Women and Justice: Keywords

Domestic Case Law

Cправа №815/4612/15 (Case No. 815/4612/15) адміністративного суду у складі Верховного Суду (Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court ) (2019)


Officials of the Odessa City Council sued the head of the organizing committee of "Odessa Pride-2015" (a multi-day queer festival and peaceful meeting in support of human rights for everyone, regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity scheduled for August 2015), in order to limit the right of this organization to peaceful assembly by banning their mass public events, namely gatherings, rallies, pickets, demonstrations meetings, etc., in the center of Odessa. The claim was based on the fact that although the organizers of "Odessa Pride-2015" sent a notification letter containing the date of the event in advance (as required in Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine), there was no detailed information about the nature of the planned peaceful assembly, place, time, routes, etc., which made it impossible for local authorities and law enforcement agencies to take necessary measures in the interests of public order to prevent riots or crimes. The first-instance court partially satisfied the claim, finding that the equality march of the LGBTQ community could create a real danger and threat to public order in the city. The appellate court left this decision unchanged. However, the Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the courts of the previous instance, noting that in order to restrict the right to assemble peacefully, the court must be convinced of the reality of a possible threat and such reality must be confirmed by relevant evidence. Given that there was no such evidence in this case, the courts of previous instances wrongfully restricted the defendant's constitutional right to peaceful assembly. This case is important because it affirms the right of marginalized people to peacefully assemble in celebration of their identity and humanity without undue state interference.

Чиновники Одеської міськради подали до суду на голову організаційного комітету "Одеса Прайд-2015" (багатоденний квір-фестиваль і мирний мітинг на підтримку прав людини для всіх, незалежно від сексуальної орієнтації та гендерної ідентичності, запланований на серпень 2015 року), з метою обмеження права цієї організації на мирні зібрання,, шляхом заборони проведення масових публічних заходів, а саме зборів, мітингів, пікетів, демонстраційних мітингів тощо в центрі Одеси. Позов обґрунтовувався тим, що хоча організатори "Одеса-Прайд-2015" заздалегідь надіслали лист-повідомлення із зазначенням дати проведення заходу (як того вимагає стаття 39 Конституції України), однак в ньому не було детальної інформації про характер запланованого мирного зібрання, місце, час, маршрути тощо, що унеможливило вжиття органами місцевого самоврядування та правоохоронними органами необхідних заходів з метою підтримання громадського порядку та запобігання заворушенням чи злочинам. Суд першої інстанції частково задовольнив позов, встановивши, що марш рівності ЛГБТК-спільноти може створити реальну небезпеку та загрозу громадському порядку в місті. Суд апеляційної інстанції залишив це рішення без змін. Проте, Верховний Суд скасував рішення судів попередньої інстанції, зазначивши, що для обмеження права на мирні зібрання суд має переконатися в реальності можливої загрози і така загроза має бути підтверджена відповідними доказами. Враховуючи відсутність таких доказів у цій справі, суди попередніх інстанцій неправомірно обмежили конституційне право відповідача на мирні зібрання. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки він підтверджує право груп (спільнот), які зазнають дискримінації, мирно збиратися для святкування своєї ідентичності та людяності без неправомірного втручання держави.

Toulouse Cour d’Appel, 9 Fevrier 2022, No. 20/03128 Toulouse Cour d’Appel (2022)

International law, LGBTIQ

With this decision, the Toulouse Court of Appeal held that a transgender woman had the right to be designated as the mother of her child when she had conceived the child before undergoing gender affirmation surgery. V., the claimant, and N.D. married and had two children. In 2009, V. successfully applied to change her civil status from male to female. She conceived the child that was the subject of these proceedings in 2014. She sought to be registered as the child’s mother, as opposed to as a surrogate, but the civil register refused. Until the decision of the Court of Appeal, only the claimant’s partner, their child’s biological mother, was listed on the child’s birth certificate. The claimant successfully argued, among other things, that it would be in the best interests of the child to have the claimant linked as the biological parent on the birth certificate. The decision was the first of its kind in France, and the result of eight years of proceedings. The Toulouse Court of Appeal referred in particular to the primacy of the child’s best interests, enshrined in the New York Convention, and to the right to respect for private and family life and the right to sexual self-determination, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 14). It found that those conventions require that a child born to a couple including a transgender person have the right to have both parents legally recognized, and that those conventions were not contrary to French national law.

