Sixth Amendment

Padilla v. Kentucky

Issues

  1. Is a defense attorney required to research and advise a defendant about the possible immigration consequences that may result from entering a guilty plea?
  2. If a defense attorney affirmatively misadvises the defendant of the possible immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea, can the defendant later claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel?

 

In 2002, Jose Padilla (“Padilla”; not the terrorism detainee), a Legal Permanent Resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to a Kentucky drug trafficking offense. Padilla claims he pled guilty in reliance on his defense counsel’s advice that he did not have to worry about deportation as a consequence of his plea. In fact, under federal law, drug trafficking is a deportable offense. Padilla claims that under the Sixth Amendment, he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to advise him as to the possible immigration consequences of his plea, and in fact misadvised him. The Commonwealth of Kentucky contends that Padilla was not denied effective assistance of counsel, because the Sixth Amendment does not require that defense counsel advise clients of collateral consequences, and immigration consequences are collateral consequences of guilty pleas. The outcome of this case will affect the duty a defense counsel has to a non-citizen client when advising a client regarding a guilty plea and the rights of a non-citizen to claim ineffective assistance of counsel when not advised or misadvised of immigration consequences.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the mandatory deportation consequences that stem from a plea to trafficking in marijuana, an "aggravated felony" under the INA, is a "collateral consequence" of a criminal conviction which relieves counsel from any affirmative duty to investigate and advise; and
  2. Assuming immigration consequences are "collateral,” whether counsel's gross misadvice as to the collateral consequence of deportation can constitute a ground for setting aside a guilty plea which was induced by that faulty advice.

Petitioner, Jose Padilla (“Padilla”), is a native of Honduras and a Legal Permanent Resident of the United States. See Padilla v.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

·      Annotated U.S. Constitution: Sixth Amendment: Right to Counsel

·      Wex: Law about Immigration Law

·      FindLaw: Deportation

Submit for publication
0

Peña Rodriguez v. Colorado

Issues

Does a rule that prohibits using evidence of a juror’s racial bias violate the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury?

After being convicted of unlawful sexual contact and harassment, Miguel Angel Peña Rodriguez obtained juror affidavits stating that, during jury deliberations, one juror made several racially-charged comments that evidenced a personal bias against Hispanics. The court denied Peña Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial and held that the affidavits were inadmissible under Colorado’s “no impeachment” rule, Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b). Peña Rodriguez claims that allowing the no-impeachment rule to ban evidence of racial bias violates his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The State of Colorado contends that Rule 606(b) is constitutional because other procedures adequately protect Peña Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine the reach of Tanner v. United States and Warger v. Shauers, and could have significant consequences on monitoring the effects of racial bias throughout the trial process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a no-impeachment rule constitutionally bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury?

Miguel Angel Peña Rodriguez worked as a horse keeper at a horse-racing track. See Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 2015 CO 31, ¶3 (2015); Brief for Respondent, State of Colorado at 4.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Premo v. Moore

Issues

1. Should the Fulminante standard apply to a federal habeas corpus claim where there is no trial record available for review?

2. Did Moore sustain his burden of proof by showing his attorney's alleged ineffective assistance prejudiced him?

 

The police brought in Respondent Randy Moore for questioning in connection with the kidnapping and murder of Kenneth Rogers. Moore requested legal counsel and was told that he was not entitled to counsel unless he could afford it. Moore ultimately confessed to accidentally killing Rogers and was then appointed legal counsel. On counsel’s advice, Moore pled no contest to felony-murder and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. After Oregon state courts denied Moore’s petition for post-conviction relief, Moore petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, asserting that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney had failed to move to suppress his confession. The federal district court denied his petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the failure of Moore’s counsel to seek suppression of Moore’s confession was unreasonable and highly prejudicial. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Oregon argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the correct standard in granting habeas relief and that Moore did not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his confession. This decision will ultimately impact when and how often defendants and states pursue plea agreements, the finality of those agreements once made, as well as the deference federal courts accord to decisions of state criminal courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. This Court established in Hill v. Lockhart the standard for assessing, in a collateral challenge to a conviction that was based on a guilty or no-contest plea, whether an attorney's deficient performance requires reversal of a conviction. In Arizona v. Fulminante--a direct appellate review case--this Court reviewed all the evidence presented at trial and held that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession at the trial was not harmless.

a. If a collateral challenge is based on a defense attorney's decision not to move to suppress a confession prior to a guilty or no contest plea, does the Fulminante standard apply, even though no record of a trial is available for review?

b. Even if the Fulminante standard applies in that context, is it "clearly established Federal law" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)?

