Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Mar. 22, 2004)
Court appealed From: United States District Court, Central District of California (Feb. 7, 2002) (summary judgment) -->Oral argument: October 12, 2005
Under Illinois law, caregivers who provide in-home assistance to disabled individuals through certain Medicaid-waiver programs may be compelled to support a private organization to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes. According to Illinois, the purpose of the mandate is to prevent inter-union rivalries that might hinder collective-bargaining negotiations and to prevent non-union members from “free-riding” off union members. In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether compelled support for exclusive representation in this specific context violates the Constitution. Petitioners argue that forcing in-home service providers to unionize infringes upon their First Amendments rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of association. Respondents counter that the Supreme Court’s precedent allows the government to force public workers to unionize when there is a compelling government interest for doing so. However, the fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on such a narrow issue has many commentators speculating that the Court may be intending to decide much more than is immediately apparent, including decisions that may have drastic consequences for the very future of labor unions.
Petitioners in this case are individuals who provide in-home assistance to disabled persons in Illinois. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). Some of the petitioners operate under Illinois’s Home Services Program (“Rehabilitation Program”) while the rest operate under Illinois’s Home-Based Services Program (“Disabilities Program”).
To raise a First Amendment retaliation claim, must public employees show they were fired for actually engaging in constitutionally protected activities?
In Paterson, New Jersey’s 2006 mayoral election, Mayor Jose Torres faced former police chief Lawrence Spagnola. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2015). Although he was friends with Spagnola and supported him privately, Paterson police detective Jeffrey Heffernan did not campaign for Spagnola, vote in the election, or consider himself politically active. But the day after picking up a Spagnola campaign yard sign at his mother’s request, Heffernan was demoted for his alleged political activities. See id. The Supreme Court will decide if Heffernan, to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim, must show that he actually engaged in constitutionally protected activity, or merely demonstrate that the City of Paterson fired him based on its belief that he engaged in protected activity. Heffernan argues that the First Amendment protects government employees from adverse action that is based upon political expression or association, regardless of the true nature of employees’ activities. See Brief for Petitioner, Jeffrey Heffernan at at 14. But Paterson maintains that the First Amendment protects only the literal exercise of association and speech. See Brief for Respondent, City of Paterson et al. at 8–12. The Court’s decision will impact how public employees engage in political activity, and the amount of litigation surrounding retaliation claims.
Does the First Amendment bar the government from demoting a public employee based on a supervisor’s perception that the employee supports a political candidate?
After twenty years in Paterson, New Jersey's police department, Jeffrey Heffernan was named a detective in 2005. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 149 (3d Cir.
Libel is a method of defamation expressed by print, writing, pictures, signs, effigies, or any communication embodied in physical form that is injurious to a person's reputation; exposes a person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule; or injures a person in their business or profession.
Should private entities operating public access television channels be considered state actors per se for constitutional purposes subject to First Amendment limitations on governmental action, even when the state does not control the private entity’s board or operations?
The Supreme Court will determine whether the Second Circuit erred in creating a per se rule that private operators of public access channels are state actors subject to constitutional liability and holding that this is true even where the state does not control the private operator’s board or operations. Petitioners, Manhattan Community Access Corporation et al., also known as Manhattan Neighborhood Network (“MNN”), argue that the Second Circuit violated Supreme Court precedent by determining the constitutional forum question before the state actor issue. MNN also asserts that the public access channels at issue, properly examined under that precedent, would not warrant constitutional protections. Respondents, DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez (“Halleck and Melendez”) counter that New York City made the legislative decision to remove MNN’s editorial discretion, thereby designating the public access channels as a public forum warranting constitutional protection. Halleck and Melendez also contend that administering a public forum constitutes a public function, meaning that constitutional protections apply. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it may have implications for the editorial discretion of other private entities—such as YouTube and Twitter—that host expressive spaces open to the public, including government officials.
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals in the 2nd Circuit erred in rejecting the Supreme Court’s state actor tests and instead creating a per se rule that private operators of public access channels are state actors subject to constitutional liability; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit erred in holding—contrary to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th and District of Columbia Circuits—that private entities operating public access television stations are state actors for constitutional purposes where the state has no control over the private entity’s board or operations.
New York City (“NYC”) awarded Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. (“Time Warner”) cable franchises for Manhattan and required Time Warner to provide four public access channels for public use, in accordance with New York State regulations. Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corporation at 5.