Avec cette décision, la Cour d’Appel de Toulouse décide qu’une femme transgenre a le droit d’être désigné comme la mère de cette enfant, quand elle conçoit l’enfant avant sa chirurgie transgenre. V, le plaignant, et N.D. sont marié et ont deux enfants. En 2009, V avec succès change son statut civil d’homme à femme. Elle conçoit l’enfant qui est le sujet de ce litige en 2014. Elle souhaite être inscrite comme la mère de l’enfant, non pas comme la mère porteuse, mais le registre de l’état-civil refuse. Avant la décision de la Cour d’Appel, seul le conjoint de la plaignante, la mère biologique de l’enfant, était inscrit sur le certificat de naissance de l’enfant. La plaignante invoque avec succès que ce sera dans les meilleurs intérêts de l’enfant d’avoir la plaignante inscrite comme un parent biologique sur le certificat de naissance. La décision est la première de ce type en France, résultant après huit ans de procédure judiciaire. La Cour d’Appel de Toulouse a fondé la décision juridique sur l’importance des meilleurs intérêts de l’enfant, inscrit dans la Convention de New York, et le droit de respect de la vie privée et familiale, inscrit dans la Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales (Articles 8 et 14). La Cour d’Appel de Toulouse trouve que ces conventions requièrent qu’un enfant né d’un couple incluant une personne transgenre à le droit d’avoir les deux parents reconnus légalement, et que ces conventions ne sont pas contraires à la loi nationale française.

Foy v. Registrar General & Attorney General High Court of Ireland (2007)

Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

In 2007, the High Court held that the failure to allow the applicant, a transgender woman who had undergone gender-affirming surgery, to obtain a new birth certificate recording her gender as female violated her rights under Article 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had been made part of Irish law, despite having found in previous proceedings involving the same applicant that her constitutional right to privacy was not disproportionately or excessively infringed. The Court agreed with the applicant that existing Irish law barred the effective recognition of her Article 8 and 12 rights in Ireland as they rendered her without the power to correct or vary the original entry on her birth certificate. The High Court considered the European Court of Human Right’s 2002 decisions in Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I. v. United Kingdom, in which the Court held that the State’s failure to have a system of law in place affording proper respect for a trans person’s Convention rights violated Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention.

R v. Soko and Another Chief Resident Magistrate's Court (2010)


The two accused persons were charged and convicted of having carnal knowledge against the order of nature –contrary to Section 153(a) of the Penal Code, which is understood to prohibit same-sex sexual relations. In the alternative, the two accused persons were charged with indecent practices between men contrary to Section 156 of the Penal Code. Both of the accused persons pleaded not guilty but were convicted of both charges and sentenced to the maximum penalty of 14 years of imprisonment including hard labor. The two accused persons had conducted a traditional engagement ceremony, or chinkhoswe. They held themselves out to be husband and wife, and the second accused person identified as a woman but the court consistently referred to her as a man. The court found that both accused committed the crimes charged. In sentencing the two accused persons to the maximum punishment available, the court cited their perceived lack of remorse and their attempt to “seek heroism […] in public, and […] corrupting the mind of a whole nation with a chinkhoswe ceremony.” The court explicitly described the sentences of 14 years imprisonment with hard labor as deterrents so that the public could be “protected from others who may be tempted to emulate their [horrendous] example.” In closing, the court stated, “let posterity judge this judgment.” According to multiple news sources (e.g., the BBC), the President of Malawi pardoned both accused persons and they were subsequently released from prison with a warning not to resume their relationship.

Rehman v Federation of Pakistan Lahore High Court (2017)

International law, LGBTIQ

On a petition filed by a transgender individual for violation of constitutional rights, arguing that the census excluded transgender people with disabilities. The High Court ordered the Census Commission to include transgender in a separate column. This followed a recent order dated 09 January 2017 in writ petition (No. 37499/2016), where the High Court ordered the Census Commission to include the category “Transgender” under the column “Sex” in Form-2. The transgender category was assigned code/number 3 in the said column of Form-2 under disability. The High Court’s rationale was that exclusion of persons with disabilities from the National Census would offend their welfare and future prospects as a population and therefore violate constitutional provisions of security, dignity and freedom of speech of a person. The court further observed that Pakistan had ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2011, which places an international obligation on Pakistan to collect appropriate information about persons with disabilities and to implement policies accordingly.

戸籍登録変更に関する異議申立書:28212731 (Appeal Concerning an Application for Permission to Revise a Family Registration, ID 28212731) 最高裁第三小法廷(2013年)(Third Petit Branch of the Supreme Court) (2013)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Person X1 transitioned from female to male. X1 registered as a male and married a woman, X2, in 2008. In 2009, X2 bore a child. In 2012, X1 applied to have the family registry reflect that X1 was the child’s father and that the child was born while X1 and X2 were married. The ward mayor in charge of changes to family registries held that there was a problem with the application because Article 774 of the Civil Law was inapplicable to the child’s situation as the child was not related by blood to X1. X1 did not comply with the ward mayor’s request to fix the application, so the ward mayor filled in the family registry for the child with a blank for father and a note that the child was X2’s oldest son. X1 and X2 filed suit to have X1 added as the child’s father on the grounds that the child should be presumed to be a “legitimately” born child based on Article 772 of the Civil Law. The Supreme Court held that the child should be presumed to be the son of X1, overruling the lower court and the ward mayor’s decision. The court reasoned that under Article 3.1 of the Gender Identity Disorder Law, a transgender man should be treated for all purposes under the law as a man. The court held that this includes being able to marry and have a “legitimate” child. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a notification on 27 January, 2014 directing that this procedure be followed for any similarly situated families. Subsequently, the state changed the family registry for 45 such couples to reflect that both parents are their children’s parents.


