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T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.

Issues

Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibit a plaintiff from challenging a state court judgment in federal court while an appeal in state court is still possible? 

The Supreme Court will decide whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to Petitioner T.M.’s case, wherein T.M. filed a claim in a federal court challenging a state court judgment before the state court judgment’s appeal window closed. T.M. argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to her case because her state court judgment was not final or issued by the state’s highest court. If Rooker-Feldman applies to her case, T.M. asks the court to overturn the doctrine. Respondents, including the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation (“UMMS”), counter that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should bar T.M.’s case because it meets all elements required by the doctrine. UMMS posits that any arguments that ask the Court to overturn Rooker-Feldman are beyond the scope of the question the Court has before it. The outcome of this case will have significant implications for litigation incentives and the relationship between federal and state courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.

The petitioner, whose identity has been anonymized to the initials “T.M.,” experienced a medical episode in 2023. T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation at 3a. T.M.

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Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Issues

Can the SEC pursue equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered financial harm?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a showing of financial harm is necessary for the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to pursue equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7). Ongkaruck Sripetch argues that congressional intent and prior precedent support a showing of pecuniary harm requirement for disgorgement. The SEC counters that Sripetch misapprehends both congressional intent and Liu v. SEC as mandating a showing of pecuniary harm. Instead, the SEC argues that congressional intent and Liu both limit disgorgement to its usage as a form of compensation for unjust enrichment, which does not require a demonstration of financial harm. This case will have significant ramifications for the effectiveness of disgorgement both as an enforcement tool and as a means of compensating victims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm.

Beginning in the 1970s, courts began ordering disgorgement of wrongfully gained profits as an equitable remedy in securities cases. SEC v. Sripetch at 3a–4a.

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Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T

Issues

Do the Communications Act of 1934 provisions that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures violate regulated entities’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial or impinge on federal courts’ Article III authority?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the statutory provisions that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC’s”) assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures violate regulated entities’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial or impinge on federal courts’ Article III authority. AT&T, which was ordered to pay a forfeiture by the FCC for violating consumer privacy rights, claims that the Seventh Amendment and Article III entitle it to a jury trial in federal court before such an order is made. The FCC argues that the current procedures—which provide AT&T with the right to challenge enforcement of a forfeiture in federal district court—preserve AT&T’s right to a jury trial in federal court. This case carries implications for the FCC’s ability to assess monetary penalties for violations of federal telecommunications law. It also has implications for other agencies that follow procedures essentially identical to those the FCC followed here.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Communications Act of 1934 provisions that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures are consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III.

The Communications Act of 1934 (“Act”) established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and introduced comprehensive federal regulation of the radio and telephone industries. 48 Stat.

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Blanche v. Lau

Issues

Does the government need clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime to parole them into the United States when they reenter the country?

This case asks whether the government must show that it had clear and convincing evidence that a Lawful Permanent Resident committed a crime of moral turpitude at the time that the Lawful Permanent Resident was temporarily paroled by the Department of Homeland Security. Petitioner former Attorney General Pamela Bondi argues that the government only needs to present clear and convincing evidence that the Lawful Permanent Resident committed a crime at removal proceedings and not before. Bondi also argues that a court cannot review the discretionary decisions of the Department of Homeland Security. In response, Respondent Muk Choi Lau argues that Lawful Permanent Residents cannot be paroled unless the government can prove the noncitizen committed a crime at the time of their reentry. Lau also asserts that the decision to parole him was a mixed question of law and fact and therefore can be reviewed. The outcome of this case has implications for screening procedures at the border, the rights of noncitizens, and public safety.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, to remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States.
 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) governs how the U.S.

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