Apparent authority is the power of an agent to act on behalf of a principal, even though not expressly or impliedly granted. This power arises only if a third party reasonably infers, from the principal's conduct, that the princip
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), codified in 42 U.S.C. Chapter 103, is a large piece of legislation passed in 1980 that gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the ability to intervene in managing land contaminated with high levels of hazardous materials.
Does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have exclusive venue over litigation involving the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program because the Environmental Protection Agency’s determinations are “nationally applicable” or, alternatively, “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect?”
This case concerns the proper venue for litigating the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standards. The EPA argues that its actions pursuant to these standards must go to the D.C. Appeals circuit. This is because the EPA contends that its actions were either nationally applicable, since they affect refineries in multiple circuits, or based on a determination of nationwide scope, since they stem from agency determinations about the Renewable Fuel Standard’s scope. Calumet Shreveport Refinery counters that the actions should not exclusively be litigated in the D.C. Circuit but rather in the applicable appeals circuits across the country, since the EPA’s determinations are not nationally applicable, but rather individualized adjudications on the petitions of hundreds of small, local refineries based on particular local circumstances. This case has important implications for the direction of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation, as well as shaping the direction of administrative law and the power allotted to executive agencies.
Whether venue for challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program lies exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because the agency’s denial actions are “nationally applicable” or, alternatively, are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
The Clean Air Act contains a provision regarding Renewable Fuel Standards ("RFS"), which requires that each year, producers across the energy sector must blend certain volumes of renewable fuel with nonrenewable fuel.
Does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt a state-law contract rule that requires a power of attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before an attorney-in-fact can bind her principal to such an agreement?
The Court must consider whether federal law preempts state law regarding arbitration clauses in powers-of-attorneys. Kindred Nursing Centers argues that state law, which requires principals to explicitly authorize an agent to enter into arbitration agreements, violates the Federal Arbitration Act. Contrarily, Janis E. Clark and Beverly Wellner argue that state law governs contract formation and that state law requires powers-of-attorneys to adhere to the expressed intentions of the principal in a contract. The case will determine whether powers-of-attorney must explicitly grant the agent the power to bind the grantor to an arbitration agreement and may impact elder care and estate planning practices across the United States.
Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration by requiring a power of attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before the attorney-in-fact can bind her principal to an arbitration agreement.
Petitioners Kindred Nursing Centers et al. (“Kindred Nursing”) operate nursing homes and rehabilitation centers, including the Winchester Centre for Health and Rehabilitation. See Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark, 478 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2015). Respondents Janis E.
Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine, most commonly used in [wex:tort], that holds an employer or principal legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent, if such acts occur within the scope of the employment or agency. Typically when respondeat superior is invoked, a plaintiff will look to hold both the employer and the employee liable.
Can a government contractor immediately appeal a denied claim for “derivative sovereign immunity” under the collateral-order doctrine?
Menocal and other detainees (“Menocal”) filed a class action against GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”), alleging forced labor and unjust enrichment. GEO argues it is shielded from suit because, under the Yearsley doctrine, a contractor has immunity for actions performed at the government’s direction. GEO further contends that the lower courts’ denials of these claims are immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. Menocal asserts that the Yearsley doctrine does not provide immunity from suit, only a defense, and that the lower court’s denial is not immediately appealable. The outcome of this case implicates the right to bring a suit against government contractors and will impact public welfare.
Whether an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”) operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (“AIPC”) under a contract with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal, et. al. at 3. Alejandro Menocal was a detainee at AIPC in Aurora, Colorado, from June 2014 to September 2014.
Does the False Claims Act cover reimbursement requests made to a program regulated by the Federal Communications Commission but largely funded by private service providers?
This case asks the Court to determine whether reimbursement requests made by schools and public libraries to the Federal Communications Commission’s E-Rate program can constitute false “claims” under the False Claims Act (FCA). Wisconsin Bell contends that the FCA does not cover reimbursement requests to the E-Rate program because the money for the E-Rate program’s funds comes solely from private companies, and the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC) is not an agent of the federal government. The federal government argues that the FCA does cover reimbursement requests to the E-Rate program because the funds are made available by the federal government, and the federal government can control the USAC. This case touches on important questions regarding the FCA’s scope and the FCA’s impact on businesses working with the federal government.
Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the Federal Communications Commission's E-rate program are “claims” under the False Claims Act.
A company violates the False Claims Act (FCA) if it “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” that is material to the government’s decision to use federal funds. 31 U.S.C.
