Sixth Amendment

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Matthew Descamps was sentenced to 262 months in prison after the Ninth Circuit found that he had committed his third violent felony, in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The contested violent felony was a 1978 conviction for burglary of a California grocery store. Under the California burglary statute, one can be convicted of burglary without an explicit finding that entry into the burgled premises was itself unlawful.  The element of unlawful entry is required under the generic burglary statute described in the ACCA. The Ninth Circuit found the “unlawful entry” element to be necessarily satisfied by the plea bargain agreed to by Descamps, thus subjecting him to the mandatory fifteen-year minimum prison sentence required under the ACCA. How the Supreme Court decides this case will determine how sentencing courts use factual assertions surrounding a prior conviction in situations where a violent crime as defined under the ACCA contains elements absent from the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Ramos v. Louisiana, which held that a criminal defendant charged in state court can only be convicted by a unanimous jury, applies retroactively to cases that were finalized before Ramos was decided. Petitioner Thedrick Edwards was convicted under Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury rule and contends that Ramos recognized an ancient guarantee of criminal procedure that should be given retroactive effect under Teague v. Lane. Alternatively, Edwards asserts that Ramos enunciated a new watershed rule that must be applied retroactively because of the importance of juror unanimity to ensure accurate convictions. In response, Respondent Darrel Vannoy, the Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, argues that Ramos overruled Apodaca v. Oregon and announced a new rule that significantly changes criminal proceedings in states that allowed conviction by nonunanimous juries. Additionally, Vannoy claims that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 independently bars the retroactive application of Ramos. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for individuals seeking retrial for guilty verdicts decided by nonunanimous juries.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to define the contours of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights when subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984’s (“ACCA”) occasions clause in light of the Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States. The ACCA authorizes enhancing a criminal defendant’s sentence when the defendant’s three prior convictions were committed “on occasions different from one another.” Under Wooden, that clause requires determining whether the previous offenses occurred on different occasions or, rather, arose “from a single criminal episode.” Paul Erlinger argues that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prohibit a sentencing judge from making that determination, rather a jury must decide the factual questions necessary under the ACCA beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nick Harper, court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, counters that the Constitution does not require the occasions clause to be decided by a jury because history and Supreme Court precedent authorize legislatures to assign recidivism-related determinations to sentencing judges. The outcome of this case has implications for criminal defendants’ rights at sentencing.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to determine whether the Georgia courts erred in determining that the prosecution’s peremptory challenges were not based on race discrimination. See Brief for Petitioner, Timothy Tyrone Foster at 2–4; Brief for Respondent, Bruce Chatman, Warden, at 1–2. Petitioner Timothy Tyrone Foster contends that he was denied due process and the right to an impartial  jury,  because the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on the basis of race. See Brief for Petitioner at 2–3. Foster argues that the prosecution’s jury selection notes demonstrate intent to exclude black jurors from the jury and that the prosecution’s purported reasons for striking the black prospective jurors are insufficient in light of the corresponding notes. See id. at 27–28. Respondent Bruce Chatman counters that the prosecution established sufficient justification for striking each prospective black juror and that the notes were prepared in anticipation of a Batson challenge. See Brief for Respondent at 1–2. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will provide greater clarity as to what constitutes a violation  under  Batson v. Kentucky.

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In 2000, Brian Michael Gall was involved in a drug ring for approximately 8 months. Five years later, he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The judge sentencing Gall chose to impose a sentence far below the sentence range recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) because of Gall’s exemplary and law-abiding behavior after he left the conspiracy. On appeal, this sentence was held unreasonable because of its great deviation from the sentence range recommended by the Guidelines. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court held that requiring a judge to impose a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range violates the Sixth Amendment, but that a sentence within the Guidelines range can be presumed reasonable. Consequently, though courts are not required to sentence within the Guidelines range, they are expected to consider the range in their sentencing decisions, and it is uncertain how much discretion they have to depart from the range. Gall v. United States will clarify the role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in sentencing decisions and what justification is needed for a departure from the Guidelines sentencing range.

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The Supreme Court will decide the scope and validity of appeal waivers balanced against a defendant’s right to file an appeal. Gilberto Garza, Jr. contends that Roe v. Flores-Ortega supports the proposition that there is a presumption of prejudice when an attorney fails to file an appeal when instructed, even if the defendant previously signed an appeal waiver and underlying plea bargain. The State of Idaho counters that Flores-Ortega does not create a blanket rule that an attorney’s failure to file prejudices a defendant because the defendant already waived their right and risks additional criminal charges in breaching their plea bargain agreement. The outcome of this case will affect States that use appeal waivers to prevent frivolous appeals in order to promote judicial efficiency and will determine whether an appeal waiver completely bars a defendant from seeking an appeal.  

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Petitioner Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated when he was charged with murder ten years after an alleged shooting occurred. Although Gonzalez did not appeal his case to the Texas state court of last resort, he later petitioned for federal habeas review. The district court held that Gonzalez’s petition was time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it was filed more than one year after the period to appeal to the highest Texas state court expired. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability, but did not indicate which underlying constitutional claim was at issue in the certificate of appealability. The parties now disagree on whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s case after issuing the certificate of appealability, and which event starts the one-year clock for federal habeas review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect petitioners’ ability to seek federal habeas review; it will also affect the allocation of judicial resources in reviewing certificates of appealability and federal habeas claims.

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Petitioner Eric Greene was accused of participating in a grocery store robbery that left the storeowner dead. Greene argues that statements made by non-testifying co-defendants improperly implicated him, because the trial court redacted co-defendant statements by replacing references to Greene with blanks or neutral pronouns. While Greene awaited appeal, the Supreme Court decided Gray v. Maryland, which held that obvious redactions of the kind in Greene’s case do not sufficiently protect the accused. Based on this development, Greene petitioned for habeas relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied relief, reasoning that Section 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act does not apply because Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” during Greene’s trial. Greene argues under Teague v. Lane that habeas petitioners benefit from any Supreme Court decision handed down before their convictions become final. Respondent Jon Fisher argues that the phrase “clearly established” precludes re-litigation of issues settled by state courts unless the state’s decision was unreasonable in light of law existing when the decision was handed down. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address the meaning of “clearly established federal law,” posing broad implications for future and ongoing habeas petitions.

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In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, the Supreme Court held that a wife’s out of court statement against her husband could only be admitted as testimonial evidence subject to cross-examination.  The instant case presents a similar question, with the added complication of whether statements made at a crime scene during the investigative stage should be admitted as testimonial or non-testimonial statements. Hershel Hammon’s wife made a statement to police officers responding to a domestic disturbance call—there is no question that such a statement is admissible, but the real issue is whether once admitted the statement is a testimonial statement subject to the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If it is not a testimonial statement within the meaning of Crawford, then the defendant does not have a right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine his wife. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to balance state criminal evidence rules and Sixth Amendment rights. New York’s opening-the-door rule allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence if a party has given an incomplete and misleading impression of the issue. Under this rule, if a criminal defendant “opens the door” to responsive evidence, the defendant also forfeits their right to exclude that evidence on the grounds that it is barred by the Confrontation Clause. Darrell Hemphill contends that New York violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser by ruling that the state’s opening-the-door rule superseded the Confrontation Clause. New York argues that the opening-the-door rule does not infringe on Hemphill’s constitutional rights. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment and the states’ trial procedures.

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