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FOREIGN RELATIONS

Animal Science Products, Inc., et al., v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al.

Issues

Is a court bound to defer to a foreign government’s interpretation of its domestic law when appearing before the court?

 

This case will decide whether American courts are bound to accept a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws. Animal Science Products Inc. (“Animal Science Products”) argues that a “binding deference standard”, which requires courts to accept an appearing foreign government’s description of its laws, inhibits a court’s ability to independently reach an accurate determination of foreign law. Furthermore, Animal Science contends, the lower court’s decision to uphold binding deference misapplied the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Pink. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals (“Hebei”) counters that requiring courts to accept an appearing foreign government’s reasonable statement of its laws appropriately balances judicial independence and international comity concerns. Moreover, Hebei asserts that the court below was correct in finding United States v. Pink to support binding deference. This issue affects how federal courts interpret foreign law in international litigation. Accordingly, this case will impact international litigation strategy and entities with operations that are regulated outside of the U.S.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a court may exercise independent review of an appearing foreign sovereign’s interpretation of its domestic law (as held by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), or whether a court is “bound to defer” to a foreign government’s legal statement, as a matter of international comity, whenever the foreign government appears before the court (as held by the opinion below in accord with the Ninth Circuit).

In 2005, Animal Science Products, Inc. and various Vitamin C producers in the United States (“Animal Science Products”) filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals Co. (“Hebei”), a Chinese pharmaceutical company and its holding company, alleging that Hebei was a co-conspirator who established an illegal cartel for price-fixing purposes. Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al., 837 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2016) at 5–6.

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Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization

Issues

Does the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA) allow federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority consistent with the Fifth Amendment?

The Supreme Court will consider whether the personal jurisdiction subsection of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Fuld argues that early laws like the Judiciary Act of 1789 show that Congress can give courts the ability to adjudicate extraterritorial conduct. The Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) argue the Fifth Amendment only allows courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners with a presence in the U.S. and that early statutes required physical control over people or property within the U.S. as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Fuld asserts that the PSJVTA’s clear notice makes the PLO’s conduct a manifestation of consent to jurisdiction. The PLO contends that consent requires a voluntary act, and that the PSJVTA lacks U.S. nexus and fair notice, violating due process. The outcome of this case will likely determine whether Fuld can recover, as well as frame the future of personal jurisdiction for terrorism in foreign countries. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992 (“ATA”) allows Americans to sue a person who aids and abets or conspires to commit an act of international terrorism. Fuld v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Michael Dorf for his insights and comments in writing this article.

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Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump

Issues

Does the International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorize the President to impose tariffs?

 

This case asks whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) authorizes the president to impose tariffs in an emergency. Learning Resources contends that the IEEPA does not give the president tariff authority, and—even if it does—does not grant the broad authority the President claims. President Trump argues that a plain-meaning interpretation of the IEEPA grants tariff authority, and the IEEPA does not limit the scope of the tariff power because the limitation is not expressly listed as other limitations are. This case raises significant issues about the separation of powers and future of foreign relations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorizes the president to impose tariffs. 

The 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) granted the United States President the power to restrict trade with certain foreign countries during wartimes. Brief for Respondent, Donald J.

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Republic of Sudan v. Harrison

Issues

Can a plaintiff suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act properly serve that foreign state by mailing the service package to the head of the foreign state’s ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can serve a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) by addressing the service of process package to the state’s foreign minister and sending it to the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States. The plaintiff, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”), maintains that, under the FSIA, plaintiffs must serve a foreign state by sending the service of process package to the foreign minister at the ministry of foreign affairs located in that foreign state’s capital. Sudan contends that Article 22 of the Vienna Convention supports this interpretation because it precludes service “via” or “through” a diplomatic mission. However, the respondents—a group of victims of an al-Qaeda attack including named party Rick Harrison (“Harrison”)—contend that, although the FSIA requires plaintiffs to address and send their service of process mail to a state’s foreign minister, it does not direct plaintiffs to send the package to a particular location. Harrison asserts that, because the FSIA’s text unambiguously allows service through an embassy, the Vienna Convention does not apply in this case. This case has large implications for foreign relations, especially as regards to terrorism. A decision for Harrison may better compensate victims of terrorist attacks and restrict state-sponsored terrorism, whereas a decision for Sudan may better protect the United States as a foreign litigant and aid the effective function of embassies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Second Circuit erred by holding – in direct conflict with the D.C., Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and in the face of an amicus brief from the United States – that plaintiffs suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may serve the foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) by mail addressed and dispatched to the head of the foreign state’s ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s diplomatic mission in the United States, despite U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to preserve mission inviolability.

On October 12, 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was refueling in Aden, Yemen when it was bombed by members of al-Qaeda. Harrison v. Republic of Sudan (“Harrison II”), at 4. In 2010, the Respondents, Rick Harrison, other victims of the attack, and their families (“Harrison”) sued the Petitioner, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C.

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Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran

Issues

Does 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provide a freestanding exception to attachment immunity, which would allow victims of terrorist acts seeking to collect judgment to attach and execute on assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under § 1610?

The issue in the case is whether 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment immunity or only eliminates Bancec’s presumption of separate status for a foreign state and its instrumentalities, without altering the criteria for overcoming immunity contained in other provisions of § 1610. Section 1610(g) is part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, under which foreign sovereigns are presumed immune from suits and attachment. Jenny Rubin, a U.S. citizen injured in a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem, argues that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment immunity because an interpretation subjecting § 1610(g) to the other provisions of § 1610 creates unresolvable inconsistencies within the statute and significantly limits the reach of subsection (g). Iran counters that § 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding exception to attachment immunity because subsection (g) can still be given its intended effect even when subjecting it to § 1610’s other provisions. Iran further argues that the clearest interpretation of subsection (g) is that it merely eliminates the Bancec presumption. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because it could improve the ability of terror victim judgment-creditors to collect judgments from a terror-sponsoring sovereign that is refusing to pay, and it will affect uniformity between U.S. and many other nations regarding attachment immunity laws.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terror victim judgment creditors to attach and execute upon assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610. 

Petitioner Jenny Rubin (“Rubin”) is one of eight U.S. citizens who were injured in a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem in September 1997. Rubin v. Islamic Repubic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir.

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