Skip to main content

First Amendment

Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party

 

The citizens of the State of Washington enacted a “top-two” primary law, Initiative 872, which allows primary voters to vote for any candidate regardless of party affiliation. The top-two candidates from the primary then advance to the general election. The law also permits candidates for some offices to disclose the name of their preferred political party on the ballot. The Republican Party argues that the law violates the right of association protected by the First AmendmentWashington State Grange argues that a candidate’s personal “preference” serves only as information for the voter, while the parties retain the right to nominate and endorse their own candidates. The Court must decide whether top-two primary systems that permit candidates to disclose their party preference on the ballot, without having any formal affiliation with the political party, violate political parties’ associational rights.

The following facts are taken from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, 460 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2006): the state of Washington employed a “blanket primary” system from 1935 until 2003. Blanket systems allow all voters, regardless of party affiliation, to vote for any candidate on the primary ballot.

Submit for publication
0

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar

Issues

Does a Florida rule of judicial conduct that bars judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds violate the candidates’ First Amendment right to freedom of speech?  

Court below

The Supreme Court will determine whether states may issue rules of judicial conduct that prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds. Williams-Yulee contends that Canon 7C(1), a Florida rule of judicial conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds, is unconstitutional because it restricts judicial candidates’ speech and fails strict scrutiny review since it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Florida Bar counters that the rule is constitutional because it serves the Florida’s interest in ensuring judicial impartiality and is narrowly tailored because candidates can exercise free speech and may raise funds through alternative means. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case implicates the type of fundraising initiatives judicial candidates are permitted to take when running their campaigns. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violate the First Amendment?

Lanell Williams-Yulee became a candidate for a Florida County Court Judgeship in September 2009. See Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379, 381 (Fla. 2014).

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

•    Current and Recent Cases of Interest, Fair Courts Litigation Task Force.

•    Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, Brennan Center for Justice (Oct. 23, 2014).

•    Adam Liptak: Judges on the Campaign Trail, The New York Times (Sept. 27, 2014). 

•    Greg Stohr: Judicial Campaign Solicitations Get Supreme Court Review, Bloomberg (Oct. 2, 2014).

•    Stephen Wermiel: SCOTUS for law students: Financing judicial elections, SCOTUS Blog (Dec. 23, 2014).

Submit for publication
0

Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission

Issues

Although McConnell v. FEC upheld the primary definition of electioneering communications, did it also preclude parties from challenging the application of that definition to prohibit certain forms of broadcast advertisements? 

 

Plaintiff Wisconsin Right to Life broadcasted three advertisements condemning the Senate for filibustering President Bush’s judicial nominees and urging viewers to contact Senator Feingold who was campaigning for reelection at the time. Wisconsin Right to Life believed that continued broadcasting of the ads would violate the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s prohibition on electioneering communications. Accordingly, Wisconsin Right to Life filed suit to request an injunction against the Federal Election Commission for possible enforcement of the restrictions on electioneering against Wisconsin Right to Life, and a judgment that the definition of electioneering, as applied to Wisconsin Right to Life’s ads, violated the Constitution. The court relied on a prior Supreme Court case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, to dismiss Wisconsin Right to Life’s “as-applied” challenge. Wisconsin Right to Life now argues that McConnell did not, indeed could not, preclude as-applied challenges and that the ads were a permitted form of grassroots lobbying, not electioneering. The Federal Election Commission argues that McConnell squarely precluded as-applied challenges and that Wisconsin Right to Life’s distinction between grassroots lobbying and electioneering is a line drawn in the sand on a windy day.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether as-applied challenges are permitted to the prohibition on corporate disbursements for electioneering communications at 2 U.S.C. § 441b after McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)?

Historic overview

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Wood v. Moss

Issues

  1. Should Secret Service agents receive qualified immunity from claims that they violated the First Amendment rights of anti-Bush demonstrators, where the agents moved anti-Bush, but not pro-Bush demonstrators, to protect the President?  
  2. Did anti-Bush demonstrators who were moved away from the President, adequately plead viewpoint discrimination if Secret Service agents had security reasons to move them?

In 2004, President Bush made an unannounced campaign stop at the Jacksonville Inn in Jacksonville, Oregon. Expecting the President to appear only at the nearby Honeymoon Cottage, pro-Bush and anti-Bush demonstrators arranged lawful demonstrations in the area. When the President changed his plans, Secret Service agents ordered local law enforcement to clear the area where the anti-Bush protestors were demonstrating. The anti-Bush demonstrators sued for viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. Secret Service agents Wood and Savage argue that the Ninth Circuit’s generalization of the protestors’ constitutional rights incorrectly deprived them of qualified immunity. Wood and Savage also argue that protestors failed to adequately plead a plausible claim because the complaint shows that the agents had a permissible security motive. Respondent Moss argues that the Ninth Circuit properly denied Wood and Savage qualified immunity because the agents moved the protesters because of the content of their speech. Moss also argues that he adequately pleaded viewpoint discrimination by laying out facts that plausibly establish the agents’ discriminatory motive. This case will determine whether law enforcement agents are able to account for demonstrators’ viewpoints when protecting public officials and the general public during political events. Additionally, this case will help define the parameters of the Court’s previous Iqbal ruling. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying qualified immunity to Secret Service agents protecting the President by evaluating the claim of viewpoint discrimination at a high level of generality and concluding that pro- and anti-Bush demonstrators needed to be positioned an equal distance from the President while he was dining on the outdoor patio and then while he was travelling by motorcade.
  2. Whether respondents have adequately pleaded viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment when no factual allegations support their claim of discriminatory motive and there was an obvious security-based rationale for moving the nearby anti-Bush group and not the farther-away pro-Bush group.