平成25年(許)5 (2013 (Kyo) No. 5) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2013)


The plaintiff-husband, who transitioned from female to male, and the plaintiff-wife requested the local public agency to amend their family registry to state the plaintiff-husband as the father of their child. The child was born by artificial insemination and had no blood relationship with the plaintiff-husband. The Supreme Court determined that, since the child was conceived by the plaintiff-wife during marriage, he is presumed to be a child of the plaintiff-husband under the Civil Code, and ordered the family registry to be amended.


González Pino, Alejandra v. Ortúzar Novoa, Graciela y otro (Case Nº 38238-2016) Supreme Court (2017)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The plaintiff, a councilwoman in the Comune of Lampa, identified as a woman and presented herself to society as a woman, filed a discrimination complaint against the defendant, claiming arbitrary discrimination for failure by the Mayor, as representative of the State, to respect her gender identity. She sued, claiming a violation of Anti-Discrimination Law No. 20.069 (“the Law”). The court, on appeal, reversed the trial court judgment and imposed a fine, finding that the Mayor of the Comune of Lampa had arbitrarily discriminated against plaintiff by failing to respect her gender identity as a woman. The court held that arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made by agents of the State or individuals that lacks reasonable justification, and that causes deprivation, disturbance, or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Constitution or international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and in effect, including gender identity as defined by the LGBTI Unit of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which includes transgender identity. Therefore, the right to an identity is constitutionally protected, including the right to identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual. Any deprivation, disturbance or threat to such identifying rights constitutes an arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of Article 2 of Law No. 20,609.

La demandante, vecina de la comunidad de Lampa, identificada como mujer y presentada a la sociedad como mujer, interpuso una denuncia de discriminación contra la imputada, alegando discriminación arbitraria por incumplimiento del Alcalde, como representante del Estado, de respetar su identidad de género. Ella demandó, alegando una violación de la Ley contra la Discriminación No. 20.069 (“la Ley”). El tribunal, en apelación, revocó la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia e impuso una multa, al considerar que el alcalde de la comuna de Lampa había discriminado arbitrariamente a la demandante al no respetar su identidad de género como mujer. El tribunal sostuvo que “discriminación arbitraria” significa toda distinción, exclusión o restricción realizada por agentes del Estado o personas que carece de justificación razonable, y que ocasiona privación, alteración o amenaza en el legítimo ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en las normas internacionales, tratados de derechos humanos ratificados por Chile y en vigencia, incluida la identidad de género según la definición de la Unidad LGBTI de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que incluye la identidad transgénero. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la identidad está protegido constitucionalmente, incluido el derecho a identificarse como lesbiana, gay, bisexual, transgénero e intersexual. Cualquier privación, alteración o amenaza a tales derechos identificativos constituye una discriminación arbitraria en el sentido del artículo 2 de la Ley N ° 20.609.

Case No. GRA 2017/56 – The Swedish Equality Ombudsman v. “the Foundation”: Decision from the Swedish Equality Ombudsman regarding gender -based separation on school bus and in gymnastics classes Diskrimineringsombudsmannen (Discrimination Ombudsman) (2017)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Five notifications regarding discrimination of students by a Foundation were made to the Equality Ombudsman after the broadcast of a TV program. In the program, the students of a school owned by the Foundation were separated by gender on the school bus. The Equality Ombudsman’s investigation noted that a gender-based separation was also made in the gymnastics classes. According to Chapter 2 Section 5 of the Swedish Discrimination Act, it is prohibited for an education provider or an employee of the provider to discriminate against any child or student that participates in the school’s operations. For gender-based separations not to constitute discrimination, either the activities of the groups must be equivalent, without any student finding it disfavoring to be separated by gender, or the separation must be limited to moments where the students’ gender is of such importance that they are not in a comparable situation. The Equality Ombudsman ruled that the separation of the students in the gymnastics classes constituted a risk of one or more students being discriminated against for gender and transgender identity or expression. However, the separation on the school bus was not found to constitute a risk of violation of the Discrimination Act.

