due process

Glossip v. Oklahoma

Issues

Does due process require the reversal of a conviction where the state suppressed evidence that a key witness was under psychiatric care and failed to correct false testimony about that care?

Court below
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine when a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of information requires retrial of a death row case. Richard Eugene Glossip, a death row inmate, asserts that the state hid information that a key witness in the case was under psychiatric care and failed to correct that witness’s lies about his psychiatric care. He argues that these actions, along with other failures to turn over information, violate his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois. Christopher G. Michel, the court-appointed amicus curiae arguing in support of the judgment in the lower court, argues that the undisclosed information was too unclear to vindicate Petitioner or affect the jury. He also argues that the court cannot hear this case, as held by the lower court on an adequate and independent state ground. The outcome of this case has significant implications for public confidence in the criminal justice system and the role of prosecutors.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the state’s suppression of the key prosecution witness’ admission that he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness’ false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois; (2) whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims; (3) whether due process of law requires reversal where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the state no longer seeks to defend it; and (4) whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Procedure Act precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.

On January 14, 1997, Justin Sneed bludgeoned Barry Van Treese to death. Glossip v. State at 223. Sneed pled guilty to this murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole, and agreed to testify regarding the involvement of Richard Glossip in the crime.

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Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown

Issues

Whether a court can acquire general personal jurisdiction to hear any claim against a foreign company when the company’s only connection with the forum state is the distribution of products by other entities of the parent corporation.

 
Appealed from: North Carolina Court of Appeals (Aug. 18, 2009)​Two North Carolina teenagers were killed in France when a tire, manufactured by Goodyear Luxembourg, malfunctioned and caused an accident. Their estates sued the foreign manufacturers of the defective tire for negligence in a North Carolina state court, and the state court found that it had general jurisdiction over the defendants and could hear the case. Goodyear Luxembourg argues that North Carolina does not have general jurisdiction because the company has no presence in or direct business with North Carolina. The teenagers' estates argue that the court properly found jurisdiction because Goodyear Luxembourg is part of the larger and highly integrated Goodyear enterprise, which does have significant contact with North Carolina. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the ease with which plaintiffs may sue foreign manufacturers in state court, and could potentially affect commercial relations between the United States and other nations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a foreign corporation is subject to  general  personal jurisdiction, on causes of action not arising out of or related to any contacts between it and the forum state, merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products placed in the stream of commerce by the defendant.

On April 18, 2004, Matthew Helms and Julian Brown died as a result of a bus accident near Paris, France. See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App.

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Additional Resources

· Washington Legal Foundation: Court Urged to Reject Expansion of Jurisdiction over Foreign Companies (Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. Brown) (Nov. 19, 2010)
 
· Nixon Peabody, Raymond L. Mariani: U.S. Supreme Court to Revisit Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Manufacturers (Nov. 16, 2010).
 
The Supreme Court will hear this case in tandem with J. McIntyre Machinery, LTD v. Nicastro, which concerns state personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer which generally targets the U.S. market but has no physical presence in the United States and uses an independent company as its exclusive distributor within the United States.
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Greenlaw v. United States of America

Issues

Can a federal appeals court judge can decide to increase a criminal defendant's sentence without being asked to do so by the Government?

 

