Women and Justice: Topics: Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Legislation

Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України "Про затвердження Національного плану дій з виконання резолюції Ради Безпеки ООН 1325 "Жінки, мир, безпека" на період до 2025 року" №1544 2020 (Order on UNSC resolution 1325 "Women, Peace, Security") (2020)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The National action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 'Women, peace, security' for the period until 2025 was developed, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine 'On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Women and Men', as well as Ukraine's international obligations in the field of human rights. This document aims to address: women's participation in decision-making; combating gender-based violence and sexual violence related to armed conflict, etc. As a problem that needs to be solved in Ukraine, this document defines women's vulnerability to the negative consequences of armed conflict. In particular, according to official statistics, the majority of internally displaced persons, unemployed internally displaced persons, etc., are women. In addition, the analyzed document contains the results of the study on violence 'Women's Well-being and Security' conducted by the OSCE in 2019, according to which 67% of Ukrainian women (who have suffered from violence), they have been subjected to physical, psychological, or sexual violence by the time they are 15 years old. The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine is the executive body responsible for the implementation of the National action plan. This document includes the following strategic goals: ensuring the protection of women from sexual and gender-based violence (during armed conflict and peacetime); ensuring the process of post-conflict recovery; development and implementation of the transitional justice system based on the principles of ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men, etc. In addition, the National Plan includes the obligation of the Ministry of Social Policy to publish an annual report on its implementation for public discussion on its official website. But, at the same time, the website of this body contains the latest report for 2020 only.

Національний план дій розроблено відповідно до Закону України "Про забезпечення рівних прав та можливостей жінок і чоловіків", а також міжнародних зобов’язань України у сфері прав людини. Цей документ спрямований на забезпечення: участі жінок у прийнятті рішень; боротьби із ґендерно зумовленим насильством та сексуальним насильством, пов’язаним зі збройним конфліктом тощо. Як проблему, що потребує вирішення в Україні, цей документ визначає вразливість жінок до негативних наслідків збройного конфлікту. Зокрема, згідно з офіційною статистикою, більшість внутрішньо переміщених осіб, безробітних внутрішньо переміщених осіб тощо становлять жінки. Крім цього, аналізований документ містить результати дослідження з питань насильства "Жіноче благополуччя та безпека", проведеного ОБСЄ у 2019 році, згідно з яким 67% українських жінок (які постраждали від насильства) зазнавали фізичного, психологічного чи сексуального насильства у віці до 15 років. Органом виконавчої влади, відповідальним за реалізацію Національного плану дій, є Міністерство соціальної політики України. Цей документ містить такі стратегічні цілі: забезпечення захисту жінок від сексуального та ґендерно зумовленого насильства (під час збройного конфлікту та мирний час); забезпечення процесу постконфліктного відновлення; розвиток та впровадження системи правосуддя перехідного періоду, що заснована на принципах забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків, тощо. Крім того, Національний план містить обов’язок Міністерства соціальної політики публікувати щорічний звіт про його виконання для громадськості. обговорення на офіційному сайті. Але, при цьому, на сайті цього органу розміщено останній звіт лише за 2020 рік.



Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України "Про схвалення Концепції комунікації у сфері гендерної рівності" № 1128 2020 (Communication Concept on Gender Equality) (2020)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The purpose of the Concept is to improve society's understanding of the essence and tasks of state gender policy and to perceive it as an integral component of a democratic and legal state. The text of the Concept highlights the problems that need to be solved. For example, the gender discrimination, gender-based violence, and sexual harassment in Ukrainian society. Gender stereotypes are often ignored and dismissed, which is a negative trend. In addition, an extremely dangerous factor is the large amount of sexist and discriminatory content in the informational space, including sexist advertising. Women are underrepresented in the upper echelons of the labor sectors, public life, and politics. These, as well as a number of other global problems in the field of ensuring equal rights of women and men, led to the adoption of this Concept. The realization of this strategic program document is planned until 2025. For this, an action plan was developed and presented for discussion with the public, which contains successive steps for the implementation of the Concept and contains 8 strategic goals, in particular, ensuring the participation of women in the decision-making process and political activity; ensuring equal access of women and men to justice; elimination of gender-based violence, etc. It is planned that the achievement of these goals should be carried out mainly through public awareness (media appearances, discussions), educational activities, research on gender issues, communication companies, etc. The Concept should help intolerance of all forms of discrimination, overcoming established stereotypes regarding gender roles, as well as embedding standards of equal rights of women and men in society.

Метою Концепції є вдосконалення розуміння суспільством сутності та завдань державної ґендерної політики та сприйняття її як невід’ємної складової демократичної та правової держави. У тексті Концепції висвітлено проблеми, які потребують вирішення. Наприклад, ґендерна дискримінація, ґендерне насильство та сексуальні домагання в українському суспільстві. Ґендерні стереотипи часто ігноруються та відкидаються, що є негативною тенденцією. Крім цього, надзвичайно небезпечним фактором є велика кількість сексистського та дискримінаційного контенту в інформаційному просторі, в тому числі сексистської реклами. Жінки недостатньо представлені на керівних посадах, у громадському житті та політиці. Ці, а також низка інших глобальних проблем у сфері забезпечення рівності прав жінок і чоловіків зумовили прийняття цієї Концепції. Реалізація цього стратегічного програмного документу розрахована до 2025 року. Для цього розроблено та представлено на обговорення громадськості план заходів, який містить послідовні кроки щодо реалізації Концепції та містить 8 стратегічних цілей, зокрема забезпечення участі жінок у процесі прийняття рішень та політичній діяльності; забезпечення рівного доступу жінок і чоловіків до правосуддя; викорінення ґендерного насильства тощо. Передбачається, що досягнення цих цілей має здійснюватися переважно через інформування громадськості (виступи в ЗМІ, дискусії), просвітницьку діяльність, дослідження ґендерних питань, комунікаційні компанії тощо. Концепція має сприяти нетерпимості до будь-яких форм дискримінації, подолання усталених стереотипів щодо ґендерних ролей, а також утвердження стандартів рівних прав жінок і чоловіків у суспільстві.



قانون العقوبات (Penal Code) (1960)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Honor crimes (or honour crimes), Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Articles 97-98 and 340-341 relate to who may benefit from more lenient sentences for “honour crimes,” such as a person who has witnessed his or her spouse committing adultery. However, Article 345 now excludes honor crimes where the victim is under 15 from qualifying as a mitigating circumstance as enumerated in Articles 97 and 98. Further, Article 308, which allowed a rapist to avoid punishment if they married their victim, was removed in the same 2017 amendment. Article 292 criminalizes intercourse with a woman, other than the man's wife, without her consent through either the means of coercion, threat, or deception. The punishment for such an action is at least 15 years’ imprisonment. This is extended under Article 293 to those women who are unable to resist sexual advances due to a physical or mental disability. In Article 294, a person who has intercourse with a girl of 15-17 years of age will be subject to 7 years temporary hard labor. If the victim is between 12 - 15 years, the minimum penalty will be 15 years. Article 304 provides a minimum standard of six months to three years imprisonment for those persons who “deflower virgins” of 18 years after promising to marry them in addition to compensation. Article 305 and 306 provides that anyone who commits sexual harassment or any type of sexual gesture with a child of under 18 (male or female), or over 18 without consent, is penalized. Article 314 provides that caretakers who permit a child between 6-16 to frequent brothels is penalized for imprisonment for a period of 6 years or with a fine of 20 (JD). Articles 309-318 prohibit prostitution, running a brothel, forcing a woman into prostitution, exposing a child to a brothel, renting a house for brothel, living off of a woman’s sex work. Article 323 punishes whomever aborts a woman's pregnancy without her consent with labor penalties for 10 years, and more than 10 years if the abortion leads to the woman’s death. Abortion remains illegal, but obtaining an abortion “to preserve honor” is a mitigating factor.

توضح المواد 97-98 والمواد 340-341 من يمكن أن يستفيد من العقوبات المخففة لجرائم الشرف مثل الشخص الذي فوجئ بزوجته بجريمة الزنا. بينما بينت المادة 345 أن العقوبات المخففة لا تشمل من هم دون 15 عام. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه تم حذف المادة 308 التي كانت تسمح للمغتصب بأن يتزوج الضحية. ومنعت المادة 292 مواقعة أنثى بغير رضاها سواء بالتهديد أو بالإكراه أو بالحيلة أو الخداع، وتكون العقوبة 15 سنة فأكثر. كما تمتد ذات العقوبة إلى الأنثى التي لا تستطيع المقاومة بسبب ضعف نفسي أو عقلي أو جسدي. كما أشارت المادة 294 إلى أن كل شخص واقع أنثى ما بين 15-17 سنة عوقب بالأشغال المؤقتة لمدة لا تقل عن 7 سنوات، أما إذا كان يقل عمره عن 15 سنة فتمتد عقوبة الأشغال إلى 15 سنة كحد أدنى. ووضحت المادة 304 أن كل شخص قام بخداع بكرًا يبلغ عمرها 18 عام فأكثر بوعده لها بالزاوج ففض بكارتها أو تسبب في حملها يعاقب بالحبس من 6 أشهر على 3 سنوات، بالإضاقة إلى ضمان بكارتها. ذكرت كل من المادتين 305 و306 أنه يعاقب كل شخص قام بفعل جنسي أو أي إيحاء يدل على ذلك لشخص لم يتم 18 من عمره أو أكمل 18 من عمره لكن لو يؤخذ برضاه. كما أشارت المادة 314 أن كل من عوهد إليه بالعناية بولد يتراوح عمره ما بين 6-16 سنة، وسمح له بالاقامة في بيت بغاء أو التردد عليه، يعاقب بالحبس حتى 6 أشهر أو بغرامة حتى 20 دولار. أما اامواد 309-318 فقد جاءت لتمنع الدعارة، والمادة 323 أشارت إلى أنه من أقدم بأي وسيلة كان على اجهاض امرأة، فيعاقب بالحبس لمدة لا تزيد على 10 سنوات، وأكثر من 10 سنوات إذا سبب ذلك الإجهاض وفاة. الإجهاض لا يزال غير قانوني، ولكن لو أرادت المرأة أن تقوم بالإجهاض للحفاظ على الشرف هو عامل مؤثر.



Constitution of Egypt (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Article 11 requires that the state guarantee equality between women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The state must work to adopt measures ensuring the proportional representation of women in the houses of parliament, as determined by the constitution. In addition, the state must ensure women’s rights in pursuing public employment, employment in the senior management of the state, and appointment in judicial agencies without discrimination. The state is committed to the protection of women against all forms of violence and guarantees the empowerment of women in reconciling familial duties and professional obligations. Article 53 mandates that all citizens enjoy equality under the law, equally in their rights, freedoms, and general obligations, without discrimination on the basis of religion, faith, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, economic status, political affiliation, geography, or otherwise. Such discrimination, as well as the incitement of hate, constitutes a crime punishable under the law. The state is committed to adopting the necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and the law establishes a special independent commission to this end. English translation available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf.



Loi No. 2010-769 du 9 Juilet 2010 relative aux violences faites spécifiquement aux femmes, aux violences au sein des couples et aux incidences de ces dernières sur les enfants (Domestic violence and effects on children) (2010)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

Article 8 of the law amended the French Civil Code provisions regarding parental custody. Specifically, it included harassment or violence, whether physical or psychological, by one parent against the other among the factors in custody determinations. Article 31 of the law amended the French Criminal Code as follows: (i) it clarified that psychological violence falls within the scope of violence against the person; and (ii) it introduced a penal offense when the harassment of one’s spouse or partner results in a degradation of that spouse’s or partner’s physical or mental health.

Article 8 modifie les provisions du Code Civile Français qui adresse la garde des enfants. En particulier, l’article inclut le harassement ou la violence, physique ou psychologique, par un parent contre un autre comme un facteur a considéré durant la détermination de la garde d’un enfant. Article 31 modifie le Code Civile Français de deux manières : (i) cela clarifie que la violence psychologique est un type de violence contre un individu ; et (ii) cela introduit une offense pénale quand le harcèlement d’un conjoint, d’un partenaire lié par un pacte civil de solidarité, ou d’un concubin aboutit à la dégradation de leur santé physique ou mentale.



Про внесення змін до Кримінального та Кримінального процесуального кодексів України з метою реалізації положень Конвенції Ради Європи про запобігання насильству стосовно жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з цими явищами (No. 2227-VIII) (2017)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). As a result of these amendments, new dangerous acts were criminalized. For example, Article 151-2 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine by providing criminal liability for forced marriage. Forced marriage (meaning coercing a person to marry, to continue a forcible marriage, to enter into cohabitation without marriage, to continue cohabitation, or to move to a territory other than that in which they reside, regardless of citizenship) is punishable by arrest for a term of up to six months, by restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by imprisonment for the same term. Article 126-1 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code by providing criminal liability for domestic violence. Domestic violence (meaning intentional systematic physical, psychological, or economic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or another person with whom an offender has had a family or close relationship) is punishable by community service of up to 150-240 hours, or arrest for up to six months, restriction of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. A new chapter, “Restrictions,” established that, in the interests of domestic violence victims, the convicted person might be (i) banned from living with a person who suffered from domestic violence or (ii) restricted in communications with their child if the child was a victim or observer of domestic violence. In addition, these amendments provide criminal liability for failure to comply with restrictive measures, which is punishment with arrest for up to six months or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, in consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни з метою закріплення положень Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), прийнятої у 2011 році. У результаті цих змін нові суспільно небезпечні діяння були криміналізовані. Наприклад, особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України доповнено статтею 151-2, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за примушення до шлюбу. Примусовий шлюб (тобто примушування особи до вступу в шлюб або до продовження примусово укладеного шлюбу, або до вступу у співжиття без укладання шлюбу, або до продовження такого співжиття, або спонукання з цією метою особи до переміщення на територію іншої держави, ніж та, в якій вона проживає (там «проживає» означає постійне місце проживання в певному місці, не обов’язково пов’язане з громадянством) карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Також у 2017 році особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України було доповнено статтею 126-1, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за домашнє насильство. Домашнє насильство (тобто умисне систематичне вчинення фізичного, психологічного або економічного насильства щодо подружжя чи колишнього подружжя або іншої особи, з якою винний перебуває (перебував) у сімейних або близьких відносинах, що призводить до фізичних або психологічних страждань, розладів здоров’я, втрати працездатності, емоційної залежності або погіршення якості життя потерпілої особи) караються громадськими роботами на строк від 150 до 240 годин, або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. Додано новий розділ «Обмежувальні заходи». Встановлено, що в інтересах потерпілого від злочину, пов'язаного з домашнім насильством, на засудженого можуть бути покладені такі обов'язки: заборона перебувати в спільному місці проживання з жертвою; обмеження спілкування з дитиною у разі вчинення насильства в сім'ї щодо дитини або в її присутності; крім того, ці зміни передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за невиконання обмежувальних заходів (покарання у вигляді арешту на строк до шести місяців або обмеження волі на строк до двох років). Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.



Кримінальний кодекс України (стаття 3901: Невиконання обмежувальних заходів, обмежувальних приписів або непроходження програми для кривдників) (No. 2341-III) (Criminal Code of Ukraine (Article 3901: Failure to complete offender treatment program) (2001)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

Article 3901 provides criminal liability for (i) intentional failure to comply with the restrictive measures applicable to perpetrators of domestic violence (for example, prohibition on cohabitation with a person who has suffered from domestic violence, restriction of communication with the child in the event that domestic violence is committed against the child or in their presence, etc.); (ii) intentional failure to comply with restrictive instructions; or (iii) intended evasion of a court-mandated offender treatment program. A person who commits these socially dangerous culpable acts shall be punished by arrest for a term of up to six months, or restriction of liberty for a term of up to two years.

Стаття 3901 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за (i) умисне недотримання обмежувальних заходів, які застосовуються до винних у домашньому насильстві (наприклад, заборона спільного проживання з особою, яка постраждала від домашнього насильства, обмеження спілкування з дитиною у випадку, якщо домашнє насильство вчинене щодо дитини або в її присутності тощо); (ii) умисне невиконання обмежувальних приписів; або (iii) умисне ухилення від проходження програми для кривдників особою, щодо якої такі заходи застосовані судом. Особа, яка вчинила ці суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років.



Кримінальний кодекс України (статті 302-303: Проституція та сексуальна експлуатація) (No. 2341-III) Criminal Code of Ukraine (Article 302-303: Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation) (2001)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and also procuring people for sex work in brothels, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and procurement, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 303 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine prohibits engaging a person in prostitution or compulsion to engage in prostitution, involving deceit, blackmail or vulnerable state of a person, with imposition of violence or threat of violence, or pimping. If breached, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of three to five years. Under this Article, pimping shall mean any action of a person committed for the purpose of engaging another person in prostitution.

Статтею 302 Кримінального кодексу України передбачено, що створення або утримання місць розпусти, а також звідництво для розпусти караються штрафом від 1000 до 2000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років. Статтею 303 Кримінального кодексу України забороняється втягнення особи в заняття проституцією або примушування її до зайняття проституцією з використанням обману, шантажу чи уразливого стану цієї особи, або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, або сутенерство. У разі вчинення дій, що криміналізовані цією статтею, передбачено покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від трьох до п'яти років. Відповідно до цієї статті під сутенерством слід розуміти дії особи по забезпеченню заняття проституцією іншою особою.



Кримінальний кодекс України (Стаття 149: Торгівля людьми) (No. 2341-III) (Criminal Code of Ukraine (Article 149: Trafficking in Human Beings)) (2001)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

Article 149 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides criminal liability for trafficking in human beings, as well as recruitment, movement, concealment, transfer, or receipt of a person committed for the purpose of exploitation, coercion, abduction, fraud, blackmail, material, or other dependence of the victim, their vulnerable condition or bribery of a third-party controlling victim, to obtain consent for their exploitation. A person who commits such socially dangerous acts shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years. Article 149 defines exploitation of a human being as including, among other things, all forms of the sexual exploitation, forcing someone to work in the pornography industry, forced pregnancy or forced termination of pregnancy, forced marriage, etc. The Article also provides an explanation of a person's “vulnerable state” (i.e., physical or mental properties or external circumstances, that eliminate or limit the ability to realize their acts (omission) or to control them, to take independent decisions, to resist the violent or other unlawful actions, the coincidence of difficult personal, family, or other circumstances).

Стаття 149 Кримінального кодексу України передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за торгівлю людьми, а так само вербування, переміщення, переховування, передачу або одержання людини, вчинені з метою експлуатації, з використанням примусу, викрадення, обману, шантажу, матеріальної чи іншої залежності потерпілого, його уразливого стану або підкупу третьої особи, яка контролює потерпілого, для отримання згоди на його експлуатацію. Особа, яка вчинила вищезгадані суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до восьми років. Згідно примітки до цієї статті під експлуатацією людини, серед іншого, розуміються всі форми сексуальної експлуатації, використання в порнобізнесі, примусову вагітність або примусове переривання вагітності, примусове одруження тощо. У примітці також надається визначення поняття "уразливий стан особи" (тобто це зумовлений фізичними чи психічними властивостями або зовнішніми обставинами стан особи, який позбавляє або обмежує її здатність усвідомлювати свої дії (бездіяльність) або керувати ними, приймати за своєю волею самостійні рішення, чинити опір насильницьким чи іншим незаконним діям, збіг тяжких особистих, сімейних або інших обставин).



Ley para la Protección de las Mujeres contra Todas las Formas de Violencia Nº 5777 de 2016, diciembre 29, 2016 y Decreto Nº 6973 of 2017 que reglaenta la Ley Nº 5777 de 2016, marzo 27, 2017 (2016)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This law seeks to promote and guarantee women’s right to live free from violence. Its purpose is to promote prevention and protection strategies, sanctions, and integral reparation measures for any kind of violence exercised against women. This law fosters public policies to prevent and remediate different forms of violence, such as psychological, sexual, and physical violence. It also assigns broad responsibilities to each Ministry and Governmental Agency to support the fight against discrimination. The law provides both for protection measures for women that are victims of abuse, such as specific agencies to channel the claims; and penalties for abusers, for instance from 10 to 30 years of imprisonment for femicide. In turn, Decree 6973 specifies that interpretation and application of Law 5777 of 2016 shall provide the broadest protection for women subject to violence. Subsequently, no legal provision may deny, undermine, or limit the rights guaranteed therein. The Decree sets specific courses of action authorities must undertake to prevent violence against women and particular procedures to accomplish that goal. Romantic, platonic, and other sorts of intra-family relationships are considered domestic. For these purposes, marriage is not a requirement.

Esta ley busca promover y garantizar el derecho de las mujeres a gozar de una vida libre de violencia. Su finalidad es promover estrategias de prevención y protección, sanción y medidas de reparación integral frente a cualquier tipo de violencia contra las mujeres. Esta ley fomenta políticas públicas para prevenir y remediar diferentes formas de violencia, como la violencia psicológica, sexual y física. También asigna amplias responsabilidades a cada Ministerio y agencia gubernamental para apoyar la lucha contra la discriminación. La ley prevé tanto medidas de protección para las mujeres que son víctimas de maltrato, como organismos específicos para canalizar las denuncias y penas para los abusadores, por ejemplo, de 10 a 30 años de prisión por feminicidio. A su vez, el Decreto 6973 especifica que la interpretación y aplicación de la Ley 5777 de 2016 brindará la más amplia protección a las mujeres víctimas de violencia. En consecuencia, ninguna disposición legal podrá negar, menoscabar o limitar los derechos en ella garantizados. El Decreto establece cursos de acción específicos que las autoridades deben emprender para prevenir la violencia contra las mujeres y procedimientos particulares para lograr ese objetivo. Las relaciones intrafamiliares, románticas y similares se consideran domésticas. A estos efectos, el matrimonio no es un requisito.



Ley 1542 de julio 5 de 2012 (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

This law extended the powers of authorities in investigations of alleged crimes of violence against women as well as amended the domestic violence and food assistance provisions, as contained in articles 229 and 233 of the Criminal Code. With the issuance of this law, the prosecutor is allowed to engage in investigations of the aforementioned crimes at the moment it learns from the conduct in any manner, thus, the prosecutor no longer has to wait until someone presses charges to start the correspondent investigations.

Esta ley amplió las facultades de las autoridades en las investigaciones de presuntos delitos de violencia contra la mujer y modificó las disposiciones sobre violencia doméstica y asistencia alimentaria, contenidas en los artículos 229 y 233 del Código Penal. Con la expedición de esta ley el fiscal puede iniciar investigaciones de los delitos antes mencionados en el momento en que tenga conocimiento de la conducta de cualquier manera, por lo que el fiscal ya no tiene que esperar a que alguien presente cargos para iniciar las investigaciones correspondientes.



Decreto 164 de enero 25, 2010 (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

This decree created a cross-sectional commission called the ‘Mesa Interinstitucional para Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres’. Its purpose is to join efforts for the coordination and cooperation between public entities in order to achieve comprehensive and accessible quality care for women victims of any kind of violence. The commission is comprised by the ministries and directors of public agencies from several sections, including technology, education, culture, justice, among others.

Este decreto creó una comisión interinstitucional denominada ‘Mesa Interinstitucional para Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres’. Su finalidad es consolidar esfuerzos para la coordinación y cooperación entre las entidades públicas, a fin de lograr una atención integral, accesible y de calidad a las mujeres víctimas de cualquier tipo de violencia. La comisión está integrada por los ministerios y directores de organismos públicos de varios sectores, incluyendo tecnología, educación, cultura, justicia, entre otros.



Ley 1257 de diciembre 4, 2008 (2008)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This law enacted rules for the prevention and sanction of several forms of violence and discrimination against women. It established provisions that guarantee all women i) a life free of violence, both in the public and private sectors, ii) the exercise of their rights granted both by the domestic and the international legal systems, iii) access to administrative and judicial procedures for protection and attention, and iv) the adoption of public policies against violence and discrimination.

Esta ley promulgó normas para la prevención y sanción de diversas formas de violencia y discriminación contra la mujer. Estableció disposiciones que garantizan a todas las mujeres i) una vida libre de violencia, tanto en el sector público como en el privado, ii) el ejercicio de los derechos que les otorgan tanto el ordenamiento jurídico interno como el internacional, iii) el acceso a los procedimientos administrativos y judiciales para su protección y atención, y iv) la adopción de políticas públicas contra la violencia y la discriminación.



Ley 599 de julio 24, 2000 (Código Penal Colombiano) (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

This law serves as the basis for the Colombian Criminal Code, it enumerates conducts that constitute crimes and their sanctions. The code sets forth several gender-related crimes. Article 104A criminalizes femicide, meaning the killing of women because they are female. Article 123 sanctions people who forcibly terminate a pregnancy. Article 187 prohibits forcing in-vitro treatments on women against their will. Article 229 regulates domestic violence offenses. Articles 208 and following criminalize rape and establish aggravating circumstances including, among others, if the victim is under 14 years old, if the victim is incapable of defending him or herself, if the abuser used violence and if the abuse was held within the household. Article 116 A prohibits the use of chemical agents or corrosive substances that cause injuries or harm when they come into contact with human tissue. Finally, for some crimes, the code treats as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victim is a woman. Law 1719 of June 18, 2014 modified and expanded these provisions.

Esta ley que contiene el Código Penal colombiano enumera las conductas que constituyen delitos y sus sanciones. El código establece varios delitos relacionados con el género. El artículo 104A tipifica como delito el feminicidio, es decir, el asesinato de mujeres solo por el hecho de ser mujeres. El artículo 123 sanciona a las personas que obligan a la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo. El artículo 187 prohíbe realizar tratamientos in vitro a mujeres en contra de su voluntad. El artículo 229 regula el delito de violencia doméstica. Los artículos 208 y siguientes tipifican como delito la violación y establecen circunstancias agravantes que incluyen, entre otras, que la víctima sea menor de 14 años, que sea incapaz de defenderse por sí misma, si el abusador usó violencia y si el abuso se llevó a cabo dentro del hogar. El artículo 116 A prohíbe el uso de agentes químicos o sustancias corrosivas que causen lesiones o daños cuando entren en contacto con tejidos humanos. Finalmente, para algunos delitos, el código trata como circunstancia agravante el hecho de que la víctima sea mujer. La Ley 1719 de junio 18, 2014 modificó y amplió algunas de estas disposiciones.



Constitution of Malawi (2017)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Employment discrimination, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape

In recognition of the inherent dignity and worth of each human, Article 12 requires that the State and all persons recognize and protect human rights and afford the fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups, and minorities. All persons have equal status before the law. Limitations of rights are only justifiable insofar as they ensure peaceful human interaction in the context of an open and democratic society. Article 13 requires the State to actively promote the welfare and development of the people by affirmatively adopting legislation and policies to achieve gender equality. This requires: (i) women’s full participation in all spheres of society with opportunities equal to men; (ii) the implementation of nondiscrimination principles and other measures; and (iii) the implementation of policies addressing domestic violence, personal security, maternity benefits, economic exploitation, and rights to property, among other relevant social issues. Article 22 mandates that all members of a family shall enjoy equal respect and shall be protected under law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or exploitation. No person shall be forced to enter into any marriage, and no person over the age of 18 can be prevented from entering into marriage. All provisions of this section apply to civil, customary, and other forms of marriage. Article 24 specifically guarantees that women are entitled to full and equal protection of law, and have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender or marital status. This includes the following rights: (i) equal rights under civil law, including equal capacity in the realms of contracts, property, custody, decision-making regarding children, and acquisition and retaining of citizenship and nationality; and (ii) upon the dissolution of marriage, entitlement to fair disposition of jointly held property and to fair maintenance. Further, any laws that discriminate against women are invalid and legislation must affirmatively be passed to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women. This affirmative requirement particularly applies to practices of: sexual abuse, harassment, or violence; discrimination in work, business, or public affairs; and deprivation of property (inherited or otherwise). Article 30 provides that, while all persons have a right to the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development, women in particular shall be given special consideration in regards to this right. The State must take all necessary measures for the realization of this right, including reforms aimed to eradicate social injustice and inequality. Other gender-related provisions include: the prohibition of torture, inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment (Article 19); Article 20’s ban on all forms of discrimination; the right to education for all people (Article 25); Article 27’s prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor; and Article 31’s requirement that all persons are entitled to fair wages and equal remuneration for equal value work without discrimination of any kind, especially on the basis of gender.



Código Penal Título VI – Artigos 377-390: Crimes Contra a Paz e a Comunidade Internacional (Penal Code: Crimes Against Peace and the International Community) (2020)


Gender-based violence in general, International law, LGBTIQ

The Penal Code establishes penalties of six months to six years for those who in a meeting, public place, or through any means of dissemination or communication with the public, incite hatred against a person or group of persons because of their race, color, ethnicity, place of birth, sex, belief or religion, political or ideological convictions, social condition or origin or other cause, with the purpose of discriminating against them.

O Código Penal estabelece penalidades de seis meses a seis anos para aqueles que em reunião, espaço público, ou qualquer outro meio de disseminação ou comunicação com o público, incitar ódio contra pessoa ou grupo de pessoas por causa de sua raça, cor, etnia, lugar de nascença, sexo, crença ou religião, convicção política ou ideológica, condição social ou origem ou outra causa, com o propósito de discriminação contra eles.



Código Penal Capítulo VI – Artigo 223: Circunstâncias agravantes (Penal Code: Aggravating Circumstances) (2020)


Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

The Penal Code includes the follow aggravating circumstances if a crime involves discrimination on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, place of birth, sex, sexual orientation, sexual harassment, belief or religion, political or ideological convictions, social ideological convictions, social status or origin, or any other form of discrimination.

O Código Penal inclui as seguintes circunstâncias agravantes: se o crime envolve discriminação com base em raça, cor, etnia, local de nascença, sexo, orientação sexual, assédio sexual, crença ou religião, convicção política ou ideológica, convicção ideológica social, status social ou origem, ou qualquer outra forma de discriminação.



Código Penal Capítulo VI: Crimes Contra a Dignidade das Pessoas (Penal Code: Crimes Against Dignity) (2020)


Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Articles 213-220 prohibit certain actions intended to violate someone’s honor, which include insult, defamation, and slander, and mandate penalties ranging from 6-12 months imprisonment and fines. The articles provide for increased penalties if the insults/offensive judgments offend someone’s race, color, ethnicity, place of birth, sex, sexual orientation, disease, disability, or religion.

Os artigos 213-220 proíbem certas ações que são destinadas a violar a honra de alguém, que inclui insult, difamação, e calúnia, e atribui penalidades que variam de 6-12 meses de prisão e multas. Os artigos impõem penalidades maiores se os insultos/julgamentos ofensivos ofenderem a raça, cor, etnia, lugar de nascença, sexo, orientação sexual, doença, deficiência, ou religião de alguém.



Código Penal: Livro II, Título III - Crimes contra a identidade cultural e a integridade pessoal (Crimes against cultural identity and personal integrity) (1995)


Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Article 240 criminalizes discrimination and incitement to hatred and violence based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity, among others. The sentence is imprisonment for one to eight years.

O artigo 240 criminaliza a discriminação e incitamento ao ódio e à violência baseado em raça, gênero, orientação sexual e identidade de gênero, entre outros. A pena é de prisão de um a oito anos.



Lei n. 24/2019: Special Part, Title One, Chapter One, Section One, Article 160 (2019)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Article 160 increases the penalty for murder to 20-24 years in prison if the crime was motivated by racial, religious, or political hatred, or generated by color, ethnic, or national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the victim.

O artigo 160 aumentou a pena para o crime de homicídio para 20-24 anos de prisão se o crime for motivado por ódio racial, religioso, ou político, ou gerado pela cor, etnia, ou origem nacional, sexo, orientação sexual, ou identidade de gênero da vítima.



Plano Nacional de Acção Para Prevenção e Combate à Violência Contra a Mulher 2008-2012 (National Plan of Action for Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women) (2008)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The plan outlines the materialization of the National Plan for the Advancement of Women (Plano Nacional para o Avanço da Mulher) by mapping out its objectives, finances, and progress evaluations given specific deadlines. It focuses on expanding services available to victims of domestic, sexual, physical, and psychological violence; improving institutions to educate the public on gender-based violence; implementing advocacy strategies to prevent and combat violence against women; and establishing multi-sector mechanisms to intervene in violent situations in which women may find themselves. For example, as women are 57% of all HIV-positive people in Mozambique, the plan provides for an STI, including HIV, prophylaxis service for victims of sexual violence. Each sector is in charge of managing its own budget in accordance with its objectives, but the Mozambican government and the Economic and Social Plan (Plano Económico e Social) are expected to be driving forces in attracting more partners and resources for the plan. The timeline is set for five years, with the Monitoring and Evaluation (Monitoria e Avaliação) creating conditions, such as annual check-ins, and using the Report on the Economic and Social Plan (Balanço do Plano Económico e Social) to ensure that each division maintains consistency in their actions.