Case No. 3488-17 – A. v. the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare Kammarrätten Dom i Stockholm (Court of Appeal in Stockholm) (2017)


The court ruled that a person who was designated male at birth, but who had undergone sex reassignment therapy and who had changed their legal identity to female has the right to change their legal identity back to male, despite having female genitalia. The court further held that Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act can be applied in this situation (i.e., where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity after having undergone sex reassignment therapy). Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act provides the test for changing one’s gender identity as follows: (i) the person feels that they belong to the opposite sex, (ii) the person has been acting in accordance with the desired gender identity, (iii) the person can be expected to live with the chosen gender identity in the future, and (iv) the person is above 18 years old. The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare and the Stockholm Administrative Court denied the petition, arguing that due to the applicant’s previous sex change it cannot be expected that the applicant will continue to live with the chosen identity. On appeal, the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal found (a) that it was possible to apply Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act in a case where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity, and (b) that the fact that the applicant had previously gone through a sex change did not indicate that the now-chosen gender identity will not be maintained in the future. Therefore, the Court of Appeal allowed the change of identity.

KI 108/18 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2018)

International law, LGBTIQ

The applicant was registered as female at birth, but has always identified himself as male. He lived and appeared as a man in all areas of life, and had begun hormonal treatment to transition. The applicant filed a request with the Civil Status Office to change his name and gender marker to reflect his male gender identity, but the request was rejected. He appealed the decision to the Civil Registration Agency, which rejected the appeal on the grounds that the applicant provided no evidence that his current name prevented his integration in society, and no medical report supporting his request for a change of his gender marker. The applicant filed a claim with the Basic Court, and, only one week later and before a decision was rendered, referred the matter to the Constitutional Court. The applicant alleged the Civil Registration Agency’s decision violated his fundamental rights and freedoms, guaranteed by Articles 23 (Human Dignity), 24 (Equality Before the Law), and 36 (Right to Privacy) of the Constitution of Kosovo, and Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant requested to be exempted from the legal obligation to exhaust all legal remedies before seeking a constitutional review on the grounds that the regular courts’ legal remedy would not be effective or sufficiently certain because of his special circumstances and the length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court surveyed foreign constitutional courts via the Venice Commission for their respective relevant case law, confirming the general requirement for an applicant to exhaust his/her legal remedies before seeking constitutional review. The court noted the existence of a very similar and recently decided case, in which a person sued the Civil Status Office and Civil Registration Agency for their refusal to grant his request to change his name and gender marker from female to male after a successful gender reassignment surgery. The Basic Court ruled for the applicant and ordered the changes made, and the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Constitutional Court therefore determined that the regular courts could furnish an effective and sufficiently certain legal remedy for the applicant. Moreover, the court noted that the applicant was not seeking review of an already lengthy court proceeding, but merely of the possibility of one, and in any event the Basic Court and Court of Appeals disposed of the above mentioned precedent in reasonable time. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court ruled the applicant’s referral inadmissible because it was premature. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

Khaki v. Rawalpindi Supreme Court of Pakistan (2009)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the social status and injustices caused to the transgender population. The Court noted that under the Constitution of Pakistan, transgender individuals are entitled to enjoy constitutional rights like every other citizen of Pakistan. Over the years, transgender individuals in Pakistan have been deprived of inheritance, other property rights, voting rights, education, and employment due to the stigma and exclusion they have suffered. The Court directed the National Database and Registration Authority to adopt a strategy for recording exact status in the electoral list and the Federal and Provincial Governments to ensure that transgender individuals receive childhood education. The Court directed the Chief Secretaries/Commissioners to consult with the Social Welfare Department to implement the order and prepare a policy that would allow transgender individuals to vote during elections.

Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 4275 (Direct Action of Unconstitutionality) Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2009)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Brazil’s Supreme Court decided by a majority that transgender individuals could change their legal name and gender originally included in their civil registry, without the presentation of psychological or medical evaluation, hormonal treatment, transition surgery, or any other medical procedure. The majority understood that no judicial authorization is necessary for the amendment, stating only a self-written report of the trans person is sufficient to change his/her legal name.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF decidiu, por maioria de votos, que as pessoas transgêneros podem alterar seu prenome e sua classificação de gênero no registro civil, mediante auto-declaração, sendo desnecessária a apresentação de laudos psicológicos, tratamento hormonais ou procedimentos cirúrgicos ou de autorização judicial.

Public Prosecutor v. S.C. Rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen afdeling Brugge sectie correctionele rechtbank (Bruges Criminal Court) (2018)

Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

The accused was prosecuted for assaulting a trans woman and her partner for being transsexual. The accused confessed to calling the victim and her partner “dirty transsexuals” and assaulting them. Following the assault, a doctor determined that the victim was unable to work. The Court found that the facts were uncontested and therefore proven. According to the Court, the accused showed a lack of respect for social norms and the physical integrity of other human beings. Additionally, the Court found the punishment should reflect that the crime was based on the victim’s transsexual status and that the punishment should serve to have a strong deterrent effect. The court convicted the accused and imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50 (i.e., in total EUR 5000))which would be suspended during three years if the accused obeyed the terms of probation.

