Affirmative action is defined as a set of procedures designed to eliminate unlawful discrimination among applicants, remedy the results of such prior discrimination, and prevent such discrimination in the future. Applicants may be seeking admission to an educational program or looking for professional employment.
Disgorgement is a remedy requiring a party who profits from illegal or wrongful acts to give up any profits they made as a result of that illegal or wrongful conduct. The purpose of this remedy is to prevent unjust enrichment and make illegal conduct unprofitable.
1. May an individual bring a claim on behalf of the plan under ERISA section 502(a)(2) for failure to follow the individual's investment instructions, where the only recovery would be to the individual's personal account?
2. When ERISA section 502(a)(3) limits a participant to suing for equitable relief, does that include reimbursement by a fiduciary for lost profits to a 401(k) retirement plan?
James LaRue, an employee of the management consulting firm DeWolff, Bobert & Associates, sued his employer for improper management of his 401(k) pension plan. Under DeWolff's pension plan, LaRue could choose among a variety of investment options for his individual account. In his suit, LaRue alleged that DeWolff failed to follow his investment instructions. LaRue sued under sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Fourth Circuit held that neither section authorized LaRue's claim because it was an individual claim and because LaRue sought compensatory damages. LaRue argues that his claim benefits the plan as a whole rather than himself individually, and that he seeks equitable relief rather than compensatory damages. The outcome of this case will determine whether an individual can use these provisions to sue an employer for improper management of a pension fund.
1. Section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2), provides that a "civil action may be brought ... by a participant ... for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title." 29 U.S.C. 1109 states that "a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any ... duties imposed upon fiduciaries ... shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach."
The First Question Presented is:
Does ? 502(a)(2) of ERISA permit a participant to bring an action to recover losses attributable to his account in a "defined contribution plan" that were caused by a fiduciary breach? Hereinafter, this will be referred to as the "502(a)(2) Question."
2. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3), provides that a "civil action may be brought ... by a participant ... to obtain other appropriate equitable relief ... to redress ... violations" of the statute.
The Second Question Presented is:
Does ? 502(a)(3) permit a participant to bring an action for monetary "make-whole" relief to compensate for losses directly caused by fiduciary breach (known in pre-merger courts of equity as "surcharge")? Hereinafter, this will be referred to as the "502(a)(3) Question."
James LaRue, an employee of the management consulting firm DeWolff, Boberg & Associates ("DeWolff"), brought suit against his employer and his employer's 401(k) plan for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to administration of the plan, in which LaRue was a participant. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc.
The authors would like to thank Professors Davidson Douglas and Emily Sherwin for their insights into LaRue v. DeWolff.
Should the government compensate the bankruptcy debtors who paid higher fees than some other debtors by refunding the higher fees or by retrospectively charging the other debtors higher fees, or is prospective uniformity in fees sufficient?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the proper remedy for bankruptcy debtors who were treated differently, paying higher fees under a statute enacted by Congress without constitutional authority. John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts entities filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2016 and paid $2.5 million higher fees than debtors in some federal districts, before the Judiciary and Congress resolved the disparate treatment. The U.S. Trustee argues that prospective equality in fees is a sufficient remedy, but if a retrospective remedy is required, the Court should extend the higher fees to debtors previously exempt from it. Hammons argues that the only proper remedy for fees paid under an unconstitutional statute is to refund them and that the remedies the U.S. Trustee proposes violate due process. The outcome of this case will affect how the bankruptcy system is funded—by debtors or taxpayers—and the remedial schemes for debtors who received unequal treatment.
Whether the appropriate remedy for the constitutional uniformity violation found by this court in Siegel v. Fitzgerald is to require the United States Trustee to grant retrospective refunds of the increased fees paid by debtors in U.S. Trustee districts during the period of disuniformity, or is instead either to deem sufficient the prospective remedy adopted by Congress or to require the collection of additional fees from a much smaller number of debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts.
