Article III

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections

Issues

Do political candidates have Article III standing to challenge election laws?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether federal political candidates generally, and Michael Bost specifically, have Article III standing to challenge state election laws. In particular, the parties are asking the Court to identify the appropriate legal standard to establish Article III standing with respect to political candidates. Petitioners, Michael Bost, et al. (“Bost”), argue that political candidates meet the injury in fact requirement of standing because candidates are harmed by the possibility of losing an election, by their participation in an illegitimate election, and by the divergence of funds used to maintain an extended campaign. Respondents, the Illinois State Board of Elections, et al. (“Illinois”), counter that candidates cannot meet this requirement by simply asserting a risk of losing an election but instead must provide evidence that the risk of individual harm is substantial. A decision in favor of Bost would likely reduce standing requirements for political candidates, making it likely that more candidates will bring lawsuits challenging election laws. A decision for Illinois would make it more difficult for political candidates to bring suit, and if evidence of changed election outcomes is required, litigation surrounding election laws may be pushed until after elections take place, leading to uncertain and even overturned election results. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

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Department of Education v. Brown

Issues

Do two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's Student Loan Debt Relief Plan, and did the Department of Education act consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”), and whether the Department of Education acted consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan. The Department of Education argues that Brown lacks Article III standing to challenge the Plan, that the Plan is statutorily authorized under the HEROES Act, and that the Secretary of Education has the authority to waive or modify the relevant procedural requirements. On behalf of herself and a similarly situated individual, Myra Brown counters that she has Article III standing to challenge the Plan, the Department of Education lacks the statutory authority to adopt the Plan, and the Plan is procedurally defective. This case has significant implications for the viability of the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan and the scope of executive power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's student-debt relief plan; and (2) whether the department's plan is statutorily authorized and was adopted in a procedurally proper manner.

On October 12, 2022, the Secretary of Education proposed the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”) under authority granted by the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (“HEROES Act”). Myra Brown, et al. v. U.S. Department of Education, et al. at 5.

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Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison

Issues

Does Article III of the Constitution permit bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in “core” proceedings as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)? If not, can bankruptcy courts exercise jurisdiction over litigants through their “implied consent”?

In 2011, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall that bankruptcy courts are constitutionally barred from granting final judgments on certain “core” state law claims. Since then, lower courts have tried to determine the scope of the holding, which addresses bankruptcy courts’ ability, as non-Article III courts, to preside over issues traditionally considered to be core bankruptcy issues. Petitioner, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, (“EBIA”) was a third party to a bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor in the proceeding had fraudulently transferred $373,291.28 to EBIA before filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee, Arkison, sued EBIA to recover those funds, and the bankruptcy court granted a judgment against EBIA. EBIA appealed and invoked Stern v. Marshall, claiming that the bankruptcy court could not enter a final judgment on a fraudulent transfer claim. The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court, reasoning that EBIA had impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will clarify the limits of Stern v. Marshall and define “core” bankruptcy proceeding. The Court will also determine what kind of consent is necessary for bankruptcy courts to have jurisdiction over claims requiring adjudication by Article III judges. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), this Court held that Article III of the United States Constitution precludes Congress from assigning certain “core” bankruptcy proceedings involving private state law rights to adjudication by non-Article III bankruptcy judges. Applying Stern, the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a fraudulent conveyance action is subject to Article III. The court further held, in conflict with the Sixth Circuit, that the Article III problem had been waived by petitioner’s litigation conduct, which the court of appeals construed as implied consent to entry of final judgment by the bankruptcy court. The court of appeals also held, in conflict with the Seventh Circuit, that a bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject to a district court’s de novo review, in “core” bankruptcy proceedings where Article III precludes the bankruptcy court from entering final judgment. The court of appeals’ decision presents the following questions, about which there is considerable confusion in the lower courts in the wake of Stern: 

  1. Whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and, if so, whether “implied consent” based on a litigant’s conduct, where the statutory scheme provides the litigant no notice that its consent is required, is sufficient to satisfy Article III.
  2. Whether a bankruptcy judge may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court in a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 157(b). 

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Facts

Nicholas Paleveda and Marjorie Ewing, a married couple, operated a series of companies, including Aegis Retirement Income Services, Inc. (“ARIS”) and the Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (“BIA”). See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (“EBIA”), 702 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir.

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Microsoft Corporation v. Baker

Issues

If plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice after defeat of a class certification, can a federal appellate court review a district court order denying class certification under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291?

This case will determine whether a federal appellate court has appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their individual claims with prejudice. Microsoft Corporation argues that a federal court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review an order that denies class certification because it disregards the Supreme Court’s decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), and impedes the discretionary review created by the Court in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Microsoft also maintains there is no jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Article III’s mootness doctrine because a voluntary dismissal eliminates any adverse interests that the plaintiffs had in the case. Seth Baker et al. assert that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice created a final judgment allowing the federal appellate court to review the adverse class certification ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Furthermore, Baker argues that there is no Article III barrier preventing appellate review in this case because the individual plaintiff’s claims were impaired by the ruling and they still maintain an adverse interest in the case. The outcome of this case could impact the procedures that plaintiffs must follow when seeking a class certification. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a federal court of appeals have jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice?

Respondents Seth Baker et al. allege that a design defect in Petitioner Microsoft Corporation’s Xbox 360 game scratched the disks required for playing the console. See Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607, 609 (Cir.

