person” would consider when reaching a decision. This case touches upon important questions regarding the balancing act between economic and other national concerns and environmental protection.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

In 2004, local youths broke into a Southern Union storage center that was improperly storing mercury; the incident resulted in a spill and cleanup effort. Southern Union was charged with storing hazardous waste without a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. After a jury found Southern Union guilty, the district court judge determined that the violation had continued for 762 days and imposed a fine of $38 million. On appeal, Southern Union argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi required that the jury determine the period of the violation, not the judge. Southern Union contends that if the determination of the period of violation is left to the judge, the court could impose a fine in excess of the actual violation, violating Southern Union’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In contrast, the United States asserts that Apprendi is not applicable because it dealt with deprivations of life and liberty interests, not the criminal fines that are at issue here. The decision in this case has implications for consistent treatment of defendants and the efficiency of courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

These two consolidated cases ask the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Mineral Leasing Act authorizes the United States Forest Service to grant a right-of-way under the national trail system. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Forest Service lacks authority to grant a right-of-way for a natural gas pipeline under the Appalachian Trail, which is administered by the National Park Service. The Forest Service and Atlantic Coast Pipeline, the respective Petitioners in each case, contend that the Forest Service has authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way under any trail that crosses through national forest land owned by the Forest Service. The Respondents, Cowpasture River Preservation Association et al., counter that the Appalachian Trail is National Park land and, accordingly, only Congress—not the Forest Service—may grant a right-of-way. The Court’s decision in these cases will influence future pipeline development, environmental preservation, and the economies of communities along the Appalachian Trail.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources