redistricting

Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama; Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama (Consolidated)

Issues

  1. Does Alabama’s legislative redistricting plan violate the Equal Protection Clause because its drafters attempted to maintain black voting population percentages in order to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?
  2. Does the Alabama Democratic Conference have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Alabama’s redistricting plan?

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely clarify the extent that state redistricting plans may take race into consideration when trying to comply with the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic Conference allege that Alabama’s 2012 redistricting plan impermissibly focused on race in drawing new district lines. Alabama responds that the 2012 redistricting plan’s primary motivations were compliance with the Constitution’s requirement of “one person, one vote” and prevention of retrogression under the Voting Rights Act. The resolution of this case will likely address the role courts play in policing redistricting plans enacted by state legislatures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

No. 13-895

Whether Alabama’s legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts.

No. 13-1138

This appeal in a legislative redistricting case presents issues of law in regard to how a State may rely on race in setting district boundaries. It is undisputed that the State had, among its chief goals, the idea that when possible it would redraw each majority--black district to have the same percentage of black population as the district would have had using 2010 census data as applied to the former district lines. This goal, particularly when combined with the new goal of significantly reducing population deviation among districts, led the State to stark racial intentionality in district-drawing, packing more super-majorities of black voters into already-majority-black districts, without regard to whether such efforts were actually necessary in each district to allow black voters to elect candidates of their choice. A divided three-judge District Court rejected the challenge to this map. This appeal presents issues summarized as follows:

a. Whether, as the dissenting judge concluded, this effort amounted to an unconstitutional racial quota and racial gerrymandering that is subject to strict scrutiny and that was not justified by the putative interest of complying with the non-retrogression aspect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?

b. Whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring such a constitutional claim?

After the 2010 census revealed malapportionment in most electoral districts in Alabama, the Republican-controlled Alabama legislature declared that compliance with the Constitution’s mandate of “one person, one vote” would be its highest priority in creating new district lines in 2012.

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Alexander v. South Carolina NAACP

Issues

Did the South Carolina redistricting process violate the Equal Protection Clause in setting a racial target in the design process for one of its districts?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the district court panel erred in ruling that South Carolina’s Congressional District 1 (“CD1”) was a racial gerrymander prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (“the NAACP”) asserts that the panel correctly found that the redistricting board set a 17% black voting age population (“BVAP”) target for their new map of CD1 to create a partisan tilt favoring Republican candidates. Appellant Thomas Alexander (“Alexander”) asserts that racial data was not a factor in the redistricting process and that, instead, the designers of CD1 relied on political data, mainly the precinct-level voting patterns from the 2020 election. Thus, Alexander argues that CD1 does not violate equal protection jurisprudence which permits a political, but not racial, gerrymander. Because of the small majority the Republican Party holds in the US House of Representatives, this case has the potential to have a major shift on both South Carolina’s congressional delegation, but also the political tilt of the House as a whole.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the district court erred when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze South Carolina Congressional District 1 and the South Carolina General Assembly’s intent;

(2) whether the district court erred in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case;

(3) whether the district court erred when it failed to disentangle race from politics;

(4) whether the district court erred in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District 1’s compliance with traditional districting principles;

(5) whether the district court clearly erred in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data; and

(6) whether the district court erred in upholding the intentional-discrimination claim when it never even considered whether—let alone found that—District 1 has a discriminatory effect.

In 2022, the South Carolina Senate adopted a reapportionment plan (“Senate Plan”) to redesign the congressional districts.  South Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP v Alexander at 6-7.  Although Congressional districts should have almost equal population, Congressional District No.

Additional Resources

  • Zack Montellaro, Supreme Court to hear racial redistricting case from South Carolina, Politico (May 15, 2023).
  • Caitlin Byrd, Federal judges strike down SC’s 1st Congressional District as racial gerrymandering, The Post and Courier (Jan. 6, 2023).
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Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Issues

Is Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts permissible under the Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c), and does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring suit to challenge such a commission?

In 2000, Arizona passed Proposition 106, which formed the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (“AIRC”). The AIRC’s purpose is to manage congressional districts. Prior to the referendum, the Arizona State Legislature (“Legislature”) had the power to determine congressional districts through the traditional legislative process. In 2012, the Legislature filed suit in the U.S. District of Arizona to challenge the legitimacy of the AIRC. A three-judge district court dismissed the suit, holding that the AIRC could remain in charge of redrawing congressional districts. The Legislature appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) permit Arizona to use the AIRC to redraw congressional districts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Do the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) permit Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts?
  2. Does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring this suit?