Smith v. City of Salem United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2004)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff-appellant a trans woman lieutenant in the Salem, Ohio, Fire Department, sued the City of Salem, alleging discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. According to the plaintiff’s complaint, after she began expressing a more feminine appearance at work on a full-time basis, her co-workers informed her that she was not acting masculine enough. She then notified her immediate supervisor that she had been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and that she planned to physically transition from male to female. The plaintiff’s supervisor met with the City of Salem’s Law Director and other municipal officials, who required the plaintiff to undergo three psychological evaluations. The plaintiff retained legal counsel, received a “right to sue” letter from the U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, and was shortly thereafter suspended for one 24-hour shift, allegedly in retaliation for retaining counsel. The district court dismissed his complaint, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently plead a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, as well as claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.

Barnes v. City of Cincinnati United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2005)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff-appellant, a trans (“a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual”) police officer, applied to be promoted to sergeant within the Cincinnati Police Department. The plaintiff passed the sergeants exam but failed a rigorous training program and was denied promotion. The plaintiff sued the City of Cincinnati, alleging that the denial of her promotion was due to sex-based discrimination and failure to conform to male sex stereotypes, such as wearing makeup, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $320,511 as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff met all four requirements of a claim of sex discrimination: that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she applied and was qualified for a promotion, that she was considered for and denied a promotion, and that other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions.

Applicants McEwan, Clarke, et al. v. Attorney General High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature (2013)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

On February 6, 2009, four transgender individuals (A, B, C, D) identifying as female were arrested and charged with both Loitering and Wearing Female Attire. The police detained the Applicants for the entire weekend without explaining the charges against them. Wearing Female Attire is prohibited under Section 153(1)(XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act, chapter 8:02. At the hearing on February 9, 2009, the Chief Magistrate commented that the Applicants were confused about their sexuality and told them they were men, not women, and needed to give their lives to Jesus Christ. The Applicants, who were all unrepresented at the time, pleaded guilty to the charge of Wearing Female Attire. Applicants A, B and D were fined $7,500, and Applicant C was fined $19,500 (Guyanese dollars). The loitering charges were eventually dismissed. The Applicants contacted the Society Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination (SASOD), the Equal Rights Trust’s Guyanese partner, about the case. SASOD agreed to represent Applicants and filed a Notice of Motion challenging the Magistrate’s Court decision and seeking redress. The Applicants argued that the police violated the Constitution because the officers failed to inform them of their arrest and did not permit the Applicants to retain counsel. They also argued that Section 153 (1) (XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act 1893 is: (1) vague and of uncertain scope; (2) irrational and discriminatory on the ground of sex; and (3) a continuing threat to their right to protection against discrimination on the ground of sex and gender under the Constitution. Applicants further argued that, by instructing the Applicants to attend Church and give their lives to Jesus Christ, the Chief Magistrate discriminated against them on the basis of religion, which violated a fundamental norm of the Co-operative of the Republic of Guyana as a secular state in contravention to the Constitution. The Court upheld the Applicants’ claims in relation to their fundamental right to be informed of the reason for their arrest under Article 139 of the Constitution, but rejected all of their other claims. The Court found that the prohibition of cross-dressing for an improper purpose was not unconstitutional gender or sex discrimination, impermissibly vague, or undemocratic. The Court also struck SASOD’s application in full, finding that SASOD did not have standing to be an applicant in the case.

Oloka-Onyango & 9 Others v. Attorney General Constitutional Court of Uganda (2014)

Gender discrimination

Petitioners sued, claiming the Speaker of Parliament allowed a vote to pass Anti-Homosexuality Act (“AHA”) of 2014 without the mandated quorum (alternatively “Coram”), which requires the presences of one-third of all voting Members of Parliament. Petitioners also claimed the AHA was unconstitutional because it violated LGBTQ people’s right to privacy and freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. The Court held that the Petitioners demonstrated that the vote proceeded without the necessary quorum, which meant Petitioners prevailed without the Court reaching the issues regarding the substance of the AHA.


Gender Recognition Act 2015 (2015)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Act provides for recognition of changes of gender, issuance of gender recognition certificates, and conforming amendments to other legislation, including the Adoption Act 2010. Any person of at least 18 years of age who is not married or in a civil partnership, inter alia (Section 9), may apply to the Minister for Social Protection for a gender recognition certificate (Section 8). Where a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, that person’s gender shall from the date of that issue become for all purposes the ‘preferred’ gender and sex (Section 18). The fact that a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person shall not affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child born prior to the certificate’s date of the issue (Section 19), or the disposal or devolution of property under a will (including a codicil), or other instrument executed before the date the Act came into operation (Section 20). The Act also provides for “gender specific [criminal] offenses” in relation to the treatment of people with gender recognition certificates. Notably, where a relevant gender-specific sexual offence could be committed or attempted only if the gender of the person with a gender recognition certificate were not the ‘preferred’ gender, that fact does not prevent the sexual offence being committed or attempted (Section 23). Finally, a person who has a gender recognition certificate may apply to the Minister for Social Protection to revoke the certificate (Section 15).

