Issues

Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. demanded that VIP Products stop selling a dog toy called “Bad Spaniels,” a toy in the shape of a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle but with dog-related alterations to the name and label. The issue is whether the “Bad Spaniels” toy should receive heightened First Amendment protection as a form of expressive conduct or whether courts should analyze such satirical products under the traditional trademark infringement test of the Lanham Act. Additionally, the Supreme Court must consider whether humorous use of another’s trademark should be considered a “noncommercial” use and therefore be immune from a dilution by tarnishment claim. Jack Daniel’s contends that the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of the Second Circuit’s likelihood-of-confusion test undermines the purpose of the Lanham Act and that “Bad Spaniels” violates the Lanham Act’s anti-dilution provision. VIP Products counters that the Second’s Circuit’s test fills in gaps in the Lanham Act and is widely accepted by lower federal courts; and, it further contends that the Lanham Act’s anti-dilution provision amounts to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The decision in this case will affect the rights of trademark holders, as well as the protections of those whose political, social, and artistic work utilizes the trademarks of others.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration automatically strips the district court of its jurisdiction to continue the litigation on the merits of the case pending the results of the appeal. The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have all held that district courts are deprived of jurisdiction in this situation, while the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held the opposite. Coinbase, Inc. argues that the “Divestiture Rule” applies here—the district court is divested of jurisdiction pending an appeal of a motion to compel arbitration. Abraham Bielski counters that the traditional discretionary test applies, which grants the district court the discretion to grant or deny a stay of the proceedings until the appeal is resolved. This case touches on important questions regarding judicial economy, economic efficiency, and the treatment of arbitration agreements in relation to other contracts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether there is a trust relationship between the Navajo Nation (“the Nation) and the U.S. government regarding the Nation’s water rights. Arizona contends that the Nation’s claim infringes upon the Supreme Court’s retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the Colorado River mainstream in Arizona v. California. Furthermore, Arizona argues that the Nation has failed to state a cognizable breach-of-trust claim because the Nation did not specify a source of law establishing the government’s fiduciary duty. The Nation counters that the claim does not fall under the Supreme Court’s reserved jurisdiction because the Nation did not seek a quantification of its rights to the Colorado River mainstream. The Nation further contends that it has identified provisions in treaties, statutes, and the Winters doctrine to establish the trust duty on the federal government to ensure an adequate water supply for the Navajo Reservation. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for the Navajo Nation’s water resources, the stability of water rights, and the water allocation system.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Lanham Act (“the Act”), a federal trademark law, applies extraterritorially to trademark infringement outside the United States by a foreign entity. Abitron argues that the Act does not apply to foreign sales, because such an extensive reading of the Act’s scope is not supported by statutory interpretation or case law. Hetronic counters that both the Act’s language and the Court’s precedent about Congress and the Act’s expansive power leaves no doubt about its extraterritorial reach. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the territoriality principle in international law and the rights and remedies of U.S. trademark owners.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether New Jersey can unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact, which it signed with New York in 1953. New York argues that New Jersey cannot withdraw without New York’s agreement because the Compact’s writers intended to bar unilateral withdrawal. New York also argues that unilateral withdrawal would violate New York sovereignty. New Jersey argues that indefinite compacts with continuing duties, like the Waterfront Commission Compact, always allow unilateral withdrawal unless specifically stated otherwise. New Jersey further alleges that requiring mutual withdrawal would prevent New Jersey from reclaiming its sovereign powers. The outcome of this case will impact interstate compacts throughout the nation, state sovereignty, and anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts within the waterfront of New York and New Jersey.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a criminal defendant who uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense can also be charged with identity fraud. Petitioner David Dubin, an employee at a psychological evaluations services company, used the name of a patient on a form he filled out while committing healthcare fraud. Respondent, the United States, charged him with committing aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The circuits have split over how to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), specifically when defendants should be charged with identity fraud while committing an underlying offense. This circuit split has created tension over how broadly or narrowly the statute should be read in light of its language, the surrounding context, and congressional intent. The decision could impact the level of discretion that prosecutors enjoy when prosecuting claims under § 1028 and the extent of due process rights for criminal defendants in such cases.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”), and whether the Department of Education acted consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan. The Department of Education argues that Brown lacks Article III standing to challenge the Plan, that the Plan is statutorily authorized under the HEROES Act, and that the Secretary of Education has the authority to waive or modify the relevant procedural requirements. On behalf of herself and a similarly situated individual, Myra Brown counters that she has Article III standing to challenge the Plan, the Department of Education lacks the statutory authority to adopt the Plan, and the Plan is procedurally defective. This case has significant implications for the viability of the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan and the scope of executive power.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the legality of the Biden administration's student debt relief plan, which six states have challenged, claiming that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority. The Biden administration argues that the six states do not have standing to bring the lawsuit because they do not suffer injuries caused by the student debt relief plan. Further, the Biden administration contends that even if the six states do have standing, the student debt relief plan falls within the statutory power of the Secretary of Education. The six states counter that they can establish standing because the student debt relief plan could cause financial loss to their state-authorized loan entity or reduce state tax revenue. The six states further contend that the student debt relief plan exceeds the statutory authority of the Secretary of Education because the plan is neither necessary nor proportionate to ameliorate the conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for student loan borrowers, state budgets, and the overall economy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Google provide substantial assistance to terrorists by allegedly not taking meaningful action to prevent such terrorists from using their services. This case also asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the same social media platforms can be held liable under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), even if their services were not used in connection with the specific act of terrorism that caused injury to the plaintiff. Twitter contends that a defendant does not knowingly provide substantial assistance through general awareness that terrorists were among its many users, and that liability cannot stem from such generalized assistance to a terrorist organization. Mehier Taamneh counters that whether Twitter and other defendants know of terrorist use of their services is a question of fact, and, at this stage, the Court need only decide that plaintiff’s factual allegation is plausible. Taamneh also argues that liability exists when a defendant substantially assists international terrorism and that JASTA’s text doesn’t limit liability to action that has a direct connection to the specific attack that injures the plaintiff.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether online platforms can be held liable for algorithmically recommending third-party content to users. Petitioner Reynaldo Gonzalez argues that Google LLC can be held liable for YouTube’s recommendations of ISIS recruitment videos because YouTube does not qualify for immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Respondent Google LLC argues that since YouTube did not create the ISIS videos at issue, it should be able to claim immunity under Section 230. This case will affect the availability of remedies for victims of harmful online content, internet company accountability, moderation, and online speech.

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