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Following an automobile stop in Manhattan, New York police officers ran Petitioner Jose Tolentino’s driver’s license through a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database, discovering that his driver’s license had been suspended and that he had at least ten suspensions for failure to answer a summons or to pay a fine. Tolentino was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, Tolentino argues his DMV records must be suppressed because they were the fruit of an unlawful stop. Respondent State of New York argues that, even if the stop was unlawful, the exclusionary rule should not be extended to apply to information the government already possessed, since such an application would be unreasonable. The Supreme Court will have to balance the cost of suppressing highly probative evidence against the potential benefit of discouraging police from conducting random automobile stops without probable cause.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to rule on whether a tribal police officer has authority to temporarily stop and search a non-Indian on public rights-of-way within Indian jurisdiction based on a potential violation of state or federal law. Petitioner United States argues Indian tribes have broad sovereign authority to protect people and property within its borders, which includes the authority to temporarily stop and search non-Indians in Indian jurisdiction for potential state- or federal-law violations. Respondent Cooley counters that Indian tribes have no such authority because they do not have inherent sovereign authority to conduct this type of stop and search; in addition, neither Congress nor the courts have given tribal officers the authority to do so. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications raising concerns of the proper balance between public safety and individual rights on Indian jurisdiction. The case also implicates the scope of tribal sovereignty and the proper role of Congress and the courts in delineating the extent of tribal authority over non-Indians within tribal territory.

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Anticipatory search warrants are used by law enforcement to gain permission to perform a search where the probable cause mandated by the Fourth Amendment does not yet exist. Instead, probable cause is expected to materialize through the anticipated conduct of the suspect, such as when a suspect takes delivery of an illegal item or receives payment for an illegal act. Currently, there is a split between federal circuits as to how much information must be provided about a party against whom such a warrant is served. In this case, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its position that the Fourth Amendment requires the warrant to enumerate plainly the triggering event, just as it requires a particular description of the place to be searched and persons or items to be seized. The Ninth Circuit believes anticipatory warrants are particularly vulnerable to abuses of police power, and requiring the warrant to articulate the triggering event allows citizens to ensure that such searches are lawfully executed. The government argues, and other Federal Courts of Appeal have agreed, that the Fourth Amendment contains no such requirement, and the unique aspects of anticipatory warrants are adequately shielded from abuse by existing probable cause requirements inherent in the warrant application process.

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FBI agents installed a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device on Antoine Jones’s vehicle as part of a drug trafficking investigation. The United States used the locational data from the GPS in a federal trial that resulted in Jones’s conviction for conspiracy. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed that conviction, holding that the agents needed a warrant before installing the GPS. The United States argues that a warrant was unnecessary because Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements in public and was never deprived use of his Jeep. Jones responds that he has a privacy interest in the aggregation of his movements over a prolonged period and that the aggregation of such information interferes with his use of the Jeep. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect how police employ new technologies to reduce the manpower and cost required for criminal investigations. The Court’s decision will also consider how citizens can protect themselves from government officials’ possible abuse of new technologies, particularly where misuse threatens fundamental privacy rights.

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Boston police officers arrested Brima Wurie in 2007 for distributing crack cocaine. Among the items confiscated from Wurie was his cell phone, which rang repeatedly while he was detained. Without obtaining a warrant, officers looked through the phone’s call log, and with that information, determined the address of a residence where they found drugs, a firearm, and ammunition. At his criminal trial, the federal district court denied Wurie’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the police’s warrantless search of his cellular phone. The court found Wurie guilty of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, distributing cocaine base, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and vacated Wurie’s conviction, holding that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before searching an arrestee’s cell phone. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will help shape the contours of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in light of new technologies.

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In 2006, an anonymous tip led Utah police officer Douglas Fackrell to investigate suspected drug activity at a house. After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the house, Fackrell illegally detained him. During the stop, Fackrell learned Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant. Fackrell arrested and searched Strieff, and found drugs and paraphernalia. In Strieff, the Supreme Court will decide whether evidence obtained incident to an illegal search should be admitted under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. Generally, the exclusionary rule permits defendants to suppress evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Constitution. The attenuation exception, however, provides that evidence may be admissible if intervening circumstances have sufficiently weakened the taint of the original violation. Utah argues that the exclusionary rule only applies when it will deter future police misconduct. The state maintains that Fackrell did not flagrantly violate Strieff’s constitutional rights, and had a duty to arrest Strieff after discovering the arrest warrant. Accordingly, the rule would not deter misconduct. But Strieff contends the attenuation exception does not apply, because Fackrell could have foreseen that stopping Strieff illegally could have led to the discovery of a warrant. Strieff concludes that attenuation only applies when the “intervening event” that weakens the taint of Fackrell’s violation is unforeseeable. The Court’s decision could affect how police handle outstanding arrest warrants, and how judges balance Fourth Amendment protections with the need to admit relevant evidence.

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In 2003, Virginia police stopped David Moore for driving on a suspended license. The officers then violated Virginia law by arresting Moore instead of issuing a summons. A follow-up search revealed cash and cocaine in Moore's pockets. Moore moved to suppress this evidence on grounds that the illegal arrest made the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Virginia responded that while Moore's arrest violated state law, the search was reasonable under the U.S. Constitution because it was incident to an arrest based on probable cause that he committed a crime. The trial court found the search constitutional and convicted Moore on drug charges. The Virginia Court of Appeals initially reversed but reinstated the conviction after hearing the case en banc. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, and Virginia appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This case could affect many state laws concerning civil liberties and the way in which police think about illegal arrests.

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