Sixth Amendment

United States v. Resendiz-Ponce

Issues

If the government fails to include an element of a crime in its indictment, can the court consider the omission harmless error or does the omission require automatic reversal on appeal.

 

In 2002, an Immigration Naturalization Service agent discovered that Juan Resendiz-Ponce was in the United States illegally and had him deported. A year later border patrol agents detained Resendiz-Ponce after he presented false documentation and falsely stated his intended destination. The United States brought suit against Resendiz-Ponce for attempting to re-enter the country after having been previously deported, and he was convicted. While the indictment alleged that Resendiz-Ponce had attempted to re-enter the United States illegally, it did not allege that he presented false documents, made false statements, or performed any other act associated with his alleged attempt. Resendiz-Ponce appealed his conviction, claiming that the indictment’s failure to allege an act introduced a fatal flaw into his trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with this argument and reversed the conviction. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the omission of an element from a federal indictment requires automatic reversal on appeal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the omission of an element of a criminal offense from a federal indictment can constitute harmless error.

Maricopa County Superior Court in Arizona convicted Juan Resendiz-Ponce of kidnapping his common-law wife in August, 2002, and sentenced him to 45 days in county jail. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 425 F.3d 729, 729 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Vasquez v. United States

Issues

Whether a harmless-error analysis that focused on the weight of admissible evidence, rather than on the erroneous evidence’s effect on the jury, constituted a Sixth Amendment violation.

 

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois convicted Alexander Vasquez of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. However, the district court had erroneously admitted statements made during recorded telephone conversations by Marina Perez into evidence for their truth. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the lower court’s error was harmless because the jury would have come to the same conclusion had there been no error. Vasquez now appeals, arguing that the Seventh Circuit misapplied the harmless-error analysis by ignoring the impact the error had on the jury. The Supreme Court will decide how courts should properly carry out harmless-error tests, as well as examine the possible constitutional questions such an error would create.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Did the Seventh Circuit violate this Court's precedent on harmless error when it focused its harmless error analysis solely on the weight of the untainted evidence without considering the potential effect of the error (the erroneous admission of trial counsel's statements that his client would lose the case and should plead guilty for their truth) on this jury at all?

2. Did the Seventh Circuit violate Mr. Vasquez's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by determining that Mr. Vasquez should have been convicted without considering the effects of the district court's error on the jury that heard the case?

Carlos Cruz and Joel Perez planned to purchase cocaine from Alejandro Diaz at a gas station. See U.S. v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir.

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Vermont v. Brillon

Issues

Can a defendant have his case dismissed, on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, when his own public defender has requested or otherwise caused all of the delays?

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The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides defendants with the right to a speedy trial. In July of 2001, Michael Brillon was charged with aggravated domestic violence, and was ultimately sentenced to twelve-to-twenty years confinement. However, due to excessive delays before his trial caused solely by his public defenders, the Supreme Court of Vermont vacated his conviction and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The questions the United States Supreme Court will have to decide is whether delays caused by an indigent's public defenders' lack of preparedness can be the basis for a sixth amendment right to a speedy trial violation, on the theory that the state is responsible for providing adequate public defenders to indigents; and if so, does this give greater rights to indigent defendants than defendants with private attorneys?

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether continuances and delays caused solely by an indigent defendant's public defender can arise to a speedy trial right violation, and be charged against the State pursuant to the test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), on the theory that public defenders are paid by the state.

2. Whether the right to counsel, as established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), should result in broader speedy trial rights to indigent defendants than defendants who are able to retain private counsel, such that only delays by private counsel get charged against the defendant under the Barker v. Wingo test.

In July of 2001, Michael Brillon was arrested and charged with domestic violence for hitting his girlfriend in the face during an altercation. Vermont v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Sup. Ct. of VT, March 14, 2008). Although domestic violence is normally a misdemeanor in Vermont, Brillon was charged with an enhanced felony domestic assault and as an habitual offender; he had three prior felony convictions, and this incident was a violation of his the pretrial conditions of release.

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Villarreal v. Texas

Issues

Does a trial court’s order that prevents a defendant and their attorney from discussing the defendant’s ongoing testimony during an overnight recess violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a trial court may bar defense counsel from discussing a defendant’s ongoing testimony during an overnight recess. Villarreal argues that this restriction violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the attorney-client privilege. Texas counters that the restriction is a qualified order that does not infringe on constitutionally protected communications. The outcome of this case has profound implications for the fairness of trials and defendants’ testimony. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a trial court’s order that prevents a defendant and their attorney from discussing the defendant’s ongoing testimony during an overnight recess violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel?

David Asa Villarreal was on trial for allegedly murdering his live-in boyfriend, Aaron Estrada. Brief for Petitioner, David Asa Villarreal at 3; 

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Washington v. Recuenco

Issues

Can a judge's imposition of a sentencing enhancement based on a fact not found by the jury be upheld under the harmless error doctrine if it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have made the same finding?

