search and seizure

Georgia v. Randolph

Issues

Can police legally search the home of an occupant who consents to the search despite the objections of another present occupant?

 

In this case the Supreme Court will resolve the issue of whether or not police can legally search the home of an occupant who consents to a search despite the explicit objections of another occupant. Police searched the house of Mr. Randolph with the consent of his estranged wife but against his unequivocal objections. Randolph would have the Court find that the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Georgia, however, reasons that a joint tenant's reasonable expectation of privacy is not infringed in this case because joint tenants assume a reduced expectation of privacy. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in this case will interpret the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches of homes with multiple occupants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Can police search a home when a co-habitant consents and the other co-habitant is present and does not consent?

On July 6, 2001, police arrived at the Randolph residence after Mrs. Randolph reported a domestic dispute with her estranged husband, Defendant Scott Randolph. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Georgia, 2003). The couple had separated two months earlier, and Mrs. Randolph left the home at that time with their son to Canada. Id.

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Herring v. United States

Issues

Should the exclusionary rule be extended to situations where a police officer relies in good faith on an invalid warrant, when that reliance was the result of a clerical error made by an employee of a law enforcement agency?

 

In 2004, Alabama police officers arrested Bennie Dean Herring and, in a search immediately following the arrest, recovered methamphetamines and a handgun. The officers arrested Herring because they were erroneously told that that a warrant for his arrest existed. Herring moved to suppress evidence of the methamphetamines and gun, arguing that they were recovered as a result of an unlawful search, and consequently, that the exclusionary rule should apply. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied his motion, finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule extends to good faith reliance by police officers on erroneous information provided by law enforcement personnel. In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained as a result of negligent error by law enforcement personnel outweighs the costs of excluding such evidence, or whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be extended.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires evidence found during a search incident to an arrest to be suppressed when the arresting officer conducted the arrest and search in sole reliance upon facially credible but erroneous information negligently provided by another law enforcement agent.

On July 7, 2004, the petitioner, Bennie Dean Herring, went to the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department to retrieve items from an impounded motor vehicle. See Brief for Petitioner, Herring at 4. Investigator Mark Anderson, who knew Herring, asked warrant clerk Sandy Pope to check the Coffee County databases for outstanding arrest warrants for Herring. See 

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• CRS Annotated Constitution: Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure”

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Kansas v. Glover

Issues

Under the Fourth Amendment, can a police officer pull over a vehicle merely because its registered owner has a suspended driver’s license, even if the officer is unsure whether that owner is driving?

This case asks whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle if the officer knows only that the vehicle’s registered owner has a suspended driver’s license, but the officer is unsure whether the registered owner is driving the vehicle. Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, police officers may initiate brief stops of drivers who they reasonably suspect are committing a crime. In the present case, police deputy Mark Mehrer observed a moving vehicle and determined that the vehicle belonged to Charles Glover, who had a suspended license. Mehrer pulled over Glover’s vehicle after assuming that Glover was driving and thus violating the law. The State of Kansas argues that Mehrer had reasonable suspicion to stop Glover, because the Fourth Amendment allowed him to make the commonsense assumption that the driver of a vehicle owns that vehicle. Glover counters that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches and seizures, because without that assumption, Mehrer had no reason to stop his vehicle. The outcome of this case has implications for drivers’ privacy, public safety, and the amount of discretion police officers possess in deciding when to stop a vehicle.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.

On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mark Mehrer was on patrol when he saw a 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck drive by. State v. Glover at 66–67. Deputy Mehrer ran a check on the truck’s license plate number and discovered that Charles Glover, Jr., the registered owner of the vehicle, did not have a valid driver’s license. Id. at 66. Deputy Mehrer neither observed any traffic violations, nor tried to confirm whether Glover was driving the truck.

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Kentucky v. King

Issues

In emergency circumstances, police may enter and search a private residence without a warrant. Does this exception apply when police create the emergency circumstances through their own lawful action, such as knocking on a door?

 

While pursuing a known drug felon, police officers smelled burning marijuana emanating from behind a closed apartment door. After knocking and announcing themselves, the police heard shuffling within the apartment. Believing that valuable evidence was being destroyed inside, they entered the apartment, found a variety of drugs and drug paraphernalia and arrested Respondent Hollis Deshaun King. King claims that this entry and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because there was no exigent circumstance which permitted the officers to enter his apartment without a warrant. The Commonwealth of Kentucky asserts that the smell of burning marijuana, in addition to the sounds of shuffling and movement within the apartment, validated the police's warrantless entry. To decide this case, the Supreme Court will have to weigh privacy interests against the need for police officers to safely and effectively perform their duties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When does lawful police action impermissibly "create" exigent circumstances which preclude warrantless entry; and which of the five tests currently being used by the United States Courts of Appeals is proper to determine when impermissibly created exigent circumstances exist?

In October 2005, the police of Lexington-Fayette Urban County, Kentucky performed a “buy bust” operation in which a confidential informant attempted to buy crack cocaine from a suspected drug dealer. See King v. Kentucky, 302 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Ky.

