INJUNCTION

Biden v. Missouri

Issues

Can the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services continue to temporarily enforce a mandate requiring health care workers at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified facilities to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 notwithstanding a district court injunction prohibiting the rule’s enforcement?

This case asks the Supreme Court to grant a stay of a district court injunction that currently blocks the Biden Administration from enforcing a mandate requiring certain healthcare workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19. The Biden Administration argues that the Supreme Court should issue a stay because the mandate is statutorily authorized, and its enforcement is in the public interest. The State of Missouri and nine other states (collectively “Missouri”) counter that the Supreme Court should reject the Biden Administration’s application for a stay and maintain enjoinment of the mandate throughout the pending litigation. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the Biden Administration’s pandemic-related authority and the role that the Supreme Court will play in either upholding or invalidating such authority.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue a stay of the injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri blocking a federal rule that requires all health care workers at facilities that participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they are eligible for a medical or religious exemption.  

On November 5, 2021, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (“CMS”), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), promulgated 86 Fed. Reg.

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Biden v. Texas

Issues

Is the Department of Homeland Security required by law to continue returning certain undocumented aliens to Mexico, consistent with the Migrant Protection Protocols; and, was the Fifth Circuit correct in holding DHS erred in terminating MPP?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) must continue enforcing the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). On October 29, 2021, DHS issued a decision terminating MPP, a Trump administration policy where Border Patrol returns certain undocumented aliens arriving at the southern border to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. The Biden Administration (“President Biden”) argues that DHS permissibly rescinded MPP via agency memoranda because the amended Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives DHS discretion over whether to remove, detain, or parole noncitizens. Texas and Missouri respond that DHS’s rescission of MPP has no legal effect because if DHS lacks capacity to detain undocumented aliens, the INA obligates DHS to remove such persons by continuing to enforce MPP. The outcome of this case has significant implications for undocumented aliens seeking asylum in the United States and immigrant communities within the United States, as well as the role of the executive in determining immigration policy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 requires the Department of Homeland Security to continue implementing the Migrant Protection Protocols, a former policy under which certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border were returned to Mexico during their immigration and proceedings; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred by concluding that the secretary of homeland security’s new decision terminating MPP had no legal effect.

In December 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). Texas v.

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eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.

Issues

Whether a patentee has an automatic right to a permanent injunction once infringement is found.

 

In 2003, a jury found that eBay, an online auction website, was violating various patents owned by MercExchange. The district court nevertheless refused to issue a permanent injunction that would have barred eBay from continuing to use the patented methods. The Federal Circuit of Appeals granted the injunction against eBay and held that permanent injunctions were the “general rule” in patent infringement cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a patentee has an automatic right to a permanent injunction after a finding of infringement. If the Court upholds the “near-automatic injunction rule,” then patent holders will have a powerful remedy that can give them tremendous leverage in litigation. However, upholding the rule may also make it easier for “patent trolls” to continue benefiting from genuine innovators. If the Court instead finds that patent holders do not automatically have the right to an injunction, infringers will be able to continue using the patented product, thereby subverting the purposes of patent law. Not granting automatic injunctions may also encourage more patent infringement. How the Supreme Court decides the case will depend on its interpretation of important precedents and how it weighs these important social implications.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Federal Circuit erred in setting forth a general rule in patent cases that a district court must, absent exceptional circumstances, issue a permanent injunction after a finding of infringement.

eBay, Inc. (“eBay”) owns and operates a website that allows buyers to purchase goods either through an auction-style format or at a fixed price via the “Buy it Now” feature. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

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Lamone v. Benisek

Issues

Is partisan gerrymandering a form of unconstitutional First Amendment retaliation that is justiciable by the courts?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Maryland’s 2011 redistricting of the Sixth Congressional District constituted unlawful partisan gerrymandering in violation of the First Amendment, and whether the First Amendment retaliation framework used by the district court provided manageable standards to decide this case. Specifically, the Court will consider whether legislators redrew electoral maps in retaliation to citizens’ political affiliations and voting histories. Appellant Linda H. Lamone argues that although the redistricting process may be tainted by partisan bias, redistricting does not necessarily indicate an intent to punish citizens for their party affiliations and voting histories. Appellee O. John Benisek counters that the proper question is whether electoral maps were redrawn because of citizens’ political affiliations and voting histories, irrespective of malicious retribution. This case could have a meaningful impact on the scope of lawful electoral redistricting and whether the Court should consider legislators’ subjective intent when making this determination.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court are unmanageable; (2) whether the three-judge district court erred when, in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, it resolved disputes of material fact as to multiple elements of plaintiffs’ claims, failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and treated as “undisputed” evidence that is the subject of still-unresolved hearsay and other evidentiary objections; and (3) whether the three-judge district court abused its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief, rendering the remedy applicable to at most one election before the next decennial census necessitates another redistricting.