In Arizona prior to 2000, the Arizona State Legislature (“Legislature”) had the authority to alter and decide congressional districts through the ordinary legislative process. See AZ State Legislature v. AZ Independent Redistricting Committee, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1049 (D. Ariz.

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Bartlett v. Strickland

Issues

If a racial minority group constitutes less than 50% of a voting district’s population, but enough other voters tend to vote for the minority group’s preferred candidate to enable it to elect the leader of its choice, does Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, require a state to place that group within its own voting district?

 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act declares that a state may not act in a way that impairs or dilutes, on account of race or color, a citizen’s opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of his or her choice. In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew its district lines and created House District 18 with the intention of complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The “controlling majority” of citizens in the new House District 18 consisted of thirty-nine percent African-American voters and enough non-African-American “crossover” voters to allow the African-American voters to elect a leader of their choice. This redistricting decision was challenged on the grounds that the Voting Rights Act does not require the creation of districts in which African-Americans or other ethnic minorities do not, by themselves, constitute a voting majority. The question the Supreme Court will decide is whether a racial minority group must constitute a “controlling majority” or an actual majority in order to trigger the districting requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed district’s population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew voting district lines throughout North Carolina in response to the 2000 decennial census. Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (N.C.

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Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, et al.

Issues

Does a state board of elections violate the Equal Protection Clause if it uses a one-size-fits-all black voting age population floor as part of its redistricting process in an effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act?

This case gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to determine whether a state’s use of a black voting age population (“BVAP”) floor in crafting new legislative districts is permissible if the state also considers other race-neutral criteria. Appellants, Bethune-Hill et al. (“Bethune-Hill”), argue that the Virginia State Board of Elections’ (“BOE”) use of a 55% BVAP floor violated the Equal Protection Clause because the BOE acknowledged that complying with the racial target was the most important factor in the redistricting process. Bethune-Hill argues that racial targets demean minorities, regardless of whether the state also considers race-neutral factors. Appellees, the BOE, contend that their use of the BVAP floor was a lawful way of complying with the demands of the Voting Rights Act. The BOE claims that the fact that the challenged districts conform to traditional race-neutral redistricting standards illustrates that minority voters were not harmed in the way the Equal Protection Clause contemplates because the state grouped them according to communities of interest, not solely according to their skin color. This case will impact what measures states can take in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the court below err in holding that race cannot predominate even where it is the most important consideration in drawing a given district unless the use of race results in “actual conflict” with traditional redistricting criteria?
  2. Did the court below err by concluding that the admitted use of a one-size-fits-all 55% black voting age population floor to draw twelve separate House of Delegates districts does not amount to racial predominance and trigger strict scrutiny?
  3. Did the court below err in disregarding the admitted use of race in drawing district lines in favor of examining circumstantial evidence regarding the contours of the districts?
  4. Did the court below err in holding that racial goals must negate all other districting criteria in order for race to predominate?
  5. Did the court below err in concluding that the General Assembly’s predominant use of race in drawing House District 75 was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest?

In anticipation of the 2010 census results, the Virginia General Assembly began preparing to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia House of Delegates and the Virginia Senate. See Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:14-cv-852, at 3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2015). Delegate Chris Jones, who had been substantially involved in the 2001 redistricting process, led the effort.

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Evenwel, et al. v. Abbott, et al.

Issues

Does the “one-person, one-vote” principle of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause permit states  to draw  their legislative districts on the basis of total population, or does it require States to use voter population?

 

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one-person, one-vote” principle requires states to apportion eligible voters equally across districts. See Reply Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 2. The Texas Constitution requires that the State legislature reapportion its legislative districts after each federal decennial census. See Evenwel et al. v. Perry et al., 14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, at 2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). In 2013, Texas adopted a new redistricting plan (“Plan S172”). See id. at 2. Texas drew its senatorial districts based only on total population. See id. at 2–3. Sue Evenwel is a registered Texas voter. See id. at 2. Evenwel argues that the one-person,  one-vote  principle requires states to divide their districts so that they each comprise a substantially equal number of eligible voters. See Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 19. Texas Governor Greg Abbott contends that the Constitution does not require states to utilize any specific measure, and thus they are free to equalize districts on the basis of total population. See Brief for Appellees, Greg Abbott et al. at 43–44. The Court’s decision could affect the voting power of eligible voters, and the method and amount of data collection states must engage in to constitutionally apportion voting districts.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the three-judge district court correctly hold that the “one-person, one-vote” principle under the Equal Protection Clause allows States to use total population, and does not require States to use voter  population,  when apportioning state legislative districts?

