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antitrust law

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend

Respondent Caroline Behrend et al., cable television subscribers, brought an antitrust class action against Petitioner Comcast Corporation alleging anticompetitive activity. In order to be certified as a class, Respondents had to present evidence that they suffered damages on a class-wide basis. The evidence they submitted consisted of a damages model prepared by their expert witness. Comcast challenges the District Court’s reliance upon that evidence, claiming that it is inadmissible under standards set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). In this case, the Supreme Court will address whether evidence presented in support of class certification must be admissible under those standards. The decision will likely significantly impact the ability of plaintiffs to certify as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and it may also affect underlying commercial conduct, such as the future use of territory-swapping and clustering agreements. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a district court certify a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence to show that they may be awarded damages on a class-wide basis?

Issue

May a district court certify a class action without resolving “merits arguments” that bear on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s prerequisites for certification, including whether purportedly common issues predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(3)?

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. (11-1160)

Phoebe Putney Health Systems ("PPHS") leased and operated one of two hospitals in Dougherty County, Georgia. PPHS then leased the other county hospital, Palmyra Medical Center, from the Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA"). In April 2011, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") filed a complaint against PPHS, alleging that by leasing Palmyra, PPHS violated the Clayton Act and the FTC Act by acting with anticompetitive effect. PPHS argues that it should be exempt from federal antitrust law under the state action doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit found for PPHS, stating that a private actor falls within the state action doctrine when its anticompetitive activity is foreseeable by the state legislature. The FTC urges a more stringent standard where the anticompetitive effect must be intrinsic to the state’s authorization. How the Supreme Court decides this case will dictate how state legislatures delegate power to local government entities, and whether or not they must formally articulate authorization for such an entity to act with anticompetitive effect.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Georgia legislature, by vesting the local government entity with general corporate powers to acquire and lease out hospitals and other property, has “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” a “state policy to displace competition” in the market for hospital services.

2. Whether such a state policy, even if clearly articulated, would be sufficient to validate the anticompetitive conduct in this case, given that the local government entity neither actively participated in negotiating the terms of the hospital sale nor has any practical means of overseeing the hospital's operation.

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Issue(s)

Where a state legislature’s authorization leads to anticompetitive actions by a private actor, what standard will be applied to determine whether those actions are exempt from federal antitrust law?

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Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.

Issues

If an antitrust plaintiff alleges that a competitor unlawfully tied a patented product to an unpatented product, must she also prove that the defendant had sufficient power to control the price or quantity of products in the patented good's market?

 

The Sherman Antitrust Act forbids product-tying arrangements by companies that possess substantial market power in the tying-product's market. While the party alleging the violation must generally prove such market power exists, market power is assumed when a company holds a valid patent on the tying product. Illinois Tool Works ("Illinois") makes the availability of licensing agreements for its patented products contingent on the exclusive use of other, unpatented products. It urges the Court to overturn the patent-based market-power presumption. Independent Ink, an Illinois licensee, claims that the tying arrangement improperly forces it to buy Illinois' ink, despite the availability of cheaper, effective substitutes, thereby stifling beneficial competition. The direct impact of the Court's decision, whether it preserves the status quo or changes its rule, making antitrust violations harder to prove, will be felt by sellers who tie patented products to unpatented ones, firms who buy products from such companies, and the consumers who ultimately purchase products from either company. Indirectly, the case may mark the Roberts Court's first foray into the doctrine of stare decisis, which provides insight into the current Court's view on when and how to defer to its past decisions. As a result, the effects of the decision may be felt in many areas of the Court's jurisprudence which don't deal with the antitrust law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in an action under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 1, alleging that the defendant engaged in unlawful tying by conditioning a patent license on the licensee's purchase of a non-patented good, the plaintiff must prove as part of its affirmative case that the defendant possessed market power in the relevant market for the tying product, or market power instead is presumed based solely on the existence of the patent of the tying product?

Trident is a wholly owned subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. ("Illinois"). Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.

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North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission

Issues

Whether state-action immunity should be given to a state regulatory board that is dominated by professionals in the regulated market.

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleges that the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners (“Board”) has engaged in unfair methods of competition by trying to exclude non-dentists from the teeth-whitening market. The Supreme Court will now determine two legal issues: (1) whether the Board is a public actor or private actor for purposes of federal antitrust liability; and (2) if the Board is a private actor, whether the Board is subject to active supervision by the state. The Board argues that it is a public actor and thus does not need “active supervision” to be immune from federal antitrust law. The FTC argues that the Board is a private actor and is not subject to active state supervision. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will impact both the efficacy of future state regulatory boards and the balance of federalism.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, for purposes of the state-action exemption from federal antitrust law, an official state regulatory board created by state law may properly be treated as a “private” actor simply because, pursuant to state law, a majority of the board’s members are also market participants who are elected to their official positions by other market participants.

The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (“Board”), enacted by the Dental Practice Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90–48, is a state agency comprised of six licensed dentists, one licensed dental hygienist, and one consumer member. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor George A. Hay for his insight into this case.

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Pacific Bell Telephone Co. D/B/A AT&T California v. linkLine Communications, Inc.

Issues

Is there a viable claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for price squeeze theories?

 

This case involves price squeeze claims and whether they are viable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In addition, the Court will likely determine if price squeeze claims must be pled and treated in the same way as traditional predatory pricing claims. This claim arose when linkLine, an internet service provider, sued its wholesale DSL supplier, AT&T, for engaging in anticompetitive practices in order to stifle competition in the California telecommunications market. The Ninth Circuit rejected AT&T’s argument that linkLine’s claim was not viable under antitrust jurisprudence, especially in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Verizon v. Trinko. The Supreme Court’s ruling will determine the status of price squeeze claims in antitrust jurisprudence, and could also clarify how the costs of retail production of a vertically integrated company with a wholesale monopoly should be measured when considering retail predatory pricing claims. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff states a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act by alleging that the defendant—a vertically integrated retail competitor with an alleged monopoly at the wholesale level but no antitrust duty to provide the wholesale input to competitors—engaged in a “price squeeze” by leaving insufficient margin between wholesale and retail prices to allow the plaintiff to compete.

AT&T and its affiliates (SBC at the time of filing) comprise a “vertically-integrated” monopoly in the California telecommunications market, owning both the local telephone network and the “last mile” lines that connect individual customers to the local network. See linkLine Communications, Inc. v. SBC California, 503 F.3d 876, 877–78 (9th Cir.

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unfair competition

The law of unfair competition encompasses torts that cause economic harm to a business through deceptive or wrongful business practices. It is designed to protect both consumers and businesses from unethical conduct that disrupts fair market competition. The term "unfair competition" can be used both broadly, to describe a wide range of wrongful business practices, and narrowly, to refer specifically to deceptive practices involving consumer confusion. 

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