After the 2010 census, the State of Maryland engaged in the redistricting of its eight congressional districts and forty-seven legislative districts to equalize each district’s population. Benisek v.

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Murthy v. Missouri

Issues

Did the U.S. government’s conduct compel social media companies in a manner that caused First Amendment harm to social media users, and should the resulting injunction be modified?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether certain government officials impermissibly used their government speech to coerce social media companies to violate the First Amendment rights of social media users. The Court will analyze (1) whether the respondents have standing; (2) whether the government’s conduct violated the Respondents’ First Amendment rights; and (3) whether the granted injunction was properly written. Murthy argues that (1) the respondents do not have standing because their injuries are not traceable to the government; (2) the government officials used their permissible government speech that did not contain any threats; and (3) the injunction is unnecessarily broad and vague and would harm the government and the public’s access to information. Missouri counters that (1) the Respondents have standing because their injuries are directly traceable to government officials and can be redressed; (2) the government officials’ unrelenting pressure crossed the line into impermissible speech that violated the Respondents’ First Amendment rights; and (3) the injunction is properly tailored to the harms that the Respondents suffered. The outcome of this case will affect the ability of the government to communicate with private entities, First Amendment rights, and social media content moderation policies. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether respondents have Article III standing; (2) whether the government’s challenged conduct transformed private social media companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and violated respondents’ First Amendment rights; and (3) whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.

Since the 2020 presidential election, some federal officials have communicated with social media platforms about “misinformation” on their websites. Missouri v. Biden, at 2. Officials from government agencies told these platforms to remove content and social media accounts involving topics such as COVID-19, pandemic lockdowns, and Hunter Biden’s laptop.

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Taggart v. Lorenzen

Issues

Does a creditor’s good-faith belief that an attempt to collect non-dischargeable debt does not violate a bankruptcy court’s discharge order protect the creditor from contempt?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine what role, if any, good-faith belief plays in relation to contempt and bankruptcy discharge orders. Petitioner Bradley Weston Taggart contends that the bankruptcy code does not afford protection for creditors who violate a discharge order, even when a creditor holds a good-faith belief that his or her attempt at collection is permissible under the law. Respondents Shelley A. Lorenzen and others counter that the bankruptcy code must consider a creditor’s good-faith belief, because otherwise creditors would be held in contempt for minor violations that make it harder for them to seek collection of non-dischargeable debt. The outcome of this case will have significant implications on the limits of creditor liability and debtor protection in the discharge context as well as implications for legal advocacy, state taxation, and the economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor’s good-faith belief that the discharge injunction does not apply precludes a finding of civil contempt.

Petitioner Bradley Weston Taggart, a real estate developer, owned a twenty-five percent interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Lorenzen v. Taggart, 888 F.3d 438, 440 (9th Cir. 2018). In 2007, Taggart transferred his interest in SPBC to his lawyer, John Berman. Id.

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Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Issues

Whether under NEPA the CEQ could make "alternative arrangements" that allowed the Navy to continue using MFA sonar in its training exercises off the coast of southern California without filing an EIS because the District Court’s conditional preliminary injunction constituted "emergency circumstances."

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction on the "mere possibility of irreparable harm," and also by not deferring to the CEQ’s findings.

 

On March 22, 2007, the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") sued the United States Navy in the District Court for the Central District of California to enjoin the Navy from conducting training exercises off the coast of southern California. Specifically, the NRDC sought to prevent the Navy from using mid-frequency active ("MFA") sonar during these exercises because such use harmed whales and other marine mammals, in violation of several environmental laws. The District Court concluded in January 2008 that NRDC had proven that allowing the exercises to continue would cause near certain harm to the environment and issued a preliminary injunction. In response to the injunction, both the President and the Council for Environmental Quality ("CEQ") exempted the Navy from two environmental statutes, finding that emergency circumstances existed which allowed the training to continue. The District Court, however, found the exemptions were improper and upheld its preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Navy challenges this decision by arguing that courts below used too lax of a standard when deciding that a preliminary injunction was justified and that the judiciary improperly interfered with the executive branch’s authority to control the military. How the Supreme Court decides this case will not only reflect its view on balancing environmental protection and national security, but also clarify the roles each Federal branch has in these matters.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether CEQ permissibly construed its own regulation in finding "emergency circumstances."

2. Whether, in any event, the preliminary injunction, based on a preliminary finding that the Navy had not satisfied NEPA’s procedural requirements, is inconsistent with established equitable principles limiting discretionary injunctive relief.

The United States Navy uses mid-frequency active ("MFA") sonar to detect submerged submarines. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (hereinafter NRDC).

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