Civilinis Kodeksas (Civil Code) (2000)

Divorce and dissolution of marriage, LGBTIQ

Under the Civil Code, same-sex marriages are prohibited. In case of a divorce by mutual consent, the marriage can be dissolved if over a year has elapsed, the spouses have made a contract regarding divorce consequences, and they have full active legal capacity. If a couple has children, they have equal rights and duties as parents, regardless of whether they were married, divorced, or separated. A parent cannot surrender their rights or responsibilities over underage children. An unmarried person can adopt a child only in exceptional cases, and unmarried persons may not adopt the same child. In addition, the adopter must be under the age of 50. Moreover, the Code states that an unmarried adult can change their designated gender if it is feasible medically with conditions for the change prescribed by law. Essential to mention, there is no existing legislation setting out the requirements for gender reassignment (see L. v. Lithuania, even though the case is from 2007, legislation efforts have been stalled to this day). English translation available here.

Pagal civilinį kodeksą tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokos yra draudžiamos. Santuoka gali būti nutraukta bendru sutarimu, jei praėjo daugiau nei metai, sutuoktiniai sudarė sutartį dėl santuokos nutraukimo pasekmių ir jie turi teisinį veiksnumą. Jei pora turi vaikų, jie turi lygias teises ir pareigas kaip tėvai, nepriklausomai nuo to, ar jie susituokę, išsiskyrę ar gyvena skyrium. Tėvas ar motina negali atsisakyti teisių ar pareigų savo nepilnamečiams vaikams. Nesusituokęs asmuo gali įvaikinti vaiką tik išimtiniais atvejais, o nesusituokę asmenys negali įvaikinti to paties vaiko. Be to, įvaikintojas turi būti jaunesnis nei 50 metų. Taip pat, kodekse nustatyta, kad nesusituokęs suaugęs asmuo gali pakeisti paskirtą lytį, jei tai įmanoma mediciniškai, įstatymų nustatyta tvarka. Svarbu paminėti, kad iki šiol nėra galiojančių teisės aktų, nustatančių lyties keitimo sąlygas (žr. L prieš Lietuvą).

Código Penal: Livro II, Título III - Crimes contra a identidade cultural e a integridade pessoal (Crimes against cultural identity and personal integrity) (1995)

Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Article 240 criminalizes discrimination and incitement to hatred and violence based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity, among others. The sentence is imprisonment for one to eight years.

O artigo 240 criminaliza a discriminação e incitamento ao ódio e à violência baseado em raça, gênero, orientação sexual e identidade de gênero, entre outros. A pena é de prisão de um a oito anos.

Zakon o azilu (Law on Asylum) (2016)

Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

This law sets the procedure for granting refugee status; the status of subsidiary protection; cessation and revocation of a refugee status and the status of subsidiary protection; temporary protection, identification documents; the rights and obligations of asylum-seekers, refugees, and aliens under subsidiary protection; and other issues related to asylum in BiH. Article 9 of the Law on Asylum enhances the protection of women as it prohibits the discrimination of aliens on all grounds stipulated in the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination, including sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and sexual characteristics. English translation available through RefWorld External URL.

Lag om fastställande av könstillhörighet i vissa fall (1972: 119 - Law on the determination of gender in certain cases) (1972)


Sweden’s Gender Recognition Act states that a person may be legally recognized as another gender provided that they: (i) over a long period of time have perceived that they belong to that gender, (ii) have presented in accordance with the chosen gender, (iii) are expected to live in accordance with the gender identity in the future, and (iv) are at least 18 years old. Applications for legal gender change are reviewed by the National Board of Health and Welfare (Sw. Socialstyrelsen) and their decision may be appealed in the Administrative Court. The requirement for sterility was removed from Sweden’s Gender Recognition Act on 1 July 2013.

Diskrimineringslag (Discrimination Act) (2008)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The Discrimination Act (“DA”) promotes equality regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or any other identity by defining and prohibiting discrimination and sexual harassment. The DA provides anti-discrimination laws which state that as long as an individual is capable of performing the relevant task, or eligible to receive services, he or she may not be discriminated against based on any identity factors. Moreover, the DA provides that organization leaders are obligated to investigate and take measures to prevent future discrimination or harassment upon becoming aware of such potential discrimination or harassment. Finally, the DA provides immunity provisions for those who report behavior that violates the DA. The penalty for failing to fulfill obligations under the DA is an obligation to pay compensation for the discrimination suffered, decided by the Board against Discrimination, and subject to appeal by the payee.

