Sixth Amendment

Smith v. Spisak

Issues

Whether the Sixth Circuit applied the proper standards for determining whether a convicted murderer was unfairly affected by jury instructions and his own counsel’s statements during sentencing, when counsel repeatedly referred to the terrible nature of his own client’s acts in closing arguments at the penalty phase of the trial.

 

Respondent, Frank Spisak (“Spisak”), was convicted on four counts of aggravated murder and four other felony counts for engaging in a shooting spree on and around Cleveland State University in 1982. The jury recommended, and the judge accepted, a death sentence. After the Ohio state courts denied Spisak’s appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered a new penalty phase of the trial. The Circuit Court held that defense counsel’s deficient performance during the trial’s sentencing phase functionally denied Spisak his Sixth Amendment right to effective legal representation. The Sixth Circuit held further that the jury instructions regarding sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment, because the jury may have misunderstood them to require a unanimous rejection of the death penalty before considering a life sentence. On its second time before the United States Supreme Court, Ohio argues that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires the federal courts to defer to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to deny Spisak’s Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the Sixth Circuit contravene the directives of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006), when it applied Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), to resolve in a habeas petitioner's favor questions that were not decided or addressed in Mills?
  2. Did the Sixth Circuit exceed its authority under AEDPA when it applied United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), to presume that a habeas petitioner suffered prejudice from several allegedly deficient statements made by his trial counsel during closing argument instead of deferring to the Ohio Supreme Court's reasonable rejection of the claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

In 1983, Frank Spisak (“Spisak”) was convicted of murdering a minister and three students in a racially and homophobically motivated shooting spree at Cleveland State University and was sentenced to death. See Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume and Professor Faust Rossi for their insights on this case. John Blume is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and the Director of the Cornell Death Penalty Project. Faust Rossi is the Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques at Cornell University and a co-author of the Brief of Amici Curiae Steven Lubet, et al., in support of Respondent.

Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Criminal Procedure

·      Capital Punishment in Context: Juror’s Understandings and Misunderstandings

·      Charles Doyle, Federation of American Scientists: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (Jun. 3, 1996)

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Smith v. United States

Issues

Must a criminal defendant be acquitted of a charge when the trial venue for that charge was improper?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the appropriate remedy for prosecuting a criminal defendant in an improper venue—specifically, whether the defendant must be acquitted. Smith argues that a determination of improper venue must be treated as an acquittal that bars the re-prosecution of the same defendant for the same offense. The United States responds that venue determinations are not questions of factual innocence or guilt and are therefore properly remedied by retrial. This case has significant implications for upholding the constitutional right of criminal defendants to be tried in a proper venue and preventing prosecutorial misconduct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the proper remedy for the government’s failure to prove venue is an acquittal barring re-prosecution of the offense, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 5th and 8th Circuits have held, or whether instead the government may re-try the defendant for the same offense in a different venue, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th, 10th and 11th Circuits have held.

Petitioner Timothy Smith is a software engineer and avid fisherman. United States v. Smith at 1238. While living in Alabama, Smith used his computer skills to obtain data from the website of a business called StrikeLines without paying for them.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

 

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Southern Union Co. v. United States

Issues

When the court imposes a criminal fine, do the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) apply, requiring that the jury find all issues of fact necessary to determine the amount of the fine?

 

In 2004, local youths broke into a Southern Union storage center that was improperly storing mercury; the incident resulted in a spill and cleanup effort. Southern Union was charged with storing hazardous waste without a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. After a jury found Southern Union guilty, the district court judge determined that the violation had continued for 762 days and imposed a fine of $38 million. On appeal, Southern Union argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi required that the jury determine the period of the violation, not the judge. Southern Union contends that if the determination of the period of violation is left to the judge, the court could impose a fine in excess of the actual violation, violating Southern Union’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In contrast, the United States asserts that Apprendi is not applicable because it dealt with deprivations of life and liberty interests, not the criminal fines that are at issue here. The decision in this case has implications for consistent treatment of defendants and the efficiency of courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles that this Court established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, apply to the imposition of criminal fines.

Southern Union Company (“Southern Union”), a distributor of natural gas, acquired an old gas manufacturing plant in Rhode Island (“the Tidewater property”) as part of its new operations in Massachusetts and Rhode Island in 2000. See United States v.