O plano esboça a materialização do Plano Nacional para o Avanço da Mulher ao mapear os seus objetivos, finanças, e avaliações de progresso em prazos específicos. Ele foca em expandir os serviços disponíveis para as vítimas de violência doméstica, sexual, física, e psicológica; melhorando as instituições para educar o público sobre violência de gênero; implementando estratégias legais para prevenir e combater violência contra mulheres; e estabelecendo mecanismos multissetoriais para intervir em situações de violência em que as mulheres se encontrem. Por exemplo, como as mulheres são 57% das pessoas HIV-positivas em Moçambique, o plano fornece serviço de profilaxia para ISTs, incluindo HIV, para vítimas de violência sexual. Cada setor está responsável por administrar o seu próprio orçamento de acordo com os seus objetivos, mas é esperado que o governo Moçambicano e o Plano Econômico e Social sejam forças motrizes na atração de mais parceiros e recursos para o plano. O cronograma é de cinco anos, com a Monitoria e Avaliação criando condições, como check-ins anuais, e usando o Balanço do Plano Ecônomico e Social para garantir que cada divisão mantenha consistência em suas ações.



Criminal Code Articles 139 (Murder), 154 (Torture), and 291 (Taking a Person Hostage) (1999)


Gender-based violence in general

For several crimes set out in the Criminal Code, knowing commission against a pregnant woman is an aggravating circumstance that increases the sentence. Murdering a pregnant woman is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8 to 12 years, life imprisonment, or the death sentence under Art. 139. Torture of a pregnant woman is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of one to three years or imprisonment for a term of one to five years under Art. 154. Taking a pregnant woman hostage is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 6 to 12 years under Art. 291.



Código Penal: Livro II, Título I – Crimes contra a pessoa: Capítulo I– Crimes contra a vida (Crimes against life) (2005)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Article 132 of the Portuguese Penal Code imposes a more severe penalty (imprisonment from 12 to 25 years) for the crime of qualified homicide (“homicídio qualificado”), if, among other special circumstances, the victim is the current or former spouse or person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender, if the victim is pregnant or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

O artigo 132 do Código Penal português impõe uma pena mais severa (de 12 a 25 anos de prisão) aos crimes de homicídio qualificado, se, além de outras circunstâncias especiais, o crime for praticado: (i) contra cônjuge, ex-cônjuge, pessoa de outro ou do mesmo sexo com quem o agente mantenha ou tenha mantido uma relação de namoro ou uma relação semelhante à de conjuges, ainda que sem coabitação; (ii) contra mulher gestante; e (iii) em razão de sexo, orientação sexual ou pela identidade de gênero da vítima.



Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, International law

Ratified by BiH in November 2013, this Convention opens the path for creating a legal framework at the pan-European level to protect women against all forms of violence and to prevent, prosecute, and eliminate violence and domestic violence against women. The Convention also establishes the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention. Its members are elected by the state parties. The structure of the treaty is based on the “four Ps”: (1) prevention, (2) protection and support of victims, (3) prosecution of offenders, and (4) integrated policies. The Convention also establishes obligations in relation to the collection of data and supporting research in the field of violence against women. Article 2 of the Convention indicates that the provisions shall apply in time of peace and also in situations of armed conflicts. The treaty came into effect in Bosnia on the 1 August 2014.



Zakona o ravnopravnosti spolova u Bosni i Hercegovini (Law on Gender Equality) (2009)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The Law on Gender Equality forms the basis for creating a network of mechanisms and institutional structures for advancing gender equality at all levels of administration in BiH. Its stated goal is to “regulate, promote and protect gender equality, guarantee equal opportunities and equal treatment of all persons regardless of gender in public and private sphere of society, and regulate protection from discrimination on grounds of gender.” The legislation defines the following offenses: discrimination on grounds of gender, direct gender-based discrimination, indirect gender-based discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and victimization. Unofficial English translation available from LegislatiOnline here.



Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículos 142, 170 (delitos contra mujeres embarazadas) (1984)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender-based violence in general, Trafficking in persons

A person who takes, hides, or imprisons a pregnant woman in order to force the woman or a third party to do, not do, or tolerate something against his or her will is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. A person who kidnaps or hides a pregnant woman to obtain a ransom is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. If perpetrator obtains the desired gain, the minimum penalty will be raised to eight years.

La persona que toma, esconde o encarcela a una mujer embarazada con el fin de obligar a la mujer o a una tercera persona a hacer, no hacer o tolerar algo en contra de su voluntad está sujeta a pena privadora de libertad de 10 a 25 años. La persona que secuestra u oculta a una mujer embarazada para obtener un rescate está sujeta a una pena de prisión de entre 10 y 25 años. Si el agresor obtiene la ganancia deseada, la pena mínima se elevará a ocho años.



Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículo 80 (1984)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

A man who kills a woman through an act of gender violence is liable for life imprisonment ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").

Un hombre que mata a una mujer mediante un acto de violencia de género es condenado a cadena perpetua ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").



Law on Eliminating Violence against Women, No. 58 of 2017 (يتعلق بالقضاء على العنف ضد المرأةقانون أساسي عدد 58 لسنة 2017 مؤرخ في 11 أوت 2017) (2017)


Gender-based violence in general, International law

The law aims to put in place measures to eliminate gender-based violence against women in order to achieve equality and respect for human dignity by adopting a comprehensive approach to prevention of all forms of violence, to punish its perpetrators, and to protect victims of violence. The law applies to vulnerability and all forms of violence, including physical, moral, sexual, political, and economic. It adopts the internationally agreed definition of violence against women consistent with the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993.



Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres, Decreto Nº 520 (Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women, Decree No. 520) (2010)


Employment discrimination, Femicide, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Trafficking in persons

The Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women (Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia) (“LEIV”) establishes a framework for prosecuting and preventing acts of violence against women, and for providing assistance and support for victims of gender-based violence. The law establishes 11 new crimes that aim to sanction various aspects of gender-based violence in various forms: physical (femicide, aggravated femicide, obstruction of justice, induced or assisted suicide); psychological (inducement and promotion of sex acts through electronic media; unlawful dissemination of information, dissemination of pornography); economic (breach of duty of economic assistance, theft of birthright, theft of profits of economic activity); and speech (violent speech against women). Rape is prosecuted through the Penal Code. The Salvadorean Institute for the Advancement of Women (Instituto Salvadoreno para el Desarollo de la Mujer) (“ISDEMU”) is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the law and with establishing women’s shelters and other programs designed to help victims of domestic and gender-based violence.

La Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres (LEIV) establece una avenida para enjuiciar y prevenir actos de violencia contra las mujeres, y para brindar asistencia y apoyo a víctimas que hayan sufrido violencia por razón de género. La ley establece 11 nuevos delitos que tienen como objetivo sancionar varios aspectos de la violencia de género en diversas formas: física (femicidio, femicidio agravado, obstrucción de la justicia, suicidio inducido o asistido); psicológica (inducción y promoción de actos sexuales a través de medios electrónicos; difusión ilegal de información, difusión de pornografía); económica (incumplimiento del deber de asistencia económica, robo de derechos de nacimiento, robo de beneficios de la actividad económica); y discurso (discurso violento contra la mujer). La violación es procesada por el Código Penal, el cual es el código penal criminal. El Instituto Salvadoreño para el Adelanto de la Mujer ("ISDEMU") tiene la tarea de supervisar la implementación de la ley y establecer refugios para mujeres asi como otros programas diseñados para ayudar a las víctimas de violencia doméstica y de violencia en base de género.



Ley de Educación 2006 (última revisión 2018) (2018)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The Law on Education established that one of the principles of Spain’s public education system is the prevention of gender-based violence (Article 1). Preference in the admission to public schools will be given to students who have had to move because they suffered acts of gender-based violence (Article 84.7).

La Ley de Educación estableció que uno de los principios del sistema de educación pública de España es la prevención de la violencia de género (Artículo 1). Se dará preferencia a la admisión a las escuelas públicas a los estudiantes que hayan tenido que mudarse porque sufrieron actos de violencia de género (Artículo 84.7).



Estatuto de los Trabajadores 2015 (última revisión 2018) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The Workers’ Statute contains some special rights for women who have suffered gender-based violence. Article 37.8 establishes that said women could work part-time if they wanted to. Article 40.4 gives them a preferential right to occupy a new position in another location if they needed to move as a result of the gender-based violence they suffered.

El Estatuto de los Trabajadores contiene algunos derechos especiales para las mujeres que han sufrido violencia de género. El Artículo 37.8 establece que dichas mujeres podrían trabajar a tiempo parcial si quisieran. El Artículo 40.4 les otorga un derecho preferencial a ocupar un nuevo puesto en otro lugar si necesitaban mudarse como resultado de la violencia de género que sufrieron.



Código Criminal de España (última revision en 2015) (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.

España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.



Criminal Code Act (Tasmania) (1924)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement

The Criminal Code Act 1924 prohibits forced and unauthorized abortions and assaults on pregnant women, sexual violence, stalking, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation. The termination of a pregnancy by a person other than a medical practitioner or the pregnant woman herself is a crime at any stage of the pregnancy. Termination carried out without the pregnant woman’s consent is a crime if it is performed intentionally or recklessly, regardless if any other harm is inflicted on the woman. Any person who unlawfully assaults a woman, knowing that woman is pregnant, is guilty of assault on pregnant woman under section 184A of the Act. Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without that person's consent is guilty of rape under section 185 of the Act. “Sexual intercourse” is defined as the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia, anus or mouth by a penis, the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia or anus by another body part or object, or the continuation of either act of penetration. “Consent” means free agreement, and does not include, among other things, if a person does not say or do anything to communicate consent. Additionally, it is a crime to have sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 17 according to section 124 of the Act. A person is guilty of stalking if they, among other things, follow, surveille, threaten, direct abusive acts towards, communicate, send or publish offensive material, or contact another person or a third person, with intent to cause the another person physical or mental harm, including self-harm or extreme humiliation or to be apprehensive or fearful under section 192 of the Act. Under section 170A of the Act, a person commits persistent family violence in relation to another person with whom the person is, or has been, in a family relationship is guilty of persistent family violence when the accused has committed unlawful family violence on at least three occasions. Family violence includes, among other things, acts of physical, psychological and economic abuse, with the specific definitions set out in the Family Violence Act 2004. Under section 178A, any person who performs female genital mutilation on another person is guilty of a crime, regardless of custodial consent. Removing or making arrangements to remove a child from Tasmania with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on the child is also a crime.



Ley Orgánica sobre Derecho de las Mujeres a una VIda Libre de Violencia Capítulo (Organic Law on Women's Right to a Life Free from Violence) (2007)


Gender-based violence in general

The objective of this law is to protect the human rights of every Venezuelan woman or woman resident in Venezuela. This law, independent of the race, creed, political, economic or social affinity of the women, seeks to defend the rights of the women in the following aspects: social, family, work and in all areas of daily life. This law intends to dignify women by providing that their fundamental rights are inviolable. It also recognizes as “violence” any form of abuse that violates or annuls any of the women’s human rights and sets forth diverse categories for all forms of violence against women and the procedures for the defense of the women’s rights. This legal instrument provides for all rights, regulations, and specific defense procedures necessary to protect the Venezuelan women from gender violence, but it is unclear the degree to which it will be enforced.



Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000)


Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape

The purpose of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act is to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, read in conjunction with item 23(1) of its sixth schedule. The effect of this is to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and harassment; to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent and prohibit hate speech; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Section 8 expands on the provisions of Section 9 by setting out, without limitation, the following specific examples of such prohibited discrimination: (a) gender-based violence; (b) female genital mutilation; (c) the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; (d) any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child; (e) any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources; (f) discrimination on the ground of pregnancy; (g) limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as health education and social security; (h) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons; and (i) systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual division of labor. The Act further regulates which party will bear the burden of proof in discrimination cases and further sets out which factors should be taken into account in determining whether discrimination is fair or unfair.

Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie (2000)

Diskriminasie op werksgeleenthede, verminking van vroulike geslagsorgane of sny van vroulike geslagsdele, geslagsdiskriminasie, geslagsgebaseerde geweld in die algemeen, skadelike tradisionele praktyke, regte op erf en erfenis, seksuele geweld en verkragting​

Die doel van die Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie is om uitvoering te gee aan artikel 9 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, in samewerking met artikel 23(1) van die Grondwet se sesde skedule. Die effek hiervan is om onbillike diskriminasie en teistering te voorkom en te verbied; om gelykheid te bevorder en onbillike diskriminasie uit te skakel; om haat-spraak te voorkom en te verbied; en om voorsiening te maak vir aangeleenthede wat daarmee verband hou. Artikel 8 brei die bepalings van Artikel 9 uit, sonder beperking, deur die volgende spesifieke voorbeelde van sodanige verbode diskriminasie uiteen te sit: (a) geslagsbaseerde geweld; (b) geslagtelike verminking van vroulike geslag; (c) die stelsel wat voorkoom dat vrouens familie-eiendom erf; (d) enige praktyk, met inbegrip van tradisionele, gebruiklike of godsdienstige praktyk, wat die waardigheid van vrouens belemmer en die gelykheid tussen vrouens en mans ondermyn, insluitend die ondermyning van die waardigheid en welstand van die meisie-kind; (e) enige beleid of optrede wat vrouens se toegang to grondreg, finansies en ander hulpbronne beperk; (f) diskriminasie op grond van swangerskap; (g) beperking van vrouens se toegang tot maatskaplike dienste of voordele soos gesondheidsopvoeding en sosiale sekuriteit; (h) die weierig van toegang tot geleenthede, insluitende toegang tot dienste of kontraktuele geleenthede vir die lewering van dienste vir oorweging, of versuim om stappe te neem om die behoeftes van sulke persone redelik te voorsien; en (i) sistematies ongelykheid van toegang tot geleenthede van vroue as gevolg van die seksuele verdeling van arbeid. Die Wet reguleer verder watter party die bewyslas in diskriminasiesake sal dra en lê verder uit watter faktore in ag geneem moet word by die bepaling of die diskriminasie billik of onbillik is.



Código Penal: Livro II, Título I – Crimes contra a pessoa: Capítulo III (Crimes contra a integridade física) (Crimes against physical integrity) (2018)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender-based violence in general

Article 144-A bans female genital mutilation and imposes a prison sentence of 2-10 years. Article 145 imposes greater penalties for offenses against physical integrity and female genital mutilation if the crime is committed, among other special circumstances, against the current or former spouse or a person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender; if the victim is pregnant; or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Article 118 provides that the statute of limitations on crimes of sexual violence and female genital mutilation against minors do not expire until the victim is at least 23 years old. Article 152 establishes the crime of domestic violence, punishable with imprisonment from 1-5 years. The crime consists of mental or physical abuse, including mistreatment, corporal punishment and sexual offenses, inflicted once or repeatedly on the following victims (1) a current or former spouse; (2) a person with whom the perpetrator has or had a relationship akin to a spousal relationship; (3) a parent of the perpetrator’s child; (4) a person who is incapable to defend him/herself due to age, disability, pregnancy, illness or economic dependency to the perpetrator. In addition, under Article 152, (1) the minimum imprisonment penalty is increased from one to two years if the perpetrator publicizes the victim’s personal information or any other private information (including information stored on audio or video) via Internet or other means available; (2) the perpetrator may be prohibited of having contact with the victim; (3) the perpetrator may be prohibited from being granted a gun license; (4) the perpetrator may lose parenting rights for up to 10 years. Also, Article 152 imposes a sentence of 2-8 years imprisonment if the domestic violence results in serious physical injury, which increases to imprisonment to 3-10 years if the domestic violence results in death.

O artigo 114 proíbe a realização de mutilação genital feminina, impondo pena de prisão de dois a 10 anos. O artigo 145 estabelece penas maiores aos crimes de ofensa contra a integridade física e mutilação genital feminina, se o crime for cometido, dentre outras circunstâncias, contra cônjuge ou ex-cônjuge ou contra pessoa no qual o agente tenha estabelecido um relacionamento romântico, independente do gênero ou do sexo, se a vítima estiver grávida ou se o crime for cometido em razão do gênero, orientação sexual ou identidade de gênero da vítima. O artigo 118 estabelece que os crimes contra a liberdade e autodeterminação sexual de menores, bem como no crime de mutilação genital feminina sendo a vítima menor, o procedimento criminal não se extingue, por efeito da prescrição, antes de o ofendido perfazer 23 anos. O artigo 152 versa sobre o crime de violência doméstica, punível com prisão de um a cinco anos. O crime consiste em abuso mental ou físico, incluindo maus-tratos, castigos corporais e ofensas sexuais, infligidos uma ou várias vezes às seguintes vítimas (1) atual ou ex-cônjuge; (2) uma pessoa com a qual o agente tem ou teve uma relação semelhante a uma relação conjugal; (3) um dos pais do filho do agente; (4) uma pessoa incapaz de se defender devido à idade, deficiência, gravidez, doença ou dependência econômica do agente. Além disso, nos termos do artigo 152, (1) a pena mínima de prisão é aumentada de um para dois anos se o agente divulgar as informações pessoais da vítima ou qualquer outra informação privada (inclusive informações armazenadas em áudio ou vídeo) via Internet ou outros meios disponíveis; (2) o agente pode ser proibido de entrar em contato com a vítima; (3) o agente pode ser proibido de receber uma licença de porte de arma; (4) o agente pode perder os direitos parentais por até 10 anos. Além disso, o Artigo 152 pune com prisão de dois a oito anos caso a violência doméstica resulte em sérios danos físicos e pune com prisão de três a dez anos se a violência doméstica resultar em morte.



Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian No. Pol 10 Tahun 2007 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Unit Pelayanan Perempuan dan Anak di Lingkungan Kepolisia Negara (Regulation No. 10/2007 on the Organization and Work of the Woman and Children Service Police Units) (2007)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

Woman and Child Service Units (UPPA) handle all cases of violence against women, including human trafficking, domestic violence, sexual violence, and other related crimes. UPPA’s units range from district police levels and up.

Unit Pelayanan Perempuan dan Anak (UPPA) menangani seluruh kasus kekerasan terhadap perempuan, termasuk perdagangan orang, kekerasan dalam rumah tangga, kekerasan seksual, dan kejahatan terkait lainnya. Jangkauan unit UPPA adalah dari tingkat kabupaten hingga di atasnya.



Law No. 26 of 2000 - Establishing the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court (2000)


Forced sterilization, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

Article 9 defines crimes against humanity to include violent acts such as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or other forms of sexual violence.



The Revised Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2004)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

The Ethiopian Criminal Code criminalizes most forms of violence against women and girls including physical violence within marriage or cohabitation (Article 564), Female Genital Mutilation/ Circumcision (Articles 565-6), trafficking women (Article 597), rape (Articles 620-28), prostitution/exploitation of another for financial gain (Article 634), and early marriage (Article 648). The Criminal Code outlaws abortion, except in cases of rape or incest, risk to the life of the mother or fetus, severe or incurable disease or birth defect, a mother who is mentally or physically incapable of raising a child, or “grave and imminent danger” that can only be addressed by terminating the pregnancy.



Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution provides that all international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land. Similarly, Article 13.2 provides that fundamental rights and freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has ratified many of these treaties including ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW. Article 35 of the FDRE Constitution pertains to the Rights of Women. The article provides for equal rights under the constitution, equal rights with men in marriage, entitlement to affirmative measures, protection from harmful traditional practices, the right to maternity pay, the right to consultation, property rights (including acquiring and controlling and transferring property), employment rights, and access to family planning education. It is worth noting that this article explicitly imposes an obligation and accountability on the state to protect women from violence at Article 35.4: “The State shall enforce the right of women to eliminate the influences of harmful customs. Laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women are prohibited.”



On the Amendments to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of Ukraine in order to implement the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (2017)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) adopted in 2011. As a result of these amendments, forced marriage (i.e. forcing a person to marry or to continue being in a forced marriage, or to enter into a cohabitation without official registration of marriage, or to continue such cohabitation) is punishable by restraint of liberty for up to three years or imprisonment for the same period and domestic violence (i.e. deliberate systematic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in family or intimate relationship, leading to physical or psychological suffering, disorder of health, disability, emotional dependence) is punishable with a sentence of public work for up to 240 hours, detention for up to six months, restraint of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. In addition, the amendments: (i) introduce new crimes, such as “illegal abortion or sterilization” (i.e., performed by a person without medical education or without consent of the victim) which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years; (ii) establish punishment for rape of a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in a family or intimate relationship (imprisonment for up to 10 years); and (iii) increase punishment for sexual violence to up to 15 years, if such acts resulted in serious consequences.



Про забезпечення рівних прав та можливостей жінок і чоловіків (No. 2866-IV) (On Ensuring the Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men) (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The Equal Opportunities Act of Ukraine (the “Act”) provides the legal framework for men and women’s parity in all spheres of social life through providing legal support for equal rights and opportunities, removal of gender-based discrimination, and prevention of imbalance between women’s and men’s opportunities in implementing the rights granted to each of them by the Constitution and other laws. The Act defines “equal rights” as the absence of gender-based restrictions or privileges. The Act provides that government regulatory bodies must ensure equal rights for men and women in elections, civil service, employment and career, social security, entrepreneurial activity, and education. The Act prohibits gender-based violence (which is defined as “actions directed at persons through their sex, stereotyped widespread customs or traditions or actions that relate predominantly to persons of a determined sex and create physical, sexual, psychological or financial damage or suffering”) and sexual harassment (defined as "sexual actions of a verbal or physical nature, which may humiliate or insult the person who is dependent on the perpetrator for work, official, financial or other reasons"). Exceptions to the prohibition of gender discrimination include when restrictions or privileges have a legitimate, objectively justified goal achieved with appropriate and necessary methods. Violation of the Act can result in the issuance of a limitation order to temporarily restrict the rights of the offender and protect the rights of the victim, including prohibiting the offender from residing with the victim, approaching the victim within a certain distance, and restricting telephone calls or other communication with the victim.

Закон України «Про рівні можливості» («Закон») створює правові основи рівності чоловіків і жінок у всіх сферах суспільного життя шляхом правового забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей, усунення дискримінації за ознакою статі та запобігання дисбалансу між можливостями жінок та чоловіків у реалізації прав, наданих кожному з них Конституцією та іншими законами. Відповідно до Закону «рівність прав» означає відсутність обмежень або привілеїв за ознакою статі. Закон передбачає, що рівні права чоловіків і жінок забезпечуватимуться у виборчому процесі, державній службі, працевлаштуванні та кар’єрі, соціальному забезпеченні, підприємницькій діяльності та освіті. Рівність забезпечується через відповідні державні/регулюючі органи. Закон забороняє гендерне насильство (діяння, спрямовані проти осіб через їхню стать, або поширені в суспільстві звичаї чи традиції (стереотипні уявлення про соціальні функції (становище, обов’язки тощо) жінок і чоловіків), або діяння, що стосуються переважно осіб певної статі чи зачіпають їх непропорційно, які завдають фізичної, сексуальної, психологічної або економічної шкоди чи страждань, включаючи погрози таких дій, у публічному або приватному житті) та сексуальні домагання (дії сексуального характеру, виражені словесно (погрози, залякування, непристойні зауваження) або фізично (доторкання, поплескування), що принижують чи ображають осіб, які перебувають у відносинах трудового, службового, матеріального чи іншого підпорядкування). Винятки, в яких можлива законна неріівність: коли обмеження чи привілеї мають законну об’єктивно виправдану мету, методи досягнення якої є доцільними та необхідними. Порушення Закону тимчасового обмеження прав правопорушника (цивільна, адміністративна та кримінальна відповідальність згідно із законом) та захисту прав потерпілого, у тому числі заборони потерпілому проживати з потерпілим за місцем проживання, наближатися до потерпілого до певна дистанція та обмеження телефонних розмов чи іншого спілкування з жертвою.



ストーカー規制法(平成12年法律81号)(Anti-Stalking Control Law (Act No. 81 of 2000)) (2000)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Dowry-related violence, Gender-based violence in general

The Stalker Control Law prohibits acts of stalking, against a victim or the victim’s spouse, at the victim’s residence, place of employment or school. In addition to broadly prohibiting stalking, the statute also includes lying in wait, demanding a meeting, violent acts, silent phone calls and sending dirty or explicit items, animal carcasses or sexually insulting materials. The Chief of Police may issue a warning, and the Public Safety Commission may issue a prohibition order, upon petition by the victim. To ensure its effectiveness, the statute provides for imprisonment with work or a fine to be imposed on people who repeatedly violate the Law or who violate a prohibition order.

ストーカー規制法は、特定の者またはその配偶者に対して、その住居、職場、学校などでのストーカー行為について必要な規制を行うだけでなく、待ち伏せ、面会、交際等の義務のないことを要求すること、粗野又は乱暴な言動、無言電話、汚物、動物の死体や性的羞恥心を害する物の送付なども規制の対象に含まれる。また、被害者の申し立てにより、警察署長は警告を、公安委員会は禁止命令を出すことができる。また、実効性を確保するために、同法に繰り返し違反した者や禁止命令に違反した者には、懲役または罰金に科せることができる。



日本国憲法 (Constitution of Japan) (1945)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution, “all citizens of Japan are equal under the law, and shall not be discriminated against in political, economic or social relations on the basis of sex.” Article 24 of the Constitution states that marriage can only be formed through the mutual consent of both sexes, and it must be maintained through mutual cooperation of husband and wife. Furthermore, Article 24 provides that “husband and wife have equal rights” under the law. Based Article 14 and Article 24, the following laws were enacted: the Basic Act for a Gender Equal Society requires the state and local public entities to take steps towards the formation of a gender-equal society; the Act on Securing of Equal Opportunity and Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment prohibits employers from discriminating based on gender; and the Act on the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims etc., and the Stalker Control Law protect women from gender-based violence.

日本国憲法第14条では、「すべて国民は、法の下に平等であって、人種、信条、性別、社会的身分又は門地により、政治的、経済的又は社会的関係において、差別されない」とある。憲法第24条では、「婚姻は、両性の合意のみに基いて成立し、夫婦が同等の権利を有することを基本として、相互の協力により、維持されなければならない」とある。第14条と第24条に基づき、国や地方公共団体が男女共同参画社会の形成に向けて取り組むことを定めた「男女共同参画社会基本法」、事業主が性別による差別を行うことを禁止した「雇用の分野における男女の均等な機会及び待遇の確保等に関する法律」、女性を性暴力から守るための「配偶者からの暴力の防止及び被害者の保護等に関する法律」や「ストーカー規制法」などの法律が制定された。



International Criminal Court: Trust Fund for Victims (Rome Statute Article 79) International Criminal Court (1998)


Gender-based violence in general

The Trust Fund for Victims (“TFV”) implements reparations when the ICC orders an award and is significant in recognizing the importance of reparations in achieving justice for victims. Under Article 79 of the Rome Statute, the ICC may order that money collected through fines or forfeiture are transferred to the TFV and used to benefit victims of crimes and their families. Pursuant to Rule 85 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, victims include both (i) individuals who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction, and (ii) organizations and institutions that have suffered harm to their property. Due to the large number of individuals that generally are victims of the crimes prosecuted by the ICC, the TFV is better placed than the ICC to effectively support such victims. In fact, the TVF can deal with victims beyond those participating in the ICC proceedings, can consult with victims, and can use voluntary contributions to assist victims. For instance, the TVF is providing support in northern Uganda and DRC by supporting gender-specific projects, such as reproductive health services, schools for girls, trauma-based counselling, and reconstructive surgery.



International Criminal Court: Rules of Evidence and Procedure International Criminal Court (2005)


Gender-based violence in general

The Rules of Evidence and Procedure (“Rules”) are a subordinate instrument for the application of the Rome Statute and to protect the rights of women in relation to sexual violence cases. For instance, under Rule 63(4) corroboration is not required to prove any crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction, including crimes of sexual violence. This is significant given the challenges faced in obtaining evidence in respect of sexual and gender-based crimes, and the physical and psychological impact on the victims. In cases of sexual violence, according to Rule 70 consent cannot be inferred where the victim was under coercion, incapable of giving genuine consent, or by reason of silence or lack of resistance. Finally, under Rule 71 evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or witness is generally inadmissible in order to prevent attempts to undermine or discredit victims of sexual violence.



Equal Opportunity for Women Act (Legislative Decree 34-2000) (2000)


Employment discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Property and inheritance rights

The Equal Opportunity for Women Act (the “Act”), enacted by this decree 34-2000, eliminates “all forms of discrimination against women” and guarantees equality in the eyes of the law and in the areas of family, health, education, culture, work, social security, credit, and land ownership. Moreover, the Act promotes participation by women in decision-making within the power structure and expressly states that women are eligible to run for public office. This law is significant because it was intended to create and expand the scope of representation and participation of Honduran women in civil society.

La Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para la Mujer (la "Ley"), promulgada por este decreto 34-2000, elimina "todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer" y garantiza la igualdad de género ante la ley y en las áreas de la familia, la salud, la educación, Cultura, trabajo, seguridad social, crédito y propiedad de la tierra. Además, la Ley promueve la participación de las mujeres en la toma de decisiones dentro de la estructura de poder y establece expresamente que las mujeres son elegibles para postularse para cargos públicos. Esta ley es importante porque tiene la intención de crear y ampliar el alcance de la representación y participación de las mujeres hondureñas en la sociedad civil.



Law No. 06/019 of 20 July 2006, Modifying and Completing the Decree of 6 August 1959 Relating to the Congolese Penal Procedure Code (2006)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced sterilization, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

This law requires the courts to secure the privacy and dignity, as well as physical and psychological well-being of victims of sexual violence during proceedings. However, it does not detail any specific measures to be undertaken. The law also stops courts from inferring sexual consent from silence or lack of resistance and prevents courts from taking into consideration a victim’s sexual history in ascertaining a defendant’s guilt.



Law No. 06/019 of 20 July 2006, Modifying and Completing the Decree of 6 August 1959 Relating to the Congolese Penal Procedure Code [alternate description] (2006)


Forced and early marriage, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The 2006 amendment to the Congolese Penal Code has the explicitly stated aim of bringing Congolese law relating to sexual violence in line with international standards. The age of minority was raised from 14 to 18, the definition of rape was widened, and new types of sexual assault were criminalised.



Domestic Case Law

Cправа № 642/4714/16-к (Case No.642/4714/16-к) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2018)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Trafficking in persons

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes). The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the appellant was not guilty, because there was no evidence that he recruited women. Instead, the appellant argued that there was a mutual agreement between himself and the women. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the previous courts unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the courts' conclusions were based on the testimony of the victims and the witness, the protocol of secret investigative actions, and audio and video recordings of the appellant’s meetings with women.

Скаржник був засуджений за торгівлю людьми через те, що він умисно, маючи корисну мету, вербував незаможних українських жінок для торгівлі ними в сексуальних цілях у Росії. Суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді п’яти років позбавлення волі з конфіскацією майна за "сукупністю злочинів" (в Україні це поняття означає вчинення однією особою двох або більше злочинів, передбачених різними статтями або різними частинами однієї статті Особливої ​​частини Кримінального кодексу, якщо ця особа не була засуджена за жоден із цих злочинів). Апеляційний суд залишив цей вирок без змін. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що він невинний, оскільки немає доказів того, що він вербував жінок. Натомість, скаржник стверджував, що між ним і жінками існувала взаємна домовленість. Верховний Суд залишив рішення попередніх судів без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що висновки судів ґрунтуються на показаннях потерпілих і свідків, протоколах негласних слідчих дій, аудіо- та відеозаписах зустрічей скаржника із жінками.



Decisión 1247 de junio 5, 2018 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República de Paraguay (2018)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

This decision promoted the systematization of complaints relating to domestic and intra-family violence. It updated the ‘Violence Registration Form’ approved by Decision nº 454 dated April 24, 2007. The form promotes a system of centralized information and, consequently, accurate statistical indicators that will help authorities to better understand and prevent violence against women. This decision also promotes a new management model for all cases and complaints relating to domestic, intra-family violence and violence against women, filed in the ‘peace courts’ (juzgados de paz) throughout the country.