Michael Greenlaw was a member of the "Family Mob" gang which sold crack cocaine on the south side of Minneapolis. Police arrested Greenlaw after he and another Family Mob member used dynamite to destroy a portion of a rival gang member's home. Greenlaw was charged and convicted by a jury of various drug and conspiracy crimes and two firearm-related offenses: carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. The Government asserted that the second firearm charge constituted a "second or subsequent offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and therefore required the court to impose a consecutive 25 year incarceration sentence to any other sentence. The trial court rejected the Government's assertion and sentenced Greenlaw to 442 months in prison, 120 of which (10 years) were imposed as a result of the second weapons charge. The Government did not exercise its right to appeal the sentence, nor did it cross-appeal the sentence when Greenlaw appealed it to the Eighth Circuit. Despite the absence of an argument by the Government for an increase, the Eighth Circuit decided to remand the case to the lower court with an order to increase Greenlaw's sentence by 15 years. Following denial of a petition for a rehearing, Greenlaw filed for certiorari with the Supreme Court challenging the Eighth Circuit's sua sponte increase in his incarceration sentence. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will reflect its view of the appropriate balance between the interest of the courts in consistently interpreting and applying sentencing statutes, and defendants' right to appeal without subjecting themselves to a sentence increase.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In 1937, this Court described as "inveterate and certain," the principle that an appellee "may not, in the absence of a cross-appeal ... 'attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights there under or lessening the rights of his adversary." Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937) (citation omitted). In light of this principle, numerous courts have held that a court of appeals may not order an increase in a criminal defendant's sentence in the absence of an appeal or cross-appeal by the Government. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, however, have held that courts of appeals may sua sponte order increases in a defendant's sentence when the district court has failed to impose a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, even if the Government has not appealed or cross-appealed the sentence. The question presented is: Whether a federal court of appeals may increase a criminal defendant's sentence sua sponte and in the absence of a cross-appeal by the Government.

Michael Greenlaw was a member of a gang named the "Family Mob" that sold crack cocaine on the south side of Minneapolis. Family Mob members worked together to sell two to three kilograms of crack cocaine per week. The gang members kept guns at each others' houses in case they were needed to intimidate non-gang members and keep others from encroaching on the Family Mob's "territory."U.S. v. Carter, 481 F.3d 601, 604-605 (8th Cir. 2007).

Additional Resources

Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manuals and Amendments
ScotusWiki: Greenlaw v. United States
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Irizarry v. United States

Issues

Is a district court required to provide a defendant with notice of its intent to depart from the sentence range established by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, if the grounds for departure are not identified in either the presentence investigation report or the Government's presentencing hearing submissions?

 

In 2001 Leah Smith obtained a divorce from and restraining against her former husband, Richard Irizarry, for spousal abuse. Between the divorce in 2001 and 2003, Irizarry sent Ms. Smith 255 e-mails, several threatening to kill Ms. Smith and her family. In 2003, Irizarry was arrested. Irizarry pleaded guilty to making threatening interstate communications to his ex-wife. As a result, he was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, a sentence nine months longer than the maximum sentence recommended by Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced Irizarry to the maximum amount of time allow under the statute, because of the likelihood Irizarry would continue threatening his ex-wife. Irizarry objected to the sentence because the court failed to give advance notice of its intent to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h) ("Rule 32(h)"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, determining that Rule 32(h) does not apply to such sentence variances. In the Supreme Court, Irizarry argues that his sentence should be overturned because Rule 32(h) requires a district court to give the parties notice any time it intends to depart from the sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on a ground not previously identified in the presentence report or a government submission.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h), and the holding in Burns v.United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) requiring a court to provide reasonable notice to the parties that it is contemplating a departure from the applicable sentencing guideline range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing submission, has any continuing application in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Richard Irizarry married Leah Smith in 1995. Irizarry was physically and mentally abusive to Smith and their son. In 2000, Smith left Irizarry and moved across the country and, in 2001, divorced Irizarry and obtained a restraining order against him. See United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). That year, Irizarry was arrested and sent to jail for violating the restraining order after he arrived at Smith's new apartment. See Brief of United States in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 3.
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Jennings v. Rodriguez (updated)

Issues

Did the Ninth Circuit err in deciding that non-citizens who are subject to mandatory detention while seeking admission to the United States must be granted bond hearings at six month intervals throughout their detention and are entitled to release unless the government meets its burden by demonstrating that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community? 

[UPDATE] The Supreme Court heard oral argument for this case and requested additional briefing. The Court received the requested briefing and re-set the case for additional argument during the 2017-2018 term.

