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CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood

Issues

Does the plain language of the CROA create a non-waivable right to sue, thereby  voiding  a consumer contract’s binding arbitration agreement?

 

Respondents Wanda Greenwood, Ladelle Hatfield, and Deborah McCleese each applied for an Aspire Visa credit card that petitioner CompuCredit Corporation marketed. Petitioner Synovus Bank issued the Aspire Visas after each respondent signed an agreement containing a binding arbitration provision. When respondents were charged card-related fees, they filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated alleging that petitioners engaged in deceitful marketing in violation of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq. (“CROA”). CompuCredit moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The district court acknowledged the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, but held that the CROA created a non-waivable right for consumers to sue in court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under the CROA. Petitioners argue that the contract between the parties should be honored and the binding arbitration clause enforced. Respondents contend, however, that Congress intended to preserve the right to bring a claim in court when it enacted the CROA. The Supreme Court’s decision will consider the balance between consumers’ right to contract and providing adequate protections for vulnerable consumers. This decision will affect the enforceability of consumer contracts’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the extent to which arbitration may act as an acceptable substitute for an individual’s access to court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether claims arising under the CROA are subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.

CompuCredit Corporation considered a credit repair organization for purposes of this case, marketed a subprime credit card called Aspire Visa to consumers with impaired credit records. See Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). As the card’s exclusive marketer and advertiser, CompuCredit Corp.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Day v. Crosby

Issues

Whether after an individual files a habeas corpus petition in federal court, and the State admits in its answer that the petition was filed within the statute of limitations, the State has then waived a statute of limitations defense to a petition, which in fact was not timely filed.
 
Whether the district court, after asking the State to file an answer to a habeas petition, and after the State's answer is filed, can then dismiss the habeas petition of its own volition under Habeas Rule 4.

 

Patrick Day is currently incarcerated in the state of Florida, serving a 55-year sentence for second-degree murder. Florida State Courts affirmed his conviction, and in 2003 Day petitioned for habeas corpus review in United States District Court. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Day was allowed to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the habeas rules provide a statute of limitations for filing the writ, and allows a district court to dismiss the petition sua sponte (or on its own volition) for any one of a number of reasons. In fact, Day's petition was late, but the district court did not dismiss the petition for this reason until after it asked for the State to file a response to Day's petition. In its response the state failed to raise the statute of limitations defense. In this case the Supreme Court must decide whether the State waived its statute of limitations defense when it failed to raise the defense in its responsive pleading and whether the district court was correct in dismissing the petition sua sponte even after the State erroneously admitted Day's petition was timely in its response. The case raises legal and policy considerations, especially in regard to the federal review of otherwise final state court criminal decisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the State waive a limitations defense to a habeas corpus petition when it fails to plead or otherwise raise that defense and expressly concedes that the petition was timely?
 
Does Habeas Rule 4 permit a district court to dismiss a habeas petition sua sponte after the State has filed an answer based on a ground not raised in the answer?
State Court Proceedings
 
A Florida jury convicted Patrick Day of second degree murder and sentenced him to prison in September 1998. Brief for the Petitioner ("Pet'r"). at 3. Day appealed his conviction to the Florida First District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the sentence on December 21, 1999. Respondent's Brief on the Merits ("Respt") at 1. Day did not file a petition for certiorari to appeal the decision to the United States Supreme Court, thereby allowing the March 20, 2000 deadline to pass. Id.
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Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho

Issues

Does an attorney’s failure to file an appeal when instructed to do so by the defendant create a presumption of prejudice even though the defendant previously signed an appeal waiver?

Court below

The Supreme Court will decide the scope and validity of appeal waivers balanced against a defendant’s right to file an appeal. Gilberto Garza, Jr. contends that Roe v. Flores-Ortega supports the proposition that there is a presumption of prejudice when an attorney fails to file an appeal when instructed, even if the defendant previously signed an appeal waiver and underlying plea bargain. The State of Idaho counters that Flores-Ortega does not create a blanket rule that an attorney’s failure to file prejudices a defendant because the defendant already waived their right and risks additional criminal charges in breaching their plea bargain agreement. The outcome of this case will affect States that use appeal waivers to prevent frivolous appeals in order to promote judicial efficiency and will determine whether an appeal waiver completely bars a defendant from seeking an appeal.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the “presumption of prejudice” recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver.

In 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. was charged with aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Garza v. State of Idaho at 1. Garza entered an Alford plea to aggravated assault and pleaded guilty to the other charge.

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Kansas v. Cheever

Issues

When a defendant presents expert testimony that he was not in the required mental-state to commit a capital offense because of methamphetamine use, does the State violate the defendant’s right against self-incrimination by presenting rebuttal testimony based on a court-ordered mental evaluation of the defendant?

Court below

After he shot and killed Sheriff Matthew Samuels, Scott Cheever argued that his habitual use of methamphetamines prevented him from forming the necessary mental intent to commit capital murder. The State initially filed its case in federal court after Kansas temporarily abolished the death penalty. In federal court Cheever presented the defense of voluntary intoxication, which is not recognized as a mental disease or defect defense in Kansas, and used expert testimony to support his defense. The federal court ordered Cheever to undergo a mental evaluation. Later, Kansas reinstated the death penalty and the State asked the federal court to send the case to state court. In state court, Kansas used the results of Cheever's mental evaluation to rebut his voluntary intoxication defense. Cheever argues that this evidence should not have been presented because he did not intend to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he presented his mental status defense in state court. Kansas argues that by presenting mental health testimony, Cheever voluntarily opened the door to rebuttal testimony based on the court-ordered mental health exam. This case will address the role of state law in a defendant’s waiver of the federal constitutional right against self-incrimination. It will also impact prosecutors’ ability to rebut a defendant’s testimony in light of the Fifth Amendment. The issues in this case implicate questions of federalism and constitutional rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. When a criminal defendant affirmatively introduces expert testimony that he lacked the requisite mental state to commit capital murder of a law enforcement officer due to the alleged temporary and long-term effects of the defendant’s methamphetamine use, does the State violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by rebutting the defendant’s mental state defense with evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation of the defendant?
  2. When a criminal defendant testifies in his own defense, does the State violate the Fifth Amendment by impeaching such testimony with evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation of the defendant?