The United States is divided into ninety-four judicial districts. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006 LLC v. Office of the U.S. Trustee (“CA10”) at 7. Before 1978, the Judicial Conference funded bankruptcy courts and appointed bankruptcy judges (“BAs”) in all districts.
May an individual sue in district court for monetary damages after accepting a settlement offer through administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether settlement with a school satisfies the exhaustion requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) so that a student might bring a claim for monetary damages in a district court. Miguel Luna Perez asserts that IDEA’s exhaustion is satisfied by a settlement with a school, not only by a decision on the merits. Perez further argues that requiring individuals to exhaust their claims in lieu of settlement would be futile. Further, Perez asserts that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion would not cause individuals to bypass the administrative IDEA process. Sturgis Public Schools and Sturgis Board of Education (“Sturgis”) counter that settlement is insufficient for exhaustion requirements especially when the individual seeks monetary damages. Sturgis further contends that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion might result in parents seeking monetary damages in the courts to the detriment of their child’s free appropriate public education. The outcome of this case has important implications on the substantive rights of children with disabilities in terms of the dispute resolution proceedings between the schools and parents.
(1) Whether, and in what circumstances, courts should excuse further exhaustion of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s administrative proceedings under Section 1415(l) when such proceedings would be futile; and (2) whether Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion of a non-IDEA claim seeking money damages that are not available under the IDEA.
When Miguel Luna Perez (“Perez”) was nine, he emigrated from Mexico and began school in the Sturgis Public School District. Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools at 2. Since Perez was deaf, the school assigned him an aide to assist him with learning sign language. Id. However, the aide did not know sign language. Id.
Does the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, which increases filing fees for bankruptcy in all states except Alabama and North Carolina, violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Section 1930 of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, which increased filing fees in trustee districts but not in bankruptcy administrator districts, violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Petitioner Alfred H. Siegel argues that the disparity in fees is non-uniform because it applies to different geographic locations in the United States differently. As a result Siegel, contends that that the fee system is unconstitutional, and asks the Court to grant a full refund of the difference in fees. Respondent John P. Fitzgerald, III, counters that the disparity does not violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, impacting trustee districts and administrator districts in a facially neutral way. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the delegation of congressional power and the structure of bankruptcy courts.
Whether the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act violates the uniformity requirement of the Constitution’s bankruptcy clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in districts under the U.S. Trustee program, not those under the Bankruptcy Administrator program.
In 1978, Congress established the Trustee program and Bankruptcy Administrator program. Siegel v Fitzgerald at 160. These programs were designed to handle United States bankruptcy proceedings.
Does the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 require exhaustion of state administrative remedies when claims seeking monetary damages are made under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act?
The Supreme Court will decide whether the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 exhaustion requirement applies when a party brings a suit under the American with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act if the plaintiff is seeking a remedy not contemplated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The parties disagree on how to interpret Section 1415(l) of the IDEA and whether the IDEA is even implicated here. Stacy and Brent Fry posit that the plain text and purpose of the IDEA make it so monetary damages are not recoverable under the IDEA and thus neither exhaustion nor the IDEA should apply here. In response, Napoleon Community Schools et al. argues that the text and purpose of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement require that substantively-the-same claims be exhausted before going to court. Depending on the how the Court rules, the ease of access to courts could be altered, thus impacting the role of school-related administrative proceedings.
The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 (HCPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), requires exhaustion of state administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for non-IDEA actions "seeking relief that is also available under" the IDEA. The question presented, on which the circuits have persistently disagreed, is:
Whether the HCPA commands exhaustion in a suit, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, that seeks damages—a remedy that is not available under the IDEA.
Petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry are the parents of E.F., a minor, who was born with cerebral palsy. See Fry, et al. v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., et al., No. 14-1137, 2 (6th Cir. Jun. 12, 2015). E.F. was prescribed a service dog in 2008 to aid her with everyday tasks. See id. This service dog, named Wonder, helps E.F.
Temporary receivership is a remedy in which the court appoints a person to temporarily manage a piece of property that is in the defendant's possession.
