Part 8 of the Crimes Act (the “CA”) of New Zealand covers crimes against a person including homicide, infanticide, assault on a child, assault on persons in a family relationship, acid throwing, female genital mutilation, coerced marriage and abduction. Section 194 provides a maximum sentence of 2 years for an assault by a male against any female or for an assault against any child under the age of 14.

The Crimes Act (“the CA”) of New Zealand criminalizes offenses against the person, property and the public order and sets out punishments and defenses for such crimes. The CA applies to all offenses occurring within New Zealand and allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction over New Zealand citizens or residents who have committed certain offenses outside of New Zealand including sexual crimes against children and young persons outside New Zealand. Part 7 of the CA broadly defines sexual violence to include rape or the unlawful sexual connection with another person.

Chapter I Article 110 of the Peruvian Penal Code provides that a mother who kills her child during child birth will be punished by 1 to 4 years imprisonment or community service.

Peruvian Penal Code Title I: Crimes Against Life, Body, and Health, Chapter I: Homicide, Article 108-B: Femicide, punishes the crime of femicide with imprisonment of no less than 20 years. femicide means killing a woman because of her identity as a woman, and it applies in several contexts: family violence, coercion, harassment or sexual harassment, abuse of power, trust or any other position or relation which places the agent in a position of authority.

The appellant was convicted of femicide for killing a 17-year-old girl when she attempted to defend herself against his efforts to sexually assault her. The appellant argued on appeal that the facts did not support a finding that he was guilty of femicide, petitioned for the re-classification of his crime, and argued that his sentence should have been reduced because he had consumed alcohol before the events that led to the girl’s death.

In Labor Appeal No. 15216-2018, the plaintiff informed the defendant, who was her employer, that she was pregnant, at which time her employer granted her temporary leave. Then, she suffered a miscarriage and notified her employer. The defendant terminated the plaintiff not long after that, claiming she had not provided the requisite documentation about her pregnancy or miscarriage. On appeal, the defendant contended that the Superior Court erroneously interpreted and applied the law. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s arguments.

An employee alleged that her employer fired her because she was pregnant. The employer sought an annulment of the previous decisions. The Supreme Court rejected the employer’s request, acknowledging that although the law requires an employee to notify an employer of their pregnancy in writing, this requirement is not enforceable when the pregnancy is physically evident. The plaintiff sought nullification of her termination under Article 29(e) of the Legislative Decree No. 728, which renders employee terminations based on pregnancy null.

The Superior Tribunal sentenced the defendant of attempted femicide to 11 years imprisonment, barred him from exercising his parental, guardianship, and conservatorship rights, barred him from contacting the victim and her family for five years, and fined him. The Supreme Court did not alter the civil penalty or no-contact order. Still, it annulled the order barring the defendant’s parental, guardianship, and conservatorship rights because that order was unrelated to the facts.

In Exp. No. 03378-2019-PA/TC, the petitioner sought to annul a family court decision, upheld on appeal, which granted protective measures to the petitioner’s partner after she accused him of committing psychological violence against her. The Constitutional Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) explained that the petitioner’s fundamental rights to be heard and to defend himself were not absolute but were limited by the victim’s right to live a life free of violence.

The appellant brought a constitutional grievance appeal against the resolution issued by the Second Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima regarding the prosecutorial decisions made in her underlying rape case. The Constitutional Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) concluded that the internal-control offices’ dispositions did not sufficiently explain why an investigation against the local prosecutor was not pursued.