2. In Moore's underlying criminal case, he confessed to police that he personally shot the victim. He also confessed to two other people, and he ultimately pleaded no contest to murder. In his collateral challenge to his conviction, he alleged that his attorney should have moved to suppress the confession to police, but he offered no evidence that he would have insisted on going to trial had counsel done so. Did the Ninth Circuit err by granting federal habeas relief on Moore's ineffective-assistance of- counsel claim?

Respondent Randy Moore and two other men were allegedly involved in the assault, kidnapping, and murder of Kenneth Rogers. See Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092, 1095, 1097 (9th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

· LII: Sixth Amendment

· CRS Annotated Constitution: Sixth Amendment: Assistance of Counsel

· Wex: Criminal Procedure

Submit for publication
0

Ramos v. Louisiana

Issues

Does the U.S. Constitution require a unanimous jury verdict to convict a state criminal defendant?

This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in Apodaca v. Oregon, where the Court held that states could permit non-unanimous jury verdicts to convict criminal defendants. In July 2016, Evangelisto Ramos was found guilty of second-degree murder by a ten to two jury verdict. Ramos contends that a non-unanimous jury conviction violates the Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury trial, and therefore, the Court should overrule Apodaca. Louisiana counters that, under Apodaca, states are not constitutionally required to mandate unanimous jury verdicts because the Sixth Amendment imposes that requirement only on the federal government. The outcome of this case has important implications for criminal procedure and the participation of minority citizens in jury deliberation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the 14th Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict.

On November 26, 2014, while inspecting blighted areas in New Orleans, a code enforcement officer discovered the dead body of a woman, later identified as Trinece Fedison, inside a trash can in an alley. Louisiana v. Ramos at 2. New Orleans homicide detectives investigated and learned that Trinece’s nephew, Jerome Fedison, had information on a possible suspect.

Written by

Edited by

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Blume, Johnson, Rana, and Weyble for their guidance and insight into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

right to confront witness

Overview

The Sixth Amendment provides that a person accused of a crime has the right to confront a witness against him or her in a criminal action.  This includes the right to be present at the trial (which is guaranteed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 43).

Taxonomy upgrade extras

right to counsel

Overview

The right to counsel refers to the right of a criminal defendant to have a lawyer assist in his defense, even if he cannot afford to pay for an attorney. The Sixth Amendment gives defendants the right to counsel in federal prosecutions.

Rivera v. Illinois

Issues

Whether a court's decision in wrongfully denying a peremptory challenge requires an automatic reversal of the related conviction.

 

This case concerns the effect of an erroneous denial of a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge to a prospective juror who was later seated. Defendant Rivera exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude Ms. Gomez, who worked administratively in a hospital known for treating gunshot victims. The trial judge denied the peremptory challenge, claiming a Batson violation. Ms. Gomez was seated on the jury, which then convicted Rivera of first degree murder in a gang related shooting. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the judge committed harmless-error in denying this peremptory challenge. Upon appeal before the Supreme Court, Rivera argues that the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge necessitates automatic reversal "because it undermines the trial structure for preserving the constitutional right to due process and an impartial jury." The State of Illinois, on the other hand, argues that there has been no constitutional violation, and that state law should determine the effect of an erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge on the verdict.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the erroneous denial of a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge that resulted in the challenged juror being seated require automatic reversal of a conviction because it undermines the trial structure for preserving the constitutional right to due process and an impartial jury?

In 1998, sixteen-year old Marcus Lee was fatally shot. See Brief for Respondent, Illinois at 1.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Rothgery v. Gillespie County, TX

Issues

Does an arrested person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach at a hearing before a magistrate judge, although no formal charges have been filed against the arrestee and no prosecutor was involved in the arrest or hearing?