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Missouri v. McNeely

Tyler G. McNeely was arrested for drunk driving on October 3, 2010. After McNeely refused a breathalyzer and blood tests, Officer Mark Winder, acting without a warrant, directed hospital personnel to remove blood from McNeely. McNeely asserts that this action violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The State of Missouri responds that Winder’s action was constitutional because it fell into the “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the blood evidence was likely to be destroyed during the time it would take to obtain a warrant. McNeely also argues that bodily integrity is the core of the Fourth Amendment, that warrantless blood draws are unnecessary because other states have required warrants for blood draws and have not encountered difficulties enforcing DUI laws, and that judges and prosecutors overwhelmingly support warrants for blood draws. Missouri responds that blood testing is the best method of obtaining probative, relevant evidence of drunk driving, that blood draws typically involve little risk and pain, and that because alcohol naturally dissipates in a person’s bloodstream, evidence of drunk driving is continually destroyed.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a law enforcement officer may obtain a nonconsensual and warrantless blood sample from a drunk driver under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.

Issue

Is there an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for forcibly drawing bl

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Navarette v. California

Issues

  1. Does the Fourth Amendment require that an officer who receives an anonymous tip about a drunken or reckless driver corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle? 
  2. Does an anonymous, uncorroborated tip that a vehicle ran someone off the road create reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle? 

In August 2008, a Mendocino County 911 dispatcher received a call from another county dispatcher reporting that a silver Ford truck had run another car off the road. The car occupants had anonymously reported that the truck ran them off the road. A police officer saw the truck, pulled it over, searched it, and found four large bags of marijuana, and arrested Jose and Lorenzo Navarette for marijuana transportation, possession, and sale. The Navarettes filed a motion to suppress evidence of the marijuana, arguing that the anonymous tip was not sufficient to justify the stop because the officer did not independently corroborate the alleged illegal activity. The magistrate judge denied the motion to suppress, and on appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether an anonymous tip must be corroborated in order to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This case will impact the continuing development of Fourth Amendment law. The Navarettes argue that the Fourth Amendment requires independent corroboration of reckless driving in order for an anonymous tip to justify stopping a vehicle. California responds that because of the state’s interest in protecting the public, an anonymous tip can supply reasonable suspicion absent police corroboration. 

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?
  2. Does an anonymous tip that a specific vehicle ran someone off the road provide reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, where the detaining officer was only advised to be on the lookout for a reckless driver, and the officer could not corroborate dangerous driving despite following the suspect vehicle for several miles?

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Facts

On August 23, 2008, Mendocino County 911 dispatchers received a call from the Humboldt County dispatcher reporting that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck with an identified license-plate number had run another car off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. See People v. Navarette, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. at 2–3, 2012 BL 268067 (Oct.

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reasonable suspicion

Rodriguez v. United States

Issues

Does an officer’s continued detention of a driver, even after completion of the traffic stop, to conduct a canine sniff violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification to support the additional investigation?

The Supreme Court will determine whether an officer may extend a traffic stop, even after the stop has been completed, to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification. Dennys Rodriguez claims that any extension of a completed stop to conduct further investigation, no matter how brief, violates the Fourth Amendment unless the extension is independently justified by reasonable suspicion. The United States counters that officers may lawfully engage in further investigations during a traffic stop so long as the officer does not unreasonably prolong the stop. The Supreme Court’s decision might curb law enforcement’s investigative powers with respect to routine traffic stops by potentially creating bright-line restrictions on those powers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are “de minimis” intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

On the night of March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble saw a vehicle briefly drive onto the shoulder of a Nebraska highway in violation of Nebraska law. See United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent, the United States at 2. Struble stopped the vehicle at 12:06 A.M.

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Safford Unified School District # 1 v. Redding

Issues

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires a stricter standard than reasonableness for student strip-searches, and if so, whether school officials conducting a strip-search have qualified immunity from suit for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

Safford middle school officials strip-searched thirteen-year-old Savana Redding, seeking prescription-strength ibuprofen pills based on uncorroborated information from another student that Savana possessed ibuprofen in an unspecified time and location. This case concerns whether the school violated Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and, if so, whether qualified immunity shields the school officials from liability. After a District Court and a Ninth Circuit panel found the search to be lawful, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc; it reversed and held that qualified immunity did not protect the school official who ordered the search. Petitioners Safford Unified School District #1, et al. argue that the search was reasonable given the fellow student's tip and the threat of prescription drug abuse, but that even if it was not, school officials must have qualified immunity so they are free to exercise their judgment regarding drug abuse in schools. They argue that a decision in Respondent's favor would hamper school officials' ability to respond in the face of threats to student safety in school. Respondent April Redding argues that a strip search was unreasonable because the school lacked any indication that Savana had pills hidden in her undergarments, and that the school officials should be held responsible. She argues that a decision for Petitioner would enable school officials to conduct highly invasive searches based on only minimal, vague suspicion. This case promises guidance both to school officials seeking to carry out their duties effectively without violating students' rights and to lower courts responsible for assessing school officials' conduct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public school officials from conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school policy.

(2) Whether the Ninth Circuit departed from established principles of qualified immunity in holding that a public school administrator may be liable in a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus.

In the fall of 2003, Safford Middle School officials were concerned about the distribution of prescription and over-the-counter-drugs among students. See Redding v. Safford Unified School District 531 F.3d 1071, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008). Bringing medicine on campus without permission violated school rules, and a student had recently become ill after ingesting a pill he allegedly received from a classmate.

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stop and frisk

A stop-and-frisk refers to a brief non-intrusive police stop of an individual. The Fourth Amendment requires that before stopping the suspect, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed by the suspect.

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