finality

Issues

Patrick Day is currently incarcerated in the state of Florida, serving a 55-year sentence for second-degree murder. Florida State Courts affirmed his conviction, and in 2003 Day petitioned for habeas corpus review in United States District Court. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Day was allowed to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the habeas rules provide a statute of limitations for filing the writ, and allows a district court to dismiss the petition sua sponte (or on its own volition) for any one of a number of reasons. In fact, Day's petition was late, but the district court did not dismiss the petition for this reason until after it asked for the State to file a response to Day's petition. In its response the state failed to raise the statute of limitations defense. In this case the Supreme Court must decide whether the State waived its statute of limitations defense when it failed to raise the defense in its responsive pleading and whether the district court was correct in dismissing the petition sua sponte even after the State erroneously admitted Day's petition was timely in its response. The case raises legal and policy considerations, especially in regard to the federal review of otherwise final state court criminal decisions.

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Issues

Carlos Jimenez was convicted of burglary and, due to a prior felony, received an enhanced sentence of forty-three years in prison. Jimenez appealed to the Texas Third Court of Appeals, but through no fault of his own, was unaware that his appeal was denied until after the statute of limitations expired for him to appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In order to remedy this, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Jimenez a reinstated appeal, which essentially tolled the statute of limitations for purposes of direct review in state court. After exhausting all state remedies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Jimenez’s federal petition for habeas corpus, stating that for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), “direct review” ended when he initially failed to timely appeal the decision of the Third Court of Appeals, not when his reinstated appeal was exhausted. The United States Supreme Court will decide whether the reinstated appeal tolled the statute of limitations until the completion of the reinstated direct review for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).

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This case presents the Supreme Court with the question of whether a federal district court can order a criminal forfeiture of property when it failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture in the time frame required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B). Petitioner Louis McIntosh argues that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s timing requirement is a mandatory claims processing rule. The United States, as respondent, argues that failure to enter the preliminary forfeiture order should not deprive a district court of its authority to order forfeiture at sentencing. The Court's decision in this matter will affect the ability of criminal defendants to suggest changes to forfeiture orders and prosecutors’ discretion in filing such orders.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Supreme Court of Arizona correctly weighed mitigating and aggravating factors when conducting an independent review of James Erin McKinney’s capital sentence, and whether the correction of the original sentencing error required resentencing by a jury at the trial level. McKinney argues that, by conducting a sentencing review, the state court reopened his finalized case, thus allowing the application of modern constitutional protections in his sentencing, which require resentencing by a jury. Arizona counters that the independent review conducted by the state court did not constitute direct review that reopened McKinney’s case and that McKinney’s sentence does not require review at the trial level. The outcome of this case will impact the retroactive application of newly established constitutional rights in capital sentencing and could afford a new opportunity for capital defendants for whom a judge conducted sentencing to be resentenced by a jury.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), an order denying a motion for relief from an automatic stay in a bankruptcy proceeding is a final order. Petitioner Ritzen Group, Inc. argues that an order denying stay relief is an interlocutory order—and thus not immediately appealable—because it merely affects the bankruptcy claims-adjudication process by determining where the parties can resolve underlying claims. Respondent Jackson Masonry, LLC argues that an order denying stay relief is final and subject to immediate appeal because proceedings deciding motions for stay relief are distinct from the overall bankruptcy proceeding and involve discrete claims, procedural standards, and legal standards. The outcome of this case will have implications on the judicial efficiency of bankruptcy litigation.

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