Esta decisión impulsó la sistematización de las denuncias relacionadas con violencia doméstica e intrafamiliar. Actualizó el “Formulario de Registro de Violencia” aprobado en la Decisión nº 454 del 24 de abril de 2007. El formulario promueve un sistema de información centralizada y, en consecuencia, indicadores estadísticos precisos que ayudarán a las autoridades a comprender mejor y prevenir la violencia contra las mujeres. Esta decisión también promueve un nuevo modelo de gestión para todos los casos y denuncias relacionadas con la violencia doméstica, intrafamiliar y contra la mujer, que se presenten en los juzgados de paz de todo el país.



Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (CCJ) en representación de persona protegida vs Cámara Penal de la Corte de Cundinamarca (Sentencia T-126-18 - Acción de Tutela; Expediente T- 6.326.145) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2018)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The case concerned issues of language in judicial rulings that led to revictimization. The protected applicant, the leader of an association of peasant women, was kidnapped and raped by an illegal armed group that considered her a threat. The plaintiff brought suit against two potential perpetrators who were acquitted by the court of Cundinamarca. The Constitutional Court ruled to exclude a section of the aforementioned decision because of the section’s use of vulgar and disqualifying expressions in relation to the victim of sexual violence. The court argued that judges must, in their decisions: (a) avoid value judgments that refer to the personality or physical appearance of an alleged victim of sexual violence; (b) quote literally the testimonies and sections that refer to the analyzed criminal behavior, and; (c) make the descriptions of the provided evidence with an objective and respectful tone.

El caso se refería al uso del lenguaje en sentencias judiciales que conducen a la re-victimización. La persona protegida, líder de una asociación de mujeres campesinas, fue secuestrada y violada por un grupo armado ilegal que la consideraba una amenaza. La víctima denunció a dos posibles perpetradores del crimen, pero fueron absueltos por la Corte de Cundinamarca. La Corte Constitucional resolvió excluir una sección de la sentencia proferida por la Corte de Cundinamarca por el uso de expresiones vulgares e insultantes contra la víctima de violencia sexual. La Corte Constitucional argumentó que los jueces deben, en sus decisiones: (a) evitar hacer juicios de valor que se refieran a la personalidad o apariencia física de una presunta víctima de violencia sexual; (b) citar literalmente los testimonios y apartados que se refieran a la conducta delictiva analizada, y; (c) hacer las descripciones de las pruebas aportadas con un tono objetivo y respetuoso.



In der Beschwerdesache der A (In the Matter of A.) [E 1948/2018-13] (2019)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The appellant, a Somali girl, applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection due to her precarious situation in Yemen. The appellant’s family fled to Yemen when she was four years old because her family was discriminated against in Somalia due to their affiliation with a Madhibaan minority clan. The plaintiff’s brother and father were killed and no other family remained in Somalia. Further, female genital mutilation is a common practice in Somalia. The appellant’s application for asylum and international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that the nature of the persecution was found to be insufficiently intense or severe. It was further decided that the appellant’s genital mutilation had already happened , so the international protection against threatened genital mutilation could not apply. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of this case were not given sufficient consideration, in particular, the disregard of the fact that women of minority clans in the relevant geographic areas were particularly vulnerable to risks of torture, rape, murder, and forced marriages. The lower court also failed to consider sufficiently the possibility of repeated genital mutilation. Finally, the Court referred to UNHCR’s finding that prior genital mutilation was an equally reasonable justification for the application for asylum and international protection because the victim suffered life-long physical and mental damages.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, ein somalisches Mädchen, beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz aufgrund ihrer prekären Situation im Jemen. Die Familie der Klägerin floh in den Jemen, als sie vier Jahre alt war, weil ihre Familie in Somalia aufgrund ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu einem Clan der Madhibaan-Minderheit diskriminiert wurde. Der Bruder und der Vater der Klägerin wurden getötet, und keine andere Familie blieb in Somalia. Außerdem ist die weibliche Genitalverstümmelung in Somalia eine gängige Praxis. Der Antrag der Klägerin auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, dass die Art der Verfolgung nicht ausreichend intensiv oder schwer sei. Außerdem wurde festgestellt, dass die Genitalverstümmelung der Beschwerdeführerin bereits stattgefunden hatte, so dass der internationale Schutz gegen drohende Genitalverstümmelung nicht zur Anwendung kommen konnte. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf, da er (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) feststellte, dass die Umstände dieses Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt wurden, insbesondere die Tatsache, dass Frauen von Minderheitenclans in den betreffenden geografischen Gebieten besonders gefährdet sind, gefoltert, vergewaltigt, ermordet und zwangsverheiratet werden. Die Vorinstanz hat auch die Möglichkeit wiederholter Genitalverstümmelung nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt. Schließlich verwies das Gericht auf die Feststellung des UNHCR, dass eine frühere Genitalverstümmelung eine ebenso angemessene Begründung für den Antrag auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz sei, da das Opfer lebenslange körperliche und seelische Schäden erleidet.



In der Beschwerdesache der A (In the Matter of A.) [E 1043/2020-10] Österreichischer Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian Constitutional Court) (2020)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

The appellant, a 22-year-old Somali woman, applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection, stating that she was abducted by the Al-Shabaab Militia and her uncle arranged a forced marriage for her. Her application for asylum and international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that the reasons stated by the appellant were not credible, too vague, and contradictory. In addition, the fact that she still had family (including her uncle) in Somalia was deemed as sufficient proof that she could lead a life without undue hardship. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of this case were not given sufficient consideration, particularly, the fact that it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to return to her family. The court did not sufficiently investigate and consider that the appellant’s uncle appeared to have beaten her several times, robbed her, locked her up, forced genital mutilation upon her and arranged for a forced wedding. The Court found the appellant’s right to equal treatment violated.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, eine 22-jährige Somalierin, beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz mit der Begründung, sie sei von der Al-Shabaab-Miliz entführt und von ihrem Onkel zwangsverheiratet worden. Ihr Antrag auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, die von der Beschwerdeführerin angegebenen Gründe seien nicht glaubwürdig, zu vage und widersprüchlich. Darüber hinaus wurde die Tatsache, dass sie noch Familie (einschließlich ihres Onkels) in Somalia hatte, als ausreichender Beweis dafür angesehen, dass sie ein Leben ohne unzumutbare Härten führen konnte. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf, weil er (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) feststellte, dass die Umstände dieses Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt worden waren, insbesondere die Tatsache, dass es für die Klägerin unzumutbar wäre, zu ihrer Familie zurückzukehren. Das Gericht hat nicht ausreichend untersucht und berücksichtigt, dass der Onkel der Rechtsmittelführerin sie offenbar mehrfach geschlagen, ausgeraubt, eingesperrt, ihr eine Genitalverstümmelung aufgezwungen und eine Zwangshochzeit arrangiert hat. Das Gericht stellte fest, dass das Recht der Beschwerdeführerin auf Gleichbehandlung verletzt wurde.



In der Beschwerdesache der A (In the Matter of A.) [E 1689/2020-5] Österreichischer Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian Constitutional Court) (2020)


Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, International law

The 90-year-old female appellant (an Iraqi national) applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection, stating that due to the war in Iraq, she feared for her life and for her family. She stated that she had been threatened by various battle groups. It appeared that the appellant was confined to a wheelchair and suffered from various illnesses including labyrinthine deafness, arterial hypertonia, kidney cysts, and dementia with behavioral disorder. Her application for international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that she did not meet the criteria for asylum or international protection. Among other reasons, her medical conditions were found to be insufficiently serious and of a nature that could be treated in Iraq. In addition, the fact that she still had family in Iraq to support her was found to be sufficient proof that she could lead a life without undue hardship. However, the Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of the case were not sufficiently considered, especially the appellant’s age, serious medical condition, unreasonable difficulty accessing medical treatment in Iraq. Therefore, the Court found (1) the appellant’s rights of Article 3 European Human Rights Convention to be violated, and (2) the lower court’s decision arbitrary.

Die 90-jährige Beschwerdeführerin (eine irakische Staatsangehörige) beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz mit der Begründung, dass sie aufgrund des Krieges im Irak um ihr Leben und ihre Familie fürchte. Sie gab an, dass sie von verschiedenen Kampfgruppen bedroht worden sei. Es stellte sich heraus, dass die Beschwerdeführerin an einen Rollstuhl gefesselt war und an verschiedenen Krankheiten litt, darunter labyrinthische Taubheit, arterielle Hypertonie, Nierenzysten und Demenz mit Verhaltensstörungen. Ihr Antrag auf internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, sie erfülle nicht die Kriterien für Asyl oder internationalen Schutz. Unter anderem wurde ihr Gesundheitszustand als nicht so schwerwiegend eingestuft, sodass dieser auch im Irak behandelt werden könne. Außerdem wurde die Tatsache, dass sie noch Familie im Irak hat, die sie unterstützen könnte, als ausreichender Beweis dafür angesehen, dass sie ein Leben ohne unzumutbare Härten führen kann. Das Verfassungsgericht hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf und stellte (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) fest, dass die Umstände des Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt wurden, insbesondere das Alter der Beschwerdeführerin, ihr schwerer Gesundheitszustand und die unzumutbaren Schwierigkeiten beim Zugang zu medizinischer Behandlung im Irak. Daher stellte das Gericht fest, dass (1) die Rechte des Beschwerdeführers aus Artikel 3 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention verletzt wurden und (2) die Entscheidung der unteren Instanz willkürlich war.



平成10年(オ)576 (1998 (O) No. 576) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2001)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The plaintiff had breast cancer and sued her operating surgeon who conducted a mastectomy arguing that he had a duty to inform her in advance that there are other treatments that do not require complete breast removal. The Supreme Court determined that the surgeon had a legal obligation to give her an opportunity to make an informed decision about her treatment, in this case by providing the name and address of medical institutions that conduct breast cancer operations that do not remove the entire breast.

本件は、乳がんと診断され、乳房を完全切除した患者が、乳房を完全切除しなくても済む治療法があることの充分な説明を事前受けていなかったとして、医師を訴えた事案である。最高裁は、医師には原告に対して治療法についての十分な情報を与えた上で決定を行う機会を与える法的義務があると判断し、本件では、乳房を切除しない乳がん治療を行うことができる医療機関の名称及び所在などを説明する義務を負っていたとした。



Tshabalala v. The State; Ntuli v. The State Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2019)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The issue on appeal in this case was whether the doctrine of common purpose can be applied to the common law crime of rape. Under the common law, rape is an instrumentality offense, which means that the perpetrator must have committed the act himself or facilitated the offense by his conduct. The doctrine of common purpose, however, is applied when a crime is committed by a group of people “with a mutual objective intended to produce a specific result against a targeted victim.” In this case, a group of young men terrorized a township, breaking into homes, attacking occupants, and several of the attackers repeatedly raped eight women. The men were charged and convicted of eight counts of rape, respectively, seven of which were imposed based on the doctrine of common purpose. The Constitutional Court reasoned that it is unsustainable to simply characterize rape as an act of a man inserting his genitalia into an unconsenting woman’s genitalia, especially in a group rape context where the mere presence of the group results in power and dominance over the victim. Thus, it held, the law must dispose of the misguided idea that rape is only a sex crime. The Court, therefore, declared that the instrumentality approach perpetuates gender inequality and promotes discrimination because it seeks to absolve those who may not have committed the crime itself but who contributed toward the commission of the crime from liability. The Court further reasoned that the doctrine of common purpose should apply to rape because the object and purpose of the doctrine is to “overcome an otherwise unjust result… by removing the element of causation from criminal liability and replacing it with the imputing deed which cased the [crime] to all the co-perpetrators.” It observed that it is “irrational and arbitrary” to not apply the doctrine to common law rape, as opposed to murder and assault, based on the distinction that a genital organ must be used to perpetrate rape. It argued that courts should be aiming to afford the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and the protection of bodily and psychological integrity to victims of sexual assault. Therefore, in this case, the Court observed that the applicants knowingly and with the requisite intention participated in the activities of the group and fully associated themselves with its criminal designs. Thus, the Court held them guilty of rape based on the doctrine of common purpose.



Decisión 72/2018 Tribunal Suprema - Sala de lo Penal (Supreme Court - Criminal Chamber) (2018)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The defendant published numerous comments on his Twitter account, including the statements: “53 murdered by gender violence so far this year, they are few in my opinion since they are so many whores;” “in 2015 there were 56 women murdered, it's not a good rate but we did what we could, let’s double that rate in 2016, thanks;” “I have the explosives already prepared for this night to use in Sol, Happy New Year, Allah is great;” and “I've already abused her, you're the next” (attaching an image of a woman). The Court ruled that the right to freedom of expression is not a defense for the type of speech in which the defendant engaged. The defendant’s speech not only constituted hostility towards women, discrimination, diminishing of women as different and inferior to men, and denigration of women. Such speech also encourages affronts and physical attacks of women. The Supreme Court condemned the defendant for hate crimes (Article 510.1 of the Criminal Code).

El acusado publicó varios comentarios en su cuenta de Twitter, incluyendo las siguientes declaraciones: “53 han sido asesinadas por la violencia de género en lo que va del año, son pocas en mi opinión ya que son tantas prostitutas.” “En el 2015 hubo 56 mujeres asesinadas, no es una buena tasa, pero hicimos lo que pudimos, dupliquemos esa tasa en el 2016, gracias.” “Tengo los explosivos ya preparados para esta noche para usar en Sol, feliz año nuevo, Allah es genial.” “Ya he abusado de ella, eres la siguiente” (adjuntando una imagen de una mujer). El Tribunal dictaminó que el derecho a la libertad de expresión no era una defensa para el tipo de lenguaje en el que participó el acusado. El discurso del acusado constituyó hostilidad hacia las mujeres, discriminación, disminución de las mujeres como diferentes e inferiores a los hombres, y denigración de las mujeres. Tal discurso también alienta las ofensas y los ataques físicos de las mujeres. El Tribunal Supremo condenó al acusado por delitos de odio (artículo 510.1 del Código Penal).



PAKR Nr. 39/2015 Gjykata e Apelit (Court of Appeals) (2016)


Custodial violence, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

Four defendants were charged with War Crimes against the Civilian Population in violation of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo and the Geneva Conventions, for variously beating “A” and “B,” both Kosovar Albanian female civilians, raping A, and subjecting them to a mock execution. All the defendants were acquitted by the Basic Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Basic Court’s acquittal of two of the defendants as the victims could not positively testify about their participation, and no other evidence conclusively linked them to the crimes. However, the panel held that the lower court failed to fully adjudicate the mock execution charge. It also dismissed as “incomprehensible” the first instance court’s ruling that there was no credible evidence that the victims had direct contact with S.S. (one of the remaining defendants who allegedly beat them), noting the victims’ testimony indicated they were certain of the identity of the defendant. The tribunal held that the lower court’s refusal to allow an in-court identification of S.S. was a violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. While the appellate court agreed that witness identification should be approached with great caution, here the victims had the opportunity to see the defendant clearly for an extended time. The panel disagreed that witness testimonies are by default unreliable, explaining that they are entitled to the same evidentiary value and analysis as any other evidence and in certain cases the victim’s testimony is the only available evidence. The appellate court then pointed out the lower court’s contradiction with regard to the rape charge: it accepted that A was kidnapped, and also that there were intercourses while she was in captivity, yet then assumed that the intercourses may have occurred with consent, only because A and H.2. (the defendant accused of raping her), had an earlier intimate relationship. The tribunal held that it was absurd to assume that someone in captivity would be able to validly express consent, and even if A did consent due to the Stockholm Syndrome, a traumatic bonding of that kind would be a psychological condition and “any consent expressed by a victim in such circumstances would hardly be considered legally valid.” The appellate court further ruled that the events took place during a war, and consent in such a coercive environment would be “void by default,” citing the definition of rape in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. On the question of whether H.2.’s actions constituted a war crime, the panel held that it was irrelevant whether he had any association with the military. The relevant factors were instead whether there was an ongoing armed conflict, whether it was governed by international or domestic conflict norms, whether the victims were protected persons under international law, and whether there was a causal link between the armed conflict and the offense. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Basic Court to clarify facts on the mock execution and the involvement of H.2. in the alleged rape, and to conduct an in-court identification of S.S. (Also available in English.)



PA-II-KZ-5/2014 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2014)


Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The defendants, both Serbs and a police officer, were accused of forcibly abducting a Kosovar Albanian civilian female and raping her, thus committing the offense of War Crime Against the Civilian Population, in violation of Article 153 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo in addition to other offences. The court of first instance acquitted both defendants of war crimes, but the acquittal was annulled by the appellate court, which sentenced them to 10 and 12 years of imprisonment respectively. Both defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies of a witness’s statement should not be treated as discrediting. The tribunal found it proven that two Serbs did rape the victim, determined that the victim’s and witnesses’ statements were credible insofar as they did not relate to the identification of the suspects, and disagreed that the lack of medical report raised doubts that the rape occurred at all because such a report’s absence was well justified by the prevailing circumstance of an armed conflict. However, the court held that it had not been proven beyond any reasonable doubt, as required by law, that the defendants were the persons who committed the rape due to deficiencies in the suspect identification process. For example, the initial process had been carried out by the KLA MP years ago, and the court lacked evidence on how the process was carried out, the photos shown to the victim, and whether statements by the KLA blurred the victim’s memory. Subsequent identification was deficient because the defendants’ photos were obviously dissimilar from the other photos shown and the victim and witnesses thereby may have been guided in identifying the perpetrators. Further, the victim’s and witnesses’ description of the perpetrators were either general and not sufficient to conclude that the defendants were the perpetrators, or not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. As a result, the tribunal granted the defendants’ appeal and acquitted the defendants. (Also available in Srpski and English.)



KI 82/16 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2017)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

The applicant, a local employee of the UN mission in Kosovo, was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses, including facilitating or compelling prostitution (Article 241 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo). The Basic Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the guilty verdict. The applicant filed a request for protection of legality with the Supreme Court, which rejected the request. The applicant then submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging, among other things, that he was discriminated against on the grounds of gender in violation of Article 24 of the Constitution because the trial court found credible the statement of a victim and a witness because they were women. The Constitutional Court explained that, in the applicant’s circumstance, equality before the law should be understood as a right of a party to impartial treatment and equal opportunity to exhaust legal remedies despite personal status. Under European Court of Human Rights case law interpreting Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification – that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim, or there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means and aim. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation of gender discrimination as “manifestly ill-founded,” finding that he failed to prove how and why the trial court treated him in an unequal way in relation to the victim and witness at issue, only because they were women. The tribunal rejected the applicant’s other claims and concluded that he had not substantiated his allegations of a violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the applicant’s referral was declared inadmissible. (Also available in Srpski and English.)



Regina v. Richards Supreme Court of Grenada and the West Indies Associated States (2017)


Gender-based violence in general, Statutory rape or defilement

The defendant pled guilty to wounding and causing grievous harm to an adult female after dragging her into the bushes and attacking her with a piece of wood and cutlass, leaving deep lacerations and abrasions. The defendant also pled guilty to the rape and robbery of a 16-year-old female, which occurred just two days later. The defendant was before the court for sentencing. Analyzing the aggravating factors, the court observed that defendant had a criminal history, was not remorseful, preferred violence, and presented a danger to the community. The court also recognized that the victims were not only physically hurt, but had “been severely traumatized by their experiences.” The only mitigating factor was the guilty plea. Accordingly, the court sentenced the defendant to 14 years and three months imprisonment.

El acusado se declaró culpable de herir y causar graves daños a una mujer adulta después de arrastrarla hacia los arbustos y golpearla con un trozo de madera y un alfanje, dejando profundas laceraciones y abrasiones. El acusado también se declaró culpable de la violación y robo de una joven de 16 años, lo cual ocurrió solo dos días después. El acusado compareció ante el tribunal para dictar sentencia. Al analizar los agravantes, el tribunal observó que el acusado tenía antecedentes penales, no tenía remordimientos, prefería la violencia como medio de resolución a conflictos y representaba un peligro para la comunidad. El tribunal también reconoció que las víctimas no solo estaban heridas físicamente, sino que habían "sido gravemente traumatizadas por sus experiencias." El único factor atenuante fue que el acusado se declaró culpable. En consecuencia, el tribunal condenó al acusado a 14 años y tres meses de prisión.



Public Prosecutor v. S.C. Rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen afdeling Brugge sectie correctionele rechtbank (Bruges Criminal Court) (2018)


Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

The accused was prosecuted for assaulting a trans woman and her partner for being transsexual. The accused confessed to calling the victim and her partner “dirty transsexuals” and assaulting them. Following the assault, a doctor determined that the victim was unable to work. The Court found that the facts were uncontested and therefore proven. According to the Court, the accused showed a lack of respect for social norms and the physical integrity of other human beings. Additionally, the Court found the punishment should reflect that the crime was based on the victim’s transsexual status and that the punishment should serve to have a strong deterrent effect. The court convicted the accused and imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50 (i.e., in total EUR 5000))which would be suspended during three years if the accused obeyed the terms of probation.



Bah v. Mukasey United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2008)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

Three plaintiffs from Guinea who underwent female genital mutilation (“FGM”) appealed decisions from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which had denied their claims for relief and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture based on FGM. An applicant who demonstrates past persecution benefits from the presumption that he or she faces future persecution, unless the government shows either a change of circumstances such that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened upon return to his or her native country, or a reasonable possibility of internal relocation within the country. Here, the BIA found that the presumption was automatically rebutted because the FGM had already occurred. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the fact that an applicant had already undergone FGM cannot, in and of itself, rebut the presumption that her life or freedom will be threatened in the future. In doing so, the Second Circuit found that the BIA had committed two significant errors in its analysis. First, it assumed that FGM is a one-time act without placing the burden on the government to show that the individuals in this case are not at risk of further mutilation. Second, to rebut the presumption, the government must show that changed conditions in the country obviate the risk to life or freedom related to the original claim; it is not enough that the particular act of persecution suffered by the victim in the past might not reoccur. The Second Circuit accordingly vacated the BIA decisions and remanded the cases.



Gawaxab v. The State High Court of Namibia (2018)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The accused was charged with assaulting and murdering a woman. At trial, the accused filed an application for his discharge at the close of the prosecution’s case, arguing that the prosecution failed to make a case requiring the accused to answer. According to prosecution evidence, after buying alcohol and drinking it with a group of women he did not know, including the deceased, an argument began because the accused stated that he could have sex with all the women. The driver stopped the car when the accused hit the deceased with a bottle. The accused continued to beat the woman outside of the car and the others drove away in fear for their lives to report the attack the police. Upon their return to the scene, they found and picked up the deceased, who was running down the road after escaping the accused. She later passed away from her injuries. At trial, prosecutors presented several eye-witnesses to testify against the accused, as well as direct and circumstantial evidence to support their case. The accused argued that the eye-witnesses had been intoxicated at the time of the assault and therefore their testimony was unreliable. He also argued that the prosecutors failed to meet their burden to convict him. However, the court agreed with the prosecution and refused to discharge the accused, finding that the prosecution’s evidence presented a prima facie case that the accused was legally obliged to answer.



Sentenza N. 10959/2016 Corte di Cassazione: Sezioni Unite (Supreme Court: Joint Sections) (2016)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement

The Supreme Court, in deciding upon the applicability of certain procedural rules, confirmed the main international definitions of violence within relationships. Particularly, the local court dismissed the case against a man charged with the crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, without giving any notice of the motion to dismiss to the person injured by the crime in accordance with Article 408 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The injured person appealed the decision of the local court and requested that the Italian Supreme Court declare the dismissal of the case null and void. In deciding the procedural issue at hand, the Italian Supreme Court pointed out that the Italian criminal law has drawn the definitions of gender violence and violence against women mainly from international law provisions, which are directly enforced in the system pursuant to Article 117 of the Constitution. In this decision the Italian Supreme Court gave all the definitions of violence within gender relationships in consideration of international conventions and specifically European law, and concluded that such definitions, even if not directly included in domestic regulations, “are fully part of our national system through international law and are therefore enforceable.” According to this interpretation, the definitions of gender violence given by the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence are directly applicable in the Italian legal framework. On this basis, the Court ruled that notice of dismissal of the case must always be served on the person injured by crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, as those provisions relate to the gender violence notion set forth under the international and EU provisions applicable in the Italian legal framework.

La Corte di Cassazione, in una decisione riguardo all’applicabilità di alcune regole procedurali, ha confermato l’applicabilità delle principali definizioni internazionali in tema di violenza di genere. In particolare, il Tribunale ha archiviato un caso contro un uomo accusato di aver commesso i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, senza aver dato avviso della richiesta di archiviazione alla parte offesa secondo quanto disposto dall’articolo 408 del codice di procedura penale italiano. Il difensore della persona offesa ricorreva per cassazione e chiedeva alla Corte di Cassazione di dichiarare nullo il provvedimento di archiviazione. Nel decidere la questione procedurale, la Corte di Cassazione evidenziava che il diritto penale italiano ha tratto le definizioni di violenza di genere e violenza contro le donne principalmente dalle disposizioni di diritto internazionale, che sono direttamente applicabili nel sistema ai sensi dell’articolo 117 della Costituzione. In questa decisione la Corte di Cassazione ha fornito tutte le definizioni di violenza di genere in considerazione delle convenzioni internazionali e in particolare del diritto europeo, e ha concluso che tali definizioni, anche se non direttamente incluse nelle normative nazionali, “per il tramite del diritto internazionale sono entrate a far parte dell’ordinamento e influiscono sull’applicazione del diritto”. Secondo questa interpretazione, le definizioni di violenza di genere previste dalla Convenzione di Istanbul sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza domestica sono direttamente applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano. Sulla base di ciò, la Cassazione ha ritenuto che l’avviso della richiesta di archiviazione debba sempre essere notificato alla persona offesa nel caso in cui si proceda per i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, in quanto queste disposizioni si riferiscono alla nozione di violenza di genere sancita dalle disposizioni internazionali e comunitarie applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano.



X. v. A., 6B_962/2010 Federal Court (2011)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

A. was a drug-addicted prostitute working in the Sihlquai area in Zurich who agreed to perform certain sexual acts with client X. for a remuneration of Fr. 50. X. took A. to a rented room outside of the city of Zurich where X. beat A. with a whip and forced her to perform violent and humiliating sexual acts. A. claimed not to have agreed to perform these acts with X., while X. countered that they were part of the agreed transaction. X. was sentenced by the Baden District Court to imprisonment for sexually abusing A. X. appealed the verdict and the Canton Aargau Supreme Federal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the preconditions of sexual assault fulfilled. The Supreme Federal Court determined that, even if A. voluntarily agreed to perform certain sexual acts with X., she did not consent to the violent acts and she could not express her refusal in any other manner than verbally and through limited physical resistance. The Supreme Federal Court also found that the client X. could not expect the victim A. to agree to such violent sexual practices, even for remuneration.



Sentencia nº 1325 de Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Número de Expediente: 11-0645) Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (2011)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

An indigenous man was charged with physical violence and threats against his ex-partner (a non-indigenous woman), a violation of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence (the “statute”), which created special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute. The special court issued a restraining order in lieu of detention pending trial. Prosecutors appealed. While the appeal was pending, the man violated the restraining order. The court of appeals vacated the restraining order and ordered detention. On a constitutional appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that, because of his identity as an indigenous person, his community’s authorities had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court acknowledged that (1) the Organic Law on Indigenous Peoples and Communities creates special jurisdiction authorizing indigenous communities to resolve controversies arising among their members within their lands, (2) this special jurisdiction allows the communities to apply their own laws, and (3) the national courts must recognize the decisions of the communities. But the Court also stressed that international conventions, the national constitution, and special laws (such as the statute) placed limitations on that jurisdiction. The Court cited, for example, Article 9 of the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which provides that “the methods customarily practiced by the peoples concerned for dealing with offenses committed by their members shall be respected,” but only “[t]o the extent compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognized human rights.” More precisely, the Court noted that the statute itself established that indigenous authorities could serve as agents for receiving complaints of violence against women, but only without prejudice to the victim’s right to seek remedy in the special courts. Based on that analysis, the Court held that the special courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute, regardless of the defendant’s ethnic identify. Notably, the Court ordered that its holding be published as binding precedent.



Sentencia nº 500 de Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Número de Expediente: CC13-348) Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (2013)


Gender-based violence in general

A landlady alleged that two delinquent male tenants assaulted her and threatened to kill her if she sought to evict them. The tenants were charged with “violence against a woman,” a violation of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence (the “statute”), which created special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute. The ordinary court declined jurisdiction and referred the case to the special court. In the meantime, after completing their investigation, prosecutors downgraded the charges to “general injuries,” a violation of the general penal code. The special court also declined jurisdiction, reasoning that its jurisdiction under the statute was limited to gender-based violence and that the violence alleged in the case was rooted in a contractual dispute and not in the landlady’s gender. When the jurisdictional conflict was certified to the Supreme Court, it held that the landlady’s gender was sufficient to bring the case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special courts, irrespective of the statutory classification of the alleged crime. Dissenting judges argued that the special court’s jurisdiction was confined to gender-based crimes and that the majority opinion would result in a separate system of justice for each gender.



Sentencia nº 357 de Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Número de Expediente: CC15-173) Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (2015)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

In 2013, a woman’s ex-partner wounded her with a machete and knife as she was arriving home at midnight. When the victim’s sister intervened, the man punched the sister and ran off. For his attack against his ex-partner, the man was charged with attempted homicide, a violation of both the general penal code and the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence (the “statute”). For his attack against the sister, he was charged with physical violence, a violation of the statute. Amended in 2014, the statute created special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases brought under the statute, but a subsequent Supreme Court decision clarified that all types of homicide offenses occurring prior to the amendment remained within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. During the preliminary hearing, the ordinary court found that the allegations did not support the attempted homicide charge but rather the offense of “minor injuries,” a violation of the statute. Accordingly, the ordinary court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and thus referred the case to the special court. In turn, finding that the allegations did support a homicide charge, the special court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. When the jurisdictional conflict was certified to the Supreme Court, it held that the special court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Court explained that the classification of the “homicide” charge was of no consequence, because the charge against the sister vested jurisdiction in the special court over all related charges involving gender violence.



Gregory v. R. Court of Appeal (2015)


Gender-based violence in general

The applicant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for abduction and robbery with aggravation. In response to his first application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence, the judge granted him leave to appeal to the sentence, but refused permission to appeal against conviction. The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against his conviction. The issue on appeal was whether the indictment erroneously citing the wrong statute warranted overturning the conviction. The offence of forcible abduction can be found in the section 17 of the Sexual Offences Act, and it was formerly an offence addressed in section 56 of the Offences Against Person Act. The latter was repealed when the Sexual Offences Act passed. Although the sections are not identically worded, they create the same offence of taking away a woman, against her will, with the intent of having sexual intercourse with her. The indictment in this case had incorrectly stated that the offence was in violation of section 56 (which had been repealed at that point). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals decided that the error was not fatal to the conviction, as an amendment would have been permissible. This leads to the conclusion that as long as indictment errors are related to the form, and not the substance, then there is no prejudice to the appellants.



RH 2003:11 Hovrätten för Västra Sverige (Court of Appeal for Western Sweden) (2003)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

L-G.T. assaulted his girlfriend, S.S., two times during the time they lived together. The District Court found that the acts were meant to cause a serious violation of S.S.’s integrity. The Court of Appeal held that the number of acts must be more than two in order to constitute a repeated violation of the integrity, but that if the acts of violence were severe, the number of repeated acts necessary for conviction may be reduced. Because the court found that the assaults at issue in this case were not severe, the court did not find the defendant guilty of violating his girlfriend’s integrity (Sw. grov fridskränkning).



RH 2016:29 Svea hovrätt (Svea Court of Appeal) (2016)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

During the course of a three month-long relationship, M.H. assaulted A.I. four times. The question in the Court of Appeal was whether M.H. and A.I. lived together under circumstances that could be considered equal to a marriage and, if so, whether the repeated assaults should be classified a violation of a woman’s integrity (Sw. kvinnofridskränkning). The Court of Appeal held that they did not. Because the couple did not share a household, the crime could not be considered as violation of a woman’s integrity. The Court of Appeal then assessed whether the couple were “closely related persons” (Sw. närstående), which would allow the assaults to be classified as aggravated violation of the integrity (Sw. grov fridskränkning). However, the Court of Appeal held that the relationship was too short for M.H and A.I. to be viewed as closely related persons and refused to convict M.H. of aggravated violation of the integrity.



