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First Amendment

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin

Issues

May a party challenge a state subpoena in federal court on First Amendment grounds without first being compelled to comply with the subpoena in state court?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide if a party subject to a state investigatory subpoena may seek relief in federal court without first being held in contempt in state court for refusing to comply with the subpoena. In his capacity as the Attorney General of New Jersey, Respondent Matthew Platkin issued a subpoena to Petitioner First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. (“First Choice”), requesting that it turn over donor information. The subpoena was issued in relation to Platkin’s investigation of alleged deceptive and fraudulent practices by First Choice in its solicitation of donations and administration of reproductive healthcare. First Choice argues that a federal forum should be available to hear its claims because the organization and donors are both suffering injuries-in-fact from the chilling of their First Amendment rights. Platkin argues that First Choice’s alleged injury is too speculative to constitute an injury-in-fact that would allow for Article III jurisdiction. This case has significant policy implications for the First Amendment rights and safety of organizations and their donors who are targets of state subpoenas and who seek federal relief from state investigations. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, a federal court in a first-filed action is deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court.

Federal and state governments have the power to issue subpoenas to procure information related to an alleged wrongdoing. Brief for Respondent, Matthew Platkin at 3. In New Jersey, if someone fails to comply with a subpoena sent by the Attorney General, the Attorney Ge

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Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

Issues

What level of judicial review is required for a court to evaluate a law that intends to protect minors from pornographic content but, as a result, burdens adults’ access to such content?

H.B. 1181 is a Texas law seeking to regulate commercial entities that publish sexual material. When more than one-third of the entities’ published material is sexually explicit, H.B. 1181 requires those entities to implement age verification systems. Free Speech Coalition argues that H.B. 1181’s age verification provision burdens adult access to constitutionally protected speech and thus the Supreme Court should apply strict scrutiny when reviewing it. Free Speech Coalition further argues that it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of H.B. 1181’s age verification provision. Paxton, on the other hand, argues that rational basis review should apply to the age verification provision because it is not content-based or speaker-based discrimination. Paxton further counters that Coalition has not proved it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of the age verification provision. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will influence how future statutes impacting protected speech may be reviewed by courts, how state governments can regulate pornography distributors to protect minors, and how the data privacy and cybersecurity of adults who use pornography websites will be weighed by the courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review, instead of strict scrutiny, to a law burdening adults’ access to protected speech.

H.B. 1181 is a Texas law intended to apply to commercial entities that publish sexual material. Free Speech Coal. v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his insights into this case.

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Friedrichs, et al. v. California Teachers Association, et. al

Issues

Do unions violate public employees’ First Amendment rights through public sector “agency shop” arrangements or by requiring them to affirmatively object to subsidizing public sector union nonchargeable speech? 

 

Under California law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public school employees in a particular school district if it can show that a majority of the employees agree to be represented by that union. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). Such a union may establish an “agency shop” arrangement with the school district, under which employees, not members of the union, are required to pay an agency fee, and may only opt out from funding union activities not related to collective bargainingSee Friedrichs, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1. Friedrichs asserts that because of the political nature of collective bargaining, compelled agency fees are a violation of the First Amendment, and the opt-out system takes advantage of dissenters unaware of the affirmative objection requirement. See Brief for Petitioner, Rebecca Friedrichs, et al. 22, 30, 55–56, 61. In opposition, the Union argues that there is no justifiable reason to modify the opt-out arrangements, and that “agency shop” arrangements do not infringe employees’ First Amendment rights but are necessary to prevent a free riding problem. See Brief for Respondent, California Teachers Association, et al. at 15–17, 32, 55. The Court’s  decision in this case  will impact unions’ abilities to raise funds and the First Amendment rights of non-members of the union. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, in Support of Respondents at 19–20, 26–29.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Should Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), be overruled, and should public sector “agency shop” arrangements be invalidated under the First Amendment?
  2. Does requiring public employees to affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public sector unions, rather than requiring employees to affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech, violate the First Amendment?

Under California law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public school employees in a school district if it can show that a majority of the employees consent to its representation. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec.

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Golan v. Holder

Issues

Does a statute extending copyright protection to works that are in the public domain violate the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution?

 

Congress enacted Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act in order to comply with the international copyright standards of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Section 514 restores copyright protection to foreign works currently found in the public domain. Lawrence Golan and other performers, educators, and motion picture distributors brought this suit challenging Section 514, arguing that Congress’s removal of works from the public domain exceeded its Copyright Clause powers. Golan also argues that Section 514 violates the First Amendment because the law does not serve any important government interests. Attorney General Holder counters that the Copyright Clause does not restrict Congress’s authority to remove works from the public domain. He further argues that Section 514 does not violate the First Amendment because the government has a substantial interest in complying with the Berne Convention and protecting American works abroad. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect millions of foreign works currently in the public domain, existing and future works based on those foreign works, and the copyright protection of American works in foreign countries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does the Progress Clause of the United States Constitution prohibit Congress from taking works out of the Public Domain?

2. Does Section 514 violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution?

In 1989, the United States became a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”). See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010).