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Sykes v. United States

Issues

Whether fleeing from a law enforcement officer in a vehicle is similar both in kind and in the degree of risk posed as the Armed Career Criminal Act's specifically enumerated felonies of burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives.

 

Faced with a prison sentence of more than fifteen years for committing three “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), Marcus Sykes is challenging the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that his conviction under Indiana law for fleeing from law enforcement officers in a vehicle constitutes a “violent felony.” Sykes argues that classifying his offense as a “violent felony” presumes that there is violence associated with flight from police. According to Sykes, such speculation by the courts may undermine the Sixth Amendment rights of individuals faced with a mandatory sentence enhancement and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling that other offenses with a similar propensity for violence are not “violent felonies.” However, the United States contends that fleeing from police in a vehicle is both violent in nature and in practice, as it poses a risk of serious harm to law enforcement officers and members of the public. In light of this danger of violence, the United States believes that the Seventh Circuit properly treated vehicular flight as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Supreme Court’s decision would help resolve the disagreement between the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuit over this issue.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether using a vehicle while knowingly or intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement officer after being ordered to stop constitutes a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

In 2008, police observed Marcus Sykes toss aside a gun after aborting his attempt to rob two individuals outside a liquor store in Indianapolis, Indiana. See United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 335 (7th Cir. 2010). Police arrested Sykes for brandishing a gun, and Sykes subsequently pleaded guilty on July 22, 2008 to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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Additional Resources

· Life Sentences Blog, Michael O’Hear: Rethinking the Categorical Approach to the ACCA (Jan. 4, 2011)

· Wisconsin Law Journal Staff: High Court Accepts Five Criminal Cases (Oct. 1, 2010)

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Thornell v. Jones

Issues

When considering a state court’s analysis of prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington (1984), when must a federal habeas court defer to factual and credibility findings of the district court and consider non-statutory aggravating evidence––including attacks on the mitigation case put on by the prisoner––in determining whether counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced the prisoner?

This case asks whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit improperly overruled a district court when granting a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim on habeas review. The IAC claim arose in an Arizona capital murder case in which Respondent Danny Lee Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure psychology and neurology professionals in support of mitigating evidence relating to Jones’s mental health. Petitioner Ryan Thornell, the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to accord proper deference to the district court’s fact-finding as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Arizona’s state sentencing laws as well as improperly weighed aggravating factors in Jones’s case. Jones rejects these claims, arguing that the Ninth Circuit properly adjudicated his claim with respect to both law and fact. This case has significant implications with respect to the proper standard of deference between appellate courts and district courts and raises concerns about finality and state sovereignty in enforcement of criminal statutes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit violated this court’s precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing prejudice under Strickland v. Washington when it disregarded the district court’s factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the state’s rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief.

On March 26, 1992, in Bullhead City, Arizona, Danny Lee Jones and his friend Robert Weaver spent the day in Weaver’s garage consuming alcohol and using crystal methamphetamine. Jones v. Ryan at 1009. At some point, Jones and Weaver fought, which concluded when Jones struck Weaver multiple times in the head with a bat, killing Weaver. Id. Jones proceeded to enter Weaver’s house, strike Weaver’s grandmother in the head with the bat, and kill Weaver’s seven-year-old daughter.

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Turner v. Rogers

Issues

1. Does an indigent defendant have the right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that could result in incarceration?

2. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision that such a defendant does not have a right to appointed counsel?

 

By the beginning of 2008, Michael Turner was six thousand dollars behind in his child support payments. A South Carolina family court eventually ordered Turner to appear to explain his failure to make any payments for the past year and a half. Turner alleged his personal and physical problems rendered him unable to pay. The family court imposed civil contempt sanctions as a result of Turner’s failure to comply with the earlier court order to pay child support. Turner appealed his twelve-month sentence, arguing that because there was a possibility that he would face imprisonment, the court should have provided him with counsel. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely determine whether indigent defendants in civil cases are entitled to representation where there is a possibility of incarceration, although the Court could possibly determine that it does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Supreme Court of South Carolina erred in holding—in conflict with twenty-two federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort—that an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that results in his incarceration.

2. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina

In January 2008, a South Carolina family court ordered Petitioner Michael Turner to appear in court to explain his failure to pay six thousand dollars in child support. See Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470, 471 (S.C.