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Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger

Issues

Does amending a complaint to omit a federal question after removal to federal court defeat federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? Does a post-removal amendment restrict a federal district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the post-removal amendment of a complaint can defeat federal-question subject matter jurisdiction and preclude a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. On one hand, Royal Canin and Purina argue both that federal-question jurisdiction cannot be extinguished by amending a complaint and also that a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction even after the resolution of all federal claims. On the other hand, Anna Wullschleger and Gerald Brewer contend that the amended complaint determines federal-question jurisdiction, and a federal district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when no federal claim remains in the lawsuit. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for forum manipulation and federalism.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a post-removal amendment of a complaint to omit federal questions defeats federal-question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) whether such a post-removal amendment of a complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Anastasia Wullschleger and Geraldine Brewer purchased prescription pet food from Royal Canin and Purina under the impression that the companies formulated the food to treat their pets’ health and disease problems. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Anastasia Wullschleger at 4.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Maggie Gardner for her guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

  • Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Dog Food Suit Location Dispute to Get US Supreme Court Review, Bloomberg (April 29, 2024).
  • Richard S. Davis, Master of Its Choice of Forum?: Supreme Court to Decide if a Plaintiff May Compel Remand of a Removed Case by Voluntarily Dismissing Its Federal Claims, Foley & Lardner, LLP (May 22, 2024).

 

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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

Issues

Can a plaintiff who has suffered no concrete harm sue in federal court for a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act without violating Article III of the US Constitution?

 

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether plaintiffs may file lawsuits in federal court simply by showing that a defendant violated a federal statute. On the one hand, Spokeo, Inc. argues that Article III of the United States Constitution requires the plaintiff to show that he was sufficiently harmed by the violation of the statute. See Brief for Petitioner, Spokeo, Inc. at 11–13. On the other hand, Robins contends that although he might not meet the injury-in-fact requirement, he was in fact harmed by the incorrect information that was listed on Spokeo, Inc.’s website. See Brief for Respondent, Thomas Robins at 34. According to Robins, the fact that Congress created a private right of action in the Fair Credit Reporting Act combined with the fact that Spokeo, Inc. violated the statute is enough to file a lawsuit. See Brief for Respondent at 15. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate class action lawsuits involving large corporations, as well as potentially alter the likelihood that corporations will settle claims to prevent significant financial consequences. See Brief for Amici Curiae Ebay Inc. et al., in Support of Petitioner at 13–14; see Brief for Time Inc. and Seven Media Organizations, in Support of Petitioner at 20.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May Congress confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute?

The issues in this case arise from the information that Petitioner Spokeo, Inc. provides to its users about other individuals through its online services. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d 762 (2015). Spokeo, Inc.

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Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.

Issues

Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are intervenors participating in a lawsuit required to have Article III standing, or is standing presumed if there is a valid case or controversy between the parties?

The Supreme Court will consider whether under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) intervenors in a lawsuit must have Article III standing or whether a case or controversy between the named parties satisfies Article III. Petitioner, the Town of Chester, argues that courts should not permit parties to intervene in an action unless they can prove they have independent Article III standing, which it argues is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. In contrast, Respondent Laroe Estates contends that so long as the initial party who brought the action has Article III standing, other parties can intervene without showing standing. The outcome of this case will have implications for the separation of powers and the potential litigation burdens on courts and parties. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether intervenors participating in a lawsuit as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) must have Article III standing, or whether Article III is satisfied so long as there is a valid case or controversy between the named parties.

Steven Sherman, now deceased, was a land developer in the Town of Chester who applied in 2000 to subdivide a $2.7 million piece of land that measured close to 400 acres. See Brief for Petitioner at 2. Over the next decade, the Town and Sherman went back and forth, with the Town passing new regulations that barred Sherman’s subdivision and Sherman submitting new proposals to satisfy the new regulations.

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Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.

Issues

Does an insurance company whose underlying liability exposure under a proposed bankruptcy plan is no greater than prior to bankruptcy have standing to challenge a plan as a “party in interest” under § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code?

This case asks the Court to resolve whether the prudential bankruptcy doctrine of “insurance neutrality” may be applied to exclude an insurance company from Section 1109(b)’s “party in interest” requirement. The insurance neutrality doctrine prohibits an insurance company from challenging a bankruptcy plan as a “party in interest” when that plan does not increase its liability exposure from pre-bankruptcy levels. This case arises from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Hanson Permanente Cement, who negotiated a plan to settle claims with asbestos tort claimants either through the tort system or via application to a special trust. The companies’ liability insurer, Truck Insurance Exchange, objected on the grounds that only the trust application process––not the tort-claim alternative––required significant disclosures from claimants to prevent duplicate or frivolous claims. Truck Insurance Exchange contends that “party in interest” encompasses any person materially affected by the bankruptcy plan. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. and other co-respondents dispute that the fact that an insurer might have been better off under another plan constitutes an “interest” in the proceedings. The case has major implications for settlement of mass tort claims and fairness to creditors. The Court must balance interests in the speedy and consensual settlement of legitimate claims, a core function of bankruptcy proceedings, with the legitimate desire of creditors to prevent collusive suits between debtors and claimant parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors with significant asbestos liabilities to channel claims into a trust established pursuant to Chapter 11 reorganization (called a “channeling injunction”). Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co.

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