Law 11317 originally sought to protect women in the workforce and end child labor. While most of the law has been repealed and replaced with modern labor standards, a prohibition on women working certain jobs considered to be dangerous or unhealthy, remains. Said prohibition was explicitly brought forward in Article 192 of Law 20744, which itself had repealed and replaced many other provisions of Law 11317.
Law 26844 expands the protections of Law 20744 (which defines the fundamental rules of the employer–employee relationship in Argentine law) to domestic workers. By explicitly applying the regime of Law 20744 where the law is silent, domestic workers are protected from the forms of discrimination to which Law 20744 applies.
Law 20744, the Employment Contract Law, defines the fundamental rules of the employer–employee relationship, including its validity and the rights and obligations of the parties, for any employment contract executed within Argentine territory. The law includes sex as a covered basis for discrimination in the treatment of employees (Article 18) and in the type of employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements available and attached salaries (Article 187).
Articles 699 through 704 of the Civil and Commercial Code define the circumstances that lead to the termination, removal, suspension, or reinstatement of parental responsibility. Parental responsibility naturally terminates at the death of the parent or child, when the child turns 18 or is emancipated, or at the adoption of the child by a third party without prejudice (Article 699).
Does the separation of powers permit statutory removal protections for heads of multimember administrative agencies? If so, do federal courts have the authority to reinstate wrongfully discharged members of such agencies?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether “for-cause” removal protections over members of multimember administrative agencies, like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), violate the separation of powers and, even if they do, whether federal courts have the power to reinstate wrongfully removed officers. President Donald J. Trump claims that the Constitution vests the entire executive power in the president and, therefore, the president must be able to control officers who exercise power on his behalf through the threat of removal. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter argues that removal protections benefit the separation of powers and enable administrative agencies to function as Congress and the founders intended. This case implicates the amount of power that a president may constitutionally exert on agencies and the stability of such agencies, including, potentially, the Federal Reserve, going forward.
(1) Whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey’s Executor v. United States should be overruled.
(2) Whether a federal court may prevent a person’s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law.
Congress established the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) through the FTC Act of 1914. Slaughter v.
When defendants claiming an intellectual disability under Atkins have multiple IQ scores, how, if at all, should courts consider the cumulative effect of the IQ scores?
Respondent Joseph Smith is challenging a death sentence for murder by claiming an intellectual disability under an Alabama state law Atkins-like framework. The first prong of the test requires claimants to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they have an intelligence quotient (“IQ”) score below 70. While Smith has had five IQ tests over 70, one of the tests includes 69 within its 95% confidence interval. Petitioner John Hamm argues that Smith’s higher IQ scores prevent Smith from meeting his burden of proof on this first prong, so Smith cannot use the intellectual disability defense to escape execution. Smith, on the other hand, argues that his scores are borderline and inconclusive, so the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Alabama state law both permit him to use additional evidence to prove his intellectual disability. This case raises questions of victims’ interests in efficient and complete justice, the right to not be subject to cruel and unusual punishment, and states’ rights to develop and enforce their own criminal code, including sentencing preferences.
Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing an Atkins claim.
In Atkins v.
Does Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act create a federal right of action for private entities?
This case asks the Court to determine whether Congress created an implied private right of action under the Investment Company Act (“ICA”) of 1940, by stating in Section 47(b) that a court “may not deny rescission at the instance of any party.” Petitioners argue that Congress did not intend to grant private parties the right to sue, as Congress would have explicitly stated a private right in the ICA had they intended to include one. Additionally, Petitioners argue that the words of the statute themselves do not imply a private right of action. Respondents contend that Congress’s use of “rights-creating language” in the statute demonstrated its intent to create a private right of action and assert that the plain text of the statute does in fact explicitly state this right. This case touches on important questions regarding the separation of powers between federal branches of government and the impact of ICA enforcement on the market.
Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act creates an implied private right of action.
In 1940, Congress enacted the Investment Company Act (“ICA”), along with a number of other pieces of legislation, in response to the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression, in order to regulate securities and prevent a similar economic crisis. Petition f
The authors would like to thank Professor Robert C. Hockett for his insights into this case.
Articles 435 through 445 of the Civil and Commercial Code define the legal dissolution of a marriage. A marriage can be dissolved due to the death of a spouse, because a spouse is missing and presumed dead, or through divorce (Article 435). Any waiver of the right to request divorce is null and void (Article 436). Divorce is only by judicial decree and can be at the request of one or both spouses (Article 437).
Articles 558 through 564 of the Civil and Commercial Code define the methods that establish parentage and describe parentage via medically assisted reproduction. In Argentina, parentage can be established via natural birth, via medically assisted reproduction, or via adoption (Article 558). The government must not label or differentiate birth certificates by parentage method (Article 559).
Law 25673 regulates the National Program on Sexual Health and Responsible Reproduction and guarantees universal, free access to contraceptive methods for the entire population, without discrimination (Article 6). The law also provides for sexual health education and information, promotes women’s participation in decisions regarding their reproductive health, and includes contraceptive coverage in the Mandatory Medical Program (PMO).