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether immigrants to the United States, who are being detained under civil immigration detention statutes, must be brought before an immigration judge for a bond hearing at six month intervals throughout their detention and whether the immigration judge must consider alternatives to a detained immigrant’s prolonged detention if the government fails to show through clear and convincing evidence that the immigrant is a flight risk or danger to the community. David Jennings et al. argue that statutory language and congressional intent prohibit immigration judges from releasing non-citizens detained under the civil immigration detention statutes on bond. Meanwhile, Alejandro Rodriguez et al. argue that Congress did not authorize prolonged detention through the immigration statutes and that without periodic bond hearings or the government’s justification of continued detention, individuals would be needlessly deprived of their liberty. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact detained non-citizen’s constitutional rights and their ability to exercise their legal rights during removal proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b), inadmissible aliens who arrive at our Nation’s borders must be detained, without a bond hearing, during proceedings to remove them from the country. Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), certain criminal and terrorist aliens must be detained, without a bond hearing, during removal proceedings. Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), other aliens may be released on bond during their removal proceedings, if the alien demonstrates that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. 8 C.F.R. 236.1(c)(8). Aliens detained under Section 1226(a) may receive additional bond hearings if circumstances have changed materially. 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(e).

  1. Whether aliens seeking admission to the United States who are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release into the United States, if detention lasts six months
  2. Whether criminal or terrorist aliens who are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release, if detention lasts six months.
  3. Whether, in bond hearings for aliens detained for six months under Sections 1225(b), 1226(c), or 1226(a), the alien is entitled to release unless the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community; whether the length of the alien’s detention must be weighed in favor of release; and whether new bond hearings must be afforded automatically every six months.

Alejandro Rodriguez, Abdirizak Aden Farah, Jose Farias Cornejo, Yussuf Abdikadir, Abel Perez Ruelas, and Efren Orozco are all non-citizens who sued in a class action challenging their prolonged detentions without individualized bond hearings or re-evaluations of the reasons for their continued detention under civil immigration detention statutes. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, No.

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Acknowledgments

Original Preview by Reymond Yamine and Natalie San Juan.

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Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez

Issues

Does an alien have the right to a bond hearing, at which the government must prove that the detainee is dangerous or a flight risk, after being held in custody for six months?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the government must prove to an immigration judge by clear and convincing evidence, that an alien who has been detained for six months is a flight risk or dangerous to the community. In 2018, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents detained Antonio Arteaga-Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, who had illegally entered the United States in September 2012. The parties differ on whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231 requires a bond hearing after six months of detention, or whether the Department of Homeland Security needs to prove that an alien is a flight risk or danger to the community. The government, represented by Tae Johnson, maintains that neither are required based on the plain meaning of the statute. Further, Johnson claims that current Immigration and Customs Enforcement policies satisfy due process requirements, citing mechanisms such as required hearings, review processes, and access to attorneys. In response, Arteaga-Martinez argues that a bond hearing is required after six months of detention, and that the Department of Homeland Security must then prove that the immigrant is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Mr. Arteaga-Martinez adds that due process is not met by the government’s scheme. This case has important implications for immigrant rights and the administration of immigration law.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an alien who is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is entitled by statute, after six months of detention, to a bond hearing at which the government must prove to an immigration judge by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community.

 

Respondent Antonio Arteaga-Martinez (“Arteaga-Martinez”) is a native and citizen of Mexico. Brief for Petitioner, Tae D. Johnson at 6. Arteaga-Martinez entered the United States four times over the past twenty years. Id. He first came to the United States in February 2000, and, after being stopped at the border, voluntarily returned to Mexico. Id.

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Johnson v. United States

Issues

Is the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague?

(Note: this preview is for re-argument of Johnson v. United States. For the earlier arguments, see the preview for Johnson v. United States - Nov. 2014.)

The Supreme Court will hear rearguments in this case to determine whether the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is unconstitutionally vague. The original issue on appeal urged the Court to consider whether possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under the ACCA, but after oral arguments, the Court ordered a rehearing to determine whether the ACCA’s residual clause itself is unconstitutionally vague. The Petitioner, Samuel Johnson, argues that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process. In opposition, the Respondent, the United States, contends that the clause is not unconstitutionally vague and successfully provides direction to judges and citizens when determining how to conform their actions to the law. The outcome of this case may effect the role of judges in interpreting the residual clause of the ACCA, the uniformity of sentencing across different states, and the level of notice people have regarding whether a crime is a violent felony under the ACCA. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation started investigating Samuel James Johnson’s participation in the Aryan Liberation Movement (“Movement”) in 2010. See United States v. Johnson, No. 12-3123, 2013 WL 3924353, at *1 (8th Cir. 2013). Johnson intended to counterfeit United States currency in order to support the activities of the Movement.