Nduta v. Republic High Court of Kenya at Siaya (2015)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for injuring his wife, who he inherited according to customary practice after her husband died in 2002. On November 8, 2013, his wife attempted to pack clothes to visit her children in Nairobi. The appellant refused to let his wife travel and threatened to murder her. The appellant cut both of his wife’s arms using a panga (machete), but she managed to escape to her nephew’s home. The nephew saw the appellant armed with the panga and a knife before taking his aunt to the police station and later the hospital. The appellant was convicted of Grievous Harm Contrary to Section 234 of the Penal Code and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to consider that this was a mere domestic issue that could have been resolved by village elders. The appellant asked for a non-custodial sentence citing the fact he was an elderly man (78 years old). The High Court upheld the conviction and the sentence, noting, “The appellant’s actions amounted to violence against women. It is my view a gender-based violence which the court cannot condone or tolerate and let perpetrators of violence against women and girls go unpunished.” This case demonstrates the relationship between the criminal courts in Kenya and customary law.



P.O. v. Board of Trustees, A.F., et al. Industrial Court at Nairobi (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual harassment

The claimant accompanied one of respondents, a co-worker “J.”, on a work-related trip. Throughout the business trip, J. made sexual innuendos towards the claimant and when his advances failed, he physically beat her. He booked a single hotel room, while the claimant believed she would have her own room. As a result, the claimant was forced to sleep on the floor and returned to Kenya two days later, while J. continued to the conference. Upon the claimant’s return, she received multiple threatening emails from J. and her employment was terminated as of May 24, 2010 for alleged “misconduct” for not travelling to the conference. Her salary for May was unpaid. Although there were numerous legal issues decided in this case, including jurisdiction, the key issue was whether the claimant was subjected to gender-based discrimination and thus unlawfully terminated, and what, if any, entitlement is due to her. The Industrial Court determined that J.’s conduct toward the claimant, no matter where it had occurred, clearly amounted to gender-based violence against an employee, and that his conduct “had the effect of nullifying or impairing the equality of opportunity or treatment in employment, based on her sex.” The Industrial Court awarded P total compensation of Kshs 3,240,000, which included general damages for sexual harassment, and unfair and wrongful termination of Kshs 3,000,000. This case is important to demonstrate Kenyan courts afford protection against sexual violence in multiple ways, including equal opportunity and human rights legislation, labor legislation, civil remedies and criminal law. In addition to Kenyan employment law, the Industrial Court also relied on the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the International Labour Organization, as well as other forms of jurisprudence to support eradicating violence and sexual discrimination against women in the workplace. The decision noted that while the Constitution of Kenya was not yet in effect and thus not directly applicable when the case was tried, Articles 1, 3 and 5 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights were included in the Kenyan Constitution and thus were applicable at the time the case occurred.



平成28年(許)45 (2016 (Kyo) No. 45) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2017)


Gender-based violence in general, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

The appellant in this case had been arrested and punished with a fine for allegedly paying for child prostitution in violation of the Act on Punishment of Activities Relating to Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and the Protection of Children (before its revision by Act No. 79 of 2014). The news media reported his arrest for the alleged charge, and all or part of the coverage was made available at several websites that were searchable on the appellee search engine. This case concerned the appellant’s request—based on his personal rights and moral interests—for an order of provisional disposition, requiring the search engine to make websites that refer to the appellant’s criminal record unsearchable. The High Court dismissed the request. The Supreme Court, on one hand, recalled its finding from precedents that the protection of information related to an individual’s privacy is subject to legal protection. On the other hand, it noted that search engines’ provision of search results (1) may constitute acts of expression and (2) has become an important infrastructure for distribution of information through the internet. The Supreme Court then found that the evaluation of whether providing particular search results amounts to an illegal action must take into account both the benefits of making the information at question unsearchable, and reasons and circumstances pertaining to providing such search results; the court can require that the search engine remove such search results only if the former exceeds the latter. In this case, the Supreme Court found that, while the criminal record at issue pertained to the privacy of the appellant and which he did not wish to be made largely available to the public, such information also concerned the public interest in light of the nature of crimes relating to child porn and child prostitution. In addition, the Supreme Court took into account that the information dissemination was limited to a certain degree considering that such search results did not show up unless a search engine user used the appellant’s name and his residing prefecture together as search keywords. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the benefit of making the information at issue unsearchable did not exceed the need of having the websites at issue on the search engine and sustained the lower court’s ruling.

本件の抗告人は、「児童買春、児童ポルノに係る行為等の規制及び処罰並びに児童の保護等に関する法律」(平成26年法律第79号による改正前)に違反した容疑で逮捕され、罰金刑に処せられた。複数のニュースメディアがその逮捕に関する記事をネット上で公開し、それらの記事は抗告人の氏名と居住する都道府県をキーワードに入れ、検索エンジンで検索すれば出るようになっていた。本件は、抗告人がその人格的権利に基づき、犯罪歴を公開するウェブサイトを検索できないよう検索事業者に削除を求めた仮処分命令の事案である。高裁は、抗告人の請求を棄却した。最高裁は、個人のプライバシーに関する情報は法的保護の対象であるという判例から、本件検索結果の提供は、(1)検索エンジンの表現行為である可能性があり、(2)ネット検索エンジンによる情報流通の社会的役割を果たしていると指摘した。また、特定の検索結果を提供することが違法行為に当たるか否かの評価は、当該検索結果を提供しない法的利益と、提供する理由に関する諸般の事情を比較衡量しなければならず、前者が後者を上回る場合のみ、検索エンジンに対して当該検索結果の削除を求めることができると最高裁は判断した。本件の場合、問題となっている犯罪記録は、抗告人のプライバシーに関わり、抗告人が広く公開されることを望んでいないものではあるが、児童ポルノや児童買春に関する犯罪の性質を鑑み、公共の利益にも関わるものでもある。また、検索エンジンの利用者は、抗告人の氏名と居住する都道府県を検索キーワードとして併用しなければ、関連する逮捕情報が検索結果として表示されないことを考慮すると、その逮捕情報の公開が一定程度制限されていたことが分かる。本件において、最高裁は、検索結果を提供しない法的利益は、検索結果を提供する必要性を超えていないと判断し、高裁判決を支持した。



The People v. Mugala High Court for Zambia (2012)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The accused was charged with one count of rape contrary to Sections 132 and 133 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The accused denied the charge. However, following the trial (during which the prosecution called five witnesses, and after considering the evidence of the accused which was given on oath), the trial magistrate found the accused guilty and convicted him of the subject offence. The case was then remitted to the High Court for sentencing pursuant to Section 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Zambia. Before passing any sentence, the Court was required to satisfy itself that the relevant legal and procedural provisions had been observed by the trial court. The Court held that there was medical evidence in support of the violent nature of the act as well as other corroborative evidence, such as the distressed state of the victim when she reported the act. Furthermore, the Court concluded there was sufficient evidence in support of the identification of the accused by the victim including the trial magistrate’s finding that the victim was a truthful witness. On the totality of the evidence, the High Court held that the trial judge’s finding of guilt and the conviction was ‘anchored on firm ground’ and, therefore, concluded that it should be upheld. The High Court sentenced the accused to 25 years imprisonment with hard labor effective from the date of arrest.



Institutional Violence Against Women (Docket XXVII.1o.3 C (10a.)) Mexico Supreme Court (2016)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará,” states that violence against women is an offense against human dignity, which constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. In addition, Article 18 of the General Law for Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence establishes that any public servant’s conduct, whether by act or omission, which is discriminatory or which impairs the woman’s human rights is considered institutional violence. Therefore, if a governmental authority deprives a woman of any right in the context of family law, the court shall acknowledge the authority’s intention to discriminate or impair the plaintiff’s human rights in its ruling. Further, any court ruling seeking to restore the woman’s rights shall identify the authority responsible for the violation. (Amparo Directo: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=462/04620000174646210006004.d...)

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer "Convención de Belém do Pará", afirma que violencia contra la mujer es un delito contra la dignidad humana y constituye una violación de los derechos fundamentales. Además, el artículo 18 de la Ley General para el Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia establece que la conducta de cualquier servidor público, ya sea por acto u omisión, que sea discriminatoria o que perjudique los derechos humanos de la mujer se considera violencia institucional. Por lo tanto, si una autoridad gubernamental priva a una mujer de cualquier derecho en el contexto del derecho de familia, el tribunal reconocerá la intención de la autoridad de discriminar o menoscabar los derechos humanos del demandante en su decisión. Además, cualquier fallo judicial que busque restaurar los derechos de la mujer deberá identificar a la autoridad responsable de la violación.



Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v. SZMDS High Court of Australia (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, International law, LGBTIQ

The respondent, an allegedly homosexual citizen of Pakistan, arrived in Australia on a visitor visa in 2007 and applied for a protection visa. To be recognized as a refugee, the respondent had to show that he had a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The respondent argued that, as a homosexual man, he belonged to a particular social group that was persecuted and subject to harm in Pakistan. The respondent’s protection visa application was initially denied, and the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed this decision. The Tribunal found that while homosexuals in Pakistan constitute a protected group, the respondent was not actually a homosexual because he safely make a three-week visit to Pakistan before traveling to Australia and failed to seek asylum on a recent visit to the UK. On appeal, the Federal Court found that the Tribunal’s decision was based on illogical reasoning. The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship appealed the Federal Court’s decision to the High Court. In a majority decision, the High Court overturned the Federal Court’s decision, finding that the Tribunal’s reasons for not believing the respondent was actually a homosexual were sound.



Appellant S395/2002 v. Minister of Immigration and Citizenship High Court of Australia (2003)


Gender-based violence in general, International law, LGBTIQ

The appellants, both homosexual male citizens of Bangladesh, arrived in Australia and applied for protection visas. To be recognized as refugees, the appellants had to show that they had a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The appellants argued that they belonged to a “particular social group” that was subject to discrimination and harm in Bangladesh by virtue of their homosexuality. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship initially determined that because the appellants had conducted their relationship in a discreet manner in Bangladesh, they would suffer no serious harm if they returned to Bangladesh and continued to keep their relationship secret. For this reason, appellants were initially denied protection visas, and the Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed this decision. The appellant’s appealed to the Federal Court for judicial review and the primary judge dismissed the application, agreeing with the delegate’s reasoning about the discreetness of the appellants’ relationship. Appellants appealed to the Full Federal Court, which also dismissed their appeal. Appellants then appealed to the High Court, which granted them special leave to appeal. The High Court considered whether the Tribunal had erred in requiring or expecting the appellants to behave discreetly in order to avoid persecution. In a four-to-three decision, the High Court found that the Tribunal had erred because it improperly split the social group of homosexual men into two groups, discreet and non-discreet. The High Court held that the expectation that a person take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, does not include the need to be discreet about sexuality, especially given that the appellants may have only been acting discreetly due to the persecution of openly homosexual men in Bangladesh. The case was referred back to the Tribunal for redetermination.



TC/0003/17 Constitutional Court (2017)


Femicide, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

Due to the increase of femicide crimes in the Dominican society, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the termination of violence against women in all its forms as it is a violation of the Constitution. The proclamation was made in commemoration of the murder of Mirabal, Minerva, Patria and María Teresa, political opponents of the regime of Rafael Trujillo, and in accordance with the international agreements executed in defense of women's rights, as well as the laws issued against gender violence, sexual violence and femicide.

Debido al aumento de los delitos de femicidio en la sociedad dominicana, el Tribunal Constitucional proclamó el cese de la violencia contra la mujer en todas sus formas, incluyéndolo como una forma de violación de la Constitución. Dicha proclamación se realizó en conmemoración del asesinato de Mirabal, Minerva, Patria, y María Teresa, quienes fueron opositores políticos del régimen de Rafael Trujillo. La proclamación está en conformidad con los acuerdos internacionales celebrados en defensa de los derechos de las mujeres y con las leyes emitidas contra la violencia basada en género sexual, violencia sexual en sí, y femicidio.



Human Trafficking (Isolated Thesis Docket: I.9o.P.144 P (10a.)) Ninth Collegiate Tribunal in Criminal Matters of the First Circuit (2017)


Gender-based violence in general, Trafficking in persons

“HUMAN TRAFFICKING. IF A VICTIM OF THIS CRIME, IN ONE OF THE FIRST STATEMENTS, MAKES AN ALLEGATION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, INCLUDING A NARRATIVE OF THE FACTS, AND SUCH STATEMENT IS CORROBORATED BY FURTHER EVIDENCE, SUCH EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ACCURATE EVEN IF THE VICTIM SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTS THE ALLEGATIONS.”

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on such tribunal. In addition, such criteria may also be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. In this case, the federal court determined that it is a well-known fact that Mexican society discriminates against sex workers. In light of the stigma that sex workers carry, they are subject to continuous pressure from different societal actors, including their nuclear family, to refrain from providing statements or to withdraw initial statements regarding crimes committed against them. The collegiate tribunal held that when a sex-worker case comes before a court, the court must consider a gender perspective in its ruling. As a result, courts must use all available mechanisms in order to obtain irrefutable proof from the victim. The tribunal based its ruling on Article 2(c) and (d) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): “(c) to establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; (d) to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation.”

“LA TRATA DE PERSONAS. SI UNA VÍCTIMA DE ESTE CRIMEN, EN UNA DE LAS PRIMERAS DECLARACIONES, HACE UNA ALLEGACIÓN CONTRA EL DEFENDIENTE, INCLUYENDO UNA NARRATIVA DE LOS HECHOS, Y DICHA DECLARACIÓN ES SUSTENTADA CON EVIDENCIA DICHA EVIDENCIA SE MANTENDRA COMO VALIDA INCLUSO SI LA VICTIMA RECANTA SU TESTIMONIO."

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para dicho tribunal. Además, dichos criterios también pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. En este caso, el tribunal federal determinó que es un hecho bien conocido que la sociedad mexicana discrimina a las trabajadoras en base a su sexo. En vista del estigma que las trabajadoras sexuales ejercen, están sujetos a la presión continua de diferentes actores sociales, incluida su familia nuclear, para que se abstengan de emitir declaraciones o de retirar declaraciones iniciales sobre los delitos cometidos contra ellas. El tribunal colegiado sostuvo que cuando un caso de trabajadora sexual se presenta ante un tribunal, el tribunal debe considerar una perspectiva de género en su decisión. Como resultado, los tribunales deben usar todos los mecanismos disponibles para obtener pruebas irrefutables de la víctima. El tribunal basó su decisión en el Artículo 2 (c) y (d) de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW): “(c) establecer la protección legal de los derechos de las mujeres en igualdad de condiciones con los hombres y asegurar a través de los tribunales nacionales competentes y otras instituciones públicas la protección efectiva de las mujeres contra cualquier acto de discriminación; (d) abstenerse de participar en cualquier acto o práctica de discriminación contra las mujeres y garantizar que las autoridades e instituciones públicas actúen de conformidad con esta obligación."



Case of Emilio Garay Franco Supreme Court (1996)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

Emilio Garay Franco was accused of murdering his mother, María Roque Franco González, in her home on August 3, 1983 at around 11:00 pm. The weapon used to commit the crime was a knife. The accused was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The accused appealed the sentence, but the action was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court confirmed the sentence, noting “no hay delito más horrendo” ("there is no more horrendous crime”) than patricide.

Emilio Garay Franco fue acusado de asesinar a su madre, María Roque Franco González en su case el 3 de Agosto del 1983 alrededor de las 11 de la noche. El arma usada para cometer el crimen fue un cuchillo. El acusado fue sentenciado a 30 años de cárcel. Él apeló la sentencia pero la acción fue rechazada por la Corte Suprema, la cúal afirmó la sentencia y agregó que, “no hay delito más horrendo” que el parricidio.



Case of Gilberto Arrúa González (No. 573) Supreme Court (2001)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

Gilberto Arrúa González was accused of murdering his mother, Lidia Blanca González in her home on April 3, 1993 at around 7:00 pm. The weapon used to commit the crime was a 21 cm long knife. The police questioned Jorge Arrúa Godoy who testified that on that day his wife, the victim, and he returned to their home to find the accused, their son, drinking wine and listening to music on the patio of the house. At one point, the defendant hit the radio with his hand, so his mother rebuked him, asking him to stop. The defendant ignored her, and his mother grabbed him by his shirt and shook him. In turn, the defendant’s father grabbed the victim by the arm, asking her to release his son. When they released him, the defendant said “I will kill you all,” then ran into the kitchen where he grabbed the knife and tried to stab his father. However, his mother stepped between them and the defendant fatally stabbed her. The defendant was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The accused appealed the sentenced but the Supreme Court confirmed the 25 year-prison sentence.

Gilberto Arrúa González fue acusado de asesinar a su madre, Lidia Blanca González, en su domicilio el 3 de abril de 1993 alrededor de las 19:00 horas. El arma utilizada para cometer el crimen fue un cuchillo de 21 cm de largo. La policía interrogó a Jorge Arrúa Godoy, quien declaró que ese día su esposa, la víctima, y ​​él regresaron a su domicilio para encontrar al imputado, a su hijo, bebiendo vino y escuchando música en el patio de la casa. En un momento, el acusado golpeó la radio con la mano, por lo que su madre lo reprendió y le pidió que se detuviera. El acusado la ignoró, y su madre lo agarró por la camisa y lo sacudió. A su vez, el padre del acusado agarró a la víctima del brazo y le pidió que soltara a su hijo. Cuando lo liberaron, el acusado dijo “Los mataré a todos”, luego corrió a la cocina donde agarró el cuchillo y trató de apuñalar a su padre. Sin embargo, su madre se interpuso entre ellos y el acusado la apuñaló fatalmente. El acusado fue condenado a 25 años de prisión. Él apeló al condenado pero el Tribunal Supremo confirmó la pena de 25 años de prisión.



Case of W.F.C.M. and L.M.S.V., No. 556 Supreme Court (2005)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

L.M.S.V. and W.F.C.M were accused of sexual coercion against the victim L.del R.A., an 18 year old woman, who was sexually coerced by the two accused males with a knife. The accused, who were minors, were sentenced to 3 years in prison. L.M.S.V appealed and the Court of Appeals confirmed the lower court sentence. Finally, L.M.S.V challenged the decision before the Supreme Court which partially overturned the decision. The Supreme Court found that because L.M.S.V. was a minor at the time of the crime and, in order to hold minors criminally responsible, minors must have sufficient psycho-social maturity (“madurez sico-social”) to understand the criminality of their actions, the sentence should be reduced to two years in prison. The court also ordered that during the probation period, L.M.S.V. must live no less than 10 kilometers away from the victim.

L.M.S.V. y W.F.C.M fueron acusados ​​de fuerza sexual contra la víctima L. del R.A., una mujer de 18 años, quien fue forzada sexualmente por los dos hombres acusados ​​con un cuchillo. Los acusados, que eran menores de edad, fueron condenados a 3 años de prisión. L.M.S.V apeló y el Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia del tribunal inferior. Finalmente, L.M.S.V atacó la decisión ante la Corte Suprema que revocó parcialmente la decisión. La Corte Suprema determinó que debido a que L.M.S.V. era menor en el momento del delito y, para responsabilizar penalmente a los menores, los menores deben tener suficiente madurez psicosocial (“madurez psico-social”) para comprender la criminalidad de sus actos, la pena debía reducirse a dos años de prisión. El tribunal también ordenó que durante el período de prueba, L.M.S.V. debía vivir a no menos de 10 kilómetros de la víctima.



Public Prosecutor v. Various Parties Court of Appeal of Antwerp (2016)


Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

An 18-year old woman died from injuries sustained during acts of exorcism (involving use of boiling water, acid, and beating) carried out at the request of her parents by a healer, a few months after she told her mother that she had homosexual feelings. At first instance, the acts were qualified as torture, and the fact that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable situation (mentally and physically) was considered an aggravating factor. Both the healer and the parents were sentenced by the lower court to prison terms (based on Article 417bis and 417ter of the Penal Code (torture)), but the court held that any possible discriminatory motive based on sexual orientation (which it considered unproven anyway) could not affect the criminal qualification, because the Penal Code does not provide for discrimination as an aggravating factor for torture. Contrary to the lower court, which qualified the acts as torture, the Court of Appeal did not qualify the acts as torture (as the intention of the defendants was not to punish the victim), but as blows and injuries intentionally inflicted without the purpose of manslaughter but leading to death under Article 401 of the Penal Code. In addition, the Court found that the aggravating factors included the failure to protect a vulnerable person (Article 405bis) and the fact that acts were committed by the parents of the victim had been the motive for the exorcism. The healer and both parents were sentenced to jail.



Affaire Songo Mboyo Tribunal Militaire de Garnison Mbandaka (2006)


Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

In December 2003, members of the Congolese army (FARDC) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bokila Lolemi stationed in the village of Songo Mboyo mutinied over unpaid wages. They targeted the local population and committed mass rapes across two nights with as many as 119 victims. Lolemi was charged with crimes against humanity for rape of 32 women by forces under his command and effective control. The court of first instance was the Military Garrison Tribunal of Mbandaka, which found 7 of the 12 defendants guilty, including Lolemi. Lolemi was found to have failed to exercise appropriate control over his soldiers and prevent the mass rapes, which he knew or should have known his soldiers were committing. The decision was appealed to and confirmed by the Military Court of Equateur. Though the defendants denied the rapes, the courts disagreed, citing survivors’ testimony and medical reports. This case is significant because it is one of the first instances of a Congolese Military Court directly applying the Rome Statute (in addition to DRC law n ° 024/2002 of November 18, 2002). The decision was issued by the same court and in the same year as the Mutins de Mbandaka case. The case is also significant because it represented the first time that government soldiers were put on trial for rape as a crime against humanity or war crime, a fact which is significant because the FARDC are believed to be responsible for a large proportion of sexual attacks in the DRC in recent times. The decision therefore struck a blow against military impunity for such crimes. (Lower court decision available at: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/166854/pdf/)



平成22年(あ)2011 (2010 (A) No. 2011) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2012)


Gender-based violence in general

The defendant was accused of taking and imprisoning four young women in either the guestroom of a hotel or in the defendant’s home. The victims suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the imprisonment. One of the key issues in the case was whether the defendant’s act constituted the crime of Confinement Causing Injury, or only the crime of Confinement. The defendant argued that a psychiatric condition, such as PTSD, should not be regarded as an “injury” under the Criminal Code. The District Court and the High Court dismissed the defendant’s argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if the defendant illegally imprisoned the victim and the victim developed continuous and characteristic PTSD symptoms as a result of the imprisonment, the victim’s PTSD could constitute an “injury” under the Criminal Code. Therefore, the defendant’s act constituted Confinement Causing Injury. This was the first Supreme Court precedent which found that a purely psychiatric condition which was not accompanied by a physical manifestation could fall within the meaning of “injury.”

被告は、4人の若い女性をホテルの客室または被告の自宅に連れ込み、監禁した。本件は、被害者が監禁により心的外傷後ストレス障害(PTSD)に苦しんだ事案で、(監禁罪は成立するが)監禁致傷罪の成否が争われたケースである。被告は、PTSDのような精神疾患は、刑法上の「傷害」とみなされるべきではないと主張した。しかし、地裁、高裁、最高裁ともに監禁致傷罪の成立を認めた。最高裁によると、被告が違法に被害者を監禁し、監禁の結果、被害者が継続的かつ特徴的なPTSD症状を発症した場合、被害者のPTSDは刑法上の「傷害」に該当し得るとした。本件では、最高裁は被告人の行為は監禁致傷罪に該当すると判断し、これは、物理的な傷害を伴わない純粋な精神的機能の障害が刑法上の傷害に当たることを初めて認めた最高裁判例である。



Individual Application of Albina Kiyamova Constitutional Court (2016)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The applicant, Albina Kiyamova, was arrested at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul for infringing an order that prohibited her entry into Turkey. She submitted a complaint to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office (the “CPPO”), asserting that the police subjected her to treatment incompatible with human dignity while she was in custody. Specifically, the applicant said that the police subjected her to a naked body search and other inhuman and degrading treatment charged by race and gender discrimination. The CPPO requested permission from the relevant authority to investigate the officers of the applicant’s treatment. However, the relevant authority denied the CPPO’s request. The applicant appealed the authority’s decision, but her appeal was rejected. She then appealed to the Constitutional Court, claiming that her constitutional right to protection from treatment incompatible with human dignity was infringed. The Constitutional Court partially rejected some of the applicant’s claims due to lack of evidence but accepted her claim that it was unjust for the relevant authority to reject her claims without conducting an investigation.



Individual Application of Ferida Kaya Constitutional Court (2016)


Custodial violence, Gender-based violence in general

The applicant, Ms. Kaya, was arrested for alleged political offences. After she was released, she submitted a petition to the Office of Prosecutor General, asserting that she had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment while she was in custody. She also claimed that physicians at the state hospital ignored her complaints related to torture and inhuman treatment. After the incident, Ms. Kaya received asylum from Austria in 2002. Concurrently, the Office of Prosecutor General brought an action against the gendarmerie personnel and the physicians who ignored Ms. Kaya’s complaints to address her complaint regarding inhuman and degrading treatment. The trial at the Court of First Instance took about nine years. During that period, the claim against physician was dropped due to the lapse of time. Ms. Kaya was outside of Turkey during the trial. However, she remotely applied to several hospitals in Turkey to get consultations regarding the medical reports that were prepared while she was in custody. All of Ms. Kaya’s medical reports indicated that she showed signs of torture and inhuman treatment. She submitted those reports to the Court of First Instance. In 2011, the Court of First Instance dropped the case as a result of lapse of time. However, the Constitutional Court set aside the Court of First Instance’s decision and ruled that the prolonged trial violated Ms. Kaya’s right to access justice. The Constitutional Court held that Turkey must hold a speedy trial to abide by its constitutional obligation to effectively investigate claims related to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. This case is important, because it concluded that an insufficient investigation may itself be inhuman treatment. This case should constitute a precedent for the future cases where women are harmed as a result of insufficient and ineffective investigation.



Kalibobo v. Uganda Court of Appeal at Kampala (2001)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The trial court sentenced the 25-year-old Appellant to 17 years in prison after finding him guilty of raping a 70-year-old widow from a neighboring village. The trial court rejected the defense that he was not in her village at the time of the rape. The trial court found that in November 1998 the Appellant broke into the home of the victim, who confronted him with a panga (machete). While raping her after disarming her, the victim called out and the Appellant, worried about being caught, fled with her panga. The police found the panga in his home the next day and he was arrested. The Appellant contested his sentence, arguing that it was manifestly harsh because he has a wife, two children, and two young brothers to care for. The State contended that the sentence was appropriate because of the victim’s age and family circumstances. The standard for appellate court interference is a sentence that is “manifestly excessive or low in view of the circumstances of the case.” The Court noted that the crime of rape, particularly the rape of “grandmothers,” is prevalent in the area and very serious. The Court held “[t]he appellant raped an old lady. That was bad. However, considering all the circumstances of the case, we think that a sentence of 17 years imprisonment was manifestly so excessive as to cause a miscarriage of justice” and reduced the sentence to seven years.



Syson Muganga v. Uganda Court of Appeal at Kampala (2008)


Acid violence, Gender-based violence in general

The trial court found the appellant guilty of attempted murder for splashing acid on the female complainant. The appellant allegedly knocked on the victim’s door on July 28, 2001, and splashed “a corrosive substance.” The trial court relied on testimony from a security guard and the victim, who knew her attacker from school. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in confirming the life imprisonment sentence. The Court, after reviewing the testimony identifying the appellant, her motive, and the “vulnerable parts of the victim’s body” that were burned, found that the life sentence was reasonable for the “outrageously despicable and sadistic act.”



Frudenthal v. Israel Supreme Court (sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals) (2003)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

The appellant appeals his conviction for trafficking in persons for the purposes of prostitution in violation of Penal Law sec. 203A(a), pimping for prostitution, and threats and false imprisonment. The appellants’ two co-conspirators reached plea agreements with prosecutors. The appellant generally admits the underlying facts of the case, but argues on appeal that these facts do not amount to trafficking in persons but rather pimping for prostitution, which has a lower sentence. The appellant “acquired” the two complainants in November of 2001 and brought them to a facility in Tel Aviv operated by the first co-conspirator for the purpose of employing them as prostitutes. Appellant “imprisoned the complainants in the facility, took their passports, and abused them physically.” The first co-conspirator supervised the complainants, forced them to work as prostitutes, and collected fees. In or around February 2002, the first co-conspirator transferred the complainants to the custody and supervision of the appellant. The appellant housed the complainants in his apartment and managed all aspects of their work as prostitutes, from arranging clients to fee collection. The appellant made each complainant pay him part of her profits for food and rent. The complainants were not allowed to leave the apartment without the appellant’s permission and supervision. The appellant argued that the lower court erred by not applying a narrow definition of “purchase” as used in property law. The Supreme Court held that section 203A(a) prohibits any deal intended to create a property relationship in which a person acquires rights in another human being. The meaning of the phrases “sale and purchase” in section 203A(a) refer to any deal, in exchange for any consideration, that grants a person any kind of property right in another human being who serves as the object of the deal. It is immaterial whether the business arrangement is under the guise of ownership, rental, borrowing, partnership, or any other means of creating a property interest in a person. The Court held that the appellant’s actions clearly constituted a business arrangement that created a property interest in a human being and that, therefore, these circumstances met the legal criteria for the crime of trafficking in persons.



Rex v. Ntai High Court of Lesotho (2004)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

The defendant was convicted of culpable homicide. The trial evidence showed that after spending an evening at a bar, the defendant beat his girlfriend to death. The defendant sought leniency at sentencing, arguing that he was drunk when he committed the offense. The High Court found that although intoxication somewhat lessens the blameworthiness of a person, the courts should not consider it a mitigating factor. According to the Court, defendants “should not be allowed to escape appropriate punishment for their actions for reasons of drunkenness, especially where such actions exhibit an attitude of violence against women” (p. 3). The Court sentenced the defendant to seven years imprisonment with half of the sentence suspended for five years if he was not found guilty of another violent offense during the suspension. This decision marked a shift in how intoxication was treated for purposes of sentencing in domestic violence cases in Lesotho.



Frau A gg. Herrn B (Ms. A v. Mr. B) [GBK I/408/12] Gleichbehandlungskommission (Equal Treatment Commission) (2014)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

In this case, the applicant brought an action against the instructor in a vocational course for making, among other things, sexually crude comments to or in the presence of the applicant and incessantly harassing her. Austria’s Equal Treatment Commission (the “Commission”) concluded that this amounted to sexual harassment in violation of Section 6 para. 1 no. 4 of the Federal Equal Treatment Act (Bundesgleichbehandlungsgesetz). This opinion is notable for the Commission’s recognition that the woman’s age is important to the determination of the extent of the harassment because harassed persons deal differently with such treatment and take different lengths of time to process sexual harassment. The Commission considered the practical links between hierarchy, power, and sexual harassment, noting that while the occurrence of sexual harassment is always an unacceptable intrusion into the human dignity of the harassed persons, young people are particularly vulnerable.

Dieser Fall wurde vor die Gleichbehandlungskommission gebracht, nachdem die Antragstellerin bei einer beruflichen Weiterbildung von einem Ausbilder unter anderem sexuell anrüchige Kommentare über sie oder in ihrem Beisein dulden musste und dieser Frau A unentwegt belästigte. Die Österreichische Gleichbehandlungskommission („die Kommission“) gelangte zu der Auffassung, dass dieses Verhalten eine sexuelle Belästigung im Sinne von § 6 Abs. 1 Ziff. 4 des Österreichischen Bundesgleichbehandlungsgesetzes darstellte. Die Feststellung der Kommission ist beachtlich, da sie betont, inwiefern das Alter der Frau bei der Entscheidung, ob eine solche Belästigung vorliegt, eine Rolle spielt. Jede Person nimmt eine solche Behandlung unterschiedlich wahr, geht mit ihr verschieden um und insbesondere dauert es unterschiedlich lang, um damit psychisch umzugehen. In der Feststellung hat die Kommission auch auf die in der Praxis bestehenden Verknüpfungen zwischen Hierarchie, Macht und sexueller Belästigung erwogen. Hierbei hat sie dargelegt, dass eine sexuelle Belästigung zwar immer ein inakzeptables Eindringen in die menschliche Würde darstellt, junge Menschen aber umso verletzlicher sind.



