Media law refers to the regulations of mass media production and use. It includes various types of media forms such as broadcast television, radio, film, internet, and print; however, broadcast media is the most heavily regulated.
Oral argument: Dec. 1, 2009
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Sept. 4, 2008)
Does Minnesota Statute Section 211B.11(1), which prohibits individuals from wearing “political badges, political buttons, or political insignia” in the polling place, violate the First Amendment?
In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Minnesota’s Statute section 211B.11(1) political-apparel ban at polling sites violates the First Amendment. Petitioners Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. (“MVA”) contend that the statute jeopardizes the right of voters to peacefully express themselves. According to MVA, the statute’s vague use of the word “political” allows poll workers to arbitrarily discriminate against voters wearing anything arguably political. MVA contends, under a strict-scrutiny analysis, that the ban on speech is not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in promoting voting decorum and that there is no government interest that justifies a ban on all political apparel. Respondents Joe Mansky, et al. (“Mansky”) counter that the statute and its application have only prohibited political apparel that, from the perspective of a reasonable person, is related to ballot issues on election day in order to ensure that Minnesotans have the right to vote freely, without undue influence. Mansky maintains that the non-public forum analysis is the proper test to determine the statute’s constitutionality, and that the statute is reasonable and viewpoint neutral in light of the government’s goal to have polling sites focus on voting. This case will clarify the scope of the right to vote versus the right to self-expression, as well as analyze the rights of individuals when participating in democratic deliberation.
Is Minnesota Statute Section 211B.11(1), which broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place, facially overbroad under the First Amendment?
Section 211B.11, entitled “Election Day Prohibitions,” of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act regulates behavior “near polling places.” Minn. Stat.
Is the First Amendment violated when a state imposes content-moderation restrictions on social media companies’ ability to censure its posts or users or when a state imposes individualized-explanation requirements when social media companies censor their posts or users?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the First Amendment is violated when states impose content-moderation restrictions and require individualized explanations for social media companies to censure posts or users. Florida Attorney General Moody argues that the content-moderation laws only regulate content and not speech and that intermediate scrutiny applies. Moody also argues that social media companies are analogous to common carriers which are subject to regulations, and providing individualized explanations are not unduly burdensome to the well-funded social media companies. NetChoice counters that the content-moderation laws restrict editorial discretion, that its members are not common carriers, strict scrutiny applies to the content-moderation laws, and that the individual-explanation requirements are too burdensome. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the ability of social media companies to monitor posts on their platforms.
Issues: (1) Whether the laws’ content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment; and (2) whether the laws’ individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment.
On August 1, 2021, Senate Bill (“SB”) 7072 took effect in the state of Florida. NetChoice, LLC v. Attorney General at 7. The Bill’s purpose is to protect Floridians from censorship on popular social media sites. Id. at 7. Specifically, Governor Ron DeSantis said that the Bill was created to “fight against big tech oligarchs that . . .
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Oral argument: March 19, 2007
Did the U.S. government’s conduct compel social media companies in a manner that caused First Amendment harm to social media users, and should the resulting injunction be modified?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether certain government officials impermissibly used their government speech to coerce social media companies to violate the First Amendment rights of social media users. The Court will analyze (1) whether the respondents have standing; (2) whether the government’s conduct violated the Respondents’ First Amendment rights; and (3) whether the granted injunction was properly written. Murthy argues that (1) the respondents do not have standing because their injuries are not traceable to the government; (2) the government officials used their permissible government speech that did not contain any threats; and (3) the injunction is unnecessarily broad and vague and would harm the government and the public’s access to information. Missouri counters that (1) the Respondents have standing because their injuries are directly traceable to government officials and can be redressed; (2) the government officials’ unrelenting pressure crossed the line into impermissible speech that violated the Respondents’ First Amendment rights; and (3) the injunction is properly tailored to the harms that the Respondents suffered. The outcome of this case will affect the ability of the government to communicate with private entities, First Amendment rights, and social media content moderation policies.
(1) Whether respondents have Article III standing; (2) whether the government’s challenged conduct transformed private social media companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and violated respondents’ First Amendment rights; and (3) whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.
Since the 2020 presidential election, some federal officials have communicated with social media platforms about “misinformation” on their websites. Missouri v. Biden, at 2. Officials from government agencies told these platforms to remove content and social media accounts involving topics such as COVID-19, pandemic lockdowns, and Hunter Biden’s laptop.
Does a California law requiring licensed pregnancy clinics to disseminate a notice containing information about state-funded family planning services including abortion and requiring unlicensed pregnancy clinics to disclose their unlicensed status violate the First Amendment’s free speech clause?