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Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal

Issues

Whether public health and safety concerns and the potential for non-religious use are sufficiently compelling reasons for the government to prevent the religious group, UDV, from using a tea containing a Schedule 1 hallucinogenic for religious ceremonies.

 

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) generally prohibits the federal government from restricting the use of controlled substances in bona fide religious ceremonies. A small North American sect of the Brazilian group, “O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal” (“UDV”) has challenged the government’s enforcement of a ban on DMT, a Schedule I narcotic and principle ingredient of “ hoasca ” a tea imported from South America that is central to UDV’s religious rituals. The government argues that its restriction on UDV falls within narrow RFRA exceptions because of the health risks associated with the use of DMT, the potential for diversion of the substance to non-religious uses, and the 1971 United Nations Convention ban on the importation of DMT. In this  case  the Supreme Court will decide whether RFRA's prohibition extends to the use and importation of Schedule I narcotics, which are those substances the federal government deems most harmful.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) requires the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession, and use of a Schedule I hallucinogenic controlled substance, where Congress has found that the substance has a high potential for abuse, it is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and its importation and distribution would violate an international treaty.

In May, 1999, federal customs officials seized goods labeled “tea extract” en route to Sante Fe, New Mexico, to Jeffrey Bronfman, President of the United States Chapter of a Brazilian religious group known as O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal (“UDV”) — roughly translated, “The Beneficial Spiritualist Center of the Union of the Vegetable.” See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao De Vegetal, No. 04-1084 (U.S.

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Gonzalez v. Google LLC

Issues

Can online platforms be held liable for algorithmically recommending harmful third-party content to users?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether online platforms can be held liable for algorithmically recommending third-party content to users. Petitioner Reynaldo Gonzalez argues that Google LLC can be held liable for YouTube’s recommendations of ISIS recruitment videos because YouTube does not qualify for immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Respondent Google LLC argues that since YouTube did not create the ISIS videos at issue, it should be able to claim immunity under Section 230. This case will affect the availability of remedies for victims of harmful online content, internet company accountability, moderation, and online speech.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider, or only limits the liability of interactive computer services when they engage in traditional editorial functions (such as deciding whether to display or withdraw) with regard to such information. 

In 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez, a United States citizen studying abroad in France, was killed in a terrorist attack in Paris. Gonzalez v. Google LLC. The following day, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and posting a YouTube video. Id.

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Harris v. Quinn

Issues

  1. Can a State compel in-home caregivers to financially support a union to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes?  
  2. Since the State has failed thus far to designate a union to be a particular group’s representative, do individuals falling within that group have standing to bring their claim?

Under Illinois law, caregivers who provide in-home assistance to disabled individuals through certain Medicaid-waiver programs may be compelled to support a private organization to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes. According to Illinois, the purpose of the mandate is to prevent inter-union rivalries that might hinder collective-bargaining negotiations and to prevent non-union members from “free-riding” off union members.  In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether compelled support for exclusive representation in this specific context violates the Constitution. Petitioners argue that forcing in-home service providers to unionize infringes upon their First Amendments rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of association.  Respondents counter that the Supreme Court’s precedent allows the government to force public workers to unionize when there is a compelling government interest for doing so. However, the fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on such a narrow issue has many commentators speculating that the Court may be intending to decide much more than is immediately apparent, including decisions that may have drastic consequences for the very future of labor unions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, compel personal care providers to accept and financially support a private organization as their exclusive representative to petition the State for greater reimbursements from its Medicaid programs?   
  2. Did the lower court err in holding that the claims of providers in the Home Based Support Services Program are not ripe for judicial review?  

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Facts

Petitioners in this case are individuals who provide in-home assistance to disabled persons in Illinois. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). Some of the petitioners operate under Illinois’s Home Services Program (“Rehabilitation Program”) while the rest operate under Illinois’s Home-Based Services Program (“Disabilities Program”).

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Hartman v. Moore

Issues

If the government chooses to prosecute someone for a crime simply to retaliate for that  individuals  criticisms of the government, can that individual sue the investigating officers for retaliatory prosecution if the government's case, although retaliatory, was supported by probable cause?

 

William Moore was CEO of a company that manufactured optical scanning technology. In an effort to establish a sales contract for that technology with the United States Postal Service, Moore initiated a media and lobbying campaign that criticized the technology and policies the USPS had in place. It was later revealed that individuals involved in Moore's campaign had entered into two illegal payoff schemes, and, at the urging of the USPS, the government prosecuted Moore for involvement in those schemes. The government's case against Moore was quickly dismissed, and Moore brought a civil suit against the prosecutor and postal inspectors claiming they had prosecuted him to retaliate for his criticism of the USPS. After a series of hearings before trial and appellate courts, Moore's claim against the prosecutor has been dismissed and the Supreme Court must now decide whether the postal inspectors are immune from suit because the prosecution, although retaliatory, was supported by probable cause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether law enforcement agents may be liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, for retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment when the prosecution was supported by probable cause.

William Moore was CEO of Recognition Equipment, Inc. (REI), a company that specialized in optical scanning technology. Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 873 (D.C. Cir 2004) (Moore I).

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