A gg. Bundesasylamt (A. v. Federal Asylum Agency) [C16 427.465-1/2012] Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) (2012)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

The minor applicant, a member of the Hazara ethnic group, illegally immigrated to Austria with her parents and four minor siblings from Afghanistan when she was approximately nine years old. The Federal Asylum Agency of Austria (“FAAA”) denied her and her family’s petitions for asylum. The Asylum Court reversed the denial, finding that the FAAA erred in summarily denying asylum based on the applicant’s statements without considering outside credible reports or sources relevant to the applicant’s asylum claim. The Asylum Court found that the applicant belonged to a particular social group based on her gender, age, and cultural and religious origins, and that she would have to live in accordance with the family’s conservative values if she returned to Afghanistan. As such, the applicant would not have the opportunity to pursue any goals outside the religion and customs of her community nor would she be able to protect herself against violence or undesired restrictions. Furthermore, a return would mean that the applicant would be raised to be a homemaker and married to a man chosen by her father and grandfather. The Court concluded that, if returned to Afghanistan, the applicant would find herself in a situation of permanent latent threats, structural violence, and immediate restrictions that would practically make it impossible for her to exercise her human rights. In granting the applicant’s asylum claim, the Court considered both gender-specific and child-specific factors that were not brought forth by the applicant, but rather gathered from credible investigative sources.

Die minderjährige Beschwerdeführerin ist afghanische Staatsbürgerin und Angehörige der Volksgruppe der Hazara. Sie wanderte gemeinsam mit ihren Eltern und vier minderjährigen Geschwistern illegal nach Österreich ein, als sie ungefähr neun Jahre alt war. Das Österreichische Bundesasylamt lehnte ihren Asylantrag und den ihrer Familie ab. Der Asylgerichtshof hat der Beschwerde der Beschwerdeführerin stattgegeben und ihr den Status einer Asylberechtigten zuerkannt. Nach Auffassung des Asylgerichtshofs lehnte das Bundesasylamt fehlerhaft den Antrag aufgrund der Angaben der Beschwerdeführerin ab, ohne weitere externe Berichte oder sonstige Quellen in Betracht zu ziehen, die ebenso relevant für die Beurteilung des entsprechenden Asylantrags sind. Der Asylgerichtshof stellte fest, dass die Beschwerdeführerin einer bestimmten sozialen Gruppe aufgrund ihres Geschlechts, Alters und kultureller oder religiöser Herkunft angehört, sodass sie in Übereinstimmung mit den konservativen Werten ihrer Familie leben müsste, sollte sie nach Afghanistan zurückkehren. Unter diesen Umständen würde ihr das Verfolgen von Zielen außerhalb der Religion und den Gepflogenheiten ihrer Gemeinschaft verwehrt. Sie wäre des Weiteren nicht in der Lage, sich gegen Gewalt oder ungewollte Restriktionen zu wehren. Außerdem würde eine Rückkehr für sie bedeuten, als Hausfrau und Mutter erzogen zu werden, bis sie an einen Mann verheiratet würde, den entweder Vater oder Großvater für sie aussuchen. Der Gerichtshof hat daher festgestellt, dass die Beschwerdeführerin, sollte sie nach Afghanistan zurückkehren, sich in einem Klima ständiger latenter Gefahr, struktureller Gewalt und unmittelbarer Einschränkungen wiederfinden würde, die es ihrer praktisch unmöglich machen, ihre Menschenrechte auszuüben. Indem der Gerichtshof, dem Antrag der Beschwerdeführerin stattgab, hat er sowohl geschlechtsspezifische und kind-spezifische Faktoren erwogen, die nicht von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgebracht wurden, allerdings aus glaubwürdigen investigativen Quellen stammen.



Supreme Court Decision 2007Du22498 Supreme Court of South Korea (2008)


Gender-based violence in general

Plaintiff, who was a credit card company’s Branch Head, repetitively committed acts of sexual harassment over 14 times (hugging, calling at night, asking for massage, etc.) against eight female employees who were under his control and supervision. The company terminated Plaintiff from employment on the grounds that he harmed teamwork by sexually harassing the female employees. However, as to Plaintiff's application of remedy for the first disciplinary dismissal, the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission acknowledged the first termination as unjust and ordered to restore him in his former position based on the excessiveness of discipline and defect in disciplinary procedure. The company revoked the first termination in accordance with the above remedy order and restored Plaintiff to employment. Thereafter, the company terminated Plaintiff from employment the second time based on additional facts that he hugged a female employee and persuaded female employees to keep his conducts secret and rationalize his conducts against the instruction of the company. The lower court ruled that the company’s termination of Plaintiff’s employment was unjust based on the reasoning that although the plaintiff's above acts could have caused the female employees to be sexually humiliated, some female employees regarded them as mere encouragement. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment below and demanded the lower court for a new trial on the following grounds: (1) A dismissal can be justified if the employee's fault is so serious that employment relationship with him cannot be continued in light of ordinary social norms. According to Article 2 (2) of the former Act on the Equal Employment for Both Sexes (amended by Act No. 7564 of May 31, 2005), the term "sexual harassment on the job" means that an employer, superior or co-worker makes another worker feel sexually humiliated or offended by sexual words or actions by utilizing his or her position within the working place or in relation with duties, or providing disadvantages in employment on account of disobedience to the sexual words or actions and any other demands. The prerequisite of "sexual words or actions" means actions such as sexual relation, or other sexual, oral and visual actions which make an ordinary and average person in the same position with the other party objectively feel sexual humiliation or offensive feelings in light of sound common sense and customs of the community. For the above sexual harassment to be established, the actors do not necessarily have to have a sexual motive or intent, but in consideration of specific relation of the parties, place of actions and circumstances, the other party's explicit or presumed response as to the action, contents and degree of the action, frequency and duration of the action, there must be actions which make an ordinary and average person in the same position with the other party objectively feel sexual humiliation or offensive feelings, and it must be acknowledged that the other party actually felt sexual humiliation or offensive feelings. (2) In a case such as this where a certain sexual harassment was so serious or repeated from the objective perspective of an ordinary and average person in the same position as to aggravate the working condition, the employer may become liable as to the victimized worker. Sexual harassers, if allowed to continue to work without a disciplinary dismissal, could aggravate a work environment to the degree where the victimized worker cannot tolerate it. Therefore if the disciplinary dismissal was imposed upon the worker who was responsible to such degree, it cannot be viewed as an abuse of a disciplinary right unless the disposition is acknowledged as patently unfair from an objective standpoint. (3) Plaintiff committed sexual harassment on the job to eight female employees who were under his control and supervision, repeatedly taking advantage of his superior position over 14 times for a certain period of time. Even if such sexual harassment happened without the female employees’ special awareness as it was triggered from an ordinary daily attitude formed by distorted social customs or culture on the job, such an excuse could not relieve the person from the seriousness of his behavior.



Monsieur G.A. v. Dame Z. Supreme Court of Benin (1973)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender-based violence in general

Monsieur G.A. requested a divorce for his wife’s “desertion of the marital home.” His wife pleaded that her husband and husband’s son mistreated her and her children because they believed she had committed adultery, making it impossible for her to stay in the home. She requested damages for raising their common children alone. The first court rejected her claim for not stating a claim, and awarded her husband a divorce for her desertion of the marital home. But, the court also granted her 141,000 Fr as alimony. She appealed the case. The Court of Appeal of Cotonou (Chamber of Local Law) held that the adultery was not proven (based on rumor) and acknowledged the violence she suffered at the hands of her husband’s son. She was hence awarded 90,000 Fr in damages. Monsieur G.A. took the case to the Supreme Court. He claimed that his wife disobeyed him in refusing to follow him to a new place after he was transferred for work. He also withdrew his request for divorce and asked for his wife to return home with him. The Court relied on evidence that the husband presented himself: a letter where his mother-in-law asked him to stop his son from beating up her daughter and grandchildren. The Court held that in such a case custom rules allow the wife to leave the marital home. Moreover, the husband did not prove that he changed the conditions that drove her from their house. Consequently, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, ordered him to bear costs, and finalized the divorce.



Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Plaintiff was a transgender woman from Mexico who was subjected to sexual assault and rape by Mexican police and military throughout her life. In 2006, she was arrested in America for driving under the influence. In 2007 she was deported to Mexico. After suffering more mistreatment in Mexico, Avendano-Hernandez returned to the U.S. and appealed for asylum under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. She reentered the United States in May 2008 and was arrested three years later for violating the terms of probation imposed in her 2006 felony offense for failing to report to her probation office. Plaintiff applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture but the immigration judge denied her request for failing to show that the Mexican government would more likely than not consent to or acquiesce in her torture, which was confirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision with respect to the Convention Against Torture application because it was enough for Avendano-Hernandez to show that she was subject to torture at the hands of local officials. Additionally, the immigration judge relied on recent anti-discrimination legislation; however, the judge did not consider the legislation’s effectiveness. Therefore, Plaintiff should be given relief under the Convention Against Torture.



Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Washington Dept. of Corrections Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

Female prisoners in Washington prisons alleged sexual abuse by the prison guards. As a remedial remedy, the Department of Corrections designated 110 positions as female-only. These female-only positions include observing female prisoners in sensitive locations, such as showers, as well as performing pat downs. The union of correctional officers sued the Department for Title VII violations for sexual discrimination in employment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department. The Circuit Court affirmed citing sex as a bona fide occupational qualification for those positions given that sexual abuse is present in prisons and positions which require observing prisoners in sensitive areas or tasks can be performed by females only in order to protect female prisoners from abuse.



Supreme Court Decision 2013Do4279 Supreme Court of South Korea (2013)


Gender-based violence in general

Defendant was indicted for photographing a 14-year old girl’s breasts and genitals during video chats under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Violence Crimes (Taking Pictures by Using Camera, etc.). The court below found Defendant not guilty because the Victim took the video of herself, which the Defendant then saved to his computer against her will. Therefore, the court below ruled in favor of Defendant on the grounds that filming a video containing images of Victim's body, not her body itself, did not constitute a violation of the Act. The Court held that the judgment below was just and dismissed the appeal.



福建林某某、楼某某强制污辱妇女案,福建光泽县人民法院 (Fujian Province v. Lin, Lou) People’s Procuratorate of Guangzhe District Court (2013)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

In 2013, a teenage girl name Lin gathered two other girls to get revenge on another girl, C., at Guangze senior high school, Fujian Province, for insulting her. C. hid and so their plan for revenge was unsuccessful. Later that day, Lin asked someone else to take C. to a quiet neighborhood. Lin and her friend slapped C.'s face, broke her nose, pulled her hair, and made C. take off all her clothes. C. was too frightened to say no and took off all her clothes. Lin and her friend took pictures of the naked C. and shared the photos. Guangzhe District Court found that Lin and her friends assaulted the victim C. According to Article 237, Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, Lin and her friend were convicted of humiliating a woman with force and coercion. Lin was sentenced to two-years’ imprisonment, with a full suspension of the sentence. Lin’s friend, Lou, was sentenced to one-year jail time with a full suspension of the sentence. The court said that because both the defendants and the victim were under age of 18, and because the defendants were willing to cooperate with the police, tell the truth, and plead guilty, the court under Article 63, Article 67, Article 72, and Article 73 of Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China to give the two defendants a mitigated punishment of community service. The court demanded that the defendants delete all the naked photos of the victim. After the crime, the defendants’ families compensated the victim and the victim forgave the defendants.

性别歧视、性暴力、性骚扰

2013年,被告人林某某认为其被陈某某辱骂,纠集楼某某、 黄某某(均为未成年女性),到福建省光泽县某中学找该校学生陈某某(女, 未成年)欲行报复。因陈某某警觉躲藏,林某某等人寻找未果。当日晚, 林某某通过他人将陈某某约出并带到光泽县某超市后面的巷子里。

林某某与楼某某先后对被害人实施打耳光、拉扯头发等殴打行为,致使被害人鼻子流血, 并叫被害人“把衣服脱光”。陈某某因害怕哭泣而不敢反抗,遂将衣裤脱光。林某某与楼某某及在场的另二名女学生对被害人围观取笑。其间楼某 某使用手机对陈某某的裸体拍摄了十余张照片并将照片传送给他人。法院经审理认为,被告人楼某某、林某某伙同他人聚众以暴力方法强制侮辱妇女,根据中华人民共和国刑法第二百三十七条,其行为已构成强制侮辱妇女罪。法院院综合考虑被告人作案时均不满十八周岁,主动归案并如实供述犯罪事实,根据刑法第六十三、六十七、七十二和七十三条,决定依法对被告人减轻处罚并适用缓刑。以强制污辱妇女罪判处林某某有期徒刑二年,缓刑二年;判处楼某某有期徒刑一年,缓刑一年。 法院要求被告人删除被害人裸照。被告人家庭案发后积极赔偿并取得对方谅解。



Doe v. Hagenbeck United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (2015)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The plaintiff is a female former cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point, where she claimed that she was forced to resign after her third year due to rampant sexual hostility. In May 2010, she was raped while at West Point after she took sleeping pills and she also cites several other instances of sexual assault and harassment, claiming that members the Sexual Assault Review Board at West Point failed to punish the perpetrators. The District Court found that the plaintiff had properly stated an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, affording women the same protections under the law as men. The District Court also found that hearing the claim was not precluded by Feres Doctrine, which typically bars tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and constitutional claims against superior officers incident to military service, since the rape was not a service-related injury and hearing the claim would not compromise the legislative or executive functions of government, including the disciplinary role of the Executive Branch over the nation's military. Therefore, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.



Peilis Bin Sami (Appellant) v. Public Prosecutor (Respondent) Court of Appeal Sitting at Kota Kinabalu, Sabah (2012)


Gender-based violence in general

This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Kota Kinabalu that had affirmed the sentences imposed by the Sessions Court of Kota Kinabalu on the Appellant. At the Sessions Court, the Appellant was charged with the 3 counts of rape of a fifteen-year-old girl, and at the conclusion of the trial, the Sessions Court found him guilty of attempted rape on the first count; and guilty of the offences of rape on the remaining 2 counts. The Sessions Court sentenced him to 4 years’ imprisonment for the first charge, and 11 years’ imprisonment for the other charges, all of which were to run consecutively. The Appellant stated in his appeal, as mitigation factors, that the victim and the Appellant were lovers, and that the sexual acts were consensual, that the complainant at the time of the commission of the offenses was almost 16 years old, and that the complainant has had sexual experiences with other men previously. The Court of Appeal held that the punishment imposed by the Sessions Court was fair and commensurate with the seriousness of the offenses committed by the Appellant, and the sentences were affirmed. In addition, the Appellant’s statement that the victim and the Appellant were lovers, and that the sexual acts were consensual were not deemed as mitigating factors by the Court since the victim was a minor, and the Appellant was 25 years old. In addition, the Court of Appeal stated that the Appellant’s claim that the victim had sexual experiences with other men was mischievous, irrelevant to the case, and far from attracting the sympathy of the Court, and was viewed by the Court as a lack of remorse by the Appellant with respect to his crime.



Mrs. X v. Ministerio dell'interno Tribunale di Cagliari (2013)


Gender-based violence in general, Trafficking in persons

The applicant, a Nigerian-born woman, was granted refugee status based on the absence of protection for violence against women generally in Nigeria, as well as her specific experience with gender-based violence. In 2010, the applicant was, without her consent, taken to Libya where she was subject to forced prostitution and violent attacks that included removal of applicant’s nails and hair. The applicant was then transferred to Italy where she applied to the Territorial Commission for international protection. Her application was denied and she appealed to the Tribunal of Cagliari to overturn the Territorial Commission’s decision. The Tribunal of Cagliari found that the applicant’s subjective credibility should have been considered, along with the objective facts available regarding the dire situation for women in Nigeria, and that the Territorial Commission’s findings were invalid because her application for international protection was not translated to a language that she was able to understand.

La ricorrente, nata in Nigeria, ottenne lo status di rifugiato sulla base dell’assenza di protezione per la violenza contro le donne in Nigeria, nonché della propria esperienza con la violenza di genere. In particolare, nel 2010, la ricorrente è stata, senza il suo consenso, portata in Libia, dove è stata soggetta a prostituzione forzata e ad abusi violenti che comprendevano la rimozione di unghie e capelli. La ricorrente è stata quindi trasferita in Italia dove ha richiesto alla Commissione Territoriale la protezione internazionale. La sua domanda venne respinta e quindi presentava ricorso al Tribunale di Cagliari per ribaltare la decisione della Commissione Territoriale. Il Tribunale di Cagliari ha ritenuto che si dovesse prendere in considerazione la credibilità soggettiva della ricorrente, unitamente ai dati oggettivi disponibili in merito alla terribile situazione delle donne in Nigeria, e che le conclusioni della Commissione Territoriale non erano valide perché la domanda di protezione internazionale non era stata tradotta in una lingua che la ricorrente era in grado di comprendere.



Decision 2012Do14788 Supreme Court of South Korea (2013)


Gender-based violence in general

After threatening and assaulting the Victim (wife) with a deadly weapon, the Defendant (husband) had violent sexual intercourse with his wife after they had started using separate rooms due to consistent dispute.” The Supreme Court found that the term ‘female’ as the victim of rape as provided by Article 297 of the Criminal Act included the offender’s legally wedded wife and that the crime of rape was established when the husband had sexual intercourse with his wife by disabling or hindering resistance through violence or intimidation in a sustained marriage. The Supreme Court stated that the legal interests protected by rape laws are not ‘women’s fidelity’ or ‘sexual chastity’ concepts based on the premise of a man as a current or future spouse, but a woman’s own sexual autonomy as a free and independent individual. Therefore, the Court concluded that the crime of rape was established in this forced marital sex case.



Somiso Mbhamali v. Rex Supreme Court of Swaziland (2013)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

Appellant was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for the murder of his elderly aunt and appealed for 10 years of his sentence to be suspended because the appellant believed the victim was a witch and could kill him with the power of witchcraft. The Supreme Court upheld the original sentence and held that a perpetrator’s belief in witchcraft is not a mitigating factor when computing an appropriate sentence for murder. While a genuine belief in witchcraft could be treated as an extenuating circumstance in certain instances, murder committed because of a belief in witchcraft would not be mitigated by the belief.



Supreme Court Decision 2009Do3580 Supreme Court of South Korea (2009)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The Victim, born a male, identified as a female while growing up and was diagnosed with gender identity disorder. At the age of twenty-four, the Victim underwent a sex-change operation and was diagnosed as a transsexual by a psychiatrist. The Victim had cohabited with a male for ten years and had lived as a female for the past thirty years after the operation. Under Korean law, the victim of the crime of rape must be female. Thus, the central issue of the case pertained to the appropriate standard in determining the legal gender of a rape victim. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Victim was a female under the law. In making this decision, the court noted that it must conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the biological, psychological and social factors, rather than merely relying on biology. Thus, in determining an individual’s gender, the Supreme Court noted that lower courts must consider the individual’s own sense of identity, including an individual’s behavior, attitude and characteristics. Additionally, courts must look to factors such as the individual’s discomfort regarding his or her biologically assigned gender, the individual’s sense of belonging and identity, whether the individual wants to obtain the genitals and other sexual characteristics of the opposite sex, whether a psychiatrist has diagnosed the individual as having transsexualism and whether the individual has received psychiatric treatment and hormone therapy, which failed to cure such symptoms. Lastly, courts must look at factors such as whether the individual has adapted to the opposite sex mentally and socially, has undergone sex reassignment surgery, identifies with such gender, wears the clothes and carries him or herself as the opposite sex, and whether others accept the changed gender. In this case, the Victim identified herself as a female and did not associate herself as a male, underwent a sex-change operation, and lived her life as a female for over thirty years after the operation. Thus, the court concluded the Victim was a female, and a rape was committed with knowledge that the Victim was a female.



Furaha Michael v. The Republic Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The appellant was charged and convicted of rape. He was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment and ordered to pay compensation to the victim of shillings 300,000 upon completion of his sentence. His first appeal was unsuccessful, so he appealed a second time, claiming that he was not properly identified, breach of criminal procedure and the fact that the court did not allow him to call a defence witness. The Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the conviction. It applied and followed the case of Selemani Makumba versus R Criminal Appeal, Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mbeya 1999 (unreported). The Appellate Court considered whether or not the complainant had been raped by the appellant and concludes that “True evidence of rape has to come from the victim, if an adult, that there was penetration and no consent, and in the case of any other woman where consent is irrelevant, that there was penetration...”



Seif Mohamed El-Abadan V. The Republic Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Tanga (2009)


Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general

The victim was raped by a doctor on 14 November 2006 at Magunga Hospital in Korogwe District. The appeal asserted that the witness in the trail was not credible. The appellate Court concluded that it was unable to “find a ground for denting the credibility of the complainant” and “not having found any contradictions in the evidence of PW1, the victim of the sexual assault by her doctor, the appellant” . The Court recognises sextortion and goes on to say: “We agree with the learned judge that ‘ it is treacherous for one to stray away from a professional calling and turn against one amongst the very lot who bestowed their trust unto the person.’ In this case, it was treacherous for the appellant doctor to rape his patient, PW1.”



Mandla Mlondlozi Mendlula v. Rex Supreme Court of Swaziland (2013)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

Appellant was convicted of murdering his girlfriend and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Appellant appealed that the sentence was too harsh and severe and that it induced a sense of shock. Appellant presented mitigating factors that he was married with four minor children to support, the sole breadwinner, a first offender, and deserved to be given a second chance in life. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after considering the interest of society, the seriousness of the offense, the fact that the crime was premeditated, and the fact that the killing was gruesome and brutal. The Supreme Court further stated that sentence was fair “particularly in the upsurge in the killing of women as well as the need to impose deterrent sentences which would provide the safeguard against this onslaught.”



Croome v. Tasmania High Court of Australia (1997)


Gender-based violence in general

The plaintiffs challenged sections of the Tasmanian Criminal Code criminalizing homosexual conduct. The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged sections violated provisions of the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act of 1994. The case revolved around whether the plaintiffs brought the action prematurely (i.e., whether the plaintiffs had “sufficient interest” to bring the action before the Court). The Court held that the case was “not to be denied at the threshold” and that the plaintiff’s claim was neither “abstract nor hypothetical.” The fact “that the plaintiffs “faced possible criminal prosecution”’ sufficed as a “sufficient interest” in the case.



Public Prosecutor v. Billy Metussin High Court of Brunei (1993)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The defendant pleaded not guilty to one charge of attempted rape of an 11 years and 10 months old female, under section 376(1) of the Penal Code. The court found that the complainant gave different versions as to the events that occurred. It found the complainant’s evidence unreliable. The court concluded that the complainant was the initiator of the events that led to the attempted intercourse. The court found that there was an attempt at sexual intercourse. In view of medical evidence that revealed that the hymen was intact and that ejaculation may have occurred outside the complainant, the court found doubt as to whether penetration occurred. The court highlighted that consent was not a defense to rape as the complainant was under the age of 14 at the time at issue. Nonetheless, consent becomes relevant to punishment, as a minimum sentence is prescribed for rape which occurs “without the consent of the victim”. The court found that the complainant gave her consent to the defendant’s attempt to have sexual intercourse with her and that she gave a real consent, not vitiated by immaturity or by any of the other factors specified in section 90 P.C. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and imposed sentences of one year imprisonment and three strokes.



Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Tamin Bin HJ Ahmad Intermediate Court of Brunei (1995)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

The defendant pleaded not guilty to three charges consisting of (i) attempted rape, under section 376 of the Penal Code, (ii) causing harm, under section 323 of the Penal Code, and (iii) theft of personal property, under section 379 of the Penal Code. The court found the complainant credible, and her version of the events consistent with a note she wrote shortly after the incident and her evidence in court, despite minor discrepancies and details left out in the note. On the contrary, the court found the defendant’s version far-fetched and unacceptable. Corroborating evidence for the complainant included her distressed condition as observed by a witness immediately after the incident, her note, the injuries a doctor found on her and the discovery of her torn underwear on the road-side. The court found that the defendant made an effort to have sexual intercourse with the complainant against her will and without her consent. The court convicted the defendant of (i) attempted rape, with a sentence of six years imprisonment and four strokes, (ii) causing hurt, with a sentence of one month imprisonment and (iii) theft, with a sentence of three months imprisonment. The sentences were to run concurrently.



Bheki Amos Mkhaliphi v. Rex High Court of Swaziland (2013)


Gender-based violence in general

Appellant convicted of murdering a woman and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. Appellant appealed the verdict and sentence, claiming that he did not possess the requisite intent to kill and mitigating circumstances that he was 35-years old, a first offender, gainfully employed and a breadwinner supporting two children should reduce his sentence. The High Court dismissed his appeal finding that the stab wounds to the victim demonstrated intent to kill and that the mitigating circumstances were properly weighed when the sentence was determined. The Court further stated, “Violence against women is a matter of great concern to the community at large and sentences imposed on perpetrators should reflect its rightful indignation at such crimes.”



Decision No. 1028 k/PID SUS/2009 Supreme Court of Indonesia (2009)


Gender-based violence in general, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

The defendant paid his friend to bring the victim, a 14-year-old child, to defendant’s café under the pretext of attending a birthday party. After defendant’s friend abandoned the victim at the café, the defendant told the victim to work as a server but also forced her to have sex with the male clients and kept all payments received for the victim’s services. Because the defendant used fraud to bring the victim to the café and exploited the victim by forcing her to act as a sex worker for profit, the Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty of human trafficking under section 2(1) of Law No. 21 of 2007 and sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment with a fine of Rp. 120,000,000. The High Court upheld the lower court’s decision but amended the defendant’s sentence to seven years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the High Court’s sentence of seven years was an error since the court did not consider that the victim had stayed with the defendant’s friend before coming to the café and therefore the health and condition of the victim may have worsened before coming to the defendant. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and did not rule on the sentencing since it was a “judex facti matter (question of fact of the case)”.



Cruz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) Immigration and Refugee Board (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

This case concerns an application for review of a decision made by the Immigration and Refugee Board, which had determined a family applying for protection, a mother and two minor children, did not have a “well-founded fear of persecution” and were not persons in need of protection. The family expressed fear of domestic violence upon a return to Mexico. During appeal, the Federal Court held that the Immigration and Refugee Board was in error “when it determined that state protection was available to the minor Applicants in Mexico.” The Court noted that the children’s individual circumstances and fear were not properly assessed and ought to have been taken into consideration by the Board: specifically, “[t]he evidence adduced with respect to the situation of each individual child should have triggered separate analyses of risk.” Furthermore, the Court noted that the Board should have considered “the ability of the Mexican state to protect these children” as individuals. The application for review was allowed to proceed.



Expediente 12-0001488-0396-PE Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal. Segundo Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Santa Cruz (2013)


Gender-based violence in general

The public ministry is appealing a previous ruling, which found the defendant not guilty of violating an order or protection that prohibited the defendant from, among other things, nearing or entering the home, place of work or place of study of the complainant. Police found the defendant approximately one or two meters from the complainant’s home, armed with a knife. He had broken down the front door and forcibly entered the home. The judge in the previous ruling found the defendant not guilty of violating the order of protection because the facts alleged by the public ministry had not been sufficiently demonstrated. The court also found that the protective order was vague (e.g., what does “near” the house mean?) and that it had not been demonstrated that the defendant was at the victim’s home without her consent. The victim declined to testify. This court overturns the ruling and remands the case to the lower court. The judge found that the investigation was deficient and the public investigators should have looked to other evidence notwithstanding the victim’s refusal to testify), including the fact that the victim called authorities for help and that the door to the house had been broken. The principle of reasonableness should govern, and here, there was clearly a violation of the intent of the protective order. The judge notes that while protective orders do limit rights of the individual subject to the order, their purpose is to provide equal rights to the protected individual. These limitations on the accused’s rights, while important, are less important than the ultimate goal of protecting the other person(s). The goal of public officials should be to provide tools to individuals so that they can enjoy their constitutional and human rights, including equality. In examining these cases, judges should look at the core purpose of the protective order and determine whether the order has been violated, and here, the facts were sufficient to show such a violation. In his discussion, the judge cites the Intra-American Convention to Prevent Violence Against Women, which requires that states take all appropriate measures with respect to legislation, judicial practices and common law in order to prevent violence against women and to establish judicial and administrative procedures for this purpose.

El Ministerio Público inicia esta apelación a una orden de la corte inferior la cual declaró al acusado “no culpable” de violar una Orden que le prohibía estar cerca o entrar a la casa, centro de trabajo, o de estudio, de la litigante. La policia encontró al acusado a unos 2 metros de la casa de la víctima y armado con un cuchillo. El había forzado la puerta del frente y se había adentrado en el hogar. El juez de la corte inferior encontró que estos actos no sumaban a culpabilidad por las siguientes razones: (1) la evidencia no fue específicamente demostrada; (2) la redacción de la Orden se determinó “vaga” porque no especificaba los metros de distancia que no eran permitidos, incluyendo la frase poco específica “cerca de la casa;” (3) no se demostró que el acusado estaba adentro de la casa sin el consentimiento de la litigante; y (4) la litigante se negó a testificar frente a la corte. Nosotros anulamos dichas conclusiones y remendamos el caso en busca de más evidencia. La investigación fue deficiente desde el inicio. Los investigadores públicos debieron haber buscado y presentado mas información—por ejemplo el hecho de que la víctima llamó a la policia diciendo que alguien había forzado la puerta del frente. El principio legal de justicia gobierna este caso. Aunque la Orden no incluya palabras especificas y en efecto limite los derechos del acusado, la conclusión de la corte inferior viola su intento. El propósito de esas órdenes es proveer derechos al protegido. Por lo tanto, cualquier limitación en los derechos del acusado resultan inferiores al objetivo principal protector. La meta de los oficiales públicos debe concentrarse en asegurar que todos los individuos disfruten sus derechos constitucionales, incluyendo la igualdad. Cuando casos similares se presentan ante la corte, los jueces deben concentrarse en analizar el objetivo principal de la Orden protectora. Entonces, en vista a ese hallazgo, determinar si ha sido violada. En este caso hay hechos suficientes demostrando tal violación. En la discusión mencionada, el juez cita datos de la Convención Intro-Americana para prevenir la violencia contra la mujer (Intra-American Convention to Prevent Violence Against Women). Esta Convención require que los estados, tomen toda medida posible con respecto a la legislatura, prácticas judiciales, y ley escrita en vistas a prevenir cualquier violencia contra las mujeres y además establecer los procedimientos judiciales y administrativos pertinentes en vistas a lograr este propósito.



Sentencia núm. 7262/2008 High Court of Cataluña, Labour Chamber (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Mrs. Yolanda was dismissed from her job post when she was in a situation of temporary incapacity as a consequence of an anxiety disorder due to physical abuse carried out by her husband. The company alleges that during the period of temporary incapacity due to anxiety disorder, Mrs. Yolanda carried out a normal life. This situation may be a cause of dismissal for normal workers, but not when the worker is a victim of gender abuse. Mrs. Yolanda was in a situation of temporary incapacity determined by the Spanish health services. The High Court of Catalonia decided that as Mrs. Yolanda was in a situation of temporary incapacity determined by the health services due to gender based violence she had to be readmitted in her job.

La Sra. Yolanda fue despedida de su puesto de trabajo cuando se encontraba en una situación de incapacidad temporal como consecuencia de un trastorno de ansiedad debido a los abusos físicos cometidos por su esposo. La compañía alega que durante el período de incapacidad temporal debido a un trastorno de ansiedad, la Sra. Yolanda llevó a cabo una vida normal. Esta situación puede ser causa de despido para los trabajadores normales, pero no cuando el trabajador es víctima de abuso de género. La señora Yolanda se encontraba en una situación de incapacidad temporal determinada por los servicios de salud españoles. El Tribunal Superior de Cataluña decidió que, dado que la Sra. Yolanda se encontraba en una situación de incapacidad temporal determinada por los servicios de salud debido a la violencia de género, tuvo que ser readmitida en su trabajo.