After each federal decennial census, the Texas Constitution requires that the State legislature reapportion its legislative districts. See Evenwel et al. v. Perry et al., 14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, at 2 (W.D. Tex. Nov.

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Harris, et al. v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Issues

  • Does Arizona’s redistricting plan violate the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by creating unequally populated legislative districts?
  • If so, must Arizona explain the deviation between districts; and, are satisfying partisan political objections or achieving preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act permissible rationales?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether Arizona’s redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by diluting the voting power of its residents. The Court will also consider whether Arizona must justify deviations in population between districts, and what kind of justification Arizona may properly raise. In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”), entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D. Ariz., 2014). In 2011–2012, the Commission created a new legislative map, which caused population deviation between districts. On April 27,  2012  appellant Wesley W. Harris and others brought suit against the Commission in District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the new legislative map. See Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. Harris argues that the Commission violates the one-person, one-vote principle of Equal Protection Clause by drawing unequal districts that dilute the voting power of citizens depending on where they live. See Brief for Appellants, Wesley W. Harris, et al. at 50. According to Harris, neither advancing partisan goals nor obtaining preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act are legitimate reasons to draw voting districts of unequal population. See id. at 25-26, 36. The Commission contends that where the difference between the most densely and least densely populated districts is less than 10 percent, the Commission does not need to justify why those districts were not drawn to be precisely equal. See Brief for Appellee, Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n at 29-34. Moreover, the Commission argues that the deviations in  population  were the result of a good-faith effort to satisfy section 5 preclearance. See id. at 38–40. The Court’s decision will affect redistricting plans  nationwide,  and could impact the way in which states consider race or ethnicity in the redistricting process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justify intentionally creating over- populated legislative districts that result in tens of thousands of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, violating the one-person, one-vote principle?
  2. Does the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle? And, even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified, is this still a legitimate justification after Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)?

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp.

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League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, consolidated with Travis County, Texas v. Perry, Jackson v.

Issues

Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 congressional redistricting plan unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of race, constitute unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, and/or dilute the voting strength of minorities in violation of the Voting Rights Act; and can states redraw congressional maps twice in the same decade when a valid plan exists?

 

After a decades-long dominance of the Texas congressional delegation by Democratic representatives, the Republican Party won a majority of seats by virtue of new Congressional district lines as reflected by the state's population growth in the 2000 Census. However, the legislature failed to redistrict the state in time for the elections, which were then governed by a district court-drawn plan. After the elections, the new Republican majority engaged in a rare mid-term redistricting plan to replace the court's map. A number of individuals and organizations sued to prevent the redistricting on a variety of grounds. The Supreme Court will decide the constitutionality of the Texas redistricting plan under analyses of due process, equal protection political, racial gerrymandering, and the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (No. 05-204)

1. Whether the 2003 Texas Congressional Redistricting Plan (Plan 1374C), adopted and developed using outdated, inaccurate 2000 Census data and resulting in malapportioned districts, in violation of one person, one vote when measured against 2003 Census data, and when “the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage” and when such purpose is realized, is an unconstitutional political gerrymander.

2. Whether proof of racially polarized voting is overcome by evidence of partisan affiliation of minority voters in the analysis of the second prong of Gingles in a minority vote dilution claim.

Travis Co., Texas v. Perry (No. 05-254)

Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 replacement of a legally valid congressional districting plan with a statewide plan, enacted for “the singleminded purpose” of gaining partisan advantage, satisfy the stringent constitutional rule of equipopulous districts by relying on the 2000 decennial census and the fiction of inter-censal population accuracy?

Jackson v. Perry (No. 05-276)

1. Whether the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment prohibit States from redrawing lawful districting plans in the middle of the decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing partisan advantage.
 
2. Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act permits a State to destroy a district effectively controlled by African-American voters, merely because it is impossible to draw a district in which African-Americans constitute an absolute mathematical majority of the population.
 
3. Whether, under Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), a bizarre-looking congressional district, which was intentionally drawn as a majority-Latino district by connecting two far-flung pockets of dense urban population with a 300-mile-long rural “land bridge,” may escape invalidation as a racial gerrymander because drawing a compact majority-Latino district would have required the mapmakers to compromise their political goal of maximizing Republican seats elsewhere in the State.
 