 

On July 15, 2002, Walter Allen Rothgery was arrested without warrant and appeared before a local magistrate as required by Texas law. Following his release on bond, Rothgery made several written requests for appointed counsel to Gillespie County officials, but county officials failed to appoint defense counsel until after a grand jury indicted Rothgery six months later. Rothgery sued Gillespie County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the County's failure to grant his request until after indictment violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rothgery contended that his initial appearance before the magistrate constituted the commencement of "adversary judicial proceedings," which triggers an accused person's Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel under U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Gillespie County supports the Fifth Circuit's holding that Rothgery's right to counsel did not attach until after Rothgery's indictment because, until that time, the state had not committed itself to prosecute Rothgery. The decision in this case will determine when the right to counsel vests, and will impact the administration of criminal proceedings and law enforcement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when "adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). This Court has held that when a defendant is arrested, "arraigned on [an arrest] warrant before a judge," and "committed by the court to confinement," "[t]here can be no doubt . . . that judicial proceedings ha[ve] been initiated." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977).

In this case, petitioner was arrested and brought before a magistrate judge who informed petitioner of the accusation against him, found probable cause that he had committed the offense based on a police officer's sworn affidavit, and committed him to jail pending trial or the posting of bail. The question presented is whether the Fifth Circuit correctly held-in a decision that conflicts with those of other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort-that adversary judicial proceedings nevertheless had not commenced, and petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights had not attached, because no prosecutor was involved in petitioner's arrest or appearance before the magistrate.

On July 15, 2002, police officers from the Fredericksburg, Texas Police Department arrested Walter Allen Rothgery for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a third-degree felony under Texas law. See Tex.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Shinn v. Ramirez

Issues

Are habeas claimants who raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in federal habeas proceedings despite having failed to raise such a claim at the state court level, as allowed under the Martinez exception, then permitted to develop evidence to support these claims despite 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)’s bar on such federal evidentiary development?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) bars a federal court from allowing habeas petitioners that fall under Martinez’s procedural-default exception to submit evidence beyond the state record in support of their claims. Petitioners David Shinn and Walter Hensley contend that expanding Martinez’s narrow procedural-default exception risks providing a free pass to federal courts that will incentivize forum-shopping, encourage the withholding of evidence, undermine state sovereignty, and contravene the purpose of AEDPA, which is to limit access to federal evidentiary review. Respondents David Martinez Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones respond that barring evidentiary development in federal court places prisoners in an absurd Catch-22 wherein their procedural defaults are excused due to ineffective counsel and yet they are barred from correcting the deficiencies in their state record due to that same counsel’s negligence. This case implicates federalism concerns over the depth of federal review of state criminal and habeas proceedings and the strength of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, particularly for indigent, innocent, and mentally ill defendants.      

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether application of the equitable rule the Supreme Court announced in Martinez v. Ryan renders the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, inapplicable to a federal court’s merits review of a claim for habeas relief.

Barry Lee Jones

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

Submit for publication
0

Smith v. Arizona

Issues

Is the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause violated when a testifying expert uses a nontestifying expert’s notes as the basis for their opinion when a defendant has not subpoenaed the nontestifying expert or otherwise had an opportunity to cross examine them?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State employs an expert who uses another expert’s notes as the basis of their own opinion. Jason Smith argues that the Confrontation Clause forbids the introduction of testimonial statements for their truth from expert witnesses whom a defendant has not had the opportunity to cross-examine, and that the testifying expert’s testimony in his case relied on the nontestifying expert’s testimonial notes and conclusions. Arizona argues that the Confrontation Clause allows experts to testify using facts that are not otherwise admissible when the facts are not submitted for their truth, and that the nontestifying expert’s notes in Smith’s case were not testimonial because they were not created for the purpose of testifying and lacked formality. The outcome of this case has serious implications for defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights and prosecutors’ ability to pursue cases that require forensics.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst’s statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert’s opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.

The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides defendants with the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against [them],” allowing them to challenge the validity of the testimony before a jury.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to Sixth Amendment