HKSAR v. Lau Chung-tim High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of First Instance (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of throwing corrosive fluid with intent to do grievous bodily harm, in contravention of section 29(c) of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, Cap 212. The corrosive fluid thrown was sulphuric acid, concentrated at 87%. Sulphuric acid at that concentration is highly corrosive and capable of causing severe burns to the skin and permanent damage to the eyes. His victims were his estranged wife and his 21-year-old son. At the time of the incident, Defendant was 65 and he was in the process of divorce, living apart from his estranged wife. Defendant returned to the marital home and became emotional, taking a knife and threatening his soon to be ex-wife. When his son, the second victim, saw what was occurring, he stood in front of his mother to protect her. Defendant opened a bottle of liquid and poured it on his estranged wife’s chest. The liquid also splashed onto his son. Because his wife was wearing only a nightgown and his son only underwear, both were burned. The victims rushed to the bathroom to attempt to wash off the liquid. They locked the door and called for help, but Defendant kicked the door in, causing a subsequent struggle. After the situation ended, the victims were taken to a hospital, where it was determined that Defendant’s estranged wife suffered 38% body burns and the son suffered 25% surface burns. The Court noted that “[acid throwing] is a very serious offence of a type which sadly occurs far too often in Hong Kong. . . . The offender aims to punish the victim for the emotional damage and to ensure that the victim is disfigured or incapacitated. The defendant here was intent on punishing the first victim for proceeding with the divorce.” The maximum penalty for acid throwing is life imprisonment. In this case, the judge passed down a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.



SIS Forum (Malaysia) v Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid bin Syed Jaafar Albar High Court (Kuala Lumpur) (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

SIS Forum (Malaysia) (“SIS Forum”) sought judicial review of the Minister of Home Affairs’ (“Minister”) decision to ban a book published by it, “Muslim Women and the Challenges of Islamic Extremism”. The book was a compilation of essays submitted during an international roundtable discussing challenges faced by Muslim women, including gender discrimination. The book was in circulation for two years before it was banned by the Minister for violating the Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No 5) Order 2008 (the “Act”). The Act prohibits publication of materials which are “prejudicial to public order”, among other things, and affords the Minister an absolute discretion to prohibit publication of any material contravening the Act. The High Court found that the Minister was unable to provide examples of how the book implicated public order issues by affecting public safety and tranquility of the community. Moreover, the book had been in circulation for 2 years and had not adversely impacted the safety and tranquility of the public. Accordingly, the High Court granted judicial review application for substantive relief to SIS Forum.



Hercules P. Guzman v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. Supreme Court of Philippines (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The respondent, a law student, filed an administrative complaint for harassment against the petitioner, her professor, alleging that she was given a poor final grade because he wanted to go on a date with her. A school committee found that the petitioner improperly conducted school-related activities outside school premises, indicative of sexually motivated intentions, in violation of the respondent’s policy of providing its students with an environment free from sexual harassment. The NLRC affirmed, declaring a one year suspension from the University. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that his constitutional right to due process was violated, finding that in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, to explain one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and that the petitioner had been afforded that opportunity.



Pollawat Suntornwuttigrai v. Toyota Leasing (Thailand), Co. Ltd. (No. 1372/2545) Supreme Court of Thailand (2002)


Gender-based violence in general

The plaintiff was working as an employee of the defendant and had the power to evaluate whether or not probation employees will be working full-time after the probation period. The plaintiff abused that power by asking his subordinate female employees out and if they did not comply the plaintiff would evaluate such female employees in a negative way. The plaintiff also abused its power by asking out applicants who apply for positions with the defendant during the period of time the defendant has to make decisions whether or not the applicants get the positions. The defendant therefore dismissed the plaintiff, which the plaintiff claimed was an unfair dismissal. The Court held that such actions of the plaintiff constitute sexual harassment. Not only do they contradict public morals and customs which are violations of the plaintiff’s obligations regarding the defendant’s rules and regulations, they were affecting the defendant’s personnel management and growth of business by reducing the morale of female employees who refused and were harassed by the plaintiff. The violations of the plaintiff’s obligations regarding the defendant’s rules and regulations were serious. The defendant had the right to dismiss the plaintiff without having to offer the plaintiff a severance pay according to section 119(4) of the Labor Protection Act, B.E. 2541, or pay in lieu of notice, according to section 583 of the Civil and Commercial Code.



Phillips v. The Queen High Court of Australia (2006)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

This appeal was based on the contention that there had been a wrong decision on a question of law concerning the admissibility of evidence in a sexual assault case. The appellant, Phillips, was convicted on several counts of rape and unlawful carnal knowledge and on one count of assault with intent to commit rape. The counts involved multiple teenage victims. Similarities existed across the victim’s stories and evidence was admitted concerning each victim. The Criminal Code stated that "an indictment must charge 1 offence only and not 2 or more offences," also stating that “Charges for more than 1 indictable offence may be joined in the same indictment against the same person if those charges are founded on the same facts or are, or form part of, a series of offences of the same or similar character or a series of offences committed in the prosecution of a single purpose." The appellant contended that the offenses did not reflect “offences of the same or similar character,” arguing that trial of the eight charges at once had been unduly prejudicial to his case. The High Court held that “prejudice to the fair trial of the appellant was substantial” and made a formal order for retrial.



PGA v. The Queen High Court of Australia (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

This case concerns charges of assault and rape brought against a husband, the appellant, for the rape of his wife in 1963. In an appeal to the High Court, the appellant sought immunity for the rape of his wife, arguing that marital rape was not illegal at the time the events took place. The appellant argued that his wife gave irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse upon their marriage in 1962 pursuant to the era’s common law. The Court considered existing laws and writings from the time period in question, questioning whether the aforementioned immunity ever actually existed and ultimately deciding that “if it did, it had ceased to do so sometime before 1963.” On the basis of this analysis, the Court dismissed the appeal.



SVFB v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs Federal Court of Australia (2004)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

A citizen of Nigeria sought protection for fear that she would be subject to female genital mutilation. The Refugee Review Tribunal found that female genital mutilation constitutes serious harm amounting to persecution, but that on the facts, there was no real risk that the applicant would be subjected to female genital mutilation.



VWFG v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Federal Court of Australia (2005)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

A citizen of Ghana sought protection for fear that she would be subject to arranged marriage and female genital mutilation. The Refugee Review Tribunal found the applicant to be not credible, in part because she could not identify the ethnic group that the proposed husband came from. The court found these factual conclusions satisfactory and affirmed.



Weheliye v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs Federal Court of Australia (2001)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

A citizen of Somalia sought a protection order on the basis that she feared persecution due to her status as young, a Somali and a woman. The application asserted that she had been sentenced to death by stoning for adultery in Somalia. The Refugee Review Tribunal denied the application, finding the applicant not credible and holding that neither married nor divorced Somalia women constituted a protected group. The court held that the Tribunal erred because it did not examine whether the law against adultery was applied and administered in Somalia in a discriminatory manner.



SZEGN v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Federal Court of Australia (2006)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

A citizen of Fiji sought an extension of time to appeal a decision by a Federal Court Magistrate who affirmed a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal to deny a protection visa. She alleged that she had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Fiji as a person who had been subjected to domestic violence by her former husband and as a member of the social group of “women at risk in Fiji.” The Tribunal found that while women had historically been at risk in Fiji, recent police forms and judgments suggested that she no longer had a reasonable fear of persecution. On appeal, she alleged that the Tribunal failed to provide her with a copy of certain country information as required by Australian law. The court found that the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the applicant was a member of a protected social group but did not accept that there was a lack of state protection. The court further found that the Tribunal adequately laid out the bases for its decision and that it did not rely on the material not provided to the applicant.



Jesus C. Garcia v. The Honorable Ray Alan T. Drilon, et al. Supreme Court of Philippines (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The plaintiff successfully sought a Temporary Protection Order against her husband under Republic Act No. 9626 Against Women and Their Children. The husband appealed, claiming the Act to be unconstitutional and the order therefore invalid because the Act favored women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The Supreme Court held that the Act was valid, highlighting the unequal power relationship between women and men; that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women, which all make for real differences justifying the law.



People of the Philippines v. Edgar Jumawan Supreme Court of Philippines (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The appellant was convicted on two counts of marital rape. On appeal, the appellant argued that marital rape was not the equivalent of non-marital rape. This was the first documented case on marital rape to reach the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s argument as essentially an attempt to revive old and now rejected standards that a husband could not be convicted of marital rape because of the “implied consent” of his wife. It found that under modern jurisprudence, the appellant’s argument would deny spouses equal protection under the constitution and that the elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.



Claimant (on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children) v. the Minister for Immigration and Asylum District Court of the Hague (2010)


Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

The claimant, of Tajik descent, had a high school diploma, was an active member of a left-leaning political organization, and was a volunteer teacher for girls while she lived in Afghanistan. The Taliban arrested a friend of the claimant who worked for UNICEF and had also pressured the claimant’s family to provide details about her whereabouts. Once the Taliban occupied her village, she and her husband hid with a relative before traveling to the Netherlands. In 2008, the claimant filed an application on behalf of herself and her minor children (two daughters and a son) under the Aliens Act 2000, citing Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The claimant argued that they were subject to inhumane treatment if they were forced to return to Afghanistan. The District Court noted that the policy relied upon did not take into account the situation of Westernized women in Afghanistan, who were at risk just having lived in Westernized society. The District Court noted that the evidence showed that not only was security a risk to all in Afghanistan, but that treatment of women and girls had deteriorated even further since the rejection of the 2003 application. Finally, the District Court referred to reports submitted in the case, noting that women returning to Afghanistan from Europe or Iran are perceived as having violated religious and social norms and, as a result, are subject to honor crimes, domestic violence, isolation and other forms of punishment. The District Court found the claimant’s appeal to be well-founded, destroyed the contested decision, and ordered the government to issue a decision taking the District Court’s findings into consideration.



Claimant v. the Minister of Justice District Court of the Hague (2010)


Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The claimant was born in Somalia and left the country when her home was destroyed and four men attempted to rape her. The claimant sought residence in the Netherlands as a refugee under Immigration Act 2000. She argued that women in Central and Southern Somalia were systematically exposed to inhuman treatment. The claimant submitted reports that abuse and rape of women, by civilians and armed groups, was frequent, and that displaced women were particularly vulnerable during their flight. Gang rape was widespread, and victims (including young girls and boys) were selected at random. Further, rape is almost never prosecuted and the victims are discriminated against because they are seen as “unclean.” The report further stated that women in Somalia do not have access to justice and receive no protection from authorities. Human Rights Watch and UN reports also described women as suffering the brunt of abuse and repression cultivated by al-Shabaab’s decrees, including forced marriage, female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and gender-based violence. The District Court opined that women are in a vulnerable position in Central and Southern Somalia and, therefore, run the risk of suffering violence and human rights violations, and cannot obtain effective protection. They are therefore a group worthy of protection from inhuman treatment and torture.



Claimants (on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children) v. the Secretary of State for Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service District Court of the Hague (2010)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Honor crimes (or honour crimes), Sexual violence and rape

The claimants, on behalf of themselves and their two minor daughters, sought residence permits under the Aliens Act 2000. The claimants stated that if they returned to Afghanistan, the mother and daughters would be subjected to inhuman treatment under Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights. The claimants noted that women were systematically disadvantaged and discriminated against in Afghanistan. Women were subject to violence throughout the country, including the claimants’ area of origin, and had no protection from the government (if they even had the opportunity of access to the courts). Women suffer domestic violence, sexual violence, honor crimes, and arranged marriage. Women do not have the same rights as men (even though the constitution states that men and women are equal), are seen as property, and have little to no access to education or health care. The District Court found the mother’s and daughters’ appeals well-founded and ordered the government to consider the applications.



Constitucionalidade da Lei Maria da Penha (ADC 19 e ADI 4424) (Constitutionality of Lei Maria da Penha (Federal Domestic Violence Law) Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

Following a request to Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) by then-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the STF reviewed and upheld the constitutionality of the Lei Maria da Penha (“LMP”). The LMP is Brazil’s first law to address the problem of domestic violence against women on a national scale. The law’s provision for the creation of special courts, as well as the law’s differentiated protection of women, had come under scrutiny in many of Brazil’s lower courts as unconstitutional. The STF, however, has previously held that those articles were constitutional. President Silva argued that the LMP was constitutional due to Article 226, § 8 of the Federal Constitution, and Brazil’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women. The Justices agreed that the LMP does not create a law of unequal treatment between men and women, but addresses the reality of longstanding discrimination and aggression directed at women, and offers substantive mechanisms to promote equality without infringing on the rights of males. The Court also found that the provision of specialized courts is constitutional and not in conflict with state control of the local courts. Finally, with a majority vote of 10-1, the Justices held that the office of the public prosecutor can prosecute domestic violence cases even when the victim fails to appear or file a complaint against her aggressor. The majority reasoned that state intervention is necessary to guarantee the victim’s protection from the risk of ongoing violence, which may be aggravated by the victim appearing in the action against her aggressor.

O Presidente do Brasil em 2012, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, ajuizou pedido de revisão da constitucionalidade da Lei Maria da Penha (LMP) ao Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, sob a ótica do tratamento diferenciado conferido pela Lei aos homens e as mulheres. Em breve retrospecto, a LMP é o primeiro dispositivo legal enderençando o problema da violência doméstica sofrida pelas mulheres em nível nacional. Em razão da referida lei prever a instituição de Juizados Especiais de violência doméstica e familiar contra a mulher, bem como diferenciar a proteção conferida às mulheres vítima de violência doméstica, diversas varas de primeira instância passaram a julgar os dispositivos das leis como inconstitucionais, muito embora o STF já tivesse firmado entendimento pela constitucionalidade da LMP. No pedido encaminhado pelo então presidente Lula argumentou que o parágrafo 8º do artigo 226 da Constituição Federal (o qual prevê que o Estado assegurará a assistência à família na pessoa de cada um dos que a integram, criando mecanismos para coibir a violência no âmbito de suas relações), bem como a ratificação do Brasil a Convenção sobre a Eliminação de todas as Formas de Discriminação contra a Mulher (CEDAW) e a Convenção Interamericana para Prevenir, Punir e Erradicar a Violência contra a Mulher garantiriam a constitucionalidade da LMP. Os Ministros do STF, quando da análise do assunto, entenderam a LMP não criou tratamento desigual em relação aos homens e mulheres, tendo endereçado apenas os problemas de discriminação e agressões dirigidas às mulheres, oferecendo, portanto, mecanismos de proteção que auxiliam na promoção da igualdade, sem retirar qualquer direito dos homens. O STF entendeu ainda que as provisões relativas à criação de Juizados Especiais são constitucionais, não havendo conflitos entre o controle jurisdicional estadual e local. Finalmente, a maioria dos Ministros (10-1) entendeu que as Promotorias Públicas têm competência para denunciar casos de violência doméstica, a inda que a vítima desista de aparecer em juízo ou prosseguir com a denúncia contra o agressor. A maioria justificou que a intervenção estatal se faz necessária para a garantia de proteção à vítima em razão do risco iminente de violência, a qual poderia ser agravada caso a vítima denunciasse seu agressor.



Case Number E.2005/151, K. 2008/37 Constitutional Court of Turkey (2008)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

The Constitutional Court held that a provision in the Turkish Penal Code that increases the penalty by half for the crime of laceration if committed against family members is constitutional. Although such a penalty treats family members differently than non-family members, the Court found that such differential treatment did not violate the equality principle under the Turkish Constitution. Under the equality principle, criminals who have committed the same offence may not be subject to the same penalty if they have different legal statuses. Here, the Court found that the Turkish Legislature, through the Turkish Penal Code, expressed a preference for family members, giving family members a different legal status and thus the provision did not violate the equality principle. In reaching its decision, the Court also noted that Turkey has taken “extensive legal and administrative measures” to prevent and reduce domestic violence in Turkey. Because the state must protect family members from danger and family members have a different legal status, the Court found that the provision increasing the term of imprisonment and fine for laceration against a family member is constitutional.



Case Number E.1999/35, K.2002/104 Constitutional Court of Turkey (2002)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

The Constitutional Court found that the legislature could take necessary measures to reduce violence within families. Articles 1.1 of the Law on the Protection of the Family allows judges to take measures against one spouse, not both, and not against the children or members of the family, if a spouse has subjected another family member to domestic violence. The Gulyaly Peace Court found that because the Articles did not provide for an injunction or penalty if a child committed a violent act, rather than a spouse or parent, the Articles violated the principle of equality. Relying on Article 41 of the Turkish Constitution, which focuses on the family as the foundation of Turkish Society and gives the legislature the power to protect the family unit, the Constitutional Court found that Article 1.1 does not violate the Constitution because it protects the family unit and ensures peace within a family unit. The Court also found that the provision did not violate the Turkish equality principle, because the legal status of spouses differs from that of other family members and just cause exists to treat such groups differently.



R. v. J.A Supreme Court of Canada (2011)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

This appeal involved the interpretation of “consent” under the sexual assault provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada in its seminal decision in 1999 in R. v. Ewanchuk unanimously confirmed that consent to sexual activity must be active, voluntary and revocable, meaning that a woman can say “no” at any time. Further, the Supreme Court in Ewanchuk held that consent cannot be implied, whether from a complainant’s dress or the fact that she said “yes” on an earlier occasion. R. v. J.A. involved a woman who reported that she was sexually assaulted by her common-law spouse where the accused strangled the complainant into unconsciousness. When the complainant awoke, she found herself bound and being anally penetrated. The accused argued that the complainant consented “in advance” to the strangulation and anal penetration that took place while she was unconscious. In its judgment, the Supreme Court held that “an individual must be conscious throughout the sexual activity in order to provide the requisite consent” and that “the definition of consent…, requires the complainant to provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an unconscious person to satisfy the requirement.”



S. v. Abraham Alfeus High Court of Namibia. Main Division, Windhoek (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

Abraham Alfeus was convicted of murder with direct intent after admitting to shooting his intimate partner twice with a shotgun. The presiding judge, Naomi Shivute, read the ruling citing provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, Act 4 of 2003 and sentenced Alfeus to 30 years in prison. In the ruling Shivute stressed a need for stiffer sentences in response to extremely high levels of domestic violence against women and children in Namibia; including that it was a matter of protecting the constitutional right for human dignity, the rights of the victim, and in the interest of society generally. The judge’s ruling was meant to deter future domestic violence offenders and is an important precedent in Namibia where domestic violence runs rampant but is rarely prosecuted.



Jan Oompie Kolea v. The State Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (Hoogste Hof van Appèl van Suid Afrika) (2012)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The appellant was convicted of repeatedly raping a woman with another man and sentenced to 15 years in prison under s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the Act). When the appellant appealed the ruling and the sentence it was found that his conviction should in fact be read under s 51(1) of the Act which imposes a minimum sentence of life in prison when the victim was raped more than once by more than one person. He was duly sentenced to life in prison and his appeal was dismissed. This case broke a previous trend of judges neglecting to impose life sentences under s 51(1), instead giving lighter sentences under s 51(2) even in the case of multiple rapes. The real threat of life imprisonment is a crucial precedent to set in South Africa, where rape is common and often overlooked or punished with leniency.

Mnr. Kolea is skuldig bevind dat hy herhaaldelik 'n vrou met 'n ander man verkrag het en vir 15 jaar in die tronk onder s 51(2) van die Wet op Strafreg 105 van 1997 (die Wet) gevonnis is. Toe Mnr. Kolea die beslissing en die vonnis appelleer is daar bevind dat sy skuldigbevinding in werklikheid gelees moet word onder s 51(1) van die Wet wat 'n minimum vonnis van die lewenslange tronkstraf opgelê het toe die slagoffer meer as een keer verkrag is deur meer as een persoon. Kolea is behoorlik gevonnis tot lewenslange tronkstraf en sy appèl is geweier. Hierdie saak het 'n vorige tendens van regters gebreek om lewenslange vonnisse te verwaarloos onder s 51 (1), en in plaas daarvan ligter vonisse onder s 51 (2) te gee, selfs in die geval van meervoudige verkragtings. Die werklike bedreiging van die lewenslange gevangenisstraf is 'n deurslaggewende presedent wat in Suid-Afrika voorgetstel word, waar verkragting algemeen voorkom en dikwels misken word.



Minister of Safety and Security v. Katise Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (Hoogste Hof van Appèl van Suid Afrika) (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general

Mr. Katise was arrested when police were called to his home and found that he had attacked his wife. Charges for domestic violence under South Africa’s Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 were eventually repealed and after suing for unlawful arrest and detention on the grounds that there was no warrant for his arrest, Mr. Katise was awarded damages. In an appeal, the judge overturned this ruling, citing s 40(1)(q) of the Criminal Procedure Act which allows peace officers to arrest anyone reasonably suspected of violating the Domestic Violence Act of 1998. The judge in this case took an important stand against leniency on domestic violence cases, giving peace officers far more latitude to protect the rights of women and furthering the protection of women’s rights in South Africa, a country marred by sexual violence.

Mnr. Katise is gearresteer toe die polisie na sy huis geroep is en gevind het dat hy sy vrou aangeval het. Klagtes vir huishoudelike geweld onder Suid-Afrika se Wet op Huishoudelike Geweld 116 van 1998 is uiteindelik herroep nadat hy gedagvaar het vir onregmatige arrestasie en aanhouding op grond daarvan dat daar geen lasbrief vir sy inhegtenisneming was nie, is Mnr. Katiseer skadevergoeding toegeken. In 'n appèl het die regter hierdie beslissing omgekeer, met verwysing na 40(1)(q) van die Strafproseswet wat toelaat dat vredebeamptes enige iemand wat redelikerwys verdink word van die oortreding van die Wet op Huishoudelike Geweld van 1998 gearresteer mag word. Die regter het in hierdie geval 'n belangrike standpunt ingeneem teen die toegeeflikheid van sake rakende gesinsgeweld, wat vredebeamptes baie meer ruimte gee om die regte van vroue te beskerm en die beskerming van vroue se regte in Suid-Afrika te bevorder, in 'n land wat deur seksuele geweld gekenmerk word.



Matter of S., R. A., E. O. A. y A., R. A. Buenos Aires Supreme Court (2006)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

In this case, a defendant who had been sentenced to twenty five years for kidnapping, among other crimes, appealed his conviction, contending that he had committed lesser kidnapping (plagio) instead of the more serious crime of premeditated kidnapping (rapto) of which he was convicted. The court decided to uphold his conviction, despite the fact that there was only coercion involved. The “lessening of sexual integrity” against the will of the victims made the defendant guilty of the greater crime of rapto under article 130 of the Argentinean Penal Code.

En este caso, un acusado que había sido condenado a veinticinco años por secuestro y otros delitos, apeló su condena, alegando que había cometido secuestro menor (plagio) en lugar del delito más grave de secuestro (rapto) premeditado del cual fue condenado. El tribunal decidió defender su condena, a pesar del hecho de que solo hubo coerción. La "disminución de la integridad sexual" contra la voluntad de las víctimas hizo que el acusado fuera culpable del mayor delito de rapto en virtud del artículo 130 del Código Penal argentino.



Utpal & Anr. v. State of West Bengal Supreme Court of India (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

On April 28, 1984 four or five men took Ms. Sitarani Jha from a bus stop to a house under construction and two of the men forcibly raped her. The trial court determined that the prosecution had not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The case was appealed and the high court determined that the defendants were guilty under section 376/34 of the India Penal Code. The case was brought before the Supreme Court to determine if the high court erred in finding the appellants guilty of rape, because no physical injuries were found on the private parts of the victim’s body. The Supreme Court determined that the high court did not err. Ms. Sitarani jha was able to identify her attackers, and that a lack of injuries on the private parts of a rape victim were not enough to acquit an identified rapist.



R. v. Smith Ontario Court of Appeal (2005)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The appellant was convicted of two counts of making obscene material, one count of possessing obscene material for distribution, and two counts of distributing obscene material through internet websites. The materials in question, consisting of audiovisual material and written stories, depicted acts of violence perpetrated against women by men. Although no explicit sexual act was depicted in the audiovisual material, the images included depictions of nude women with their genitalia exposed and with weapons protruding from their bodies. The written stories, however, depicted explicit sex and violence. The trial judge imposed a $100,000 fine and a period of probation, during which the appellant was prohibited from accessing the internet or residing in any place where internet access was provided. The appellant appealed both his convictions and sentence. The Court of Appeal judge ruled that he would allow the appeal, set aside the convictions on four of the five counts and ordered a new trial on those counts. With respect to the written stories, the judge dismissed the appeal, set aside the original sentence and probation order, and imposed a $2,000 fine.



Joseph v. Canada Federal Court of Canada (2006)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Ms. Joseph is a citizen of Grenada who fled to Canada in order to escape a violent common law relationship she had been involved in for 15 years. During Ms. Joseph’s relationship with her common law spouse, she tried to leave him several times; however, he always found her and the abuse would continue. She applied for protection in Canada pursuant to the Gender-Related Guidelines of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which aids determination of the risk facing women who are fleeing gender-specific persecution. Ms. Joseph based her claim on the ground that there is a substantial risk that she would face torture and cruel and unusual treatment at the hands of her former common law spouse, and there is more than a mere possibility that she would face gender-based persecution, if forced to return to Grenada. Despite the fact that the officer reviewing Ms. Joseph's application found her testimony and evidence to be credible, her application for protection was denied on the ground that she had failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in Grenada. When Ms. Joseph was informed that removal arrangements had been made, she brought a motion for a stay of removal, which was granted. The court ordered that Ms. Joseph’s application for judicial review be allowed, due to “discrepancies in logic” regarding the officer’s estimation of her evidence and his decision on her application, and remitted the matter to a different state officer for redetermination of her application for protection.



Erdogu v. Canada Federal Court of Canada (2008)


Gender-based violence in general, Honor crimes (or honour crimes)

Ms. Erdogu, a Turkish national, fled to Canada and filed a claim for refugee protection to escape persecution for her political and religious activity in Turkey. Because she was both an ethnic and religious minority (Kurdish/Alevi), she was arrested in Turkey on a number of occasions, during which she was detained, interrogated, beaten, and sexually molested. Further, she claimed to be at risk because a violent ex-boyfriend had informed her father of the former couple’s sexual relationship, leading her father to declare his intent to kill her in order to preserve the family’s honor. Ms. Erdogu’s application was denied, and she applied for judicial review of that decision. The judge noted that the documentary evidence clearly demonstrated continuing problems with the Turkish government’s efforts to address the issue of honor killings, finding that the officer who had made the initial decision on Ms. Erdogu’s case had failed to consider such evidence. Because of the high risk of honor killing that Ms. Erdogu faced, and due to the officer’s failure to justify his denial of her initial application for protection, the judge ruled that judicial review would be allowed, and that the decision on Ms. Erdogu’s application was to be set aside and redetermined by another officer.



R. v. Arcand Court of Appeal of Alberta (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The complainant was raped by the accused, a distant relative, while unconscious in her home. Prior to the incident, out of kindness, the complainant had taken the accused to her home and had offered to let him stay with her. Just before the assault, the two were sitting on a bed talking, drinking, and watching television. The complainant then passed out, and she awoke to find the accused having sexual intercourse with her. She pushed him off and brought suit against him for sexual assault. The trial judge found the accused guilty of sexual assault. Although there is a three-year minimum sentence for serious sexual assault, the judge took the recommendation of defense counsel and sentenced the accused to 90 days imprisonment, to be served intermittently, plus three years probation. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that it should have been in the three- to four-year range. In evaluating the appropriate application of the proportionality principle to sentences for sexual assault, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the Supreme Court had never endorsed the concept of a harmless rape or other major sexual assault. The court held that non-consensual sexual intercourse under any circumstances constituted a profound violation of a person’s dignity, equality, security of person and sexual autonomy, and that under the circumstances of the instant case, the offense should have been sentenced as a serious sexual assault. However, the court also ruled that, having regard to all relevant considerations, a downward departure from the three-year minimum sentence is justified. Finding that the original sentence was inadequate, the court granted the appeal and concluded that a fit and proper sentence would be two years imprisonment plus two years probation.



Singh v. State of U.P. & Another Supreme Court of India (2006)


Gender-based violence in general

A man and woman from different castes married. The woman’s brothers objected to the inter-caste marriage and lodged false complaints of criminal activity against the husband and his family. They also alleged the woman was not mentally fit, leading to her committal. The husband’s family members filed a petition to the High Court, and the High Court ordered them to appear before a sessions judge who would assess whether they had committed a crime. The family members petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court ended all proceedings pending against the husband’s family and the warrants against them. The Court held that the police and administrative authorities have a duty to protect individuals from harassment, threats, and violence based on an inter-caste marriage. In doing so, the Supreme Court stated that the Hindu Marriage Act does not ban inter-caste marriages and admonished violent acts in protest of inter-caste marriages.



Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat Supreme Court of India (2009)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

A man convicted in part under § 306 of the Indian Penal Code appealed the charge of abetting his wife’s suicide. There was a history of dowry-related abuse, and the husband demanded another 40,000 rupees from his wife and her family before the she committed suicide by burning herself. The Court held that cruelty alone was not enough to convict the husband for abetment of suicide. Showing abetment requires proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid. The man’s conviction was upheld on other grounds.



Susan Couch v. Attorney-General (2008)


Gender-based violence in general

The plaintiff, Ms. Couch, was seriously injured when William Bell robbed her place of employment. William Bell was a parolee under the supervision of the Probation Service. Ms. Couch claimed that the Probation Service failed to exercise reasonable care in the supervision of William Bell, leading to her injuries. The Court of Appeals dismissed her claim on the basis that the Probation Service owed no duty of care to her. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the Probation Service owes a duty of care to victims of criminal assault by parolees under its supervision. In doing so, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a so-called “sufficient proximity” rule, stating that the Probation Service owes a duty of care only to plaintiffs who are members of an identifiable class that is at particular risk of harm by parolees. The Supreme Court also held that the Probation Service is not vicariously liable for the actions of its parolees.


OTS v. No Defendant Mendoza Supreme Court (2006)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

A mentally handicapped young woman was allowed to have an abortion per article 86 of the Argentinean Penal Code. The woman was impregnated through rape. Because of the woman’s mental disorders and medication issues, it was impossible to ensure a viable child and a healthy mother. This decision also declared that article 86, which allows for abortion in the case of non-viability, can be employed at a doctor’s discretion without formal court proceedings.

A una joven con discapacidad mental se le permitió abortar su embarazo, conforme con el artículo 86 del Código Penal Argentino. La mujer fue impregnada por violación. Debido a los trastornos mentales y los problemas de medicación de la mujer, era imposible garantizar un hijo viable y una madre sana. Esta decisión también declaró que el artículo 86, que permite el aborto en caso de no viabilidad, puede emplearse a discreción de un médico sin procedimientos judiciales formales.



Matter of N., R. F. Sexual Abuse San Carlos de Bariloche Supreme Court (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

A seventeen-year old girl won her court petition for an abortion despite the fact that there was no issue of fetus viability. The minor had suffered repeated sexual abuse at the hands of her father and uncle for the past six years. The court reaffirmed constitutional and human rights protections for fetuses against abortions, but explained that the right to life is not protected from conception to death with the same intensity. In this case, the fact that the pregnant minor had suffered repeated sexual abuse, had passed a psychological evaluation, and was only 11 weeks pregnant were sufficient reasons to override the presumption of protection for the fetus.

Una niña de diecisiete años ganó su petición en la corte para un aborto a pesar del hecho de que no había ningún problema de viabilidad del feto. La menor había sufrido repetidos abusos sexuales a manos de su padre y su tío durante los últimos seis años. El tribunal reafirmó las protecciones constitucionales y de derechos humanos para los fetos contra los abortos, pero explicó que el derecho a la vida no está protegido desde la concepción hasta la muerte con la misma intensidad. En este caso, el hecho de que la menor embarazada había sufrido abuso sexual repetido, había pasado una evaluación psicológica y tenía solo 11 semanas de embarazo era razón suficiente para anular la presunción de protección para el feto.



Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association v. The Cabinet Division Bangladesh Supreme Court (2011)


Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

In an application under Article 102 of the Constitution, the Bangladesh National Women's Lawyers Association (BNWLA) petitioned the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) to address the exploitation and abuse endured by child domestic laborers in Bangladesh. The BNWLA argued that child domestic workers are subjected to economic exploitation, physical and emotional abuse, and the deprival of an education in violation of their fundamental constitutional rights. In support of these arguments, it presented multiple reports of extreme abuse suffered by child domestic workers. In deciding this case, the Court reviewed the current laws in Bangladesh, including the Labour Act, 2006, which fails to extend labor protections to "domestic workers," including children, and lacks an effective implementation and enforcement system. The Court directed the government of Bangladesh to take immediate steps to increase its protection of the fundamental rights of child domestic workers including prohibiting children under the age of 12 from working in any capacity including domestic settings; supporting the education of adolescents; implementing the National Elimination of Child Labour Policy 2010 and applying the Labour Act, 2006 to domestic workers. Additionally, the Court directed the government to monitor and prosecute incidents of violence against child domestic workers, maintain a registry of domestic workers and their whereabouts to combat trafficking, promulgate mandatory health check-ups and strengthen the legal framework relating to child domestic workers.