 

A jury found that defendant Recuenco assaulted his wife using a “deadly weapon,” but the jury was never asked to find whether he used a “firearm.” Afterwards, the trial judge—independent of the jury—found that Recuenco used a “firearm” and increased his sentence by three years. Where the judge’s failure to instruct the jury about a “firearm” did not influence their verdict, may a reviewing court uphold the resulting sentence if it finds the erroneous instruction was harmless? Or must the court vacate the sentence because the error tainted the entire trial? The State of Washington argues that an incomplete jury instruction qualifies as a harmless error. To the contrary, Recuenco argues that the judge's imposition of an enhanced sentence based on facts not found by the jury violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether error as to the definition of a sentencing enhancement should be subject to harmless error analysis where it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict on the enhancement.

Defendant Arturo Recuenco became enraged at his wife after learning that she did not prepare dinner for his relatives. Brief for Petitioner at 3.

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Whorton v. Bockting

Issues

1. Does the new ruling in Crawford v. Washington, that a witness must have been cross–examined in order for their hearsay testimony to be admitted as evidence, “significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures” and “implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial,” allowing it to apply retroactively?

2. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2254 incorporate the analysis from Teague v. Lane to allow federal courts to review cases decided correctly under then-current law, but rendered incorrect by subsequent Supreme Court decisions?

 

Marvin Bockting, a criminal defendant, was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison by a Nevada Court. He challenges the constitutionality of the court’s admitting hearsay testimony of his victim without opportunity for cross-examination. While no such requirement was in place at the time of his conviction, the Supreme Court has since decided that such cross-examination is necessary for the admission of hearsay testimony. The Supreme Court is now asked to determine whether this new rule must be retroactively applied. This case will represent another data point in the set defining the scope of retroactivity of criminal procedure rules. Moreover, it will clarify federal courts’ powers to hear cases on writs of habeas corpus when the issue at hand is the retroactive application of a criminal procedure rule.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether, in direct conflict with the published opinions of the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) regarding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay evidence under the Sixth Amendment, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral review violates this court's ruling in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

3. Whether, in direct conflict with the published decisions of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1) and (2) adopted the Teague exceptions for private conduct which is beyond criminal proscription and watershed rules.

Autumn, a six year old girl, lived with her mother, Laura, and step-father, Marvin Bockting, in a one room motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1013 (2005). One evening Autumn awoke upset.

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Williams v. Illinois

Issues

Does it violate the Confrontation Clause to allow an expert witness, who did not prepare the forensic DNA report, to give testimony concerning the report?

 

Petitioner, Sandy Williams, was charged with sexual assault on 22-year-old L.J in 2000. At trial, the prosecution called an expert witness to testify about DNA test results that identified Williams as the assailant. He moved to strike the evidence under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because the testifying witness had not performed the DNA tests. The court denied his motion and convicted Williams of sexual assault, kidnapping, and robbery. He contends that allowing an expert witness to testify regarding forensic reports when the witness did not prepare the reports violates the Confrontation Clause. Williams insists that he must have the opportunity to cross-examine the analysts that prepared the reports, particularly because DNA test results are prone to error or manipulation. Respondent, the State of Illinois, argues that allowing the expert witness to testify does not violate the Confrontation Clause because the witness was applying her own independent analysis and opinions concerning the report.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state rule of evidence allowing an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by non-testifying analysts, where the defendant has no opportunity to confront the actual analysts, violates the Confrontation Clause.

On February 10, 2000, 22-year-old L.J. walked home after her shift as a clothing store cashier in Chicago. See People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 129 (Ill. 2010). L.J.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Wood v. Allen

Issues

Whether the scope of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act requires a federal court to conduct its own fact-finding, and to what degree, when determining the reasonableness of state court decisions regarding habeas corpus petitions under the Act.

 

In 1994, Petitioner Holly Wood was convicted of capital murder for sneaking into his ex-girlfriend’s bedroom and shooting her in the head with a shotgun. The judge imposed the death penalty, as recommended by the jury. Wood claims that, during sentencing, he did not receive effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. He argues that defense counsel failed to further investigate or present evidence of his mental disabilities. According to Wood, the state court’s rejection of this argument was an unreasonable application of federal law. He also argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard of review in habeas corpus proceedings abdicates the court’s judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The State of Alabama counters that the Eleventh Circuit properly deferred to the reasonable determinations of the state courts as required by the AEDPA. This decision will better define the appropriate level of deference due to state court factual determinations during federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether a state court’s decision on post-conviction review is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts when it concludes that, during the sentencing phase of a capital case, the failure of a novice attorney with no criminal law experience to pursue or present evidence of defendant’s severely impaired mental functioning was a strategic decision, while the court ignores evidence in the record before it that demonstrates otherwise?

2. Whether the rule followed by some circuits, including the majority in this case, abdicates the court’s judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act by failing to determine whether a state court decision was unreasonable in light of the entire state court record and instead focusing solely on whether there is clear and convincing evidence in that record to rebut certain subsidiary factual findings?

In 1993, while on parole for shooting another former girlfriend, petitioner Holly Wood snuck into the bedroom of his ex-girlfriend while she slept and fatally shot her in the head with a shotgun. See Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1283–84 (11th Cir.

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Additional Resources

·          Annotated U.S. Constitution: Sixth Amendment

·          Wex: Law about Criminal Procedure

·          Federation of American Scientists, Charles Doyle: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (Jun. 3, 1996)

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