This case will determine how much a state can force a medical provider to say when that speech is antithetical to the provider’s religious beliefs. California’s Reproductive FACT Act (“the Act”) requires licensed pregnancy-service facilities to disseminate a notice stating that: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women” and providing a phone number that patients can call to seek more information. The Act also requires unlicensed clinics to distribute a notice disclosing that they are not licensed by the state. The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”) argues that the Act unconstitutionally compels speech and should be subjected to strict scrutiny, which it cannot survive. NIFLA further contends that the Act discriminates impermissibly against pro-life clinics based on their viewpoint. California responds that the Act is a permissible exercise of the government’s authority to regulate speech between professionals and their clients, which survives any level of scrutiny. California also claims that the Act addresses fraudulent practices affecting women’s understanding of their reproductive healthcare choices and does not suppress pro-life viewpoints. Will free speech prevail over regulation of doctors and will the result benefit pregnant women?
Whether the disclosures required by the California Reproductive FACT Act violate the protections set forth in the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 2015, the California Legislature passed the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (“the Act”) into law, declaring in the bill’s text that “all California women, regardless of income, should have access to reproductive health services.” See Nat’l Inst.
Do statutes that limit the amount a political party can donate in coordination with a political candidate violate the First Amendment?
This case asks the Court to determine whether 52 U.S.C. § 30116 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) violates the First Amendment rights of political parties wishing to coordinate donations for their preferred candidates’ political campaigns. FECA was established to set a cap on a political party’s coordinated expenditures to prevent circumvention of contribution limits. Petitioners, National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”), National Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”), former Senator J.D. Vance, and former Representative Stephen Chabot (collectively “NRSC”), argue that the limits on coordinated party expenditures violate the First Amendment because they infringe their speech and political association rights. NRSC further argues that Colorado II, a case in which the Supreme Court previously upheld coordinated party expenditure limits, should not control this case. The Court-appointed attorney Roman Martinez, invited to support the judgment below, argues that the coordinated party expenditure limits are necessary to achieve the government interest in preventing quid-pro-quo corruption between donors and candidates, and that Colorado II must control this case’s outcome. Martinez further highlights several justiciability concerns. The outcome of this case could impact political corruption deterrence and Congress’ ability to regulate campaign finance.
Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications" as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37.
Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) in 1972 to regulate political campaign spending. National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (“NRSC v. FEC”) at 4. The FECA imposes a variety of limits on individual contributions to political parties and on political parties’ campaign spending.
Does a government regulator violate the First Amendment when the regulator threatens companies with regulatory action for doing business with a party because the regulator disagrees with that party’s viewpoints?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a government regulator violates the First Amendment when the regulator threatens companies with regulatory action for doing business with a party because the regulator disagrees with that party’s viewpoints. In 2018, New York State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) Superintendent Maria Vullo asked financial institutions, in response to the Parkland school shooting, to reconsider their business with the National Rifle Association (“NRA”). The NRA argues that these communications constitute impermissible coercion designed to stifle its freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Vullo contends that such communications are protected government speech and essential to her job as a regulator. The outcome of this case has important ramifications for free speech, state officials’ ability to regulate, and the right to bear arms.
Whether the First Amendment allows a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government’s own hostility to the speaker’s viewpoint or (b) a perceived “general backlash” against the speaker’s advocacy.
In October 2017, the New York State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) opened an investigation into the legality of certain insurance programs endorsed by the National Rifle Association of America (“NRA”). National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo at 3.
Does Texas House Bill 20 restrict social media platforms’ content screening policy in a manner that violates the First Amendment?
This case addresses whether Texas House Bill 20, which prohibits social media platforms from censoring users’ expressions, violates the First Amendment. NetChoice, the petitioner, argues that social media platforms need not display all user-submitted content because they are not common carriers that may not selectively disseminate speech. NetChoice further contends that the bill is a content-based regulation of speech that interferes with social media platforms’ editorial discretion, without achieving any compelling state interest. Texas counters that social media platforms are common carriers that must host all users’ speech because they provide equal and open-access services to users. Texas also contends that the bill preserves social media platforms’ right to express their views on posted content, and neutrally applies to all user expressions irrespective of their content because it only permits removing content outside of First Amendment protection. This case will significantly impact social media corporations and state governments because it determines the extent of latitude big social media corporations have in implementing content mediation policy.
Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech — or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.
The Texas state legislature passed House Bill 20 (“HB 20”) on September 9, 2021, prohibiting large social media platforms from censoring users based on their viewpoints. NetChoice, LLC v.