State v. L.D. Cluj Court of Appeal (2006)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The accused L.D. entered into the house of an 80-year-old woman, exercised physical violence against her, and raped her. The woman died as a result of the violence, and L.D. was convicted for homicide. Related to the rape the trial court considered that due to the lack of the victim’s complaint (a condition precedent for criminal investigations in case of rape) L.D. could not be convicted of rape. In the appeal submitted by the prosecutor, the Appeal Court held that although in normal circumstances the lack of a victim’s complaint will prevent criminal investigations of an alleged rape, in special cases, where the victim died, the criminal investigations shall start ex-officio. As any person needs to be treated with dignity during criminal investigations, the memory of the victim needs to be treated in the same way. The Appeal Court explained that the right of a person to file a criminal complaint for rape had been hindered by an unpredictable and invincible event, the death of the victim of the rape.



U.S. v. Morrison Supreme Court of the United States (2000)


Gender-based violence in general

The Court examined whether the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the authority to enact portions of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") of 1994. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact portions of the Act that allowed victims of gender-based violence to sue their attackers in federal court rather than state court. The Court held that Congress could not draw on the Commerce Clause for authority because violence against women was not an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. The Court also held that the Act did not redress harm caused by state action and therefore did not fall under Congress's 14th amendment power. In his dissent, Justice Souter argued there was sufficient evidence to establish the effect of violence against women on interstate commerce.



Constitutionality of the Women's Right to a Life Without Violence Law Tribunal Supremo de Justicia - Sala Constitucional (Venezuela Supreme Court of Justice - Constitutional Chamber) (2007)


Gender-based violence in general

The Supreme Court declared the Organic Law on Women's Right to a Life Without Violence approved by the National Assembly on 25 November 2006 constitutional. The Court found that the Law develops the constitutional protection referred to in article 21.2 of the Constitution for the benefit of women, a traditionally vulnerable social group.



State v. Ferreira and Others Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2004)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general

The appellant, convicted of hiring two workers to kill her abusive husband, argued for a reduced sentence. The court held that a lesser sentence is permitted only when there are "truly convincing" circumstances or where a life sentence is disproportionate or unjust. Expert testimony regarding battering and its effects showed how her behavior fit a well-known pattern for abused women. The court found this testimony convincing and held that the appellant's use of third parties to kill her husband did not invalidate her claim to be a victim of battering. Additionally, the court held that appellant's failure to testify should have no effect on her credibility. The court reduced her sentence but declined to acquit the appellant because of the premeditated nature of the act.

Die appellant, wat skuldig bevind is aan die huur van twee werkers om haar geweldadige man dood te maak, het aangevoer vir 'n verlaagde vonnis. Die hof het beslis dat 'n verlaagde vonnis slegs toegelaat word as daar 'werklik oortuigende' omstandighede is, of as 'n lewenslange vonnis buite verhouding of onregverdig is. 'n Getuienis van kundiges rakende die geweld en die gevolge daarvan het getoon hoe haar gedrag pas by 'n bekende patroon vir mishandelde vroue. Die hof het bevind dat hierdie getuienis oortuigend was en het bevind dat die applikant se gebruik van derde partye om haar man te vermoor nie die feit ongeldig gemaak dat sy ‘n slagoffer van geweld is nie. Verder het die hof beslis dat haar versuim om te getuig geen effek op haar geloofwaardigheid moes hê nie. Die hof het haar vonnis verminder, maar het geweier om die applikant vry te laat weens die voorbedagte aard van die handeling.



司法院大法官會議第554號解釋 (J.Y. Interpretation No.554) Constitutional Court of Taiwan (2002)


Gender-based violence in general

The Taiwan Constitutional Court overturned this decision in J.Y. 791. This case allowed the legislature to enact a law restricting freedom of sexual behavior within the system of marriage (such as by making adultery punishable under criminal law), but only if the restrictions are not overly severe in violation of the principle of proportionality embodies in Article 23 of the Constitution. In particular, the offense must be indictable only upon complaint, and no complaint may be instituted if the spouse has connived against or forgiven the offending party for the offense.

立法機構可以制定法律來限制婚姻制度內的性行為自由(如規定通姦行為應受刑法處罰),但前提是這種限制不能過於嚴厲,以至於違反憲法第23條揭示的比例原則。 尤其,該犯罪行為必須於提出告訴時是可以起訴的,且如果配偶縱容或原諒行為人的犯罪行為,則不得再行提出告訴。



Rex v. Rankhebe High Court of Lesotho (1987)


Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The accused was convicted of raping an 11 year-old girl. In considering sentencing, the High Court upheld the conviction and, citing South African and English law, noted the presumption that girls under the age of 12 are considered too young to give their consent to intercourse, but in cases involving girls between the ages of 12 and 16 the prosecution must demonstrate that there was non-consent for the accused to be convicted of rape. If a girl of 12 to 16 years old does consent to sexual intercourse with a man, then the man should be found guilty of defilement or statutory rape under the Women and Girls Protection Proclamation No. 14 of 1949. [Note: The Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child/minor as any person under 18 years of age in the absence of domestic laws. Generally, minors do not have the capacity to give consent.]



Republic v. Chiledzelere High Court of Malawi (2007)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The accused was convicted of attempted rape and sentenced to five years imprisonment with hard labor for accosting the complainant and assaulting her with the intent to have intercourse with her before he was prevented from doing so by the arrival of the witness. The appeal was dismissed because the accused's actions in fondling the complainant and tearing her underwear provided clear evidence of his intent. The sentence was upheld because of the aggravating factors that the accused was told that the complainant was a married woman and the traumatic effect of the tearing of the woman's underwear. [Note: International legal standards do not discriminate on the basis of marital status in determining the gravity of a rape.]



State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh Supreme Court of India (2003)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

A case of sexual assault where the accused was acquitted. The State appealed and the court determined that lack of physical evidence of rape and previous sexual activity on the part of the victim cannot be grounds for acquittal and the court restored the conviction. Also, the testimony need not be corroborated with additional evidence as long as there is an assurance of veracity.



Sudesh Jhaku v. K.C.J. High Court of India (1998)


Gender-based violence in general

The Court held that extreme caution must be taken during the questioning of child witnesses: questions must not be long, complex, or confusing, breaks may be taken during the questioning if necessary, a screen may be used to block the child's view of the courtroom, and "a social worker or other friendly but ‘neutral' adult" may be present or even allowed to sit next to the child. Moreover, such questioning must be in camera.



The Chairman, Railway Board & ORS v. Mrs. Chandrima Das & ORS Supreme Court of India (2000)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

A case of gang-rape under public law because the accused were employees of the national railway. The case includes a discussion of the application of UN resolutions domestically, including the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Court concludes that the victim can recover under public law due to the violation of her fundamental rights, enshrined in the declarations and the Indian Constitution.



Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan Supreme Court of India (1997)


Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general

This case involved a public interest petition filed by a group of NGOs for enforcement of the Constitution's protection of women's rights and international women's rights norms. The victim was gang-raped and before the rape had complained of 13 to the authorities, but there was no response. The court held that 13 is a violation of gender equity and the right to life and liberty and the government must provide safeguards to prevent such harassment from happening.



A. and B. v. Eastern Health Board High Court of Ireland (1997)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

C. was a 13 year-old girl who became pregnant as a result of rape allegedly by a family friend and was now in State care. The health board sought a court order to allow her to travel outside the State to obtain an abortion because abortion was illegal in Ireland except where the pregnancy formed a real and substantial risk to the woman's life. The Court granted the health board's order permitting C. to travel outside the State to obtain an abortion. The Court based its decision on the fact that the girl's risk of suicide presented a real and substantial risk to her life, entitling her to an abortion within Ireland as well.



Nkabane v. Nkabane High Court of Lesotho (1987)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Property and inheritance rights

The plaintiff wife sought a decree of divorce on the grounds of the defendant's desertion on the grounds that the defendant abused her and drove her out of the matrimonial home to live with another woman. The Court found that the defendant was previously married through Lesotho customary law to the other woman at the time of the marriage to the plaintiff; thus, the defendant's marriage to the plaintiff was null and void. However, the Court declared that the relationship was a "putative marriage" for the purposes of dividing the plaintiff and defendant's joint property.



Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India Supreme Court of India (1991)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

In this public interest litigation, the case at issue concerned six women who were sexually assaulted and raped on a commuter train. The Court set out new requirements for police dealing with rape victims, including that victims be provided with legal representation, informing the victim of all her rights before questioning her, and protecting her anonymity during trial. The court also ordered that the criminal compensation board consider the totality of the circumstances, ranging from the emotional pain of the act itself to medical costs and emotional pain associated with any child that might result from the rape when setting out compensation to be paid.



Dr. G.M. Natarajan v. State, Supreme Court Supreme Court of India (1995)


Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

A woman, harassed by her husband and in-laws for additional dowry, committed suicide by jumping into a well with her baby. The trial court acquitted the accused because the prosecution did not prove the case. The Court reversed, holiding that if the facts necessary to create a presumption of dowry-death are shown, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant and not the prosecution.



Auto 102-07 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2007)


Gender-based violence in general

The Court ordered the Secretary General of the Court to hold a planning session along with several other governmental and non-governmental entities to address issues of forced displacement of women.

La Corte ordenó al Secretario General de la Corte que realizara una sesión de planificación junto con varias otras entidades gubernamentales y no gubernamentales para abordar los problemas del desplazamiento forzado de mujeres.



Naz Foundation v. Govt. of Delhi Supreme Court of India (2009)


Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

A public interest litigation was initiated to change the definition of non-criminal sex from "hetero-sexual penile-vaginal" to "consensual sex between adults." The court granted the petition finding the criminalization of non-heterosexual sex violative of the constitution.



Sentencia C-322/06 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2006)


Gender-based violence in general

The Court was asked to reexamine the domestic implications of Colombia's adoption of the CEDAW. Those opposing the CEDAW argued that its adoption would have grave consequences and be inconsistent with the Colombian Constitution. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of Colombia's participation in the CEDAW.

Se solicitó a la Corte que reexaminara las implicaciones internas de la adopción de la CEDAW por parte de Colombia. Quienes se oponen a la CEDAW argumentaron que su adopción tendría graves consecuencias y sería incompatible con la Constitución colombiana. La Corte afirmó la constitucionalidad de la participación de Colombia en la CEDAW.



P. Babu Venkatesh v. Rani High Court of India (2008)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

After a marital dispute arose, the husband transferred ownership of the marital home to his mother in order to evade the 2005 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act which does not permit women to be forcibly dispossessed of their homes. The Court held that the subterfuge was insufficient to evade the law and ordered that the wife be allowed to live in the home until the dispute could be resolved. Here, the Supreme Court held that the shared household only includes homes which are owned or rented by the couple.



Sentencia C-355/06 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2006)


Gender-based violence in general

The Court ruled that a complete ban on abortion was unconstitutional and legalized abortion in cases of incest, danger to the health of the mother, and rape, involuntary insemination, serious deformity to the fetus, or when the mother is under the age of 14. In instances of deformity to the fetus or danger to the mother, the Court required that medical evidence be provided. The Court relies on its obligations in international law to protect women's rights to health and life, among others.

La Corte dictaminó que la prohibición total del aborto era inconstitucional y legalizó el aborto en casos de incesto, peligro para la salud de la madre, casos de violación, inseminación involuntaria, deformidad grave del feto, y cuando la madre es menor de 14 años. En casos de deformidad para el feto o peligro para la madre, el Tribunal requirió que se proporcionaran pruebas médicas. La Corte se basa en sus obligaciones en derecho internacional para proteger los derechos de las mujeres a la salud y la vida, entre otros.



Sentencia T-088/08 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2008)


Gender-based violence in general

Recognizing the constitutional vulnerability of pregnant women and unborn and newborn children, the Court ordered defendant, and insurance company, to insure plaintiff, an 18-year old pregnant woman, who had lost the right to her parents' insurance upon reaching the age of 18.

Reconociendo la vulnerabilidad constitucional de las mujeres embarazadas y de los niños que están por nacer y los recién nacidos, la Corte ordenó al demandado y a la compañía de seguros que aseguraran a la demandante, una mujer embarazada de 18 años, que había perdido el derecho al seguro de sus padres al cumplir los 18 años.



Sentencia T-209/08 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2008)


Gender-based violence in general

Therapeutic abortion in cases of rape, incest, and to save the health and life of the woman. The Court reaffirmed that a ban on abortion in all instances would an unconstitutional violation of women's fundamental rights.

Este caso analizó los abortos terapéuticos en casos de violación, incesto y para salvar la salud y la vida de la mujer. La Corte reafirmó que la prohibición del aborto completamente en todos los casos absolutos, sin mirar las circunstancias particulares constituiría una violación inconstitucional de los derechos fundamentales de la mujer.



Sentencia T-622/05 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2005)


Custodial violence, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The Court held that prison procedural rules that required vaginal inspections of female visitors, and that did not allow female visitors to enter the prison while menstruating, violated female visitors' right to dignity, personal liberty and health. The Court ordered the National Institute of Prisons and Jails (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario) to stop such intrusive inspections and install at the prison in question, the Cárcel Distrital Villahermosa de Cali, equipment necessary to accomplish the safety objectives of a vaginal inspection without needing to conduct such an inspection.

El Tribunal sostuvo que las normas de prevención penitenciarias que exigían inspecciones vaginales de las visitantes femeninas y que no permitían que las visitantes ingresaran a la prisión mientras menstruaban violaban el derecho a la dignidad, la libertad personal y la salud de las visitantes femeninas. La Corte ordenó al Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario que detuviera tales inspecciones intrusivas e instalara en el centro penitenciario en cuestión, la Cárcel Distrital Villahermosa de Cali, los equipos necesarios para lograr los objetivos de seguridad de una inspección vaginal sin necesidad para realizar dicha inspección.



Sentencia T-988/07 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2007)


Gender-based violence in general

The Court ordered defendant, a health-care provider, to provide a mentally and physically-disabled woman with an abortion after she became pregnant from nonconsensual sexual intercourse. The Court held that because of her mental disability, the woman's parents could request the abortion, despite the fact that the woman was 24-years old. The Court also held that the rape need not have been reported to the authorities, as was argued by the defendant.

El tribunal ordenó al acusado, un proveedor de atención médica, que le hiciera un aborto a una mujer con discapacidad mental y física después de que ella quedara embarazada en una violación. La Corte sostuvo que dada su discapacidad mental, los padres de la mujer podían solicitar el aborto por ella, a pesar de que la mujer tenía 24 años. El Tribunal también sostuvo que la violación no tenía por qué haber sido denunciada a las autoridades para que se concediera el aborto, como había argumentado el acusado.



Sentencia 09076, Expediente 02-006271-0007-CO Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (2002)


Gender-based violence in general

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Articles 8, 9(a), 9(c), 10 and 19 of the University of Costa Rica's Regulation against Sexual Harassment, arguing that they were inconsistent with the Costa Rican Political Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights. The Court rejected the Plaintiff's challenge, affirming the constitutionality of the provisions.

El demandante desafió la constitucionalidad de los artículos 8, 9 (a), 9 (c), 10 y 19 del Reglamento de la Universidad de Costa Rica contra el acoso sexual, discutiendo que estos eran incompatibles con la Constitución Política de Costa Rica, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. La Corte rechazó la impugnación del demandante, afirmando la constitucionalidad de las disposiciones.



Sentencia 15547, Expediente 08-009127-0007-CO Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (2008)


Gender-based violence in general

Defendant in a criminal prosecution challenged the constitutionality of Articles 22, 25 and 27 of the Criminal Law Against Violence Toward Women, arguing that the law's vague language allowed for arrests and convictions to be made based on vague, non-specific allegations and was thereby inconsistent with the Costa Rican Political Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Court held Article 22 and 25 to be unconstitutional, but upheld Article 27. The ruling had retroactive power.

El acusado en un proceso penal desafió la constitucionalidad de los artículos 22, 25 y 27 de la Ley Penal contra la Violencia contra las Mujeres, argumentando que el vago lenguaje de la ley permitía que se realizaran arrestos y condenas sobre la base de acusaciones vagas e inespecíficas, lo cual es inconsistente con la Constitución Política de Costa Rica, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos. La Corte determino que los artículos 22 y 25 eran inconstitucionales, pero mantuvo el artículo 27. Fue decidiso que la determinacion tendría poder retroactivo.



State. v. Matlho Court of Appeal of Botswana (2008)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The appellant challenged the sentence for rape under the sections of the Penal Code that set forth mandatory minimum sentences for rape charges depending on circumstances such as the perpetrator's use of violence or the perpetrator's status as being HIV positive. Section 142(5) of the Penal Code prohibits a sentence for rape from running concurrently with any other offense; the sentences must be served consecutively. The appellant was convicted on two counts of rape and sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years for each count, resulting in a total of 20 years imprisonment, which he claimed was a violation of the constitutional prohibition on "torture or inhuman or degrading punishment." The Court upheld the conviction, noting that although it was undeniably severe, it was not disproportionate to the offense, especially in light of the increase in the incidence of rape in Botswana and the heinous nature of rape itself.



Public Prosecutor v. Hishamuddin Bin Hj Chuchu High Court of Brunei (1997)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Although the Court found that intercourse was consensual and lacked the requisite forcible element, it stated that evidence from the alleged victim is enough to corroborate a rape allegation.



Aruna Parmod Shah v. Union of India High Court of India (2008)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

A man charged with domestic violence against his female live-in domestic partner challenged the law's use by an unmarried domestic partner. The court held that domestic violence by a man against a woman in any marriage-like relationship, or even relationships outside marriage, is subject to the law. This decision is notable given that many marriages in India are unofficial or not legally valid.



Yapura, Gloria Catalina v. Nuevo Hospital El Milagro y Provincia de Salta Supreme Court of Argentina (2006)


Gender-based violence in general

Plaintiff sought an order requiring a hospital to perform a tubal litigation on her after she delivered her fourth child. Plaintiff lived in poverty and neither she nor her husband was employed. The trial and appellate courts refused to grant the order, but the Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower court, citing the lower court's failure to examine the facts of the case.

La demandante solicitó una orden que requería que un hospital le realizara un litigio tubárico después de que ella dio a luz a su cuarto hijo. La demandante vivía en la pobreza y ni ella ni su esposo estaban empleados. Los tribunales de primera instancia y de apelación se negaron a otorgar la orden, pero el Tribunal Supremo devolvió el caso al tribunal inferior, citando el fallo del tribunal inferior de examinar los hechos del caso.



José Santos Colque Góngora c/ Angela Muriel Aguilar y otros Sala Penal (1999)


Gender-based violence in general

Jose Santos Colque Gongora, his mother, Angela Muriel Aguilar and one other woman, Marina Medina Estevez, were convicted of performing an abortion on Miriam Colque Villca without her consent, in violation of Article 263-1 of the Penal Code. The victim was Colque Gongora's wife. Colque Gongora and his mother took the victim to Medina Estevez's house, telling her it was for a check-up, at which time Medina Estevez conducted the abortion. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed the conviction.

José Santos Colque Góngora, su madre, Ángela Muriel Aguilar y otra mujer, Marina Medina Estévez, fueron condenados por hacerle un aborto a Miriam Colque Villca sin su consentimiento, en violación del Artículo 263-1 del Código Penal. La víctima era la esposa de Colque Gongora. Colque Góngora y su madre llevaron a la víctima a la casa de Medina Estevez, diciéndole que era para un chequeo, momento en el cual Medina Estevez realizó el aborto. Los tribunales de apelación y supremo afirmaron la condena.



Reports

IV Plan Nacional de Igualdad (2018-2024): Allanar obstáculos para la igualdad Sustantiva (2018)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The IV Equality Plan promotes effective equality by removing obstacles to equality and eliminating all forms of discrimination. In this regard, the Plan seeks to eliminate discrimination against women, promote equal access and participation of women in public decision-making, guarantee women a life free of violence, and create conditions that enable women to access justice free from sexist stereotypes.

El IV Plan Nacional de Igualdad promueve la igualdad efectiva removiendo los obstáculos y eliminando toda forma de discriminación. En este sentido, el Plan busca eliminar la discriminación contra las mujeres, promover la igualdad de acceso y participación de las mujeres en la toma de decisiones públicas, garantizar a las mujeres una vida libre de violencia y generar condiciones que permitan a las mujeres acceder a la justicia libres de estereotipos sexistas.



National Strategic Plan on Gender-based Violence & Femicide (2020)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

The South African government released a National Strategic Plan (“NSP”) in response to the 2018 Summit on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide. The Summit identified key interventions and developed strategies regarding gender-based violence and other challenges women and children face in South Africa. The NSP was published as a framework to recognize and affirm the challenges and rights identified at the Summit. The vision of the NSP is “A South Africa free from gender-based violence directed at women, children and LGBTQIA+ persons” and is enacted through six key pillars: 1. accountability, coordination and leadership; 2. prevention and rebuilding social cohesion; 3. justice, safety, and protection; 4. response, care, support, and healing; 5. economic power; and 6. research and information management. The NSP lists specific general strategies and defines the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders to accelerate, advance, and realize the vision and outcomes of the NSP. The NSP outlines the specific short-and long-term goals and which stakeholder is responsible for specific targets under each pillar. It also provides a brief history of gender-based violence and femicide in South Africa, as well as a summary of relevant legislation in South Africa.



Посебан протокол за заштиту и поступање са женама које су изложене насиљу (Special Protocol for The Protection and Treatment of Women Victims of Violence) (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

Adopted by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy, this Protocol addresses how these ministries should respond to reports of domestic violence. The Special Protocol for the Protection and Treatment of Women Victims of Violence outlines procedures for risk-assessments, identifying violence, law enforcement response, and documenting incidents. (English translation available here.)



Handbook on Juvenile Law in Zambia (2014)


Gender-based violence in general

The Handbook aims to function as a practice guide for judicial officials and legal practitioners who work in the area of juvenile law. It addresses a range of issues from the constitutional, statutory, and human rights framework of juvenile law, special issues that arise in cases of child sexual abuse, and procedural protections for juvenile witnesses.



Avon Global Center 2013 Women and Justice Conference Report (2014)


Acid violence, Gender discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Harmful traditional practices, Gender violence in conflict, Forced and early marriage, Gender-based violence in general

In December 2013, the Avon Global Center hosted its annual conference in New York, NY on "State Responsibility to End Violence Against Women: The Due Diligence Principle and the Role of Judges."


Sexual Violence by Educators in South African Schools: Gaps in Accountability (2014)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of Witwatersrand and Avon Global Center for Women and Justice at Cornell Law School released a joint report on sexual violence committed by educators against students in South African schools.

Die Sentrum vir Toegepaste Regstudies by die Universiteit van Witwatersrand en Avon Global Centre for Women and Justice by Cornell Law School het 'n gesamentlike verslag vrygestel oor seksuele geweld wat opvoeders teen studente in Suid-Afrikaanse skole gepleeg het.



Avon Global Center 2012 Women and Justice Conference Report (2013)


Statutory rape or defilement, Sexual violence and rape, Gender-based violence in general

In December 2012, the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice hosted its annual conference. The topic for 2012 was addressing sexual violence against girls in Southern Africa.


Avon Global Center 2011 Women and Justice Conference Report (2012)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

In 2011, the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice hosted a conference in New Delhi, India on the theme “Gender-Based Violence and Justice in South Asia.”



Avon Global Center 2010 Women and Justice Conference Report (2011)


Femicide, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general

In 2010, the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice held a conference in Washington, DC to discuss advances and obstacles to securing justice for women and girls in conflict and post-conflict areas.



"They are Destroying Our Futures" Sexual Violence Against Girls in Zambia's Schools (2012)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

A report by the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice at Cornell Law School, Women and Law in Southern Africa-Zambia, and the Cornell Law School International Human Rights Clinic examining the problem of sexual violence against girls in school in Zambia.



Women in Prison in Argentina: Causes, Conditions, and Consequences (2013)


Gender-based violence in general

Report by the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice and International Human Rights Clinic, University of Chicago Law School's International Human Rights Clinic, and the Public Defender's Office in Argentina finding that women and their families are disproportionately affected by the harsh penalties imposed for low-level drug offences in Argentina.

Informe del Centro Mundial para las Mujeres y la Justicia y la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de Avon, la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Chicago, y la Oficina del Defensor Público de Argentina que encuentran que las mujeres y sus familias se ven afectadas de manera desproporcionada por las duras sanciones impuestas por delitos de drogas de nivel en la Argentina.



Staying Alive: Fourth Monitoring & Evaluation Report 2010 on the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (India) [pdf]. (2010)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

Report by Lawyers Collective Women’s Rights Initiative (LCWRI), International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) and UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women on the implementation of India’s domestic violence law since its establishment in 2005 (2010).



The World's Women 2010: Trends and Statistics (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

A United Nations report highlighting the differences in the status of women and men in eight areas – population and families, health, education, work, power and decision-making, violence against women, environment and poverty.


UNIFEM: Progress of the World's Women (2009)


Gender-based violence in general

This UNIFEM Report focuses on the urgent need to strengthen accountability to women.


Staying Alive (2005)


Gender-based violence in general

Lawyer's Collective of India Report evaluating the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act of 2005 in India.



“I Am Not Dead, But I Am Not Living" Barriers to Fistula Prevention and Treatment in Kenya (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

Human Rights Watch report describing the situation of women with fistula in Kenya, including the increased risk of stigma and violence and the impact of a health system that fails to properly address the problem of fistula. July 15, 2010. Copyright 2010 Human Rights Watch.



Evaluation: Strengthening of Prosecution of SGBV Offences through support to the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit (SGBV CU) in Liberia (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

UNFPA Report presenting the findings, analysis and recommendations from the Evaluation of the SGBV Crimes Unit, which has as its purpose to prosecute perpetrators of gender and sexual based violence, particularly rape, in Liberia (November 2010).



Hidden in the Mealie Meal (2007)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape

Human Rights Watch Report on the Zambian government's failure to meet its international obligations to combat violence and discrimination against women. The report documents abuses that obstruct women's ability to start and adhere to HIV treatment regimens, including violence against women and insecure property rights (2007).



Costing and Financing 1325 (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

Global Network of Women Peacebuilders report on the Resources Needed to Implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 at the National Level as well as the Gains, Gaps and Glitches on Financing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.


Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women Thematic Report (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences submitted a thematic report on reparations to women subjected to violence in conflict and post-conflict. April 19, 2010.


"The Ten-Dollar Talib" and Women's Rights: Afghan Women and the Risks of Reintegration and Reconciliation (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

Human Rights Watch, July 13, 2010.



Bottom of the Ladder: Exploitation and Abuse of Girl Domestic Workers in Guinea (2007)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Human Rights Watch Report documenting how girls as young as 8 years old work up to 18 hours a day as domestic workers in Guinea, frequently without pay, and are often insulted, beaten and raped by their employers (2007).



Burnt Not Defeated (2007)


Gender-based violence in general

Report by Campaign and Struggle Against Acid Attacks on Women (CSAAAW) on acid attacks in Karnataka, India.



International Case Law

Beizaras ir Levickas prieš Lietuvą (Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania) European Court of Human Rights (2020)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, LGBTIQ

Two men published a Facebook post of them kissing, which sparked hundreds of homophobic comments. At their request, an LGBTQ rights advocacy organization complained to the prosecutor’s office, asking to launch an investigation for instigation of homophobic hatred and violence. Both the prosecutor’s office and court on appeal refused on the basis that the post was “eccentric” and the authors’ comments, even though obscene, did not contain actual criminal act and intent. The ECtHR unanimously ruled that Lithuania violated the right to an effective remedy (Article 13), awarding the applicants non-pecuniary damages.

Du vyrai susilaukė šimtų homofobinių komentarų socialiniame tinkle paskelbę įrašą, kuriame jie bučiuojasi. Jų prašymu LGBTIQ teisių gynimo organizacija pasiskundė prokuratūrai, prašydama pradėti tyrimą dėl homofobinės neapykantos ir smurto kurstymo. Tiek prokuratūra, tiek apeliacinis teismas prašymą atmetė, remdamiesi tuo, kad įrašas buvo „ekscentriškas“, o autorių komentaruose nebuvo rimto pagrindo ir visų nusikaltimo požymių. EŽTT vienbalsiai nusprendė, kad Lietuva pažeidė pareiškėjų teisę į veiksmingą teisinės gynybos priemonę bei priteisė pareiškėjams neturtinę žalą. Vertimas lietuvių kalba: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-203614



Sharma, et al. v. Nepal Human Rights Committee (ICCPR) (2018)


Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

The Government of Nepal declared a state of emergency in response to a rebellion by the Maoist party and granted powers to the Royal Nepal Army to arrest individuals on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities through and to keep them in detention for up to 90 days without charge. The first author, Sarita Devi Sharma, is the sister of Himal Sharma, Secretary-General of a Maoist-affiliated political party in Nepal. Ms. Sharma and her friend B.M. were followed and asked about Ms. Sharma’s brother, then they were handcuffed, placed in a van and taken to Army barracks. She was detained and held from October 2003 through 30 June 2005. Once her husband, the second author, became aware of her disappearance, he submitted an application to the National Human Rights Commission denouncing her disappearance and submitted a writ petition to the Supreme Court of Nepal demanding an order of habeas corpus, which the court rejected, claiming lack of evidence proving her illegal detention. He also informed Amnesty International about her disappearance, but they never received a reply from the Government when they inquired about her. During the first four-five months, she was routinely interrogated, beaten, held underwater for long periods of time and threatened with rape. After that, she suffered ill health and was taken to a hospital. In the hospital, she sent a letter secretly to her husband who, after several months of not hearing any further information, shared it with members of All Nepal National Independent Student Union Revolutionary who included information about her condition in a press release. As a result, Ms. Sharma was interrogated harshly and beaten. Ms. Sharma was then moved to a small, dark room and kept in isolation. Her husband filed a new petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, which ordered her release. The Committee determined that Nepal produced no evidence to show that, while Ms. Sharma was held in incommunicado detention, it met its obligations to protect her life, and that this failure resulted in a violation of article 6(1) of the Covenant. In addition, the Committee found that the enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention of Ms. Sharma, and the acts of torture and conditions to which she was exposed constituted violations of article 7 of the Covenant. Further, the Committee concluded that the enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention of Ms. Sharma amounted to a violation of article 9 (1-4) of the Covenant. The enforced disappearance deprived her of the protection of the law and her right to recognition as a person before the law in violation of article 16 of the Covenant. The anguish and distress suffered by Ms. Sharma’s husband and son, the third author, due to her enforced disappearance also were found to constitute a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee determined that neither Ms. Sharma did not receive an adequate remedy (246,000 Nepalese rupees), in violation of article 2 (3), in conjunction with articles 6, 7, 9 (1-4) and 16, and her husband and son received no interim relief, which constituted a violation of article 2 (3), read in conjunction with article 7 of the Covenant. Moreover, the Committee stated that Nepal was obligated to provide an effective remedy. This remedy should include: (1) conducting a thorough and effective investigation into the facts surrounding the detention and the treatment suffered in detention; (2) prosecuting those responsible for the violations committed and making the results public; (3) providing detailed information about the results of the investigation to Ms. Sharma and her family; (4) ensuring that any necessary and adequate psychological rehabilitation and medical treatment is provided; and (5) providing adequate compensation and appropriate measures of satisfaction for the violations suffered. Further, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar violations in the future, the Committee stated that Nepal should ensure that its legislation: (1) criminalizes torture and enforced disappearance and provides for appropriate sanctions and remedies; (2) guarantees that such cases give rise to a prompt, impartial and effective investigation; (3) allows for the criminal prosecution of those found responsible for such crimes; and (4) amends the 35-day statutory limit for claiming compensation for torture, in accordance with international standards.



The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, et al. (Confirmation of Charges) International Criminal Court (2011)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Under Article 7 of the Rome Statue, sexual and gender-based crimes can amount to crimes against humanity. Although terminated by the ICC because of insufficient evidence, this case clarifies the principles for prosecuting these crimes. Charges for the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer of population, and persecution were brought due to the post-election violence in Kenya, where an attack allegedly targeted ethnic groups perceived as supporters of the Party of National Unity. The ICC determined the key elements of such crimes against humanity are: (i) an attack against civilians who were the primary object of the attack; (ii) widespread or systematic attacks with acts of violence having an organised nature; (iii) attacks committed pursuant to a State or an organisational policy; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and the attacks; (v) the organizer intended and had knowledge of the attacks.



Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture et Ligue de la Zone Afrique pour la Défense des Droits des Enfants et Elèves (pour le compte de Céline) v. Democratic Republic of the Congo African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2016)


Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The complainants filed suit on behalf of a 17-year-old girl who was violently attacked and raped by two men. Local police, who allegedly knew the attackers, witnessed the beginning of the attack but did not aid the victim. The complainants further alleged that the Kinshasa police knew that an organized gang had attacked the victim and other girls and the identities of the attackers, but refused to take action to dismantle the gang due to their limited financial resources. The Commission held that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) had violated several articles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “Charter”) due to the failure of (i) police to take action to prevent the rape and (ii) competent authorities to provide justice to the victim. The Commission requested the DRC (1) take measures to find and punish the attackers; (2) accord the victim adequate reparation as well as medical and psychological assistance; (3) take measures to prevent sexual violence and rape in the parts of its territory where these offenses are common; (4) take measures to change patterns of behavior linked to violence against women and girls, including sexual violence and rape; (5) establish rehabilitation programs for girls who are victims of sexual violence and rape; and (6) organize training sessions for law enforcement and judges on the treatment of sexual violence and rape, under conditions conforming to the pertinent dispositions of the Charter.



Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2004)


Gender-based violence in general

On July 18, 1982, special forces murdered 268 people in Plan de Sanchez, Guatemala, predominantly indigenous Mayans. The massacre was part of a broader state policy to counter insurrection that targeted indigenous populations and ravaged communities. During the attack an estimated twenty girls and young women were rounded up, raped and murdered. The remainder of the detainees was killed by grenade and open fire. The representatives of the victims and their next of kin brought suit against the State of Guatemala alleging various violations of the American Convention on Human Rights including Article 1(1): the obligation to respect the rights enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 5: the right to humane treatment, Article 8: the right to a fair trial, Article11: the right to privacy, Article 12: the right to freedom of conscience and religion, Article 16: the right to freedom of association, Article 21: the right to property, Article 24: the right to equal protection and Article 25: the right to judicial protection. Guatemala acknowledged the international responsibility of the State and stipulated to the facts of the case before the Inter-American Court. The Court held that, in accordance with the State’s own acknowledgement, Guatemala was in breach the American Convention. With particular regard to Article 24 and 25, the Guatemalan Army abused and raped women and girls of Mayan decent during its genocidal counter-insurgence policy. These women had no recourse to the law. The Court found that the State had aggravated international responsibility for the commission of a State Crime, the commission of which was facilitated by the State’s intention, omission or tolerance during a period of grave human rights violations. The State and its agents, including the Guatemalan Army and civil collaborators, were held responsible for the tragedy that occurred at Plan de Sanchez.

El 18 de julio de 1982, fuerzas especiales asesinaron a 268 personas en Plan de Sánchez, Guatemala, las cuáles eran predominantemente mujeres indígenas mayas. La masacre fue parte de una política estatal más amplia para contrarrestar la insurrección dirigida a las poblaciones indígenas y otras comunidades devastadas. Durante el ataque, aproximadamente veinte niñas y mujeres jóvenes fueron detenidas, violadas, y asesinadas. El resto de los detenidos fueron asesinados con granadas y a fuego abierto. Los representantes de las víctimas y sus familiares presentaron una demanda contra el Estado de Guatemala alegando varias violaciones de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, las cuáles incluían el artículo 1 (1): la obligación de respetar los derechos consagrados en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Artículo 5: el derecho a un trato humanitario, Artículo 8: el derecho a un juicio justo, Artículo 11: el derecho a la privacidad, Artículo 12: el derecho a la libertad de conciencia y de religión, Artículo 16: el derecho a la libertad de asociación, Artículo 21: el derecho a la propiedad, Artículo 24: el derecho a protección igualitaria y el Artículo 25: el derecho a la protección judicial. Guatemala reconoció la responsabilidad internacional del Estado y presentó los hechos del caso ante la Corte Interamericana. La Corte sostuvo que, de acuerdo con el propio reconocimiento del Estado, Guatemala infringió la Convención Americana. Con especial atención a los Artículos 24 y 25, el Ejército de Guatemala abusó y violó a mujeres y niñas mayas en su política de contrainsurgencia genocida. Estas mujeres no podían recurrir a la ley. La Corte determinó que el Estado agravaba la responsabilidad internacional ya que el crimen fue cometido por el Estado mismo. Dicho acto se vió facilitado por la intención, omisión o tolerancia del gobierno durante un período de graves violaciones de derechos humanos. El Estado y sus agentes, incluído el Ejército de Guatemala y colaboradores civiles fueron declarados responsables de la tragedia ocurrida en el Plan de Sánchez.



Prosecutor v. Akayesu International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998)


Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Mr. Jean Paul Akayesu served as the mayor of the Taba commune and was responsible for maintaining law and public order in Taba during the tragic events which took place in Rwanda in 1994. The court held that Mr. Akayesu had knowledge of the killing of thousands of Tutsis in Taba, but did not attempt to prevent such acts even though he had the duty to do so. Moreover, Mr. Akayesu was involved and even took an active role in some instances. In addition, the court held that Mr. Akayesu had knowledge of sexual assaults of civilians who sought refuge at the bureau communal by armed local militia but did not attempt to prevent such acts even though he had the duty to do so. The court found that Mr. Akayesu was guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity. On appeal, the Appeal Chambers dismissed Mr. Akayesu claims and upheld the judgment of the court a quo. This case is important because it established for the first time that sexual violence constitutes a crime against humanity and a tool of genocide by a government official. It is also worth noting that the court’s broad definitions of rape and sexual violence were the first of their kind in international law.



Sandra Jankovic v. Croatia European Court of Human Rights (2009)


Gender-based violence in general

The applicant brought a claim in Split Municipal Court for protection against being disturbed in occupying her room. After years the applicant finally gained possession of the room and then was assaulted by several individuals. Although the applicant tried to get a criminal case brought, it was dismissed by the domestic courts. She then brought a complaint relying on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention before this Court. The applicant argued that the national authorities failed to afford her adequate protection against violence inflicted by private individuals, which was an Article 8 violation. The Court agreed that Article 8 applied due to the circumstances under which she had been attacked and found that Article 8 had been violated due to the delay of the authorities in prosecuting the crime.



Yilmaz v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights (2008)


Gender-based violence in general

A 20-year-old Y killed himself while performing his compulsory military service after being provoked by Sergeant A’s physical and verbal violence who had been informed of Y’s problems linking to his sister’s marital difficulties. The ECtHR concluded a violation of Article 2 as the authorities failed to effectively protect the victim from the improper conduct of his superiors.



Izci v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights (2013)


Gender-based violence in general

A Turkish woman was allegedly attacked by the police following her participation in a peaceful demonstration to celebrate Women’s Day in Istanbul and that such police brutality in Turkey was tolerated and often went unpunished. The ECtHR considered that the police officers had failed to show a certain degree of tolerance and restraint before attempting to disperse a crowd which had neither been violent nor presented a danger to public order,and that the use of disproportionate force against the demonstrators had resulted in the injuring of Ms Izci. Moreover, the failure of the Turkish authorities to find and punish the police officers responsible raised serious doubts as to the State’s compliance with its obligation under the ECHR to carry out effective investigations into allegations of ill-treatment. Finally, the use of excessive violence by the police officers had had a dissuasive effect on people’s willingness to demonstrate. The Court reiterated that a great number of applications against Turkey concerning the right to freedom of assembly and/or excessive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations were currently pending. Considering the systemic aspect of the problem, it therefore requested the Turkish authorities to adopt general measures, in accordance with their obligations under Article 46 of the Convention, in order to prevent further similar violations in the future.



Jabari v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights (2000)


Gender-based violence in general

The applicant fled to Turkey from Iran fearing that she would be convicted of having committed adultery, an offence under Islamic law, and sentenced to be stoned to death or flogged. She was arrested at Istanbul airport on the ground that she had entered Turkey using a forged passport. No charges were brought against her on account of the forged passport but she was ordered to be deported. The applicant subsequently lodged an asylum request, which was rejected by the authorities on the ground that the request had not been submitted within five days of her arrival in her Turkey. Later the applicant was granted refugee status by the UNHCR. The Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's petition against the implementation of her deportation on the grounds that there was no need to suspend it since it was not tainted with any obvious illegality and its implementation would not cause irreparable harm to the applicant. The applicant complained that her right not to be subjected to ill-treatment guaranteed under Article 3 ECHR would be breached if she were to be deported to Iran. She further complained that she had no effective remedy in the domestic law of the respondent state to challenge her deportation, in breach of Article 13. The ECtHR was not persuaded that the authorities of the respondent state conducted any meaningful assessment of the applicant's claim, including its arguability. It would appear that her failure to comply with the five-day registration requirement under the Asylum Regulation 1994 denied her any scrutiny of the factual basis of her fears about being removed to Iran. The automatic and mechanical application of such a short time-limit for submitting an asylum application must be considered at variance with the protection of the fundamental value embodied in Article 3 of the Convention. It fell to the branch office of the UNHCR to interview the applicant about the background to her asylum request and to evaluate the risk to which she would be exposed in the light of the nature of the offence with which she was charged. The Administrative Court on her application for judicial review limited itself to the issue of the formal legality of the applicant's deportation rather than the more compelling question of the substance of her fears, even though by that stage the applicant must be considered to have had more than an arguable claim that she would be at risk if removed to her country of origin. It further observed that the government have not sought to dispute the applicant's reliance on the findings of Amnesty International concerning the punishment meted out to women who are found guilty of adultery. Having regard to the fact that the material point in time for the assessment of the risk faced by the applicant was the time of its own consideration of the case, the Court was not persuaded that the situation in the applicant's country of origin has evolved to the extent that adulterous behavior was no longer considered a reprehensible affront to Islamic law. It had taken judicial notice of recent surveys of the current situation in Iran and noted that punishment of adultery by stoning still remained on the statute book and may be resorted to by the authorities. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court found it substantiated that there was a real risk of the applicant being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if she was returned to Iran. Accordingly, the order for her deportation to Iran would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3. The Court held that there had been a breach of Article 13. The notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 and the possibility of suspending the implementation of the measure impugned. Since the Administrative Court failed in the circumstances to provide any of these safeguards, the Court was led to conclude that the judicial review proceedings did not satisfy the requirements of Article 13.



Ebcin v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights (2011)


Gender-based violence in general

A teacher was attacked in the street by two individuals who threw acid in her face. She alleged that the authorities had failed to prevent the attack on basis of a report by the Turkish Human Rights Foundation according to which 91 of 143 teacher killings in south-east Turkey between 1984 and 1995 were attributed to the PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organization). Her claim for compensation was twice set aside by the Supreme Administrative Court. Her aggressors were not arrested until six years later; the proceedings against the instigator of the aggression lasted over seven years and those against his accomplice were still pending before the Court of Cassation. The ECtHR did not hold the authorities responsible for any failure to take steps to protect the applicant individually due to lack of proof of any intimidation or threats to which she might have been subjected. But the Court found that the administrative and criminal proceedings had failed to provide prompt and adequate protection against a serious act of violence and that there had been a violation of Articles 3 and 8. The Court did not examine the case under Article 6.



Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (2008)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

The applicant, who was born to a mother in slavery, was sold to a local chief at age 12. For the next nine years she was subjected to rape, violence, and forced labor without remuneration. When Niger’s Supreme Court failed to convict her "owner" under Article 270.1-5 of the Nigerien Criminal Code, which made slavery illegal in 2003, the applicant brought her case before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice under Article 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05. The court ruled that the applicant had been a slave under the definition in Article 1 (I) of the Slavery Convention of 1926 and that in failing to convict her former "owner," Niger had not upheld its legal responsibility to protect her from slavery under international law. This case was the first ECOWAS ruling on slavery and only the second conviction made under Niger’s 2003 anti-slavery law. The case gained a high level of publicity, setting the precedent for women to fight back against the traditional slavery practices common to Niger and other ECOWAS nations. As of 2009, there had been approximately 30 more cases upholding the prohibition of slavery in Niger.



Saadia Ali v. Tunisia CAT Committee (2008)


Gender-based violence in general

Saadia Ali, a dual French/Tunisian citizen, was attempting to obtain an official document from the court of first instance in Tunis when she was taken into custody, stripped of her clothing, and beaten by a prison guard in front of fifty male prisoners for verbally criticizing a Tunisian public official. Upon regaining consciousness, Ali was given a summary trial without due process and a suspended sentence of three months imprisonment for attacking a public official. Ali’s lawyer initiated a complaint with the office of the State prosecutor, which rejected the complaint without further explanation. In her complaint to the Committee Against Torture, Ali alleged violations of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT), and cited violations of internationally recognized standards on the administration of justice and articles 25 and 26 of Tunisia’s Code of Criminal Procedure. The Committee held that Tunisia’s actions towards Ali were tantamount to torture and violated articles 1, 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Convention. The deliberate infliction of severe pain and suffering upon Ali by Tunisian public officials constituted torture under article 1 and cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment within the meaning of article 16. The Committee also held that the State’s dismissal of the complaint and delay in investigating Ali’s case established a violation of articles 12 and 13, under which a State has the obligation to promptly investigate allegations of torture. The State’s failure to act on the complaint and immediately launch an investigation equated to a breach of the State’s obligations under article 14 to provide redress to victims of torture in the form of restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.



Slovak Republic, Constitutional Court, Decision No. 10/2010-36, 2010 Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (2010)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

Ms M.V. (the claimant) was sterilized while giving birth to her second child. She was informed that sterilization would be performed on her shortly before delivery by C-section, to which she did not give her written consent. The day after giving birth, while inquiring about her own health and that of her child, she was informed that sterilization was performed due to health reasons, as another pregnancy could be dangerous. She was given a form to sign for the “sake of her health,” which she did without reading or inquiring due to her concerns about the well-being of her newborn child. The claimant only later found out that sterilization was not a “life-saving” procedure after speaking with a representative from a non-governmental organization. Her claim was dismissed by the district and regional courts based on hospital records which contained her written consent and the testimonies of the doctors and other staff members. She filed a claim with the Constitutional Court which held that the decisions of the district and regional courts did not sufficiently address the claimants claims, in breach of the claimants' right to a fair trial. The Constitutional Court awarded the claimant EUR 1,500 damages and ordered the re-examination of the matter by the district court.



De La Cruz-Flores v. Peru Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2004)


Gender-based violence in general

De La Cruz-Flores was detained, charged and convicted by a "faceless judge" for the crime of terrorism. In 2003, laws were passed ordering the annulment of judgments made by secret judges and practitioners. De La Cruz-Flores, however, remained in captivity, captivity she argued was arbitrary. The Court held that Peru violated De La Cruz-Flores's rights under Articles 1(1), 5, 7 and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court ordered Peru to reinstate De La Cruz-Flores in her previous employment, grant her any previous retirement benefits, pay her costs, pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, grant her medical and psychological treatment and provide her with a grant for professional development.



Lori Berenson-Mejía v. Peru Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2004)


Custodial violence, Gender-based violence in general

The IACHR submitted an application to the Court to determine whether Peru violated Articles 1(1), 5, 8 and 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights to the detriment of Berenson-Mejia in relation to proceedings that took place against her before both military and civil courts, as well as to the inhumane conditions of detention to which she was subjected. The Court held that Peru violated Berenson-Mejia's right to humane treatment (Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 5(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights) due to the conditions she faced while incarcerated, violated Articles 1(1), 2, 8(1), 8(2), 8(2)(b)-(d), (f), and (h), 8(5) in relation to her military trial, but not to her civil trial. The Court ordered Peru to provide Berenson-Mejia with adequate medical care, to discharge the reparation established against her in favor of the State in her civil trial, to improve the conditions at the prison in which she was detained to meet international standards, and to pay costs and expenses.



Doebbler v. Sudan African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2003)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Eight female students of the Nubia Association of Ahilia University were arrested for engaging in immoral activities that violated the public order, in contravention of Sudan's Criminal Code, which incorporates Islamic Sharia law. The immoral activities the women committed consisted of "girls kissing, wearing trousers, dancing with men, crossing legs with men, sitting with boys, and sitting and talking with boys." The women were punished with fines and between 25 and 40 lashes. The lashing took place in public by use of a wire and plastic whip. The wire and plastic whip were unclean, the lashing was not under the supervision of a doctor, and the women were bareback in public while they were lashed. The complaint asserted that the punishment violated Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which guarantees the right of individuals to human dignity and prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment. The Commission found that the lashing violated article 5 of the African Charter. It requested that Sudan abolish the punishment of lashing and compensate the women for their injuries.



T.A. v. Sweden CAT Committee (2003)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

T.A. and her husband are Bangladeshi citizens and members of the Jatiya party. After T.A. was arrested for participating in a political demonstration and released, the police, accompanied by members of an opposing political party, arrested T.A. and her four-year-old daughter. At the police station, T.A. endured torture including repeated rape until she confessed to the crime of illegal arm trading. She was released after she signed a document stating that she would not take part in any further political activity. T.A. fled to Sweden with her daughter where she applied for refugee status. The Migration Board that received her application did not contest her allegations of rape and torture, but concluded that these acts could not be attributed to the State; rather, they were to be regarded as acts of individual policemen. T.A. appealed to the Alien Appeals Board, submitting medical certificates that supported her account of torture and the traumatic experience it had on her daughter. The Alien Appeals Board upheld the Migration Board’s decision and stated that because of a political change in Bangladesh since the incident, T.A. would not be subjected to further torture if she returned. In her complaint to the Committee, T.A. argued that given the medical evidence of the case, a deportation order would in itself constitute a violation of article 16 of the Convention under which State parties are obliged to prevent cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment conducted by the State or its public officials. The Committee considered T.A.’s complaint in regards to a State’s obligation under article 3 not to expel or to return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of torture. The Committee noted that T.A. belonged to a political party in opposition to the current ruling party in Bangladesh, and that torture of political opponents was frequently practiced by state agents. Taking into account the Bangladeshi police’s ongoing search for T.A. because of her political affiliations, the Committee concluded that T.A. would be exposed to a serious risk of torture if she returned to Bangladesh, and therefore her forced deportation would violate article 3 of the Convention.



Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden CAT Committee (1996)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki was raped in her home in front of her children by security forces after refusing to allow the government party MPR to host a party rally at her restaurant in Kisanto. She was detained and taken to Makal prison in Kinshasa where the guards forced the women prisoners to dance before they beat and raped them. Kisoki stated that she was raped more than ten times while in prison. After she managed to escape when her sister bribed a prison supervisor, Kisoki fled to Sweden where she immediately requested asylum. The Swedish Board of Immigration denied her request, concluding that the political climate in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) had improved, and Kisoki would not suffer persecution or harassment for her past activities. After the Alien Appeals Board confirmed the decision, Kisoki submitted a new request which referred to the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of rights violations in Zaire. Her application was denied again on the ground that Kisoki could not introduce new evidence. Her complaint to the Committee accused Swedish authorities of basing their decision on a false image of Zaire. Kisoki cited the Commission on Human Rights report to demonstrate that female prisoners are often raped, and a background paper from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees the show that the Zairian Security Police expose return asylum seekers to long sessions of interrogation. The Committee held that Kisoki’s history of working with the opposition party and of detention and torture provide substantial grounds to believe she would face further persecution and torture if she returned to Zaire. Thus, expulsion or return would be violation of article 3 which obligates State parties not to expel or return a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.



Velasquez-Rodriguez Case Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1988)


Gender-based violence in general

States are responsible for private acts of violence (duty to investigate, prosecute and punish).



Interights (on behalf of Husaini and Others) v. Nigeria African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2005)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

Interights, an international human rights organization, filed a complaint before the Commission on behalf of several complainants, arguing that Nigeria's Islamic Sharia courts had violated their rights to a fair trial and due process. The main complainant, S.H., a nursing mother, was sentenced to death by stoning for adultery. She was tried under Sharia law, according to which adultery is punishable by death. The petitioners also included A.L., a woman sentenced to similar punishment for adultery, and B.M., an unmarried woman who received 100 lashes as punishment for zina (voluntary premarital sexual intercourse). In response to the complaint, the Chairman of the African Commission sent an urgent appeal to Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, urging him to suspend further implementation of the Sharia penal statutes and convictions under those laws pending the outcome of the complaints before the Commission. In response to the Chairman's urgent appeal, the Secretary General of the African Union formally brought the matter to President Obasanjo. The President's Chief of Staff wrote to the Chairman of the African Commission that while the federal government could not suspend the operation of Sharia law, the administration would ensure that the "right to life and human dignity" of S.H. and the others would be adequately protected. Before the court ruled on admissibility of the complaint, the complainant moved for withdrawal of the complaint, and it was withdrawn from the Commission.



K.L. v. Peru Human Rights Committee (2003)


Gender-based violence in general

HRC held that Peruvian government violated Article 7 (the right to be free from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment), Article 17 (the right to privacy) and Article 24 (special protection of the rights of a minor) when it denied 17 year-old the right to a legal therapeutic abortion.



Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz v. Peru Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2007)


Gender-based violence in general

The IACHR lodged an application against Peru for the violation, among other things, of the right to free association. Garcia-Santa Cruz was founder of a women's organization in a mining community, and provided support to the families of miners during a mining strike. Garcia-Santa Cruz was executed, and the Court held that her execution was an attempt to intimidate miners into not unionizing. The Court held this type of intimidation to be a violation of the freedom of association (Article 16 of the American Convention). The Court also found Peru to have violated Articles 1(1), 4, 5, 7, 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court ordered Peru to investigate and punish those who carried out these violations, to publicly acknowledge international responsibility for these violations, to provide psychological services to the victims' next of kin, and to pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages and costs.



X and Y v. Argentina Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1996)


Custodial violence, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

Vaginal inspections for visits to family inmates. A complaint was brought against Argentina by a woman and her 13-year old daughter who were routinely subjected to vaginal inspections when they would visit the woman's husband (and girl's father) at a prison. The complaint alleged that such inspections violated the "American Convention as it offends the dignity of the persons subjected to such a procedure (Article 11), and is a degrading penal measure which extends beyond the person condemned or on trial (Article 5.3) and, furthermore, discriminates against women (Article 24), in relation to Article 1.1." Argentina argued that such inspections were reasonably necessary and conducted with as little intrusion as possible by female guards. The Commission opined that such an inspection should not occur unless absolutely necessary. In this case, the Court found that the procedure was not absolutely necessary as there were alternatives that could achieve the same objective. The Commission also held that in cases where such an inspection was absolutely necessary, they should only be carried out by pursuant to a judicial order, and by qualified medical personnel. The Commission found the inspections in this case to violate Articles 5, 11, 17, 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

Inspecciones vaginales para visitas a familiares de internos. Una mujer y su hija de 13 años de edad fueron sometidas de forma rutinaria a una inspección vaginal cuando visitaban al marido de la mujer (y al padre de la niña) en una prisión, por lo cual demandan a Argentina. La queja alegó que tales inspecciones violaron la "Convención Americana, ya que ofende la dignidad de las personas sometidas a tal procedimiento (Artículo 11), y es una medida penal degradante que se extiende más allá de la persona condenada o enjuiciada (Artículo 5.3) y además, discrimina a las mujeres (artículo 24), en relación con el artículo 1.1 ". Argentina argumentó que tales inspecciones eran necesarias y que se llevaron a cabo con la menor intrusión posible de las guardias. La Comisión opinó que tal inspección no debería ocurrir a menos que sea absolutamente necesario. En este caso, el Tribunal consideró que el procedimiento no era absolutamente necesario ya que había alternativas que podrían lograr el mismo objetivo. La Comisión también sostuvo que en los casos en que dicha inspección fuera absolutamente necesaria, solo deberían llevarse a cabo de conformidad con una orden judicial y por personal médico calificado. La Comisión consideró que las inspecciones en este caso violan los artículos 5, 11, 17 y 19 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.



Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2004)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The IACHR submitted this case to the Court, alleging violations by Guatemala of the rights to humane treatment, to judicial protection, to fair trial, to equal treatment, to freedom of conscience and of religion, and to private property, in combination with the obligation to respect rights. These allegations arose from a massacre carried out by the Guatemalan army against a primarily Mayan community. During the massacre, approximately 20 girls ages 12 to 20 were mistreated, raped and murdered. Guatemala acknowledged its international responsibility for the massacre and withdrew any objections to the allegations. The Court found that Guatemala "breached the rights set forth in Articles 5(1) and 5(2) (Right to Humane Treatment); 8(1) (Right to Fair Trial); 11 (Right to Privacy); 12(2) and 12(3) (Freedom of Conscience and Religion); 13(2) paragraph a and 13(5) (Freedom of Thought and Expression), 16(1) (Freedom of Association), 21(1) and 21(2) (Right to Property), 24 (Right to Equal Protection) and 25 (Right to Judicial Protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights; and that it did not fulfill the obligation to respect rights set forth in Article 1(1) of that Convention, as set forth in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the instant Judgment."

La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos presentó este caso a la Corte, alegando violaciones por parte de Guatemala de los derechos humanos, con respecto a la protección judicial, a un juicio justo, a un trato igualitario, a la libertad de conciencia y de religión, y a la propiedad privada, en combinación con la obligación de respetar dichos derechos. Estas acusaciones surgieron a partir de una masacre llevada a cabo por el ejército guatemalteco contra una comunidad principalmente maya. Durante la masacre, aproximadamente 20 niñas de 12 a 20 años fueron maltratadas, violadas y asesinadas. Guatemala reconoció su responsabilidad internacional por la masacre y retiró cualquier objeción a las acusaciones. El Tribunal determinó que el país "violó los derechos establecidos en los artículos 5 (1) y 5 (2) (Derecho a un trato humano); 8 (1) (Derecho a un juicio justo); 11 (Derecho a la privacidad); 12 (2) ) y 12 (3) (Libertad de conciencia y religión); 13 (2) párrafos a y 13 (5) (Libertad de pensamiento y expresión), 16 (1) (Libertad de asociación), 21 (1) y 21 ( 2) (Derecho a la propiedad), 24 (Derecho a la igualdad de protección) y 25 (Derecho a la protección judicial) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, y que no cumplió con la obligación de respetar los derechos establecidos en el artículo 1 (1) de esa Convención, tal como se establece en los párrafos 47 y 48 de la presente Sentencia. "



Memoranda

Anti-Human Trafficking Legislation in Tanzania and 6 Countries Around the World (2013)


Gender-based violence in general, Trafficking in persons

In 2008, Tanzania adopted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act (ATPA) to combat human trafficking, mandate stricter investigation and prosecution, and afford protection to victims of trafficking. This report: explains and evaluates the ATPA, including the effectiveness of its implementation since its enactment in 2008; describes similar acts around the world, including an evaluation of those laws’ implementation and effectiveness; offers specific recommendations for Tanzania to enhance the effectiveness of its anti-trafficking law.



Child Testimony: Admissibility, Reliability and Procedures (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

This memorandum discusses the strategies courts employ around the world to treat child victims and witnesses and their evidence when giving testimony. International and regional human rights standards have highlighted good practices in the treatment of vulnerable young child witnesses, centering on the foundational principle of the best interests of the child. In turn, domestic courts and legislatures worldwide have created and employed a broad range of judicial approaches to the admissibility of child witness testimony; the reliability of child witness evidence, and the procedures that should be employed to facilitate child witness testimony.



Closed-circuit Television in Cases Involving Child Testimony (2014)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

This memorandum discusses the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) in courtrooms for cases where there will be child testimony. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes recommends that children be allowed to give testimony through CCTV or another mechanism in order to prevent the child witness from being traumatized. Unfortunately, given the funding requirements, few countries have the facilities to use CCTV. Yet, a number of countries have statutes allowing for alternative mechanisms to prevent child victims from seeing the defendant while giving testimony. Some laws providing for the use of CCTV have been challenged, but courts have upheld the laws in nearly every situation.



Assessing the Impact of Mandatory Minimum Sentences on Sexual Offences in Tanzania (2013)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

With the goal of assessing the impact of mandatory minimum sentences for sexual offences in Tanzania, this memorandum provides a comparative study with a small sample of jurisdictions – including Canada, Kenya, Lesotho, Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania - to showcase how different countries have utilized mandatory minimum sentences to address sexual offences. It also explores whether imposing mandatory minimums has resulted in a reduction of the commission of the sexual offences they target.



Domestication of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and the role of national courts (2013)


Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

This memorandum describes several success stories from countries that have domesticated the Convention on the Rights of the Child into their national laws and also examines the role of the courts. In particular, this memorandum focuses on how Lithuania, Bangladesh and South Africa have implemented their laws and/or the role that the courts have played in preventing child abuse and exploitation.



Gender Based Violence in Africa (2011)


Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum provides a brief overview of the issue of gender based violence in Sub-Saharan Africa with relevant statistics.



Journalistic Rights to Photography (2012)


Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum discusses the intellectual property rights of a journalist to the photos he has taken outside the course of his employment citing international, United States and United Kingdom law.



Problems Women and Child Victims and Witnesses Encounter in Sexual Offenses Cases in Tanzania (2012)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum examines the particular problems that women and children confront as vulnerable victims and witnesses in sexual offenses cases in Tanzania.



Class Action Litigation in the United States (2012)


Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum presents information regarding class action lawsuits in the United States, highlighting the importance of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, outlining the most common types of class action lawsuits in the United States, discussing the pros and cons of using class action litigation, and briefly considering the practicality of utilizing the U.S. model of class action litigation in India.


Judicial Caseloads in the United States (2012)


Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum presents information about the caseload of courts in the United States. The memorandum discusses the structure under which the judicial caseload is broken down and provides the most currently available case statistics for both federal and state court systems. Appendices and references to supplemental resources are included and provide more extensive caseload information and statistics.



Problems in Prosecuting or Adjudicating Corruption Cases in Tanzania (2012)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum provides a brief overview of corruption in Tanzania and efforts taken by the government to address the problem. The memorandum also examines the problems that emerge in prosecuting or adjudicating corruption cases in Tanzania and the reasons corruption cases fail.



Proceeds of crime in Tanzania (2012)


Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum examines the rules governing forfeiture of proceeds of crime in Tanzania.



Exploitation of Child Workers in Bangladesh (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Trafficking in persons

This memorandum examines the exploitation of child domestic workers in Bangladesh and the ties between child domestic labor and trafficking.



Problem-Solving Courts and Integrated Domestic Violence Courts in New York State (2011)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum briefly outlines the history and structure of problem-solving courts in New York state, with a special focus on New York's Integrated Domestic Violence Court System.



Public Policy Considerations of Child Domestic Labor and Exploitation of Child Domestic Workers (2010)


Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

This memorandum examines the public policy considerations raised by child domestic labor and the exploitation of child domestic workers.



Resources Relating to the Effects of Polygamy (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum provides some resources on the effects of polygamy on women, men, children and society at large.


Articles

Sustainable Development (2011)


Gender-based violence in general

By Sandra Day O'Connor & Kim K. Azzarelli. 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2011). Copyright 2011 by the Cornell International Law Journal.


Judging Women (2011)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Employment discrimination

By Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman, & Eric A. Posner. 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 504-532 (2011).


The Gender Jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Progress in the Revolutionary United Front Judgments (2011)


Gender-based violence in general

By Valerie Oosterveld. 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2011). Copyright 2011 by the Cornell International Law Journal.



Access to International Criminal Justice for Victims of Violence Against Women Under International Family Law (2009)


Gender-based violence in general

Mohamed Y. Mattar, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 141 (2009).


Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

By Johanna E. Bond. 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 509-574 (2010). Reprinted from Southern California Law Review, Volume 83. Copyright 2010 Southern California Law Review.


Using international law to promote millennium health targets: a role for the CEDAW optional protocol in reducing maternal mortality (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

By Margaux J. Hall. 28 Wis. Int'l L.J. 74-107 (2010). Reprinted from Wisconsin International Law Journal, Volume 28. Copyright 2010 Wisconsin International Law Journal.



Reference Guides

Checklist for Domestic Application of International Law (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

This reference guide aims to assist judges and other legal professionals in applying international law in domestic courts.


Charts

Analysis of Jurisprudence Involving Sexual and other Gender-Based Violence During Conflict (2010)


Gender-based violence in general

This chart summarizes and analyzes gender-based violence cases before international war crimes tribunals and special courts.