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The Supreme Court will determine whether federal jurisdiction over Title VII claims is limited to claims that have met Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement by first being presented to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Fort Bend County, Texas (“Fort Bend”) argues that it is “fairly discernable” from the text, structure, and purpose of Title VII that Congress intended to limit jurisdiction in this way, and so presenting a claim before the EEOC should constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Lois Davis (“Davis”), who filed a Title VII complaint alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and religious discrimination while employed by Fort Bend, contends that because Congress has not made a “clear statement” that the administrative exhaustion requirement under Title VII is jurisdictional, jurisdiction should not be limited where the exhaustion requirement has not been met. This case will have implications for the efficiency and costs of administrative actions and Title VII enforcement.

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This case asks the Supreme Court whether a third-party defendant in a state court class action may remove a counterclaim from state court to federal court. Petitioner Home Depot U.S.A. Inc. (“Home Depot”) argues that the Supreme Court’s case Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, which holds that an original plaintiff may not remove a counterclaim to federal court, does not apply to third-party defendants. Moreover, Home Depot asserts that the text of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) allows for the removal of class action counterclaims by any defendant, including third-party defendants. Conversely, Respondent George W. Jackson—a class action representative who counterclaimed against Home Depot—contends that Shamrock Oil actually bars third-party defendants from removing. Furthermore, Jackson maintains that CAFA’s discussion of removal does not explicitly expand the term “defendant” to third-party defendants, and thus should not be read to allow Home Depot to remove Jackson’s counterclaim. This case has large implications for consumer class action suits in state court, as it will affect class action litigation strategy and forum selection in potentially hostile state courts.

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Petitioners are a group of investors who owned shares in mutual funds offered or advised by respondents, Putnam Funds Trust. These investors brought a class action suit in Illinois state court asserting  breach  of fiduciary duty and alleging that the mutual funds set prices in a way that allowed arbitrageurs to exploit differences in prices to the detriment of long-term investors. The respondents removed the suit to federal court pursuant to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). The judge then remanded the case to state court because the petitioners had not alleged a loss “in connection with the purchase or sale of securities” as required under the Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), such a remand is not appealable if the remand is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, in conflict with previous decisions by the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, ruled that the remand was reviewable because the basis of the SLUSA remand  was not  lack  of  subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not apply. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars appellate review of remand orders in suits removed under statutes such as SLUSA.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to certify a class in a class action where some members lack Article III standing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require commonality of questions and predominance of similar injuries to allow certification, and lower courts certified Davis and other blind plaintiffs as a class of all legally blind individuals unable to use Labcorp self-check-in kiosks due to their disability. Labcorp contends that was error because the class contains some members who never experienced any harm from Labcorp and therefore lack Article III standing. Davis counters that all class members within the certified class suffered an injury; but, even if they did not, Article III does not require an injury for all unnamed class members at the class-certification stage. The outcome of this case has implications for settlement frequency and cost and the accuracy of certified classes. 

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The City of Riviera Beach seized Fane Lozman’s houseboat after he did not comply with new city regulations. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the indefinitely moored houseboat was a “vessel” for purposes of maritime jurisdiction under 1 U.S.C. § 3. Lozman argues that courts should interpret “vessel” purposively and that his houseboat was not a vessel because its purpose was not to transport people or goods. The City of Riviera Beach counters that the definition of “vessel” requires a capability test that asks merely if the structure is capable of transporting people or goods. Additionally, both parties and the U.S. Solicitor General argue the subsequent purchase and destruction of Lozman’s houseboat by the City of Riviera Beach does not render the case moot because of a $25,000 security bond that the City posted. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case may reshape the role of state and federal courts in some maritime matters. The decision could also expand current maritime legislation to apply to structures such as casino boats or floating homes, or remove federal legislative protections for maritime lenders.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review a non-citizen’s request that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) equitably toll the 90-day filing deadline on the non-citizen’s motion to reopen the non-citizen’s removal proceeding due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Peterson, arguing by Court appointment in support of the lower court’s judgment, argues that the Fifth Circuit properly characterized Mata’s request to reopen his removal proceeding as an invitation for the BIA to reopen the proceeding sua sponte, and that the Fifth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision. However, Mata contends that the Fifth Circuit erred in construing his request for equitable tolling as a request for the BIA to reopen the proceeding sua sponte, and that Congress specifically grants courts of appeals the jurisdiction to review final orders of removal and BIA decisions on motions to reopen via statute. Holder agrees with Mata that the Fifth Circuit mischaracterized Mata’s request to reopen and that Congress provided courts of appeals a statutory basis upon which to review final orders of removal and BIA decisions on motions to reopen. Holder further contends that courts should apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing agency determinations. The Supreme Court’s ruling implicates the due process rights of non-citizens and the fairness and substantive legality of the immigration system.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) provides federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over state law claims based on violations of the Exchange Act or whether state courts are permitted to hear such state law claims. See Brief for Petitioner, Merrill Lynch, et al. at i. Merrill Lynch argues that Manning relies on Regulation SHO, a federal regulation, and therefore federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. See id. at 19. On the other hand, Manning argues that, because his claims are based on state law, state courts have jurisdiction over this case, even if some elements of his claim rely on federal law. See Brief for Respondent, Greg Manning, et al. at 25. Ultimately, the Court’s decision has the potential to affect whether uniformity in decision-making is necessary to enforce Regulation SHO and whether state courts can govern duties arising under federal regulations. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, in Support of Petitioner at 8–9.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a provision of federal bankruptcy law, 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), restricts the power of federal courts to review the order approving the sale of Sears’ assets. In the wake of Sears’ bankruptcy filing, Sears’ former CEO created a company, Transform HoldCo. Transform HoldCo then acquired Sears’ lease for space located in the Mall of America and subsequently assigned that lease to one of its subsidiaries with approval from the Bankruptcy Court. MOAC Mall Holdings, which owns Mall of America, challenged the assignment in federal court. Transform HoldCo contends that federal courts do not have the ability to review the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, and that regardless, the relief that MOAC seeks is unavailable because under no circumstances can MOAC retake control of the lease. MOAC contends both that the assignment decision is indeed reviewable by federal courts and also that it is entitled to relief under the relevant statutes. This case has important implications for judicial review and for the protections that mall owners and good-faith transferees have during bankruptcy proceedings.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) allows a federal court to review decisions by an executive agency holding that a noncitizen was not eligible for relief from removal. The Eleventh Circuit claimed judicial review of such decisions was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and declined to review a Board of Immigration Appeals decision, which held that because Petitioner Pankajkumar Patel (“Patel”) had previously made a false statement to a federal agency, he was not eligible for such relief. Patel appealed, arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) merely bars judicial review of decisions to grant relief, not the prerequisite eligibility decisions. Respondent Attorney General Merrick Garland (“Garland”) interprets the provision to bar judicial review of any discretionary decision, including some eligibility decisions, although he agrees that the Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) prohibits judicial review of Patel’s particular eligibility decision. This case has important implications for the future of immigration law and procedure, the status of noncitizens in the United States, and the jurisdiction of federal courts.

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