WAGES

Feliciano v. Department of Transportation

Issues

Is a federal civilian employee who is called or ordered to active duty during a national emergency entitled to differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) regardless of whether their duty is directly connected to the national emergency?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if any civilian employee who is called to active military duty during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay—compensation for the difference between their civilian pay and military pay—under 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a). Feliciano contends that all civilian employees called to duty during a national emergency should receive differential pay. The Department of Transportation (“DOT”) counters that 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) requires the civilian employee’s work to be related to a contingency operation rather than merely coinciding temporally with the national emergency to qualify for differential pay. The outcome of this case has profound implications for the United States military’s effectiveness and financial security of military reservists.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

Nick Feliciano served as a civilian air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation Administration and a member of the Coast Guard Reserve. Feliciano v. Dep’t of Transp. (“Federal Circuit”) at 2. From July to September 2012, Feliciano performed active-duty service. Id. His service was pursuant to 10 U.S.C.

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Harris v. Viegelahn

Issues

Does a debtor who has paid part of his wages to a trust as part of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy agreement recover the wages upon conversion to Chapter 7 bankruptcy, or do those wages belong to the creditors?

The Supreme Court will determine whether undistributed funds in a Chapter 13 trustee’s possession must be returned to the debtor upon conversion to Chapter 7, or whether creditors have a right to those funds. See Brief for Respondent, Mary K. Viegelahn, Chapter 13 Trustee at i. Harris argues that the Third Circuit’s rule is right in that a debtor’s post-petition wages become part of the property of the estate and thus revert back to the debtor upon conversion. See Brief for Petitioner, Charles E. Harris, III at 18–20. Viegelahn, however, counters that the Fifth Circuit’s rule is the correct one because funds belong to creditors, as the Bankruptcy Code creates an escrow relationship between the trustee and creditors. See Brief for Respondent at 19–21. The resolution of this case has the potential to affect the incentives a debtor has to file under Chapter 13, and may also implicate the balance of equitable considerations between debtor and creditor. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (“NACBA”), in support of Petitioner at 29; see Brief for Respondent at 28; Brief of NACBA at 25.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to repay their creditors by turning a portion of their monthly income over to a Chapter 13 trustee for distribution to those creditors. At any time, however, a debtor may convert a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case to one under Chapter 7. Congress has provided that "[e]xcept" where the conversion is made in bad faith, the resulting Chapter 7 estate is limited to the debtor's property "as of the date" the original Chapter 13 petition was filed; it does not include wages or property that the debtor acquired after the petition date. 11 U.S.C. § 348(f).

The question presented is:

When a debtor in good faith converts a bankruptcy case to Chapter 7 after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, are undistributed funds held by the Chapter 13 trustee refunded to the debtor (as the Third Circuit held in In re Michael, 699 F.3d 305 (2012) [sic] or distributed to creditors (as the Fifth Circuit held below)?

In February of 2010, after falling $3,700 behind on his mortgage loan, Charles E. Harris III filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Harris, 757 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir.). His reorganization plan was confirmed in April of 2010.

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minimum wage

Minimum wage laws establish a base level of pay that employers are required to pay certain covered employees. The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. In addition to a federal minimum wage, some states also have their own minimum wages, codified either in a state statute or in the state's constitution. States are broken up into 4 classifications for minimum wage:

Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton

Issues

Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act’s choice-of-law provision, does state law apply only where federal law does not address the issue; or, does state law also apply when it addresses the issue and it is not pre‑empted by, or inconsistent with, federal law?

The Supreme Court will determine whether state wage-and-hour laws may supplement existing federal wage-and-hour laws for disputes arising on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) of the United States. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) provides that state law that is “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law may apply to cases on the OCS. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, are split as to whether the OCSLA requires state law to only be used as a gap-filling device when federal law is not on point, or if state law may be used even when it supplements or overlaps with existing federal law. Petitioner Parker Drilling Company, Ltd. (“Parker Drilling”) argues that the text and legislative history of the OCSLA, as well as Supreme Court precedent, requires state laws to only be used as a gap-filling device when federal law does not address the issue. Parker Drilling also contends that even if state law can be used to supplement existing federal law, California wage-and-hour laws cannot be used because they are inconsistent with federal wage-and-hour laws. Brian Newton (“Newton”) counters that the text of the OCSLA allows for a more expansive use of state law that also includes supplementing existing federal law, as long as there is no conflict. Newton further asserts that California wage‑and‑hour laws can be applied here because they are relevant and compatible with existing federal wage‑and‑hour laws. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it may have implications for offshore drilling employer‑employee relationships and the responsibilities of federal officials administering the OCSLA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, state law is borrowed as the applicable federal law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held, or whenever state law pertains to the subject matter of a lawsuit and is not pre‑empted by inconsistent federal law, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held.

Beginning in January 2013, Respondent Brian Newton (“Newton”) worked for Petitioner Parker Drilling Management Services (“Parker Drilling”) on drilling platforms for approximately two years. Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt.

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