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Additional Resources

· Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Elizabeth Patterson: Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: the Silent Return of Debtor's Prison

· Findlaw: Civil Contempt of Court

· Department of Health and Human Services: Handbook on Child Support Enforcement

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United States v. Bryant

Issues

Can the Government constitutionally rely on tribal court convictions that fail to satisfy the Sixth Amendment for purposes of proving the predicate offense requirement under 18 U.S.C. 117(a)?

 

This case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine whether the United States Government ("Government") can use uncounseled tribal court convictions to satisfy the predicate offense requirement outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). Section 117(a) is a domestic assault statute under which the Government may prosecute a person who has committed sexual assault within the U.S. or Indian country and who has already been twice convicted in State, Federal, or Indian court, of assault against a spouse or intimate partner. The Government argues that it may use Bryant’s prior convictions in his § 117 prosecution because the convictions did not violate the U.S. Constitution but were instead obtained on tribal lands where the Constitution is inapplicable. The Government further argues that using the convictions would not violate due process because the statute passes the rational-basis standard of review and is consistent with the principles of comity. Bryant counters, arguing that the Court’s precedent establishes a bright-line rule that invalidates convictions obtained in a manner that violates the Constitution, including Bryant’s convictions here, and that the Government’s reading of Court precedent is overly broad. Bryant further contends that allowing these convictions would lead to either admittance of an abundance of suspect convictions or a complex process requiring courts to determine the validity of each conviction. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will significantly impact the validity of tribal court judgments for purposes of predicate-offense crimes as well as the ability of prosecutors to prevent domestic abuse crimes in Indian Country.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 117(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a federal crime for any person to “commit[] a domestic assault within the special maritime and terri-torial jurisdiction of the United States or Indian coun-try” if the person “has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings for” enumerated domestic-violence offenses. 18 U.S.C. 117(a) (Supp. II 2014). The question presented is:

Does the reliance on valid, uncounseled tribal-court misdemeanor convictions to prove Section 117(a)’s predicate-offense element violate the Constitution?

In 2011, Michael Bryant, Jr. was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 117(a), which involves the offense of domestic assault by a habitual offender. See United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673–74 (9th Cir. 2014); 18 U.S.C.

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United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez

Issues

Should proving the Sixth Amendment right to proceed with the counsel of choice depend on whether the deprivation of that right also resulted in compromising a defendant’s right to a fair trial?

 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States constitution provides:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”  In Cuauhtémoc Gonzalez-Lopez’s criminal trial, the district court refused to allow Gonzalez-Lopez to hire the attorney of his choice.  On review, the Eighth Circuit held that this denial violated Gonzalez-Lopez’s Sixth Amendment right to proceed with the counsel of his choice. Gonzalez-Lopez argues that the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right should stand. The government argues that the Eighth Circuit’s ruling conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ‘right to counsel’ decisions, which hold that a criminal defendant cannot obtain reversal of his conviction unless he establishes that an alleged error implicating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel compromised his right to a fair trial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court's denial of a criminal defendant's qualified right to be represented by counsel of choice requires automatic reversal of his conviction?

On January 7, 2003, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Missouri charged Gonzalez-Lopez with conspiring to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. Petition for cert at 3.  Gonzalez-Lopez’s family hired Texas attorney John Fahle to represent Gonzalez-Lopez. Id.

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United States v. Haymond

Issues

Does 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which imposes mandatory sentencing for violations of supervised release conditions, deny criminal defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of the sentencing requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (“Section 3583(k)”), which imposes a mandatory resentencing requirement for individuals who violate a condition of their supervised release. Specifically, the Court will consider whether Section 3583(k) denies criminal defendants their right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. The United States argues that the mandatory sentencing is constitutional because the jury right only applies to the imposition of a sentence, while Section 3583(k) merely administers a sentence that had already been imposed. Haymond contends that Section 3583(k) imposes a new sentence for the conduct found to be a violation of the conditions of supervised release. This outcome in this case may have a meaningful impact on the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment and influence how courts determine which punishment to impose after a defendant violates conditions of probation or parole.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in holding “unconstitutional and unenforceable” the portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) that required the district court to revoke the respondent’s 10-year term of supervised release, and to impose five years of reimprisonment, following its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child pornography.

After trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma in 2010, a jury convicted Andre Ralph Haymond of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).

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