Issues

This challenge to administrative action by numerous states, including Ohio (“Ohio et al.”) asks the Court to determine whether a stay of enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) default emissions regulations, named the “Good Neighbor Provision,” is appropriate, pending review of the legality of the EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Ohio et al. maintain that they are requesting a stay, which should be approved when considering the irreparable harm to state parties as a result of the implementation of the federal-default rule. Meanwhile, the EPA claims Ohio et al. are actually requesting an injunction, which should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Ohio et al. further argue that the agency’s disapproval of their state-level implementation plans was an “arbitrary and capricious” action because the EPA failed to consider that state courts would limit the applicability of the federal-implementation plan, leading to a less effective rule. The EPA counters that its consideration of the “reasonableness” of the plan was adequate at the time of its initial promulgation and that it was not required to consider subsequent legal action. The outcome of this case has significant implications regarding the transition to greener energy, specifically related to economic costs, and the success of environmental goals.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Corner Post, Inc.’s (“Corner Post”) claim under the Administrative Procedure Act was barred under a particular statute of limitation, and whether that six-year statute began running 2011 when the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (“Federal Reserve”) published their regulation, or in 2018 when Corner Post was first founded and affected by it. Corner Post asserts that interpreting statutes of limitations to start when harm is inflicted on plaintiffs is consistent with historic models of statutory interpretation and fairness. The Federal Reserve counters that the statute in question was clear in its terms and intentions to give administrative agencies a distinct time period during which to expect legal challenges, and as such the six-year statute would begin with the promulgation of the regulation. The outcome of this case has serious implications for administrative law and statutory interpretation, particularly with respect to the practicability of suing agencies for long-standing policies.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for infringements over three years before the filing of a lawsuit if the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the infringement within three years of the filing of the lawsuit. Petitioners Warner Chappell Music, Inc., and Artist Publishing Group, LLC, contend that the discovery rule, which provides that a claim accrues when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the infringement, is inapplicable because the statute of limitations commences at the time of infringement, marking the completion of the cause of action. Additionally, Petitioners assert that applying the discovery rule would contravene Congress’s intent, as the language pertaining to the discovery rule is intentionally absent from the copyright provision. On the other hand, Respondents Nealy and Music Specialist, Inc. argue that Petitioners’ challenge on the discovery rule exceeds the scope of the issue presented to the Supreme Court, as the lower courts already presumed the application of the discovery rule in this case. Respondents also posit that introducing a separate damages bar—a cap on damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff—in federal copyright cases would undermine Congress’s purpose, as copyright law does not impose such a bar. This case will affect the scope of infringement cases initiated by copyright holders and alter the burden of proof for each party in future copyright cases.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) exemption includes employees who do not work within the transportation industry but conduct work related to transportation. Employee Petitioners argue that the Court should not adopt the Second Circuit's interpretation that industry is dispositive because doing so would be inconsistent with the ruling in Saxon. Additionally, Petitioners argue that Congress specifically phrased the statute to include all workers whose work aided the transportation industry. Employer Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the Court should consider industry as dispositive because this would be consistent with the ruling in Circuit City. Further, Respondents argue that workers who historically fell under similar acts passed by Congress have been those who worked within the transportation industry and—in the case of seamen—had employment contracts that distinguished them as such. This case touches on important questions regarding discrepant treatment of employees and the availability of arbitration as an alternative to judicial action. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify the ambit and enforceability of Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, also known as the Disqualification Clause, which states that “[n]o person shall. . . hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, who, having previously taken an oath. . . as an officer of the United States . . . to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same.” Former President Donald Trump contends that he is not subject to Section Three disqualification because he has not served as a qualifying oath–taking “officer of the United States”; because his actions on January 6th, 2021 were protected speech, not insurrection; and because the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of Section Three was legally incorrect. A group of Colorado electors and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold respond that the President is an “officer of the United States” such that Section Three applies to Trump; that Trump engaged in insurrection on January 6th, 2021 and does not qualify for First Amendment protection in that regard; and that the Colorado Supreme Court properly applied Section Three. This case has significant implications for democratic norms and institutions, parties’ and voters’ interests in elections, and the bounds of political activity.

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This case, along with its companion case Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, asks the Supreme Court to consider the government’s interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the reach and constitutionality of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Under Chevron, courts defer to reasonable executive agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. Relentless, Inc. contends that the partial industry funding component of the government’s at-sea monitors program relies on a faulty interpretation of the governing statute, and that Chevron deference itself is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers and an abdication of interpretive responsibility by the judiciary. The Department of Commerce counters that its interpretation of the statute is both correct and  entitled to deference. The outcome of this case could have seismic consequences for administrative law, statutory interpretation, and the balance of power between the federal judiciary and the administrative state.

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This case asks the court to determine whether investors may bring a private claim against an issuer under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for an omission without an associated misleading statement, known as a “pure omission,” based on the disclosure requirements set by Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K. Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation argues that investors cannot bring a private claim for a pure omission because the text and statutory context of § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Item 303 do not support such claims. In opposition, Moab Partners, L.P. argues that investors may bring a private claim for a pure omission because Supreme Court precedent and statutes comparable to § 10(b) indicate that investors may bring such claims. This case touches on important questions regarding disclosure requirements, issuer liability for omissions, and the suitability of enforcement of securities regulations through private lawsuits.

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This case, along with its companion case Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, brings before the Supreme Court the question whether the court should overrule, or at least strictly limit, its decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Under Chevron, courts defer to reasonable executive agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. Petitioner Loper Bright Enterprises argues that the Chevron decision contravenes the separation of powers by giving too much power to the executive branch. Respondent Raimondo counters that Chevron is a cornerstone of administrative law and is protected by the principles of stare decisis. The Court's decision on this matter will influence how effective the administrative agencies can regulate corporations and individual behavior and the balance of power between the federal judiciary and the administrative state.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Takings Clause allows a person whose property is taken without compensation to seek redress in court even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action. The Petitioners Devillier, et al. argue that the Takings Clause permits individuals to seek redress in court, as the Constitution implicitly bestows the procedural right when granting the substantive right to just compensation. The Petitioners further argue that both the constitutional text and the historical context of the just-compensation right support the recognition of such a right. On the other hand, Respondent State of Texas contends that the Takings Clause on its own does not establish a cause of action, asserting that Congress must provide such authorization before individuals can seek relief in court. The Respondent also argues that neither the text nor the historical background of the just-compensation right indicates an implied cause of action, pointing out that properties have historically been compensated through direct intervention by Congress for over a century. The outcome of this case has significant ramifications for the balance between state and federal court power, judicial and legislative power, and the substantive rights of property owners against the states.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State employs an expert who uses another expert’s notes as the basis of their own opinion. Jason Smith argues that the Confrontation Clause forbids the introduction of testimonial statements for their truth from expert witnesses whom a defendant has not had the opportunity to cross-examine, and that the testifying expert’s testimony in his case relied on the nontestifying expert’s testimonial notes and conclusions. Arizona argues that the Confrontation Clause allows experts to testify using facts that are not otherwise admissible when the facts are not submitted for their truth, and that the nontestifying expert’s notes in Smith’s case were not testimonial because they were not created for the purpose of testifying and lacked formality. The outcome of this case has serious implications for defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights and prosecutors’ ability to pursue cases that require forensics.

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