GI Forum of Texas v. Perry (No. 05-439)

1. Whether political partisanship is sufficient justification, under section 2 and the Constitution, for dismantling a Latino-majority congressional district in order to elect the Anglo-preferred candidate.
 
2. Whether section 2 permits a state to eliminate a majority-minority district located in one area of the state and create another majority-minority district in a different area of the state.
 
3. Whether the District Court erred by requiring section 2 demonstrative districts to be more compact and to offer greater electoral opportunity to minority voters than the corresponding districts in the challenged redistricting plan.
 
4. Whether the number of majority-minority districts that can be created in the state functions as the upper limit of permissible political opportunity when assessing proportionality under Johnson v. DeGrandy.

 

The U.S. Constitution requires states to reapportion their respective congressional seats based on population changes reflected by the U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial census. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.

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Merrill v. Milligan

Issues

Does Alabama’s 2021 congressional redistricting map violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), which prohibits discriminatory voting practices. Petitioner Alabama Secretary of State John Merrill claims Alabama’s recently redrawn congressional district map, which results in one majority-minority district, does not violate the VRA because it was drawn using race-neutral guidelines. Respondent Evan Milligan counters that the map violates the VRA because its effect is to concentrate Black voters into one district, undermining their voting power. This case has important ramifications for future redistricting efforts and for claims of vote dilution under the VRA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the state of Alabama’s 2021 redistricting plan for its seven seats in the United States House of Representatives violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Alabama has seven seats in the United States House of Representatives. Milligan v. Merrill at 2–3. Following the 2020 census, in May of 2021, the Alabama Legislature and Committee on Reapportionment (the “Committee”) began redrawing its congressional districts, known as “redistricting,” to account for population changes since the last census.

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Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill

Issues

Does a state legislature have standing to appeal a district court’s order to enact a remedial redistricting plan; and, does that state legislature violate the Equal Protection Clause when it uses race to draw legislative districts during the post-census redistricting process to comply with the Voting Rights Act?

The Virginia House of Delegates argues that it not only has the proper standing to appeal the district court’s decision rejecting its redistricting plan, but also that race did not impermissibly predominate in the redistricting process. But even if race did predominate, the House further contends that its redistricting plan satisfies strict scrutiny because it must consider race to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Bethune-Hill and other Virginia voters as well as Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring respond that the House does not have standing to appeal because it does not suffer a particularized and concrete injury. Furthermore, Bethune-Hill notes that even if the House has proper standing, race predominated in the redistricting process and the redistricting was not narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny. The outcome of this case has implications on future cases in which legislative bodies may wish to intervene, as well as on racial gerrymandering challenges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the district court conducted a proper “holistic” analysis of the majority-minority Virginia House of Delegates districts under the prior decision in this case, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, even though it ignored a host of evidence, including the overwhelming majority of district lines, which were carried over unchanged from the prior map; the geographic location of population disparities, which imposed severe redistricting constraints and directly impacted which voters were moved into and out of the majority-minority districts; and the degree of constraint the House’s Voting Rights Act compliance goals imposed in implementation, which was minimal;

2. Whether the Bethune-Hill “predominance” test is satisfied merely by a lengthy description of ordinary Voting Rights Act compliance measures;

3. Whether the district court erred in relying on expert analysis it previously rejected as unreliable and irrelevant and expert analysis that lacked any objective or coherent methodology;

4. Whether the district court committed clear error in ignoring the entirety of the house’s evidentiary presentation under the guise of credibility determinations unsupported by the record and predicated on expert testimony that should not have been credited or even admitted;

5. Whether Virginia’s choice to draw 11 “safe” majority-minority districts of around or above 55 percent black voting-age population (“BVAP”) was narrowly tailored in light of the discretion the Voting Rights Act afforded covered jurisdictions to “choose to create a certain number of ‘safe’ districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice,” under Georgia v. Ashcroft, or the requirement the Voting Rights Act, as amended, imposed on covered jurisdictions “to prove the absence of racially polarized voting” to justify BVAP reductions towards or below 50 percent BVAP;

6. Whether the district court erred in ignoring the district-specific evidence before the house in 2011 justifying safe districts at or above 55 percent BVAP; and

7. Whether appellants have standing to bring this appeal.

After receiving the 2010 census results data, the Virginia state legislature (“General Assembly”) redrew the state’s legislative districts. Golden Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections (“Bethune-Hill I”), 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 137 (E.D. Va. 2018). This included all 100 Virginia House of Delegates (“House”) districts. Id. The new, redrawn districting plan would go into effect for the 2011 election cycle. Id.

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