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Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates filed a class action lawsuit in federal court, arguing that Allstate Insurance Companyviolated New York law in failing to pay interest to policyholders. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that New York law prevented a class action lawsuit in this context, and the Second Circuit affirmed. This case concerns the application of state law in federal court under the Erie Doctrine, particularly whether New York class action law applies in federal court and whether it conflicts with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Shady Grove argues that Rule 23 is the comprehensive class action rule for federal courts, and that New York law cannot undermine federal court procedure. Allstate claims that state law applies because plaintiffs would have different rights in state and federal court. The case will address Rule 23 and the ability of states to restrict class action lawsuits.

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Sprint brought an action before the Iowa Utility Board to prevent Windstream, then called Iowa Telecom, from cutting off service to Sprint’s customers. After refusing Sprint’s request to cancel the hearing, the Board required Sprint to pay interstate access charges to Windstream. Sprint, thinking that the Iowa Utility Board did not have jurisdiction to make this determination, initiated suits in federal and state courts against Elizabeth S. Jacobs and other members of the Iowa Utility Board in their official capacity. In the federal suit, the district court granted the Board members’ abstention motion under Younger v. Harris—which requires a federal court to abstain from interfering with certain ongoing state judicial proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the abstention. The Supreme Court will clarify the difference between remedial and coercive actions, and determine whether Younger abstention applies to a federal suit when there is an ongoing remedial action in state court. The Court’s ruling implicates important issues of federalism including whether a party can seek federal judicial review of a state agency’s decision after the party voluntarily initiated the action.

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After suffering property damage in a 2010 hailstorm, Greg Knowles filed a class action lawsuit in Miller County, Arkansas, against the Standard Fire Insurance Company ("Standard Fire") for failure to pay a contractor's retention fee. Standard Fire tried to remove the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Pursuant to CAFA, a federal court has jurisdiction over a class action only if the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. The district court remanded the case to state court because Knowles's complaint stipulated that he would not seek more than $5,000,000 in damages for the class. Standard Fire argues that Knowles cannot defeat removal under CAFA by using a stipulation because it would bind absent class members before class certification and before Knowles could be declared an adequate class representative. Knowles argues that as master of his complaint, he is free to limit his claims, and that class members are not adversely affected by the stipulation. The Supreme Court will determine whether a named plaintiff in a class action, before being declared an adequate class representative, can limit the entire class's claims to $5,000,000 in damages in order to defeat an attempt to remove the case to federal court.

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This case asks whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit improperly overruled a district court when granting a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim on habeas review. The IAC claim arose in an Arizona capital murder case in which Respondent Danny Lee Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure psychology and neurology professionals in support of mitigating evidence relating to Jones’s mental health. Petitioner Ryan Thornell, the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to accord proper deference to the district court’s fact-finding as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Arizona’s state sentencing laws as well as improperly weighed aggravating factors in Jones’s case. Jones rejects these claims, arguing that the Ninth Circuit properly adjudicated his claim with respect to both law and fact. This case has significant implications with respect to the proper standard of deference between appellate courts and district courts and raises concerns about finality and state sovereignty in enforcement of criminal statutes.

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Sean Carter was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape, and was sentenced to death in Ohio. His counsel filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and requested a pre-petition competency hearing to determine whether Carter was competent to participate in the federal habeas proceeding. The district court granted both the petition and the request. Two years later, the district court determined that Carter was incompetent and dismissed his petition while also stopping the one-year statute of limitations. When the warden at the facility where Carter is imprisoned challenged the district court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that even though the district court was justified in finding Carter incompetent, the proper course of action was to stay, rather than dismiss, the habeas proceedings until Carter was competent. Another warden now argues that a district court does not have the authority to stay federal habeas proceedings, nor does Carter have a right to competence in his own habeas proceedings. How the Supreme Court decides this case will determine the balance between recognizing the finality of state-court criminal judgments and allowing federal courts to use their discretion to implement stays in federal habeas proceedings where a capital prisoner’s competence to assist counsel is questionable.

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This case asks the Court to resolve whether the prudential bankruptcy doctrine of “insurance neutrality” may be applied to exclude an insurance company from Section 1109(b)’s “party in interest” requirement. The insurance neutrality doctrine prohibits an insurance company from challenging a bankruptcy plan as a “party in interest” when that plan does not increase its liability exposure from pre-bankruptcy levels. This case arises from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Hanson Permanente Cement, who negotiated a plan to settle claims with asbestos tort claimants either through the tort system or via application to a special trust. The companies’ liability insurer, Truck Insurance Exchange, objected on the grounds that only the trust application process––not the tort-claim alternative––required significant disclosures from claimants to prevent duplicate or frivolous claims. Truck Insurance Exchange contends that “party in interest” encompasses any person materially affected by the bankruptcy plan. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. and other co-respondents dispute that the fact that an insurer might have been better off under another plan constitutes an “interest” in the proceedings. The case has major implications for settlement of mass tort claims and fairness to creditors. The Court must balance interests in the speedy and consensual settlement of legitimate claims, a core function of bankruptcy proceedings, with the legitimate desire of creditors to prevent collusive suits between debtors and claimant parties.

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Philip Morris removed a class action tobacco lawsuit from an Arkansas state court to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs Watson and Lawson sought to remand the case to state court, but their motion was denied. The Eighth Circuit held that Philip Morris was a corporation qualifying as a “person acting under a federal officer” and thus entitled to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The Supreme Court takes up the question of whether parties operating in an arena of heavy federal regulation qualify under this federal officer removal statute or, to the contrary, if the statute’s origins and history preclude such interpretation.

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