Does compelling a business owner to engage in artistic expression which goes against his deeply-held religious beliefs in accordance with Colorado’s public accommodation anti-discrimination law violate either the Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
This case asks the Supreme Court to balance public accommodation anti-discrimination laws and First Amendment rights. Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) prohibits commercial businesses from denying service to patrons based on protected characteristics, including sexual orientation. Masterpiece Cakeshop and its owner Jack Phillips contend that CADA violates their First Amendment rights to free artistic expression and religious belief. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission (“CCRC”) and Charlie Craig and David Mullins counter that Masterpiece Cakeshop’s First Amendment rights are not at issue, as CADA applies in all cases of commercial discrimination, and that merely invoking such rights should not exempt Petitioner from complying with the anti-discrimination law. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for LGBTQ rights, creative expression, and religious freedom.
Whether applying Colorado’s public-accommodation law to compel artists to create expression that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
In July 2012, Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins visited Petitioner Masterpiece Cakeshop, a Colorado bakery, to request that its owner, Petitioner Jack Phillips, create a cake for their same-sex wedding. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. at 1. Phillips declined their request, explaining that he would not make a custom wedding cake for them because of his Christian beliefs, but that he would be happy to sell them any other baked goods. Id.
The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his guidance and insights into this case.
Are state-mandated buffer zones around reproductive health care facilities that prohibit pro-life activists from approaching patients constitutional?
To dissuade women from having abortions, pro-life activists in Massachusetts sometimes attempt to communicate with women as they enter and exit reproductive healthcare facilities. To promote public safety, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law that imposes a thirty-five foot buffer zone around the access points to those clinics, and prohibits people from remaining in the buffer zone with a few exceptions. McCullen represents a group of Massachusetts residents who engage in pro-life counseling and who claim that the buffer zones put them at a disadvantage in their mission. McCullen also argues that the statute violates the First Amendment because it prevents patients who are contemplating having an abortion from obtaining information about alternatives. Coakley, the Massachusetts Attorney General, counters that the purpose of the statute is to prevent violence and facilitate access in and out of those healthcare facilities. The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to consider whether these buffer zones surrounding reproductive healthcare facilities are constitutional. The Court’s ruling will implicate the rights of pro-life and pro-choice activists in promoting their views near these facilities, as well as the rights of individuals seeking services there.
Massachusetts has made it a crime for speakers to “enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of an entrance, exit, or driveway of “a reproductive health care facility.” The law applies only at abortion clinics. The law also exempts, among others, clinic “employees or agents . . . acting within the scope of their employment.” In effect, the law restricts the speech of only those who wish to use public areas near abortion clinics to speak about abortion from a different point of view.
Petitioners are individuals who believe that women often have abortions because they feel pressured, alone, unloved, and out of options. Petitioners try to position themselves near clinics in an attempt to reach this unique audience, at a unique moment, to offer support, information, and practical assistance. They are peaceful, non-confrontational, and do not obstruct access. Yet, the State prohibits them from entering or standing on large portions of the public sidewalk to proffer leaflets or seek to begin conversations with willing listeners.
The questions presented are:
For over three decades, pro-life and pro-choice advocates have battled each other over the best forums for expressing their ideas. See McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 171, 172 (1st. Cir 2009).
Media law refers to the regulations of mass media production and use. It includes various types of media forms such as broadcast television, radio, film, internet, and print; however, broadcast media is the most heavily regulated. Media Law can cover censorship, intellectual property (i.e.
Oral argument: Dec. 1, 2009
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Sept. 4, 2008)
Is the First Amendment violated when a state imposes content-moderation restrictions on social media companies’ ability to censure its posts or users or when a state imposes individualized-explanation requirements when social media companies censor their posts or users?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the First Amendment is violated when states impose content-moderation restrictions and require individualized explanations for social media companies to censure posts or users. Florida Attorney General Moody argues that the content-moderation laws only regulate content and not speech and that intermediate scrutiny applies. Moody also argues that social media companies are analogous to common carriers which are subject to regulations, and providing individualized explanations are not unduly burdensome to the well-funded social media companies. NetChoice counters that the content-moderation laws restrict editorial discretion, that its members are not common carriers, strict scrutiny applies to the content-moderation laws, and that the individual-explanation requirements are too burdensome. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the ability of social media companies to monitor posts on their platforms.
Issues: (1) Whether the laws’ content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment; and (2) whether the laws’ individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment.
On August 1, 2021, Senate Bill (“SB”) 7072 took effect in the state of Florida. NetChoice, LLC v. Attorney General at 7. The Bill’s purpose is to protect Floridians from censorship on popular social media sites. Id. at 7. Specifically, Governor Ron DeSantis said that the Bill was created to “fight against big tech oligarchs that . . .