top

Facts

During his 2004 presidential campaign, President Bush made an unannounced stop at the Jacksonville Inn in Jacksonville, Oregon. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2012). The President was scheduled to appear at the nearby Honeymoon Cottage, so both pro-Bush and anti-Bush groups were prepared to demonstrate in the area.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Woodford v. Ngo

Issues

Does the rejection of a prisoner’s grievance on procedural grounds, due to the untimely nature of the claim, bar the prisoner’s constitutional claims from federal court under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that prisoners exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit?

 

In 2000, California state prisoner Viet Mike Ngo was placed in administrative segregation for alleged misconduct. Following his release, he was prevented from taking part in certain programs deemed critical for parole eligibility. Ngo submitted a formal grievance that was time-barred by the Appeals Coordinator because it was not filed within the requisite 15 working days after the event. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners are prevented from filing suit until administrative remedies are exhausted. The District Court ruled that Ngo failed to exhaust his remedies under PLRA and was therefore precluded from seeking federal relief. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that Ngo exhausted all remedies as required by the PLRA. The Supreme Court will address whether an untimely administrative appeal satisfies this exhaustion requirement under PLRA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a prisoner satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s administrative exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative appeal?

Respondent Viet Mike Ngo is a prisoner serving a life sentence in California. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 1. On October 26, 2000, Ngo, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, was placed in administrative segregation as punishment for alleged “inappropriate activity” with Catholic volunteer priests. Brief for Respondent at 2, .

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association

Issues

Whether, under the First Amendment, a state legislature may bar local governments from making payroll deductions to support political activities.

 

In 2003, the Idaho state legislature passed the Voluntary Contributions Act, which prevents state political subdivisions from making payroll deductions for political activities. The Pocatello Education Association and other organizations challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it impermissibly burdens free speech. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the state does not exercise sufficient control of local governments to allow it to regulate speech through its systems. It therefore found the statute unconstitutional. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a state exercises sufficient control over local governments to allow it to regulate speech through their systems. This decision will impact whether the Court evaluates state government regulations of local governments using strict scrutiny or a “reasonableness” standard of review.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit a state legislature from removing the authority of state political subdivisions to make payroll deductions for political activities under a statute that is concededly valid as applied to state government employers?

In 2003, the Idaho state legislature enacted the Voluntary Contributions Act (“VCA”). See Pocatello Educ. Ass'n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

· Legal Information Institute, Wex:  First Amendment

· First Amendment Online (hosted by the University of Minnesota Law School)

· First Amendment Law Prof Blog

Submit for publication
0

Zubik v. Burwell, et al.

Issues

  1. Does the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ self-certification requirement for objecting religious non-profits under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) violate the rights of these non-profits to freely exercise their religion?
  2. Would the government satisfy the Court’s test for overriding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) where it admits that its alternative scheme may not fulfill the regulatory objective of providing contraceptives at no cost to objecting employers?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether requiring objecting religious non-profit organizations to sign a waiver allowing employees to receive health coverage, including contraception and abortion-inducing drugs from third parties, violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Petitioners, a group of Catholic non-profits (the “Catholic groups”), argue that the requirement forces them to offer health coverage to their employees in a manner inconsistent with the Catholic groups’ faith. The Catholic groups further argue that the requirement has been imposed without proof that the mandated coverage cannot be achieved through alternative means. Sylvia Burwell, the secretary of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, counter that the objections of these religious organizations are not a cognizable burden under RFRA. Furthermore, their refusing to sign the waiver will frustrate the government’s compelling interest in protecting the health of all women, including female employees of Catholic groups. This decision could expand the religious exemption to the requirements of the Affordable Care Act, and will further define the limits of the First Amendment protections afforded under RFRA. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1.  Does the Government violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) by forcing objecting religious nonprofit organizations to comply with the HHS contraceptive mandate under an alternative regulatory scheme that requires these organizations to act in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs?

2.  Can the Government satisfy RFRA’s demanding test for overriding sincerely held religious objections in circumstances where the Government itself admits that overriding the religious objection may not fulfill its regulatory objective—namely, the provision of no-cost contraceptives to objectors’ employees?

The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), passed in 2010, requires health insurers to cover preventive care and screenings for women at no cost according to guidelines established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Geneva College et al. v.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to First Amendment