Ligji Nr. 05/L -020 Për Barazi Gjinore (Law No. 05/L -020 on Gender Equality) (2015)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

Law No. 05/L-020 on Gender Equality promotes gender equality, by defining the relevant concepts, setting forth various measures to protect equal rights of genders, and specifying the institutions responsible for gender equality. The Law defines “woman” and “man” as including any person who considers oneself as such, and describes gender identity – which does not require medical intervention – as a “protected characteristic.” Direct and indirect gender discrimination are prohibited under the Law, including less favorable treatment of women for reasons of pregnancy, maternity, or sexual orientation, and gender-based violence. Harassment and sexual harassment are also forbidden, and whether a person refuses or surrenders to such behavior shall not be used as a basis for a decision affecting that person in a legal proceeding. The Law directs the Kosovo institutions to implement various general measures to achieve gender equality in Kosovo, including gender mainstreaming in all policies and legislation, gender budgeting in all areas, and ensuring recruitment and appointment are consistent with the requirement for equal representation of women and men. In areas where inequities exist, public institutions are further instructed by the Law to take temporary special measures to accelerate the realization of gender equality, including quotas, preferential treatment, hiring, and promotion. The Law in particular requires legislative, executive, and judicial bodies at all levels to adopt special measures until equal gender representation is achieved. The Law establishes an Agency for Gender Equality to support the implementation of the Law, and further mandates that all ministries and municipalities must appoint gender equality officials, and allocate sufficient resources from their budget, to implement the Law. Discrimination on bases including sex, pregnancy, or birth, is prohibited in employment matters including access to employment or training, and working conditions. In regard to education, the Law proscribes sex discrimination in access to education and scholarships, evaluation results, and attainment of degrees, and mandates the inclusion of gender equality education in school curricula at all levels. Persons who believe the principle of equal treatment has not been implemented in relation to them may initiate proceeding in accordance with the Law on Protection from Discrimination. Violations of the Law are punishable by fines of up to 700 Euros for individuals, and 900 Euros for legal entities. (Unoffocial English version available here.)

Equality Act (2010)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

This Act is a comprehensive act that replaced several pieces of legislation, including the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In general, The Equality Act 2010 legally protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society, and provides equality provisions, including the following:

the basic framework of protection against direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimization in services and public functions, work, education, associations and transport changing the definition of gender reassignment, by removing the requirement for medical supervision protection for people discriminated against because they are perceived to have, or are associated with someone who has, a protected characteristic clearer protection for breastfeeding mothers applying a uniform definition of indirect discrimination to all protected characteristics harmonizing provisions allowing voluntary positive action allowing claims for direct gender pay discrimination where there is no actual comparator making pay secrecy clauses unenforceable extending protection in private clubs to sex, religion or belief, pregnancy and maternity, and gender reassignment introducing new powers for employment tribunals to make recommendations that benefit the wider workforce

Anti-Discrimination Act (Tasmania) (1998)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 makes it unlawful to directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis of certain grounds (“attributes”) in connection to public life; including employment, education and training, and provision of facilities, goods and services. The various unlawful grounds of discrimination include: sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, gender, gender identity, intersex variations of sex characteristics, martial status, relationship status, pregnancy, breastfeeding, parental status, family responsibilities, irrelevant medical record, association with a person who has, or is believed to have, any of these attributes. Additionally, the Act prohibits inciting hatred towards a person on the grounds of their race, disability, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, or gender identity, as well as harassment, sexual harassment, and victimization towards a person based on protected attributes or their intent to file a claim under this Act. It also prohibits a person from promoting discrimination through a sign, notice, or advertisement. The Act also establishes the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner to investigate and resolve complaints. Complaints can be initiated by the person targeted by the discrimination, a trade union, or another representative for the targeted person. The Commission can also investigate any discrimination ex officio. If the Commissioner believes that the complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation or that the nature of the complaint is such that it should be referred to the Tribunal, the Commissioner can refer the complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. If the Tribunal finds that a complaint is substantiated, it may, among other remedies, order the respondent to pay the complainant an amount the Tribunal thinks appropriate as compensation for any loss or injury suffered by the complainant and caused by the respondent's discrimination or prohibited conduct.

Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act (Tasmania) (2019)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Act was adopted to amend several major pieces of legislation in Tasmania, including the Adoption Act 1988, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, and the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, with the purpose of improving and strengthening the rights of trans people. The new provisions make it possible to change legal gender through statutory declaration and remove the previous requirement of having completed gender reassignment surgery before amending a birth certificate. Additionally, gender is now allowed to be taken of birth certificates altogether. The Act entered into force on 5 September 2019.