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Additional Resources

Lyle Denniston: Court Orders New Look at Armed Criminal Law, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 9, 2015). 

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Jones v. Flowers

Issues

When mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, is the government required to take additional steps to locate the owner before taking the property?

 

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to give “reasonably calculated” notice to inform an affected party of an upcoming governmental proceeding. The issue before the Court is whether, when mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, due process requires the government to take additional steps to locate the owner before taking the property. A holding that the government is required to take additional steps may subject the government to significant administrative burdens and undermine the process of transferring property rights. A holding that due process does not require the government to take additional steps may make property from tax sales more transferable, but may also deprive property owners of their constitutional right to due process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, does due process require the government to make any additional effort to locate the owner before taking the property?

 

In 1967 Gary Jones purchased a house in Little Rock, Arkansas. When he and his wife separated in 1993, his wife stayed in the house and he moved to a new address. Jones did not notify the tax authority of his new address. After both Joneses failed to pay taxes on the house, the Commissioner of State Lands sent a notice to Gary Jones’ last known address via certified mail. The notice stated that the property would be subject to a public sale if Jones did not pay the delinquent taxes and penalties.

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Jones v. Hendrix

Issues

Does a prisoner who did not initially challenge certain aspects of their conviction have the right to challenge their conviction later via habeas corpus after the Supreme Court changed the standard of conviction for the related crime?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the extent to which habeas relief is available to a prisoner after a Supreme Court case heightens the standard of conviction for the crime they were convicted of. The relevant statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)’s saving clause, allows a prisoner to move for habeas relief if alternative remedies available under other subsections of § 2255 are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention.” Petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones argues that because the lower court applied the wrong substantive law, the alternative remedies were ineffective in testing the legality of his detention, and that he is therefore entitled to habeas relief under § 2255(e). Jones further argues that the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute renders § 2255(e) superfluous and violates many of Jones’s constitutional rights. Respondent Dewayne Hendrix counters that the § 2255(e) requires a showing of actual innocence, which he argues Jones cannot make, in order to trigger habeas relief, and that Jones’ constitutional concerns are misguided. The outcome of this case will determine the availability of post-conviction relief to prisoners following changes in relevant substantive law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether federal inmates who did not — because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them — challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C § 2241 after the Supreme Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction.

In December 1999, Marcus DeAngelo Jones was arrested at a convenience store in Columbia, Missouri as part of an undercover operation related to drug dealing. U.S. v. Jones at 808. At trial, the government introduced evidence showing that Jones had been in possession of a firearm on multiple occasions. Id. Jones possessed this firearm despite his several prior felony convictions.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Kaley v. United States

Issues

Do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a pretrial, adversarial hearing, at which the defendant may challenge the underlying charges before the government can freeze assets needed by the defendant to retain counsel of choice?

Kerri and Brian Kaley were indicted by a federal grand jury in 2007 for stealing prescription medical devices and selling them on the black market. Along with the indictment, the United States obtained an order to restrain assets traceable to the alleged crime. Because those assets were needed to retain the Kaleys’ counsel of choice, the Kaleys contested the order as violative of their Fifth Amendment right to due process and of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Those rights, the Kaleys argued, entitled them to a full pretrial, adversarial hearing at which to challenge the validity of the forfeiture. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Kaleys are entitled only to a hearing at which to challenge the assets’ traceability to the crime—not the underlying charges as well. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will impact not only the scope of pretrial asset restraint hearings, but also the ease with which the government may seize assets, as well as defendants’ ability to retain counsel of their choice.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order freezes assets needed by a criminal defendant to retain counsel of choice, do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a pre-trial, adversarial hearing at which the defendant may challenge the evidentiary support and legal theory of the underlying charges?

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Facts

Petitioner Kerri Kaley was a sales representative for a New York–based medical-device company. See United States v. Kaley,677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.

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