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Facts

On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot and killed Greenwood County Sheriff Matthew Samuels near Hilltop, Kansas. See Kansas v. Cheever,284 P.3d 1007, 1014 (Kan. 2012). Cheever and four others were cooking and using methamphetamine in the early morning before the police arrived at the home.

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Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.

Issues

Does a party waive its contractual right to arbitrate a claim whenever it engages in litigation proceedings on that claim or only when the opposing party is prejudiced by those litigation proceedings?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to assess whether arbitration clauses in contracts may be waived by entering litigation. The FAA provides standards that courts must apply when enforcing contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes. Robyn Morgan argues that the FAA requires courts to interpret arbitration agreements to be no less and no more enforceable than other contractual provisions. Therefore, Morgan contends that she does not need to show that she was prejudiced in order to establish that her employer, Sundance, Inc. (“Sundance”), waived an agreement to arbitrate. Sundance counters that the FAA merely provides minimum standards for arbitration clauses, and even if it did not, proving waiver in this instance requires a showing of prejudice. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for arbitration proceedings and employment contracts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violates the Supreme Court’s instruction in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.”

Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925. Brief for Petitioner, Robyn Morgan at 5. The FAA’s purpose was to make arbitration agreements, previously disfavored in legal proceedings, as enforceable as other contracts. Id. at 6. To that end, Section 2 of the FAA explicitly states that agreements to arbitrate are valid and enforceable.

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United States v. Washington

Issues

Does a state workers’ compensation law that only applies to federal contract workers who work at a specific federal facility violate the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the State of Washington’s workers’ compensation law may apply to certain federal contract workers without violating the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which prevents state and federal governments from interfering with each other’s sovereignty. The United States argues the intergovernmental immunity doctrine applies and mandates that the state workers’ compensation law apply evenhandedly to federal, state, and private actors. Washington counters that the federal government has waived its intergovernmental immunity by statute, and even if it did not, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine does not require completely equal treatment of federal and non-federal actors. The outcome of this case has important implications for consideration of workplace dangers and the costs associated with workers’ compensation. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers’ compensation laws to federal facilities “in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.”

The Hanford site is a decommissioned federal facility for nuclear production in Washington State. United States v. Washington at 858. While active during World War II and the Cold War, approximately two-thirds of the United States’ weapons grade plutonium was produced at the Hanford facility. Id. The nuclear production resulted in large amounts of chemically hazardous and radioactive waste. Id.

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Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana

Issues

Does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt the California Private Attorneys General Act to require state courts to enforce a bilateral arbitration agreement stipulating that an employee cannot raise representative claims?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act demands that state courts enforce an arbitration agreement’s waiver of the statutory right of action to collect penalties on behalf of the state, despite state law prohibiting such a contractual waiver. Petitioner Viking River Cruises argues that the Federal Arbitration Act requires that arbitration agreements signed by employees must be enforced as written for claims brought under California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) because such claims are individual disputes and incompatible with the procedures of individual bilateral arbitration. Respondent Angie Moriana counters that PAGA claims involve the state, not the individual, and that PAGA’s anti-waiver rule is necessary to bolster the state’s labor law enforcement. The outcome of this case has important implications for the enforcement of state labor codes, the availability of civil remedies for workers, and the effectiveness of arbitration agreements to resolve employment-related disputes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires state courts to a enforce an arbitration agreement that includes a waiver of a statutory right of action to collect penalties on behalf of a state, even when such a waiver is prohibited by the state’s law.

From 2016 to 2017, Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking River Cruises, Inc. (“Viking”), a company that globally operates and sells trips on ocean and river cruise lines. Brief for the Petitioner, Viking River Cruises, Inc., at 12.

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Wood v. Milyard

Issues

In a habeas proceeding, does the government’s assertion that it “will not challenge, but [is] not conceding” the timeliness of a prisoner’s habeas petition waive the state’s timeliness defense, and, if so, does an appellate court have the authority to raise that timeliness issue on its own?

 

Petitioner Patrick Wood filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 25, 2008, in order to challenge his murder conviction. On appeal, the appellate court raised, sua sponte, a 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations defense that barred Wood’s claims. Wood argues that appellate courts lack authority to raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte, because an affirmative defense is forfeited if not raised, and because the government waived its statute of limitations defense at the district court level. In opposition, Kevin Milyard argues that appellate courts do have authority to raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte, assuming the state did not intelligently waive the defense in the district court. In determining appellate court capacity to independently raise statute of limitations defenses, this decision will impact the finality of lower court decisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does an appellate court have the authority to raise sua sponte a 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) statute of limitations defense?

  2. Does the State’s declaration before the district court that it “will not challenge, but [is] not conceding, the timeliness of Wood’s habeas petition,” amount to a deliberate waiver of any statute of limitations defense the State may have had?

On January 27, 1986, Petitioner Patrick Wood attempted to rob a pizza shop with a revolver, killing an employee in the attempt. See Wood v. Milyard, 403 Fed.Appx. 335, 336 (10th Cir.

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