Offenses Pertaining to Schools (Title 16, Chapter 38, General Laws of Rhode Island)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Discrimination on the basis of sex is prohibited in all public colleges, community colleges, universities, and all other public institutions of higher learning in the state that are operated by the board of governors for higher education. This prohibition applies to employment, recruitment, and hiring practices, employment benefits, admissions, curricular programs, extracurricular activities including athletics, counseling, financial aid including athletic grants-in-aid, student medical, hospital, and accident or life insurance benefits, facilities, housing, rules and regulations, research, and all other school functions and activities. Notwithstanding these prohibitions, schools may do the following: (i) maintain separate but comparable restrooms, dressing, and shower facilities for males and females, including reasonable use of staff of the same sex as the users of these facilities; (ii) provide separate teams for contact sports or for sports where selection for teams is based on competitive skills, provided that equal athletic opportunities which effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both sexes are made available; (iii) maintain separate housing for men and women, provided that housing for students of both sexes is as a whole both proportionate in quantity to the number of students of that sex that apply for housing and comparable in quality and cost to the student; and (iv) permit the establishment and operation of university based social fraternities and sororities.

Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act (Title 34, Chapter 37, General Laws of Rhode Island)

Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Property and inheritance rights

The Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act prohibits housing practices that discriminate based on gender identity or expression, which is defined to include a person’s actual or perceived gender, as well as a person’s gender identity, gender-related self-image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression; whether or not that gender identity, gender-related self-image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated with the person's sex at birth.

Anti-Discrimination Act of 1992 (Northern Territory) (2018)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in certain settings on the grounds of any designated attribute, including sex, sexuality, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, and breastfeeding. Unlike in other Australian jurisdictions, “gender identity” and “sex characteristics” are not included as designated attributes in the Northern Territory. The settings in which discrimination based on a designated attribute is prohibited include: education, work, accommodation, provision of goods, services and facilities, clubs, and superannuation. Discrimination includes any distinction, restriction, or preference made based on a designated attribute that has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity, and harassment based on a designated attribute. Certain exceptions from the prohibition of discrimination exist, including: certain religious circumstances; provision of rights or privileges connected to childbirth; and discrimination aimed at reducing disadvantage. Alleged victims of prohibited discrimination can lodge a complaint against the discriminating person or entity, which will trigger a conciliation. If the matter is not resolved through conciliation, the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Commissioner may assess the complaint. If the Commissioner finds that the complaint is substantiated, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal can order that the discriminator pay compensation to the victim, discontinue the discriminating behavior, or do any other act specified by the Tribunal.

International Case Law

L. prieš Lietuvą (L. v. Lithuania) European Court of Human Rights (2007)

International law, LGBTIQ

The applicant was born a female and given a female name; however, recognizing his gender as male, he underwent partial gender reassignment treatment and changed his name. Further process was halted since the Parliament had not passed legislation regulating full gender-reassignment treatment, and no transsexual rights were implemented for the following four years. This created issues for the applicant, such as applying for jobs, loans, seeking medical treatment, and crossing the border. The ECtHR ruled that the State’s failure to enact relevant legislation violated the right to private and family life (Article 8) and awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.

Gimusio pareiškėjo lytis buvo įregistruota kaip mergaitės ir jam buvo suteiktas moteriškas vardas. Tačiau, pripažindamas savo lytį kaip vyro, jis atliko dalinę lyties pakeitimo operaciją ir pakeitė savo vardą. Tolesnis procesas buvo sustabdytas, nes Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas nepriėmė teisės aktų, reglamentuojančių lyties keitimo sąlygų ir tvarkos. Taip pat, byloje paminėta, jog per ketverius metus nuo civilinio kodekso nuostatų įsigaliojimo nebuvo įgyvendintos transseksualų teisės. Tai sukėlė problemų pareiškėjui, ypač kreipiantis dėl darbo, paskolos, gydymo ir kertant sieną. EŽTT nusprendė, kad valstybės nesugebėjimas priimti atitinkamų teisės aktų pažeidė pareiškėjo teisę į privatų ir šeimos gyvenimą bei priteisė pareiškėjui turtinę ir neturtinę žalą. Vertimas lietuvių kalba: http://lrv-atstovas-eztt.lt/uploads/L._2007_sprendimas.pdf


Eurasian Coalition on Male Health: National Report on the Violation of Human Rights of Gay Men, Other MSM and Trans People, in Particular the Right to Health, in Georgia 2018 (2019)

Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

This report by the Eurasian Coalition on Male Health (ECOM.ngo) discusses the status and treatment of LGBTQ people in Georgia, specifically gay men, other men who have sex with men (MSM), and trans people. It explains existing legal protections for LGBTQ people, societal attitudes, human rights violations, and recommendations for future progress. (PDF is in English. The External Link offers Russian, English, and Estonian.)

Visit to Georgia: Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (2019)

International law, LGBTIQ

This report provides an overview of Georgian law regarding the discrimination against and the violation of human rights for members of the LGBTQ community. The letter is written by the UN’s Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, Victor Madrigal-Borloz, and assesses the implementation of existing and national and international human rights standards to combat violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. (Links to translations in: Russian, French, Spanish, Arabic, and Chinese).